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Two comments, CPR-85 and CPR-86, were received on the maps. 
Each is answered in the appropriate section to which the map 
pertains. 
CPR-85 regarding water quality sampling stations is addressed 
in Section 2.1.8.1, Coastal Water Quality. 
CPR-86 concerning the density of bomb impacts is addressed in 
Appendix A, Analysis of Naval Operations on Vieques which 
immediately follows. 
‘ 
APPENDIX A: ANALYSIS OF NAVAL OPERATIONS ON VIEQUES 
Except for a comment regarding Map 39 in Section A.2.1.3.2, 
no comments specifically referring to this section were 
received. Comment USEPA-2, addressed in the Introduction to 
the FEIS and CPR-52, addressed in Section 3 also pertain to 
the level of operations on Vieques. 
Response to comment CPR-86 
CPR-86 
Map 39 depicting the density of impacts of live air-to-ground 
ordnance is contradicted by maps presented by the Navy to the 
District Court, 
Vol. 11-l 
Response: 
The purpose of Map 39 is to show the density of impacts during 
current activities in order to delineate the areas and inten- 
sity of impacts from continued activities. The data for 
plotting the impacts were taken from records of 482 live bombs 
dropped during July and August 1978. On the other hand, the 
purpose of maps referred to in the comment is to show saturated 
impact areas or areas which are dangerous because of the 
possible presence of unexploded ordnance. Unexploded ordnance 
can result from several types of activities (i.e., NGFS, ATG, 
FMFLANT artillery and small arms), not just ATG, and may have 
been used any time in the past, not just the current year. 
Therefore MAP 39 is not misleading or contradictory to other 
Navy maps. Instead it depicts another topic -- the density of 
impacts from live air-to-ground ordnance during the current 
year. 
APPENDIX B: EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE SITES 
Although no comments specifically referring to this section 
were received, responses to USDHEW-1, USDHEW-2, USDHEW-3, 
CPR-82 and SLPR-17 are related to this appendix. These 
comments are addressed in Section 4, Alternatives Analysis. 
APPENDIX C: DETAILED BACKUP MATERIAL DESCRIBING THE NATURAL 
ENVIRONMENT 
No comments; refer to DEIS. 
APPENDIX D: WATER QUALITY STANDARDS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF 
PUERTO RICO 
No comments; refer to DEIS. 
Vol. II-2 
APPENDIX E: PURPOSES AND METHODS OF FIELD INVESTIGATION OF 
CULTURAL SYSTEMS OF VIEQUES 
No comments; refer to DEIS. 
APPENDIX F: NOISE DEFINITIONS AND CRITERIA AND RESULTS OF 
MONITORING PROGRAM 
No comments: refer to DEIS. 
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APPENDIX I ---- 
Comments Received on the DEIS 
This appendix contains all comments received. Comments from the 
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, the U.S. Department 
of Interior, the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Wel- 
fare, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the Commonwealth 
of.Puerto Rico and the Servicios Legales de Puerto Rico are each 
individually addressed in the FEIS. These comments are cross- 
referenced in the table which follows immediately. The reader 
should consult the table to locate the response to a particular 
agency comment in the FEIS and to locate the pages 6f the DEIS 
to which the comment applies. 
Communications reviewed from the Puerto Rico Recreational Devel- 
opment Company, and from.the Department of Public Instruction . 
did not raise issues which required a response. Comments re- 
ceived from individuals were extremely general and presented 
individual opinions about the continued presence of the Navy in 
Vieques. These comments are reproduced but are not cross-refer- 
enced in the table. 
I-i 
COMMENTS 1 
ACHP - 1 
USDOI - 1 
USDOI - 2 
USDOI - 3 
USDOI - 4 
USDOI - 5. 
USDOI -6 
USDOI - 7 
USDOI - 8 
USDHEW - 1 
USDHEW - 2 
USDHEW - 3 
USDHEW - 4 
USDHEW - 5 
USDHEW - 6 
USDHEW - 7 
USDHEW - 8 
USEPA - 1 
USEPA - 2 
USEPA - 3 
USEPA - 4 
USEPA - 5 
USEPA - 6 
USEPA - 7 
USEPA - 8 
CPR - 1 
CPR-2 
CPR -3 
-CPR -4 
CPR-5 
CPR-6 
CPR -7 
. 
TABLE OF COMMENTS BY AGENCY OR GROUP 
SECTION DEIS PAGE FEIS PAGE 
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation 
5.2.3 5-7 
U.S. Department of Interior 
5.2.3 5-7 
2.1.8.2 2-42 
3.1.1 3-3 
2.2.2.1 2-96 
2.2.2.1 .2-97 
2.2.2.1 2-108 
2.2.2.1 2-107 
3.2.2.2 3-38 
5-7 
5-9 
2-10 
3-2 
2-27 
2-27 
2 - 28 
2-29 
3-22 
U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare 
4.1.3.2 4-3 
4.1.3.2 4-3 
4.1.2 4-2 
2.3.2.6 2-270 
3.2.1.3 3-24 
3.3.4 3-80 
3.4.3 3 - 104,105 
3.1.4.2 3-18 
4-7 
4-8 
4-l 
2 - 54 
3 -14 
3-38 :,-Y 
3-41 
3-12 :’ 
U.S. Envirbnmental Protection Agency 
5.2 5 - 3et seq. 
introduction General 
(FEIS only) 
2.1.8.2 4-42 
Introduction General 
(FEIS only) 
2.4.5.2 2 - 292,293 
2.4.5.3 2-393 
2.1.8.1 2-41 
2.4.1.2 2-364 
5-2 
xxi 
2-16 
xxii 
2-85 
2-88 
2-3 
2-76 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico 
2.1.8.1 2-34 
21.8.1 2-41 
2.1.8.1 2-42 
2.1.8.1 2-42 
2.1.8.3 2-43 
2.1.8.1 2 - 33et seq. 
2.1.8.1 2-40 
2-4 
2-5 
2-6 
2-7 
2-17 
2-7 
2-8 
IF”--+--, 
1 Comment designation numbers consisting of an acronym and a number correspond to the labels attached to the 
comments in this Appendix I, They are used to refer to the comments throughout the main’text of this FEIS. 
I- ii 
COMMENTS ’ SECTION DEIS PAGE FEIS PAGE 
CPR-8 
CPR -9 
CPR - 10 
CPR - 11 
CPR - 12 
CPR - 13 
CPR - 14 
CPR - 15 
CPR -16a 
CPR - 16 b 
CPR - 17 
CPR - 18 
CPR - 19 
CPR - 20 
CPR-21 
CPR-22 
CPR - 23 
CPR - 24 
CPR - 25 
CPR - 26 
CPR. - 27 
CPR - 28 
CPR - 29 
CPR - 30 
CPR - 31 
CPR - 32 
CPR - 33 
CPR -34 
CPR - 35 
CPR - 36 
CPR - 37 
CPR - 38 
CPR - 39 
CPR -40 
CPR - 41 
CPR - 42 
CPR - 43 
CPR - 44 
CPR - 45 
CPR - 46 
CPR - 47 
CPR -48 
CPR -49 
CPR - 50 
CPR - 51 
CPR - 52 
CPR -53 
CPR - 54 
I 
2.1.8.1 
2.1.8.2 
2.2.1 .I 
2.2.1 .I 
2.2.1.1 
2.2.1 .I 
2.2.1.1 
2.2.1.1 
2.2.2.1 
2.2.2.1 
2-40 2-9 
2-43 
2 - 47et seq. 
2 - 47et seq. 
2 - 47et seq. 
2 - 47et seq. 
2-79 
2-79 
2-81etseq. 
2-81etseq. 
2,-81etseq. 
2-84 
2 - 84et seq. 
2 - 84et seq. 
2 - 106,107 
2- 116 
2-116 
2-116 
2- 111 
2- llletseq. 
2- 114 
2- 116 
2-117 
2- 131 
2- 131 
2- 133 
2- 17 
2-19 
2-20 
2-21 
2-22 
2-24 
2-26 
2-29 
2-30 
2.2.2.1 
2.2.2.1 
2.2.2.1 
2.2.2.1 
2.2.2.1 
2.2.2.1 
2.2.2.1 
2.2.2.1 
2.2.2.1 
2.2.2.1 
2.2.2.1 
2.2.2.1 
2.2.2.1 
2.2.3.2 
2.2.3.2 
2.2.3.2 
2 - 31 
2-32 
2-33 
2-33 
2-34 
2-35 
2-35 
2-38 
2-39 
2-40 
2-40 
2-41 
2-41 
2-43 
2-44 
2-45 
2.2.3.3 2-144 2-45 
2.2.3.4 2 - 147,152 2-47 
2.2.3.5 2 - 165,166 2-47 
2.2.3.6 2- 167 2-48 
2.2.3.8 2- 173 2-48 
2.2.3.8 2-174 2-49 
2.3.2.8 2-275 2-56 
2.4.4 2 - 382 2-83 
2.4.5.3 2-393 2-88 
2.3.6.4 2-344 2-74 
2.3.6.1 2 - 329 2-67 
2.3.6.1 2 - 330 2-67 
2.3.6.2 2-332 2-67 
2.4.1.3 2 - 365 2-78 
2.4.1.5 2 - 367 2-79 
2.4.3 2-376 2-81 
2.4.5.1 2 - 390 2-85 
2.4.5.2 2 - 392,393 2-86 
2.4.5.3 2-395 2-90 
3 3-l 3-l 
3.1.1 3-3 3-3 
3.1.2.1 3-6 3-4 
I - iii 
COMMENTS 1 SECTION DEIS PAGE FE IS PAGE 
CPR - 55 
CPR - 56 
3.1.2.1 
3.1.4.1 
3-7 
3-13 
3-5 
3-10 
CPR - 57 3.1.4.1 3- 17 3-11 
CPR - 58 3.2.1.1 3-20 3-13 
CPR - 59 3.2.1.3 3-24 2-17 
CPR - 60 3.2.1.4 3-31 3-18 
CPR - 61 3.2.1.5 3-34 3-20 
CPR -62 3.2.2.2 3-37 3-22 
CPR - 63 3.2.2.2 3 - 38 3-22 
CPR - 64 3.2.2.2 3-39 3-23 
CPR - 65 3.2.2.3 3-40 3-24 
CPR - 66 3.2.2.3 3 - 42,43 3-25 
CPR - 67 3.2.3.1 2 - 45et seq. 3-29 
CPR - 68 3.2.3.1 3-48 3-29 
CPR - 69 3.2.3.1 3-51 3-30 
CPR - 70 3.2.3.1 3-53 3-30 
CPR - 71 3.2.3.1 3-54 3-31 
CPR’- 72 3.2.3.1 3-55 3-31 
CPR - 73 3.2.3.4 3-56 3 - 32 
CPR - 74 3.2.3.4 3-57 3-32 
CPR - 75 3.3.2.2 3 - 67,68 3-35 
CPR - 76 3.3.6.1 * 
CPR -77‘ 
3-84 3-39 
3.3.7.1 3 - 93 3-40 
CPR - 78 3.3.7.2 3-95 3 - 40 
CPR - 79 3.4.3 3 - 104,105 3-43 
CPR - 80 3.43 3-106 3-43 
CPR - 87 3.4.5.1 3- 115 3-46 
CPR - 82 4.5 4-52 4-13 
CPR - 83 5.1 5-l 5-l 
CPR - 84 7 7-l 7-1 
CPR - 85 2.1.8.1 2 - 33 2-9 
CPR - 86 Appendix A A - 20 Vol. Ii - 1 
SLPR - 1 
SLPR - 2 
SLPR - 3 
SLPR - 4 
SLPR - 5 
SLPR - 6 
SLPR - 7 
SLPR - 8 
SLPR - 9 
‘Servicios Legaies de Puerto Rico 
Introduction 
(FEIS only) 
3.4.3 
2.2.3.3 
2.3.2.2 
2.3.2.8 
Introduction 
(FEIS only) 
3.1.1 
3.1.2.1 
3.1.3 
General 
3 - 104,105 
2 - 144,145 
2 - 244,245 
2 - 276 
Generai 
3-3 3-4 
3-6 3-8 
3-11 3-9 
xxii 
3 - 43 
3-46 
2-51 
2-65 
. . . 
XXIII 
/--4 
, F--.& / 
I - iv 
COMMENTS’ 
SLPR - 10 3.1.4-l 
SLPR - 11 3.2.1.3 
SLPR - 12 3.2.1.4, 
SLPR - 13 3.2.1.5 
SLPR - 14 2.2.1 .I 
SLPR - 15 3.2.3.4 
SLPR - 16 3.3.3 
SLPR - 17 4.1.3.1 
SECTION DEIS PAGE 
3-18 3-11 
3-24 3-17 
3-26 3-19 
3 - 34 3 - 21 
2 - 76,77 2 - 26 
3-57 3-33 
3-71 3 - 36 
4-3 4-2 
FEIS PAGE 
I-v 
Advisory 
Council On 
Historic 
Preservation 
ACHP 
1522 K Street NW. 
Washingt0nD.C 
2ooo5 
Ifarch 28, 1980 
Commander Atlantic Division 
Naval Facilities Engineering Command 
Norfolk, Virginia 23511 
Dear Sir: 
The Council has reviewed your draft environmental impact' 
statement (DEIS) for continued use of the Atlantic Fleet 
Weapons Training Facility Inner Range, Vieques, Puerto 
Rico, circulated for comment pursuant to Section 102(2)(C) 
of the National Environmental Policy Act. We note that 
the undertaking will affect numerous identified and 
unidentified archeological and historic sites, potentially 
eligible for inclusion in the National Register of Historic 
Places. Circulation of a DEIS, however, does'not fulfill 
your responsibilities under Section 106 of the National 
Historic Preservation Act of 1966 (16 U.S.C. Sec. 470f, 
as amended, 90 Stat. 1320). 
ACHP-1 
Prior to the approval of the expenditure of any Federal 
funds or prior to the granting of any license, permit, or 
other approval for an undertaking, Federal agencies must 
afford the Council an opportunity to comment on the 
effect of the undertaking on properties included in or 
eligible for inclusion in the National Register of Historic 
Places in accordance with the Council's regulations, 
"Protection of Historic and Cultural Properties" (36 CFR 
Part 800) (enclosed). This process most often results in 
a Memorandum of Agreement specifying steps to be taken to 
avoid or mitigate adverse impacts to National Register 
listed or eligible resources. In the case of the Navy"s 
holdings on Vieques, because of the many and diverse 
activities proposed, we suggest that the Navy consider 
the development of a management plan for all the resources 
which may be affected. Such a management plan should be 
developed in consultation with the Puerto Rico State 
Historic Preservation Officer and the Council. We suggest, 
also, that the Navy request the Council's comments on 
their activities in Vieques as a whole, rather than 
requesting comments for each individual action. 
I-l 
ACHP 
2 
Until these requirements of 36 CFR 800 are met, the 
Council considers the DEIS incomplete in its treatment of 
historical, archeological, architectural, and cultural 
resources. You should obtain the Council's substantive 
comments through the process outlined in 36 CFR Sec. 
800.9. These comments should then be incorporated into 
any subsequent documents prepared to meet requirements 
under the-National Environmental Policy Act. Don Klima 
may be contacted at 202-254-3495 for further assistance. 
Sincerely, 
J&x&n E. Tannenbaum 
Chidf, Eastern Division of 
'Project Review 
Enclosure 
I-2 
USDOI 
United States Department of the Interior 
ER-80/77 
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY 
Southeast Region / Suite 1412 + /Atlanta, Ga. 30303 
Richard 8. Russeil Federal Building 
75 Spring Street, S. W. 
March 11, 1980 
Conunander 
:ATTN: Code 20 
Atlantic Division 
Naval Facilities Engineering 
Command 
Norfolk, Virginia 23511 
Dear Sir: 
This is in response to the January 8, 1980, request for the Department 
of the Interior's comments on the draft environmental statement (DES) 
for the Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training Facility, Inner Range, Vieques, 
Puerto Rico. We have reviewed the DES for impacts on recreational, 
cultural (historical and archeological), geological, and fish and wildlife 
resources and find the DES to be generally complete and well written in 
-he following 
i nement of the 
the areas of our departmental programmatic interests. T 
specific connnents are offered as suggestions towards ref 
.DES. 
Historical and Archeol~&~-Qmmmr& --- -------- 
USDOI-1 
Because of the continuing impacts to,potentially significant resources 
throughout the Navy-controlled portions of the island, we urge that the 
cultural resources management program proposed on page V and outlined 
briefly on pages 5-7 and 5-8 of the draft statement be implemented as 
soon as possible in order to comply fully with Executive Order 11593, 
"Protection and Enhancement of the Cultural Environment." We also 
recommend that, in consultation with the Puerto Rico State Historic 
Preservation Officer (SHPO), the Navy work with the Advisory Council on 
Historic Preservation to develop a Programmatic Memorandum of Agreement 
for further identification, evaluation, and treatment of these resources. 
This would assist the Navy in meeting its responsibilities under Section 1 
of the National Historic Preservation Act, as amended, and the implementir 
regulations (36 CFR Part 800). 
USDOI-2 
The DES, pages 2-42 and 2-363, discusses the use and adequacy of ground- 
water resources for the training facility. However, the final -statement 
should more thoroughly assess the potential impacts of the facility on 
I-3 
_ USDOI / f--X ‘6 
ground water. For example, there should be discussion of whether any 
indication of upward or lateral migration of brackish or saline water 
has been noted during the operation of the Navy wells. The possibility 
of effects of the Navy wells on other ground-water users should be 
addressed. The potential for ground-water pollution from the planned 
disposal of sewage effluent by land application should be addressed; for ' 
example, such an assessment should give at least a general concept of 
the amount of area that would be used, the permeability and capacity for 
absorption and adsorption of the soils, the depth to ground water, a 
description of underlying beds which might protect ground water, if any 
exists, and the probable schedule of application, that is, the volume 
per acre per unit of time. If the current disposal into the dry swale 
is monitored or if monitoring is planned for the proposed land application, 
it should be discussed. 
should be exp7ained. 
If no monitoring is considered necessary, this 
USDOI-3 
The statement? pages 3-2 and 3-3, Suggests that craters caused by air- 
to-ground bombing activities are seen as a self-mitigating effect that 
would retain a certain percentage of increased runoff and its sediment 
from reaching nearby lagoons and bays. However, the statement does not 
consider the potential for adverse effects that may result from the 
continued filling of these craters by sediment and subsequent flushing 
by increased runoff from high-intensity tropical storms. Such effects 
may force sediment-laden runoff to reach the lagoons and eventually "---x 
discharge increased sediment loads to the bays. This potential adverse 
effect should be addressed in the final statement. 
Fish and Wildlife Comments ----------a 
us&i-4 
Page 2-96, Table Z-22. The statement incorrectly identifies Anolis 
cuvieri as the Puerto Rican Giant Anole. The common name should be 
changed to Puerto Rican giant green lizard to avoid confusion with the 
endangered giant anole (Anolis roosevelti) of Culebra Island. 
USDOI-5 
Page 2-97, Section 2.2.2-l(2). A question arises as to whether any 
surveys were conducted for nocturnal seabirds. 
could have sufficient habitat for these species. 
It appears that Vieques 
USDOI-G 
Page 2-106, Section 2.2.2.1(4). The Arctic peregrine falcon (Falco 
pereqrinus tundrius) should be added in this section. 
been observed in Vieques within the past 2 years. 
This spz has 
USDOI-7 
Pase 2-107, Section 2.2.2.1(2). Same conmtent as for page 2-96, table 2~22. 
USDOl-8 
Page 3-38, Section 3.2.2.2. The first reference to West Indian Hawk in 
paragraph 2 should be changed to read West Indian nighthawk. Also, this 
species is classified as peripheral by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 
not endangered as stated. 
I-4 
uyot 
As stated in the DES, the Navy has initiated consultation wi,th the 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, in accordance with the Endangered 
Species Act of 1973, as amended. The consultation meetings (are scheduled 
for the near future. While the Service does not anticipate ,that continued 
use of the training facility will cause a degradation in current fish 
and wildlife populations, they prefer not to predict the impacts on 
threatened and endangered species until after the consultation has 
occurred. 
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this statement. 
Sincerely yours, 
YA.2 l 
James H. lee 
Regional Environmental Officer 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE 
PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 
CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL 
ATLANTA. GEORGIA 30333 
USDHEW 
d--F% 
April 11, 1280 
Commander 
Atlantic Division 
Xaval Facilities Engineering Command 
Naval Station 
ilorfolk, Virginia 23511 
Dear Sir: 
Ke have reviewed the Draft Environmental Inpact Statement (EIS) for the 
Continued Use of the Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training Facility Inner Range . . 
on the Island of Vieques, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. We are responding 
on behalf of the Public Health Service and are offering the following comments 
for your consideration. 
In general, we have no major concerns regarding the continued use of the 
Inner Range on Vieques. We recognize that the present use of Vieques is 
essential to the defense of the Nation and-that if no suitable alternative 
location exists for conducting ilavy training activities, its continued use is 
required. 
USDHEW-1 
In land use planning, the highest and 'best use of all lands has to be considered. 
If the best use now exists with the Navy training activities and facilities in 
Vieques, the use of an alternative location would not be necessary- Would 
increased tourism, manufacturing, agriculture, and fishing, as well as the 
satisfactory protection of ecologically sensitive areas and species, result on 
Vieques without the Wavy's presence? If so, and if other viable alternative 
locations for Xavy training activities exist, it may be in the long-range inter- 
est of the Navy to move the training facilities and activities to one or more 
remote and uninhabited islands. Such a move should be considered in view of 
the public controversy and the past suit presented by the Governor of the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico regardin g the presence and impact of the Navy 
activities. 
USDHEW-2 
./--+% 
According to the EIS, Vieques is operationally and environmentally the preferred 
location for Navy training activities and facilities. FJe recognize that a 
number of alternative island locations were evaluated for transferring Navy 
training activities. None of these locations except for the island of Culebra 
and its Cays appear to possess the operational and environmental cmharacteristics 
necessary for an acceptable training location. Since President Nixon decided 
to end Navy training activities on Culebra and its Cays in 1975 and Congress 
authorized $12 million in the Military Construction Authorization Act (FfCAA) of 
1974 to relocate the ship-to-shore and other gunfire and bombing operations from 
the Culebra complex, the final EIS should explain why the Culebra islands are 
even being considered as an alternative at this time. The Final EIS should 
f-? 
. . 
I-6 
USDHEW 
PaSe 2 - Commander 
also discuss if and how the $12 million was used and what agreejdent was 
negotiated between the Secretary of the Navy and the Commonweal,th of Puerto 
Bico to satisfy Section 204(b) of XC&L 
USDHEW-3 
Please explain why only the alternative locations shown in the IXS were 
considered. Are there other alternative island locations (not examined in 
the EIS) that night also be operationally and enviromentally satisfactory 
for Xavy training activities? The Final EIS should address this issue and 
state why other alternatives were not studied. 
USDHEW-4 
AccordinS to the EIS, craters outside the target area are not graded. Both 
beneficial and detricental effects of leavin g the craters undisturbed should 
be addressed. While these craters nay have the advantage of acting as siltatiol 
basins if they lie along drainage courses, they Uay also increase stagnant 
water areas and becoEle potential vector breeding areas. The potential effects 
that such stagnant water areas :Ulight have on both the transmission of diseases 
and control program on the island should be discussed. 
USDHEW-5 
TTxazG.nation of Tables 2-18 and 2-19 of the "tIS reveal a significant change in 
mangrove forests. It is centioned on pages 3-22 and 3-24 that the loss of 
mmgroves is a result of: local modifications affecting tidal flow, loss of 
channel openings, road impact, reduction in freshwater runoff, increased silta- 
tion, and high levels of salinity. We agree that the causes should be investiga 
and appropriate renedial.action should be undertaken. Even though certain 
structural as?d drainage modifications nay have occurred before the Kavy's arrive 
in Vieques, we encourage the Xavy to develop and inplement appropriate rzitigatic 
measures and obtain the necessary permits to iFprove and protect >langrove forest 
on &Javy property. 'Toe potential vector and vectorborne disease problem 
associated with mangrove forests and other wetlands on the island should also 
be addressed. 
USDHEW-6 
iJe understand tLat the %avy leases about 14,2X acres to the Coopertiva Ganaderc 
de Vieques for gazing purposes. T!lis lease arrangement required t-he iupleaen- 
tation of a soil. and water conservation plarr pM.ch was developed by the Soil 
Conservation Service. Secause the requirements of the plan have not been 
satisfactorily implemented, overgazins has resulted in tile degadation of the 
grazing areas and has caused soil erosion to occur. Me su&gest that measures be 
taken to imediately r&tigate these irlpacts and enforce the terns and conditiom 
of the lease contract and the soil a5z! 57ater conservation plan. 
USDHEW-7 
Tile EIS should discuss in inore detail the occurrence an? nature 'of any past 
accidents to island inhalitants and unauthorized personnel as a result of 
Xaval trainin activities. "ile effectiveness of the public notification process 
wIien the Inner ?.anse is to be used, tile surveillance anct patrol 'progran, ad 
the barriers to prevent wauthorized entry and potential accidents should be 
&scribed. 
USDHEW-8 
I'.as tie Departlzent of the Xavy obtainec a ‘JPJXS pemit for the discharge of 
rcunitions into Q7aters of the United States? 
I-7 
- 
USDHEW 
Page 3 - Commander 
!?e appreciate the opportunity to review this Draft EIS. Please send two copies 
of the final document when it becomes available. 
. 
-dYY~~,~ 
e 
rank S. Lisella, Ph.D. 
Chief, Environmental Affairs Group 
Environmental Health Services Division 
Sureau of State Services 
I-8 
,. .-y 
. 
USEPA 
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION.AGENCY 
REGION II 
26 FEDERAL PLAZA 
NEW YORK. NEW YORK 10007 
MAY I 5 1980 
Commander 
Atlantic Division 
Naval Facilities Engineering 
Command 
Naval Station 
Norfolk, VA 23511 
Class. ER-2 
Dear Commander: 
We have reviewed the draft environmental impact statement @IS) issued by your 
office in connection with continued use of Vieques as the Atlantic Fleet Weapons 
Training Facility (Inner Range) ,.and offer the following comments for your 
consideration in preparing a final EIS. 
:L;ISEPA-l- 
The draft EIS is well organized and treats environmental issues in a generally 
. comprehensive fashion. As indicated in the draft EIS, a number of sensitive, 
highly productive ecosystems have been, and are expected to continue to be, im- 
pacted to some degree by combined training exercises on Vieques; of particular 
concern to EPA are coral reefs, seagrass beds and mangrove swamp:s. In view of 
the compelling statement of need presented by the Navy, we consider use of 
effective mitigating measures as the single, most important area of investigatio, 
in the EIS. The draft EIS presents an extensive list of measures having potenti 
for minimizing adverse effects on Vieques. Some of the most promising include 
inland relocation of targets away from reefs , mangroves and seagrass beds, in- 
creased use of non-live or weak ordnance, and flagging of special or unique 
vegetation in mangrove areas. We recommend an intensive investigation to 
identify the most effective and feasible mitigating measures, and request that 
the final EIS include a commitment to implement-the chosen measures according 
to an explicit timetable. 
’ USEPA- 
A subject that, in our opinion, is inadequately treated in the draft EIS is the 
environmental assessment of future training activities at Vieques (reference 
page 3-18). Although we recognize that it may be difficult to project future 
needs with a great deal of confidence, it should be possible to (define the 
probable extent of expanded use and its effects. It is recommended, therefore, 
that the final EIS include a "worst case" analysis of increased use of Vieques, 
projecting the direct environmental effects of increased activities and the 
indirect effects on the adequacy of support facilities, e.g., ammunition storage 
areas, and on infrastructure capacities, e.g., quantity of.potable water, ad- 
equacy of sewage treatment. 
I-9 
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JSEPA-3 
Although the draft EIS discusses the Vieqqes, groundwater regime, it does not 
address the potential for surface waterlgroundwater connections, and the 
potential for contamination of groundwater by explosives or explosives products. 
Draft comments of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico 
L. Harker of Peabody, 
, as forwarded to us by Timothy 
Rivlin, Lambert and Meyers (letter dated April 4, 1980), 
allege that RDX, a component of explosives, 
groundwater supply. 
has been found in the Vieques potable 
We recommend that the final EIS present groundwater data to 
demonstrate the extent of aquifer contamination and assess the long-term im- 
plications. 
JSEPA-4 
The draft Commonwealth comments allege many other inadequacies in.the draft EIS 
and in the techniques used to gather data. We request that all contentions 
concerning environmental quality be addressed in the final EIS. In addition, 
it is alleged that the draft EIS has not mentioned or adequately evaluated im- 
portant information presented by the Commonwealth in the recent litigation 
concerning Navy use of Vieques. One of the prominent features of the National 
Environmental Policy Act is the requirement that an ag,ency "acknowledge and 
consider 
effects"' 
'responsible scientific opinion concerning possible adverse environmental 
even where such opinion is "contrary to the official agency position..." 
Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 149 U.S. App. D.C. 380, 463 F. 2d 
783, 787 (1971). For instance, the draft EIS refers to an environmental questfon- 
naire indicating that only 4.6 percent of responding Vieques residents consider 
their neighborhood noisy. Yet, other,parts of the questionnaire indicate that 
residents are affected by noise, primarily from artillery and aircraft bombardment, 
and secondarily, from aircraft and helicopters. Noise due to Navy activities 
apparently disturbs more residents than does noise from all other sources; dis- 
turbances are characterized to include rattling houses, frightening people and 
disturbing sleep. 
&EPA-5 
, 
Further, existing noise mitigation appears less effective than the draft EIS seems 
to indicate. The existing system to predict sound focusing (1) relies on meteoro- 
logical data from San Juan, not Vieques, (2) gathers data at fixed times of day 
rather than immediately before the start of, and during, Navy activities, (3) uses 
noise overpressure criteria related to physical damage, but not human annoyance or 
activity interference, and (4) involves substantial delay due to the complex flow 
of sound focusing data b*efore a prediction is made. In view of our understanding 
that more effective systems exist (reference Dalgren, Virginia), we encourage the 
Navy to consider upgrading the noise prediction operations on Vieques. 
USEPA- 
:-x 
.----% ; I 
The final EIS should also address the deviations of actual flight paths from the 
idealized paths used to generate noise contours. Flight control systems that 
would prevent aircraft from flying near populated areas should be evaluated for 
use on Vieques. 
USEPA- 
The 31 July 1978 report by Ming G. Lai on water and soil explosion products 
presents useful data. We are concerned, however, about the undefined use of the 
term '!maximum permissable concentration" 
following the last military exercise. 
and about the one-week delay in sampling 
Although it is recognized that safety 
considerations mandate a reasonable time for detonation of unexploded ordnance, 
massive dilution by seawater of the measured chemical contaminants brings into 
question the usefulness of the data. i-2, 
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USEPA- 
in order to permit drafting of a permit pursuant to section 402 of the Clean 
Water Act, it is requested that the Navy present its requirements for on-site 
inspections by EPA and the Puerto Rico Environmental Quality Board. In addition 
it is requested that the following data for each sewage treatment plant be 
presented: size, type, age and efficiency. The final EIS should also include 
a schedule for the proposed modification to a land application system, and an 
assessment of the anticipated effects on the quality of surface and ground 
waters. 
In view of these concerns and in accordance with EPA procedures, we have rated 
the draft EIS ER-2, indicating our environmental reservations (ER) and our 
request for additional information (2). 
. 
We appreciate the cooperation afforded EPA by members of your staff, particular1 
Messrs. Brandon and Goodwin, and urge continued interagency liaison. .It is 
requested that EPA be given an opportunity to review the Navy's responses to the 
issues discussed in this letter before preparation of a final EIS. Charles 
Zafonte of my staff may be contacted at (212) 264-0592 to coordinate this 
informal review. 
Sincerely yours, 
Anne Norton Miller, Director 
Office of Federal Activities 
COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO 
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR 
CPR 
May 9, 1980 
Commander Atlantic Division 
Naval Facilities angineering Command 
Naval Station 
Norfolk, Virginia 23 511 
Dear Sir:. 
Pursuant to Notice published in the Federal Register (45 Fed. Reg. 3946; 
January 21, 1980), enclosed are the written comments of the Governnrent 
of Puerto Rico regarding the Navy’s Draft Environmental Impact 
Statement relating to the continued use of the Atlantic Fleet Weapons 
Training Facility Inner Range (Vieques). 
Sincerely, 
/&4ifk/dw Cc 
Pedro A. Gelabert 
Chairman 
Department of Natural Resources 
partment of Justic 
:.-, 
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COMMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF PUERTO RICO ON TFIE 
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY'S DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPACT STATEMENT COVERING THE CONTINtjED 
USE OF THE ATLANTIC FLEET WEAPONS 
TRAINING FACILITY INNER RANGE 
(VIEQUES) 
May 15, 1980 
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COMMENTS OF THE GOVERNMEWT OF PUERTO~RICO ON THE Q DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY'S DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL I 
IMPACT STATEMENT COVERING TEE CONTINUED 
USE .OF THE ATLANTIC FLEET WEAPONS 
TRAINING FACILITY INNER RANGE 
(VIEQUES) 
The Navy's analysis in its draft environmental impact state- 
ment ("draft EIS") of the effects on the environment of the con- 
tinued military usage of Vieques seem calculated to leave the 
reader with the erroneous impression that the Navy's bombing, 
shelling and other military operations have little or no adverse ', 
environmental impact on Viegues and are actually beneficial. The 
facts show otherwise. The draft EIS does not comply with the 
NEPA requirement of a systematic and scientific in-depth analysis 
of the impacts of these operations or the requirement of full 
disclosure to the public and the branches of government of such 
impacts. Despite the gaps in relevant information and scientific 
uncertainty, the draft EIS fails 'to present,the required Ifworst 
case" analysis. 40 C.F.R. I 1502.22. Indeed, the document 
presents what amounts to a "best case" analysis. Furthermore, 
its analysis is'based on: 
1. limited field work; 
2. deficient techniques and analyses; 
3. out-of-date information (9. field work that was 
conducted two years ago); and 
4. incorrect assumptions (e.s., the draft EIS predicts 
future environmental effects based on the continuation of 
this same level of military activities, while the stated 
f--x 
,-.: intent of the Navy is to increase its activities at Vieques). 
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The purpose of an environmental impact statement is to help 
the public, decision-makers, and Congress to properly evaluate 
the-potential impact of an activity on the environment. The 
following specific comments are submitted with the concern in 
mind that such an informed evaluation is impossible based on the 
information and conclusions contained in the draft EIS.. 
COMMENTS 
CPR-1 Z-34. 1/ The draft EIS states that the status of the water -m 
quality of Laguna Anones (Station 6) is in noncompliance with the 
water quality standards of Puerto Rico due to "natural conditions.1' 
This information is incorrect since Laguna Anones is filled with 
large craters caused by bombing and is surrounded by many pieces 
of ordnance, both exploded and unexploded. (CRB Prop. Finding 
103j). 2/ 
L/ Refers to page in Vol. I of draft EIS. 
2/ References in these comments to CRB Prop. Finding refer 
50 the Post-Hearing Findings of Fact submitted by plaintiffs 
Carlos Romero-Barcelo, et al. in their suit in Carlor2 Romero -- 
Barcelo, et al. v. Harold Brown, et al., C-A- No, 78-323 (D.P.R.) -- -w 
References to exhibits ('rexh.lr) and testimony (tftr.") are those 
submitted during that proceeding. "CRB Exh." refers to exhibits 
submitted by plaintiffs Carlos Romero-Barcelo, et al. "Def. -m 
Exh." refers to exhibits submitted by defendants Harold Brown, 
et al. -- 
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CPR-2 In addition, in no section of the EIS is there mention of 
the specific chemical composition of the ordnance used, The 
Environmental Quality Board of Puerto Rico (EQB) requires an 
identification of all chemical compounds identified and con- 
trolled under the Water Quality Standards Regulations of Puerto 
Rico and/or that Federal Regulation which defines toxic and 
dangerous substances. Special attention should be given to 
chemical compounds that may become incorporated into waters 
because of different physical and chemical processes, either 
during the process of explosion of the munitions or subsequently, 
by action upon remaining residues of these munitions, through the 
processes of corrosion, solution, dilution, diffusion, etc. 
Special attention should be given to quantifying these 
chemical pollutant substances, and their potential effects upon 
water quality, including any accumulative .effects that could 
:,--a 
occur in the system. 
CPR-3 The Navy must indicate what soil erosion control measures 
will be implemented in the impact areas, so that sediments carried 
by established drainage patterns do not have a direct, grave and 
adverse effect in the lagoons adjacent to the firing area, includ- 
$ 
ing Laguna Anones. Sediment control measures should also be 
devised to avoid sedimentation of nearshore coastal areas, such 
as bays and reefs. 
CP R-4 There should be a discussion of acceptable measures to 
eliminate or minimize the effects of munitions detonation directly 
over coral reefs and seagrass beds in the marine areas adjacent 
to the inner range and firing zones. 
‘f--S, 
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CP R-5 The outlet of treated waters from the sewage 
at Camp Garcia should be sealed until appropriate 
._ 
obtained to operate the plant and use the treated 
irrigation. 
CP R-6 In general, the environmental impact of Navy 
treatment plant 
permits are 
waters for land 
activities in 
Viegues is one that significantly affects water bodies and alters 
existing ecosystems. 
Icacos, Bahia Salinas 
water near the impact 
Especially severely affected are Bahia 
de1 Sur, Laguna Anones, and other bodies of 
area. 
CPR-7 Z-40. The draft EIS admits that the levels of zinc and 
lead around Vieques are not in compliance with water quality 
standards or within the approximate concentrations found in 
natural seawater. However, the draft EIS then fails to do any 
follow-up analysis of this admission. There is no mention of the 
cause of this noncom$liance nor is there any suggestion of how to 
correct the situation. Evidence produced at trial shlowed water 
quality violations for iron levels around Viegues. (:Def. Exh. 24. 
This violation is not ever raised in this draft EIS. 
CP R-8 In addition, the draft's analysis of the presence of metals 
in the water around the island talks in terms of "average concen- 
trations." This study requires not a vague discussion of "average 
concentrations, *I but instead demands a presentation and analysis 
of specific metal level readings. Such disclosure must be made 
so that an accurate evaluation of potential future remedial 
measures can be made. 
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CPR-9 Finally, the Navy has admittedly detected RDX in the drinking 
water of Viegues, but the draft EIS fails to mention this. Also 
the draft EIS indicates that the RDX levels on Viegues are safe. 
The 1978 analysis done by Hoffsommer is inadequate to support any 
F-3 
such conclusion. Review of the relevant toxicology literature 
reveals that analyses in existing general literature is not suf- 
ficient to calculate that RDX at these levels is safe. 
CPR-10 2-47 et seq. Plant cover types used in the draft EIS do 
not correspond to any recognized vegetation classification scheme, 
not even the one used by Rushing et al. in their vegetation 
analysis performed for the Navy. Although lip service is paid to 
the climatic classification scheme of Holdrige (page Z-47), this 
scheme is not used. As applied to.Puerto Rico by Ewe1 and Whitmore 
(1973), it would divide Viegues into two distinct climatic 'zones. 
.- 
We mention this because it would tend to explain the observed 
floristic and structural differences in 
between the eastern and western ends of 
in the EQB (1972) Survey of the Natural 
the upland vegetation 
the island, as detailed 
Resources of Vieques. 
CPR-11 The description&of the vegetation types used is too vague 
and too lacking in data on floristics, structure (canopy height, 
closure, basal area, diversity) to be ecologically meaningful. 
The draft EIS includes fourteen supposed vegetation types (table 
2-16) but does not offer any quantitative criteria that would 
allow us to distinguish some of these types from each other: for 
example, the types called Nmicrophyllous thorn scrub," "mixed low \ 
scrub," *'mixed thron scrub," and "mixed scrub, trees and pastures" 
do not appear to be separable from each other on any quantitative 
criteria at all. 
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CPR-12 There are many errors in the vegetation section of the draft 
EIs that tend to suggest a superficial job by the Navy in studying 
the material at hand. For example, no mention is made of the 
extremely rare Conocarpus mangrove swamps present in the Eastern 
Maneuver area around Laguna Matias and **no-name lagoon,lf although 
these swamps were mentioned by Navy consultant Robin Lewis in his 
report on the mangroves of Viegues. One of these lagoons is 
perilously close to an air-to-ground target. Similarly, the 
presence of the rare species Stahlia monosperma in the margins of 
the alluvial forest near Laguna Yanuel is ,guestioned, although 
this plant was collected by EQB personnel and mentioned in the 
trial in Roy Woodbury's testimony. The dominant tree species in 
the upland forest in Cerro Matias was *%achuelofr (Pictetia aculeata-) 
according to EQB data. A large number of other species were also 
prominent in this forest, which is typical of tropical plant 
formations in having a large number of co-dominant species. The 
*rgumbo-limbo*l (Bursera simaruba) trees noted in the draft EIS 
occur in this forest in relatively smaller numbers, and probably 
appeared more prominent than they really were to the untrained 
eye because of their conspicuous red, peeling bark. Once again, 
this shows the importance of using quantitative data. The tree 
cactus noted as very important in this upland forest was only 
prominent locally, mostly on southeast-facing (drier) .slopes. 
CPR-13 The most serious error in the vegetation section is the 
analysis of ground cover values of different vegetation types. 
Consultants have apparently assumed that only the qround vegeta- 
tion of a forest has cover value (prevents erosion). This leads 
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to the odd conclusion (see Table 2-17, page 2-66 of the draft- 
EIS) that the highest ffcover*f values are afforded by old pastures. 
(The lowest *rcover*f values under this scheme are found in "Beach 
scrub" and Lowland Forest, both of which have rather dense cano- 
pies.) These estimates are totally misleading, since f*cover*' in 
a forest is primarily due to the leafy tree canopy, which first 
breaks the force of the raindrops, and then channels rainfall 
down branches and boles, thus reducing erosion. EQB personnel 
measured cover in Eastern Vieques in both natural and disturbed 
plant communities. We found the following true cover-values 
(leafy canopy plus herb and,shrub layers -- the **ground vegeta- 
tion'* referred to by the Navy's Consultant): 
Bare ground 
Cover % plus litter 
Mixed low scrub 64.5 
(periphery of impact 
3'?.5 
areas) 
Evergreen scrub (pta. 
Este) 
100.0 0 
Upland deciduous 
forest (Cerro Matias) 
81.3 18.7 
Tall thorn forest 
(valley) 
84.6 15.4 
Mangroves (various) 85-90 10-15 
These data were presented in court. It is clear that we 
measured much higher cover values using this method (which, 
incidentally, is the one generally used in ecological studies). 
Note that with this method, impact areas showed cover values only 
one-half or less those of natural ecosystems. We also determined 
that the area of such impacted zones has increased notably between 
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*f-? 1972 and 1978. If it is safe to assume that weapons training 
activity will continue at present or greater rates on eastern 
Viegues, then this increase in ground areas vulnerable to erosion 
will 
CPR-14 
that 
ened 
also continue. 
2-79, Z-80. This is the first mention in this draft EIS 
the survival of mangrove forests in certain areas is threat- 
and that death and deterioriation of the mangroves on Vieques 
has' occurred. Several factors of *'uncertain origin" are desig- 
nated by the draft EIS as responsible for this decline. They 
include high salinity, restriction of tidal flow and/or freshwater 
drainage into the forest. Unbelievably, the EIS stop:s right here 
in its analysis .of stressed and dead mangroves on Viegues. The 
question of what has caused these high salinities, restriction of -- 
tidal flow and fresh water drainage is never even askled, let 
alone answered in a responsible way. 
The failure of the draft EIS to attribute responsibility to 
military operations for the death and destruction of mangrove 
systems on Viegues is misleading in light of the findings reported 
by the Navy's own mangrove expert in his report as well as during 
the trial. The Navy's expert Lewis found that military activi- 
ties on Vieques appear to be responsible for 90.8 percent of the 
stressed areas (49.2 hectares) and 43 percent of the dead areas 
(39 hectares) of mangroves on the island. (Def. Exh 31, pp. 
12-13.) The Navy is aware of the following specific major stresse 
or damaged areas of mangroves under military control on Viegues. 
Yet, the draft EIS is silent about such military responsibility: 
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a. Puerto Ferro. An area of stressed black mangroves 
appears to be associated with a road constructed between Puerto 
Mosquito and Puerto Ferro. (Def. Exh. 31, p. 10.) 
b. Northwest end. The northwest end of Vieques has 
four interconnected mangrove lagoons (Boca Quebrada, Arenas, El 
Pobre and Kiani), which contain some of the most interesting 
mangrove stands on Vieques. (G. Cintron, Tr. 1864.) According 
to Lewis, it originally contained 83 hecta.res of mangroves. 
Lewis testified that currently 29 percent (23.3 hectares) of 
these are severely stressed and 34 percent (27.9 hectares) are 
dead. (Def. Exh. 31, p. 12; see R. Woodbury, Tr. 1546-1547.) 
Gilbert0 Cintron, a leading authority on mangroves, gave the 
opinion that there are almost 90 acres of dead mangroves in the 
northwest area. (G. Cintron, Tr. 1864.) Lewis stated that the 
major problems appear to have been road and tramway construction 
from a pier on the west end and blockage of the natural tidal 
channel to the sea located 600 meters north of Punta Boca Quebrada. 
The EQB previously warned about this blockage. The roadway was 
present prior to 1940 but the tramway construction and blockage 
of the Boca Quebrada sea connection to the ocean appear to have 
occurred after 1941. There is only one small (10 meter wide) 
opening connecting this entire area to the sea. Salinity measure- 
ments from this opening towards the stressed and dead areas show 
a gradual increase (38 percent-59 percent), and a number of 
culverts under the road are either blocked or only partially 
functioning. It appears that hypersaline conditions due to poor 
water exchange has led to the present situation. Lewis warned in 
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1978 that unless *'immediate action is taken, further large sea] 
declines can be expected to occur.*f (Def. Exh. 31, p. 12; CRB 
Exh. 173; Woodbury, Tr. 1546-1547, 1551; Lewis, Tr. 5614.) 
C. Laguna Playa Blanca. This area provides good 
avian habitat. Its vegetation is primarily black mangrove and 
buttonwood on the banks higher up. Although this basin forest 
lies just outside the Inner Bombing Range, it has received a 
'number of **hits If from stray bombs. Lewis gave his opinion that 
this lagoon should, if possible, be protected from additional 
stray ordnance. (Def. Exh. 31, p. 8; G. Cintron, Tr. 1872; 
Dugger, Tr. 1275-1278; Lewis, Tr. 5660-5661, 5644.) 
d.. Bahia Salina de1 Sur. A small area of fringe 
black, white and red mangroves 5-10 meters tall is present alor 
the western shore of Bahia Salina de1 Sur. Bomb craters'are 
present and a recent road has been bulldozed through the back z 
side of the mangroves, isolating a salt basin and some black 
mangroves. (Def. Exh. 31, p-8.) 
e. Bahia de la Chiva. A forest exists behind the 
beach area known as "Blue Beach" where Marines make practice 
amphibious assaults. The beach has widened considerably since 
military use of it started, and the normal drainage outlet and 
tidal channel that originally connected the forest to the sea : 
severely restricted. This is due to (1) a road which crosses 1 
old channel and has very poorly maintained drainage pipes and 1 
the apparent deposition of sand into the channel !by cleanup 
operations after military use of the beach. This causes" insufa 
ficient tidal flow and results in salt-stress by evaporation 0: 
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.he water. The loss of vegetation on the beach also allows 
Ilowing sand to accumulate in the old channel. (Def. Exh. 31, 
lp. 8-9; R. Woodbury, Tr. 1531-1532.) According to Lewis, approxi- 
lately 10 percent of this forest showed signs in 1978 of recent 
leath of large trees (red and black mangroves to 10 meters tall) 
md the remainder shows signs of stress with large black mangroves 
-0-15 meters tal.1 on the higher elevations losing their footing 
tnd falling over. This is apparently due to the lack of tidal 
flushing, which has allowed the highly organic soil to compact, 
ind to dry and oxide with exposure to air. Loss of support for 
zhe shallow root system of the black mangroves then allows them 
:o topple from their own weight. In response to this instability 
lany of the black mangroves have formed adventitious **propf* roots 
similar to'those only normally seen on red mangroves. This 
jattern was seen in several of the stressed mangrove forests 
:e.g., Laguna Puerto Diablo, Laguna Corcho). (Def. Exh. 31, p. 
J- 1 In addition, there were a number of 3-5 meters' wide swaths 
zut through the mangroves from the beach., These were apparently 
:aused by some sort of tracked vehicle--possibly a tank or person- 
lel carrier. (Id- 1 - 
f. Bahia Tapon. Over 40 percent of the original 
nangrove forests surrounding Bahia Tapon was dead as of Summer, 
1978. According to Lewis, approximately four hectares were 
cilled by the impounding of mangroves by the Navy's construction 
>f an elevated sewage disposal pipe that enters the sea west of 
3ahia Tapon. The rest of the mortality is apparently due to- the 
P’“^ -* 
I 
/“-9% 
accumulation of sediment in the back of the forest adjacent to 
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the Navy's main road through Camp Garcia. This. area receives 
drainage from a major portion of the marine base. Salinities a: 
high as 125 parts per thousand were measured, on May 19, 1978 in 
this elevated area. There are no 
ing prolonged salinities above 90 
intermittent rainfall this figure 
reduced to 53 parts per thousand, 
and, no doubt, also more sediment 
Lewis, Tr. 5651.) 
known cases of mangroves survj 
percent. After several days c 
of 125 parts per thousand was 
indicating fresh-water input 
,. (Def. Exh. 31, pp. 9-10; 
Q- Laguna Corcho. Laguna Corcho lies behind "Red 
Beach," another area where practice amphibious landings take 
place. The mangroves of Laguna Corcho are stressed; Comparisol 
of old aerial photographs indicated. a filling and blockage of ff 
drainage/tidal channel that periodically connects the mangroves 
with the sea. This was caused by removal of beach vegetation aI 
beach cleanup operations. Fresh-water flow into the landward 
site of the forest appears to have been restricted by road con- 
struction and altered drainage patterns on Camp Garcia. (Def. 
Exh. 31, p. 10; Lewis, Tr. 5650.) 
h. Laguna Puerto Diablo. The existing forest of ret 
black and white mangroves showed signs of stress in 1978 (dead 
trees, prop roots, and little sign of reproduction). (Def. Exh 
31, p. 7.) This entire area is cut off, from connection with th 
sea by a sand beach and a road presently maintained by the Navy 
At least a portion of that blockage is due to the :Navy road. 
(Def. Exh. 31, p. 7; Lewis, Tr. 5639.) There is also evidence 1 
a large number of hits from stray ordnance in Laguna Puerto Did 
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G. Cintron, Tr. 5639.) The large number of craters there are 
.ery detrimental for wildlife activities. (R. Woodbury, Tr. 1513.) 
t was recommended by Lewis in 1978 that any bombing of Puerto 
)iablo be stopped. (Lewis, Tr. 5660.) 
i. Northcoast No. 5. This is another isolated basin 
trea that is located within the inner range. A road has been 
:onstructed through a portion of the mangrove forest. (Def. Exh. 
rl, p. 7.) 
j. Lacuna Gato and Laguna Anones. These lagoons 
lrovide good seasonal habitat for several species of shorebirds 
md wading birds. Both, however, had, by Summer, 1978, been very 
severely damaged by exploding bombs. Large craters, dead red 
langroves, and damaged black, white, and button mangroves were 
evident. (Def. Exh. 31, p. 7; Dugger, Tr. 1275-1278; G. Cintron, 
Zr. 1872; Lewis, Tr. 5639.) As lon'g as the range is in operation, 
these areas will remain damaged. (Def. Exh. 31, p. 8; Lewis, Tr. 
5644.) Laguna Anones is filled with large craters. The soil in 
-his area is soft and sandy and therefore does not resist blasts 
rery well. (CRB Exhs. 304(5), 305(13); Dugger, Tr. 1267; G. 
lintron, Tr. 1348.) There are many pieces of ordnance, both 
Sxploded and unexploded, in this area. (G. Cintron, Tr. 1362- 
1363 .) Laguna Gato (also known as '*Middle Lagoon"), although not 
iirectly in a target area, is impacted with bombing. There are 
remnants of trees. (CRB Exhs. 305(4), (14), (15), (16); Dugger, 
Cr. 1260-1266.) There were, in 1978, many more craters in these 
TWO lagoons than there had been in 1972. (Lewis, Tr. 1357.) If 
explosions falling on these two lagoons were terminated and a 
I-26 
CPR 
conscious effort at reforestation were made, these lagoons could 
be reforested. In Lewis' opinion, this would be valuable for the 
ecology of these two lagoons. (Lewis, Tr. 5662-5663. ) 
k. Laguna Monte Larqo. Laguna Monte Largo had been 
disturbed by roads, salt-stress, cattle, erosion as of Summer, 
1978. (R. Woodbury, Tr. 1526.) 
1. Other mangrove areas. Other mangrove areas under 
military control showed evidence of damage or stress,; including, 
inter alia, Laguna Algodones (R. Woodbury, Tr. 1528),, Laguna 
Yanuel, which has valuable vegetation including the rare stahlia 
monosperma (Z&M. Exhs. 47(l), 52; G. Cintron, Tr. 1461-1462; R. 
Woodbury, Tr. 1501, 1530); Laguna Playa Grande (G. Cintron, Tr. 
1981); Puerto Mosquito (G. Cintron, Tr. 1985; Lewis, Tr. 5604); 
and Laguna Matias (G. Cintron, Tr. 1388). 
This draft EIS inexplicably fails to inform the reader of 
any of the above listed specific causes of these dangerous man- 
grove conditions. 
CPR-15 In 1978, the Navy's own expert Lewis made certain mandatory 
suggestions critical to the life of the remaining mangrove system: 
These recommendations included: (1) that a detailed topographic 
survey be made of the mangrove forest at Bahia de la Chiva to aid 
in determining the feasibility of constructing protected openings 
for drainage and tidal flow; (2) that a restoration plan be 
prepared to 
the damaged 
possible to 
determine the feasibility of restoration of some of 
areas: (3) that a program be developed as soon as 
reduce overgrazing and prevent large-sca:Le erosion; 
and (4) that a wildlife management program be instituted for the 
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mangrove forest within the inner range. The draft EIS does not 
explain why these measures were not implemented almost two years 
ago. 
f---5 
In conclusion, the treatment in this draft EIS of the impact 
of military activities on mangrove forests is grossly misleading 
and therefore renders the draft EIS useless as an evaluative tool 
fof this issue.. The threat of "factors of uncertain origin" is 
an inaccurate assessment of what the Navy surely knows to be the 
cause of mangrove stress and death. To accuse "high salinityl', 
restricted drainage and restricted tidal flow of being the ulti- 
mate reasons for the problem does not go very far in identifying 
the prime cause and find the ultimate solution. The Navy should 
own up to its own responsibility for this problem and then at 
least follow the advice of its own expert to correct it. 
CPR-16a 2-81 et seq. The draft EiS concludes that present land use -- 
patterns have favored a number of species on Viegues that may be 
threatened or endangered elsewhere within their natural ranges. 
We think that this is an excessively optimistic and misleading 
assessment of the situation., The question of endangered species 
is discussed at length throughout Puerto Rico's Comments. 
CPR-16b The draft EIS (p. 3-57) states that tt... These potential 
impacts can be mitigated by the surveying of the landing beaches 
and the protection of the nests during an exercise . ..'I (emphasis 
added). That will be inadequate to protect turtle nesting beaches 
in the light of the poaching of nests discovered during the site 
inspection by Puerto Rican Government personnel in 1978. Y----Y 
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CPR-17 In the case of the brown pelican, the EIS does not deal 
adequately with the measures to be taken to assure nesting suc- 
cess of this species. Shell casings (presumably derived from 
aircraft on strafing runs) were found in 1978 on Cayo Conejo and 
in adjacent waters. Prohibition of fixed-wing aircraft not on 
ordnance delivery missions will not assure that the birds do not 
suffer from this type of disturbance. 
CPR-18’ We also note that at least one bird species (the local race 
of the Puerto Rican Screech Owl) may have disappeared from the 
Eastern Maneuver Area during the Navy's tenure (Raffaelle in EQB: 
Natural Resources of Viegues, 1972). This tends to refute the 
EIS's contention that areas controlled by the Navy provide 
VsanctuarySf areas for wildlife. 
CPR-19 2-84. The methodology used by the Navy to gauge pelican 
reactions to air-to-ground and naval gunfire support operations 
is inadequate. The EIS states simply that "records were obtained 
in the absence of and during" the above operations. Etowever, the 
work done by the Navy's consultant Schreiber was totally inadequate 
to measure the effect of these operdtions on the pelicans of Cay0 
Conejo. Schreiber spent a total of 45 min*utes observing brown 
pelicans on Cayo Conejo during some bombing and over-flight 
activities. In addition, he viewed pelican behavior on Cayo 
Conejo during one helicopter fly-over. 
It is, therefore, impossible for this draft EIS to make any 
conclusory statements about the future stability of the pelican 
population on Cayo Conejo based on the studies performed to date. 
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CPR-20 2-96. The draft EIS indicates in its chart that not one 
specimen of the four endangered turtle species reportedly nesting 
on Viegues was sighted by Navy experts. Taken in isolation, this 
information would induce the reader to undermine the importance 
of Vieques as habitat for hawksbill, green, leatherback and 
loggerhead turtles. The Navy, however, is very aware that numer- 
ous actual sightings of at least two of the species listed, as 
well as sightings of nesting sites for all four species, have 
been reported. Therefore, the report of no turtles sighted, as 
contained in the draft EIS, is inaccurate. This draft E,IS..has a. 
responsibility to report not lfportionsll of the truth, but all . 
aspects of the truth --and this includes sightings of which they 
are aware by all responsible experts regardless of affiliations. 
The Navy has been cognizant of the existence of these sea 
turtles on and around the easte'rn end of Viegues (i.e. the target 
area). Although this data is missing from the draft EIS, the 
Navy has known that there were numerous sightings of hawksbill 
turtles by expert Tom Carr in the northeastern portion of Viegues 
from west of Isla Yallis to Punta Salinas. (CRB Exh. 207 (Figures 
1 and 2) reproduced in the form of transparent overlays as CRB 
Exh. 342 A, B.) Additional sightings of hawksbill and green 
turtles were made by Carr on the northeast coast of Viegues in 
Bahia Playa Blanca near the tip of Punta Este. On the southeast 
coast'there were sightings of hawksbills by Carr in Bahia Salina 
de1 Sur, near Cayo Conejo, and between Punta E&e and Bahia 
Salina de1 Sur. In addition, Carr located leatherback and hawks- 
bill nesting sites on the northeastern portion of the island. 
Carr's sightings are attached hereto as Appendix A. 
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Tom Weiwandt, another turtle expert, sighted.numerous hawks- 
bill and green turtle as well as turtle beaches. The Navy's 
expert, Bill Rainey reported in 1978 sightings of various leather. 
back and hawksbill nests and nesting beaches. 
More specifically, during a brief inspection period from May 
20 to June 7, 1978, Carr sighted 14 hawksbill turtles on the 
eastern end of Vieques. (CRB Exh. 207.) Weiwandt sighted 15 
hawksbills, including 9 -between the eastern and western friendly 
lines. (Z&M Exh. 64; Weiwandt, Tr. 698-600, 603-604.) Weiwandt 
obtained additional information from fishermen who, between 
mid-July and mid-August 1978 located 32 hawksbill turtles. 
(Weiwandt, Tr. 607.) Even the Navy's expert Rainey identified 
the presence of hawksbill turtles in the water. (Rainey, Tr. 
5191, Def. Exh. 8.) 
Carr reported lb leatherback nesting sites (CRB Exhs. 207 
(Figure 2), 342A.) Weiwandt sighted, or had reported to him, two 
leatherbacks. (Weiwandt, Tr. 607.) The Navy's expert Rainey 
reported nesting leatherbacks and stated that: 
"The numbers of nesting leatherbacks are 
unusual for islands around here . . . the 
number of leatherbackls] nesting on Vieques 
is unusual in that most of the Caribbean 
Islands which have been examined . . . to any 
extent have no persistent nest populations... 
no regular nesting by leatherbacks. 
They have occasional or sporadic nesting. 
So that is a significant population, although 
it is not a resident of Vieques, it makes use 
of Vieques." (Emphasis added.) (Rainey, Tr. 
5191-5192, 5200. ) 
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Carr sighted four green turtles around the eastern end of 
Vieques. (CRB Exhs. 207 (Figure 2), 342A.) Weiwandt's survey in 
July and August 1978 resulted in reports of green turtles, includ- 
ing juvenile green turtles and 6 pairs of mating turtles. (Weiwandt, 
Tr. 607-608, see also Weiwandt, Tr. 611, 657; Z&M Exh. 62-D.) 
The Navy's expert Rainey observed green turtles from his aerial 
survey. (Rainey, Tr. 5178.) 
Weiwandt had one possible sighting of a loggerhead. (Weiwandt, 
Tr. 610; ZS! Exhs. 62-AA, 64.) Rainey testified that any logger- 
heads encountered would represent a significant portion of that 
species in the Caribbean area "because the total numbers for the 
region are quite small.'l (Rainey, Tr. 5233.) 
All of these sightings were made during late May and early 
June, 1978 and are in the area designated by the Navy as being 
lfsaturatedlf with ordnance. (CRB"Exhs. 181, 342.) (Appendix C 
hereto.) Certain of the sightings are in, or border on, areas 
designated by the Navy as "supersaturated" with ordnance. These 
are supersaturated Areas lfA,ff IIBIrr '*C,'l **Etf and rrJfr as they 
appear in Exh. 1, presented by the Navy at an earlier hearing 
held in Puerto Rico on April 10, 1978 (hereinafter April 10, Exh. 
1). (Appendix D hereto.) 
The Navy has also known about the existence of potential sea 
turtle nesting beaches found by Carr on the eastern portion of 
Viegues. (Appendix B hereto.) Seventeen of these beaches are in 
the area designated by the Navy as ffsaturatedfr with ordnance (CRB 
Exhs. 181, 342); an additional 5 are in other areas where the ,“--. ,, i 
Navy conceded that ordnance may also be present. Id. Nine of - 
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these beaches are in, or border on, areas designated by the Navy 
as "supersaturated with ordnance." These are supersaturated 
Areas l*A, II IIB, *I lfc, If 'ID, II IfEll and II J, 11 (April 10, Errh. 1.) 
The Navy's failure to include these sightings raises doubts 
about its objectivity and their ability to properly assess the 
impact of military operations on endangered sea turtles. 
CPR-21 2-106 l The draft EIS makes the specific comment that "The 
large number of endangered species on Vieques seems to indicate 
that the present system of tenure and land use'* of Vieques by the 
Navy "offer habitat and a degree of protection which allows these 
species to reproduce successfully.** The Government of Puerto 
Rico strongly disagrees with this remark. The "land use" of 
f-7 . Vieques by the Navy includes such activities as: 
a. Conducting air-to-ground bombing and strafing 
attacks on the island and in the waters using a variety of Navy 
and Marine Corps jet aircraft and turbojet helicopters. tc= 
Exh. 417, Answer to Interrogatory No. 25; Barr, Tr. 2730, 2788.) 
b. Conducting ship-to-shore bombardment from de- 
stroyers (Naval Gunfire Support, hereinafter "NGFSl*) against the 
island and the shores. (CRB Exh. 417, Answer to Interrogatory 
No. 27; Barr, Tr. 2730.) 
C. Conducting amphibious landings on and over the 
beaches on the southeastern and northeastern portion of Vieques. 
(See Def. Exh. 38.) This operation utilizes landing craft that 
weigh from 60,000 pounds to 8,000 tons, that approach the beaches 
in waves of 5 to 8 and from which tanks, artillery and heavy 
wide-track vehicles disembark into coastal waters and onto the 
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beaches. (Barr, Tr. 2938-42.) High-powered, low-level jet 
aircraft flights also occur along 
within the restricted zone during 
(Barr, Tr. 2893.) 
three south shore beaches 
the amphibious landings. 
d. Firing artillery barrages from Howitzers located 
near the central and the south/central portion of Vieques at the 
western boundary of the Navy's property on the east side of the 
island. (Barr, Tr. 2802-03; Eldred, Tr. 4020.) and 
e. Dropping mines into the coastal waters of Viegues 
and conducts mine-sweeping and anti-submarine operations using 
helicopters. (Barr, Tr. 2912; Kinnear, Tr. 3250-52.) 
There is no question whatsoever that endangered species on 
Vieques and their habitat would be infinitely safer if this 
predominant type of "land user' yere not taking place. Expert 
reports and testimony produced the following information with 
respect to present levels of military activities and their effect 
on endangered species: 
CPR-22 1, Turtles: 
The Navy's miljtary operations are harming and disturbing 
suitable turtle habitat around the eastern end of Viegues. Carr 
testified that: 
"Both in the maneuver and,impact area, and on 
civilian beaches, well-used campsites were 
found on many of the turtle beaches visited. 
Tracks of bulldozers and 4-wheel-drive vehicles 
were found on many of the beaches and the pro- 
files of four major beaches in the maneuver 
and impact area had been severely altered by 
bulldozer. Ordinance [sic] litter and craters 
were found on beaches where turtles were laying 
eggs. ** (CRB Exh. 207, p. 6.) 
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This was confirmed by Weiwandt. (Weiwandt, Tr. 66-g-670, 673-686; 
Z&M Exhs. 62-A (excavation on Purple Beach), 62-B (beach alteratiol 
by bulldozer near Bahia de1 Diablo), 62-C (road construction and 
grazing in Playa Salina de1 Sur), 620CC (craters and .road along 
Playa Salina de1 Sur), 62-D (heavy vehicle tracks on :Red Beach), 
62-E (vehicle tracks from amphibious landing operatio:ns on Beach 
No. '.9), 62-F (bulldozer scraping of Blue Beach), 62-G (cattle on 
beach in Eastern Reserve), 62-H (shrapnel on Beach No. 20), 62-J 
(craters and projectile on Beach No. 21), 62-K (demolition range 
west of Beach No. l-B), 62-L (unexploded projectile at south edge 
of Bay No. 17), .62-M (crater near Beach No. 10). 
Weiwandt identified four major problems arising from the 
current land use practices within eastern Vieques: 
"1. Destruction of marine habitat, especia:Lly 
reefs and grass flats required by resident 
and immigrant turtles for food and/or 
shelter. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Disruption of normal behavior patterns 
through nighttime flaring procedures and 
bombing or shelling along and within bays 
and reefs. 
Beach alteration and inevitable nest dis- 
turbance from bombing and demolition 
operations, bulldozing, other training 
exercises (e-q., foxhole digging and 
amphibious landings), vehicular traffic 
along beaches, and trampling from free- 
ranging cattle. 
Uncontrolled poaching.*' Z&M Exh. 64, 
P- 4.) 
The 
military 
[turtle] 
Navy's witness Rainey also acknowledged that "the 
activities are clearly having negative effects on the 
habitat. Rainey said that the Navy's lfdirectf' modifica- 
tion of sea turtle habitat, such as physically changing the 
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ach, as well as the Navy's failure to prohibit on-going activi- 
es "both potentially serve to reduce carrying capacity for sea 
rtles by reducing suitable habitat and also they may reduce 
cruitment in the case of things like trampling by livestock." 
.ainey, Tr. 5194.) He went on to state that there is "presump- 
ve evidence*' of "military influence U that is reducing recruit- 
:nt. (Rainey, Tr. 5275.) 
The chance for the survival of turtles on Viegues is "very 
.imtf if there is no change in the current conditions on Vieques. 
feiwandt, Tr. 693-694.) If the Navy's military operations are 
.lowed to continue at their present level, the result will be 
reparable harm to the turtles. (Weiwandt, Tr. 714.) Cessation 
: military activities on Viegues would definitely be beneficial 
) the preservation of endangered and threatened turtles on 
.eques. (Weiwandt, Tr. 693.) Even the Navy's expert Rainey 
!commended that it would be desirable to reduce the amount of 
rdnance that falls in the water. (Rainey, Tr. 5288, 5294, 
!96.) He agreed that assuming ordnance does fall into Viegues 
iters, it would be beneficial to use the less destructive dud 
>unds. (Rainey, Tr. 5293.) Indeed, there is evidence of adult 
lrtle mortality specifically caused by the explosion of military 
rdnance in the waters of Vieques. (Montero Rossi, Tr. 2500.) 
lat turtles are physically endangered by ordnance is confirmed 
1 the fact that when the Navy had proposed to set off a bomb on 
reef at Isla Yallis 'on June 7, 1978, Rainey had "suggested that 
lat would pose some risk to turtles in the area." (Rainey, Tr. 
297.) It should be noted that a recommendation put forth by the 
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most recent turtle conference was that critical habitat designation 
be made for these turtle beaches and nesting sites on Vieques. 
CPk23a 2 . Brown pelican: 
Cayo Conejo is near (within one mile of) the impact area for 
the air-to-ground and ship-to-shore target practice and lies 
under the path of low-flying aircraft and NGFS shells. (Def. 
Exh'. 16, p. 5; see also CRB Exhs. 327(l), 3.27(2), 327(3), 327(5); 
Belitsky, Tr. 830-833; Findings 8-15.) The Navy's witness Schreibe 
stated that Cayo Conejo is l*... subject to overflights by military 
aircraft on a . . . frequent basis and bombing and shell-fire 
explosions from those aircraft and ships offshore.l* (Def. Exh. 
16, p-5.) In the words of Schreiber, **Thus, the concern for,the 
welfare of the pelicans nesting in the region." (Id.) Dr. - 
Levins of Harvard and Dr. Livingston of Florida State University 
also testified during the injunction hearing as to their concerns 
about disturbances to the colony from the Navy's military opera- 
tions. (Levins, Tr. 2380-2381; Livingston, Tr. 1218-1219.) 
CPR-23b There is substantial risk to pelicans from dire& hits from 
ordnance. Cayo Conejo has been impacted by ordnance and there 
are bomb craters present. (CRB Exh. 189, pp. 2-3; Def. Exh. 73, 
p. 15.) Navy personnel have indicated **that stray ordnance would 
occasionally strike the island.** (CRB EXh. 401A, p. 70.) In 
'addition, there was eye-witness testimony of a recent direct hit 
on the island. (Santos Velaiques, Tr. 1078-1082.) Belitsky 
testified that there are craters and metal fragments on Cayo 
Cdnejo which indicate that the island has been bombed. (Belitsky, 
Tr. 837, 998.) This concerned him as a wildlife spec:ialist 
because the pelicans in this area evidently are not ground nesters 
and the destruction of the supporting vegetation for next structures 
could have a serious impact on the use of the island for nesting. 
(Belitsky, Tr. 837.) A misshot could either render Cayo Conejo 
unsuitable for nesting by brown pelicans, or kill the pelicans 
using Cay0 Conejo. (Belitsky, Tr. 837, 840.) Schreiber was 
"quite confident 11 that if a 500 pound bomb dropped into the 
center of a pelican colony within 25 yards, it would obviously 
destroy those nests. (Schreiber, Tr. 4902-4903.) He also noted 
that there were several bomb craters on Cayo Conejo. He acknow- 
ledged that bombs can send shrapnel a considerable distance. 
(Schreiber, Tr. 4902-4903.) One investigator who visited Cayo 
Conejo noted seven dead pelicans on the eastern part of the Cayo 
in March 1978. Their bodies were perpendicularly aligned, and 
their heads were pointing westward. Their bodies were approx- 
imately six feet apart laterally. This alignment was, in his 
opinion, unusual. (Cardona, Tr. 1070, 1072.) 
Brown pelicans fly in the areas where aircraft are in opera- 
tion. (Schreiber, Tr. 4899.) This creates a risk of collision 
with airplanes. The result of colliding with an aircraft is 
usually fatal for a bird, (Schreiber, Tr. 4939-4942.) In addition, 
brown pelicans may fly over the target range itself, thereby 
risking being harmed by the effects of explosions. (See Schreiber, 
Tr. 4899,) 
CPR-23c Because Cayo Conejo is very close to the area that is pres- 
ently being used as a target area, it is being impacted by the 
noise from military activities. (Belitsky, Tr. 827.) In 1972, 
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the Navy admitted generally the problem of noise and other militar 
related activities with respect to disrupting nesting and reducing 
resident bird populations at Vieques: 
Brow n pelicans suffer from the noise or physical presence of 
aircraft over the island. Cayo Conejo is in direct line with a 
mock runway target that is used in Vieques. The aircraft that 
approach that target approach from the south at a low altitude 
over this Cayo. These overflights can cause birds to flush from 
the nests or cause aborted testing attempts, in which ;?airs going 
through preliminary 'stages of courtship leave the island and do 
not return to nest, (Belitsky, Tr. 993-994; Schreiber, Tr. 
4863-4864.) 
CPR-23d Brown pelicans have been observed to flush from their nests 
on Cayo Conejo because of ordnance explosions on Viegues. Dr. 
Robert Livingston testified that while he was on an anchored boat 
50 to 80 meters off Cayo Conejo, a bomb went off on Vieques. The 
bomb was an unexploded bomb lying in the range that was set off 
by the Navy. Dr. Livingston was facing Cayo Conejo at the time, 
and when the bomb went off, pelicans immediately flushed. They 
circled for about three to five minutes, and then came down in a 
different place from where they had taken off. Dr. Livingston 
was concerned about this. (Livingston, Tr. 1215-1218.) 
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Pelicans may restrict their mating activities when bombs are' 
exploded near Cayo Conejo. Schreiber stated that the only place 
he has ever observed sexual mounting by brown pelicans was at 
nesting sites. He did not, however, observe any sexual mountings 
during bombing operations on Viegues. (Schreiber, Tr. 4913-4914.) 
Pelicans that might be in the water feeding during bombing 
could be harmed'by the shock waves from the bombs. (Belitsky, 
Tr. 837-838.) Indeed, California brown pelicans are frequently 
killed when there is an explosion while their heads are beneath 
the surface of the water reaching for fish. (CRB Exh. 184, p. 
56; Belitsky, Tr. 879.) 1 
CPR-24 3 . 
The 
manatees 
Manatee: 
Navy's activities on the east end of Vieques are forcing 
away from the eastern end and reducing the range of , 
..'"--% 
manatees. (Belitsky, Tr. 855-856, 863-864, 960, 962-963, 979.) 
The concentrated nature of the Navy's operations on the eastern 
end is unlike the scattered marine and air traffic distributed 
around the entire island of Puerto Rico. (Belitsky, Tr. 863-864.) 
The Navy's bombing and shelling of the eastern end destroys the 
seagrass beds of thalassia and syringodium and therefore destroys 
manatee food. (See also CRB Exh. 328, p. 10.) The Navy's expert 
stated that she believed if manatees use the eastern end, it 
would be desirable for the Navy to avoid hitting seagrass areas 
and also to reduce the percentage of explosives dropped on the 
east end of Viegues. (Magor, Tr. 5136-5137, 5154-5156.) 
Bombing activities, explosions, boat and amphibious assaults 
are harassing and scaring manatees, reducing the range of suitable 
,P -r “1 
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manatee habitat, and placing the manatee in actual physical 
danger. (Belitsky, Tr. 855, 960, 979, 1029-1031.) Generally, 
sounds will disturb manatees. (Magor, Tr. 5129, 5146.) The 
military activities, by harassing the animals around Vieques, a: 
having a major impact 
(Belitsky, Tr, 976,) 
dropped on Vieques in 
on the manatee population of Puerto Rico. 
Because over 1100 tons of ordnance were 
January and February of 1978, Belitsky wa: 
concerned for the welfare of Vieques manatees because of the 
increase in disturbances from bombing and air traffic 'since 
1970-1971. (Belitsky, Tr. 1042.) One of the Navy's witnesses 
(Antonius) sighted a manatee moving in a "determined fashion" 01 
of- an area on the eastern end of Vieques where helicopters were 
dropping buoys from a 150-300 foot altitude. (Magor, Tr. 5152- 
5153.) Airplanes cause specific disturbances to m'anatees. Whel 
an aircraft flies lover the manatee below 1,000 feet, 
animal will stop what it is doing and move away from 
Even when experts do aerial surveys, the circling 'at 
frequently causes animals that are either feeding or 
often the 
the area. 
300-400 fef 
resting to 
move and flee. (Belitsky, Tr. 866, 970-971, 979, 1031.) Shock 
waves transmitted through the water from explosive ordnance 
disturbs manatees. (Belitsky, Tr. 979.). The repo:rt of an inte: 
national advisory committee on marine mannals has (concluded 
specifically: 
"Detonation of explosive material flor 
the purpose of munitions disposal, (gunnery 
practice and seismic testing can cause 
death and, if carried out intensively 
in restricted areas, can change local 
'distribution patterns.!' (Emphasis adde 
(CRB Exh. 328, p. 10,) 
:d. ) 
CPR 
As stated previously, the Navy's manatee expert conceded that 
manatees are quite possibly frightened from the east end of 
Vieques by defendants* activities there. (Magor, Tr. 5128.) She 
also warned that manatees might be in danger if they were in the 
area. (Magor, Tr. 5154.) If manatees did occur on the east end, 
she recommended that it 
support targets'.and all 
bombs or inert ordnance 
would be desirable to move naval gunfire 
air-to-ground activities of dropping 
form the shore area so as not to harass 
manatees. (Magor, Tr. 5134.) 
It is therefore undisputed that all endangered species on 
Vieques would be better off.without the bombing and other related 
military land use activities. 
CPR-25 2-111. The Navy's expert on brown pelicans, Dr. Schreiber, 
conducted a survey which can only be characterized as once-over- 
lightly superficial work. 
Schreiber's remarks during the injunction hearing concerning 
the effect of noise on the brown pelican colony on Cayo Conejo 
revealed an obvious lack of knowledge of Vieques military opera- 
tions. His information on blast overpressures from explosions 
was obtained the day before he testified from a conversation with 
another witness and in the middle of October 1978, after he had 
prepared his report (Def. Exh. 16): (Schreiber, Tr. 4900.) 
Schreiber showed ignorance concerning a number of important 
factors, including the effect of an ALPHA strike, which is a 
major strike that can involve over 100 bombs being dropped within 
the span of a.minute. He had made no evaluation of sound focusing 
of noise energy on Cayo Conejo as a result of blasts on or around 
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the target area. (Schreiber, Tr. 4901.) 
how many amphibious operations were done 
CPR 
Schreiber did not know 
per year, when they are 
usually held, or the direction in which the craft move. (Schreibe 
Tr. 4905.) He knew nothing of "Operation Solid Shield,'* operation 
involving high powered marine jet aircraft flying along the south 
shore beaches, or night operations with the use of flares. 
(Schreiber, Tr. 4906-4907.) He was apparently misled by the Navy 
concerning the pattern of military activities at Cay0 Conejo. 
Indeed, he was told that the pattern of flights that he saw on 
July 22 with respect to bombing runs was the "usual approach 
pattern" with respect to strafing. (Schreiber, Tr. 4880, 4903, 
4962. ) That is not so. The evidence shows that the strafing 
runs over Cayo Conejo are much lower. 
CPR-26 Although this draft EIS was submitted in December, 1979, Dr. 
Schreiber's work was 'finished by the end of the summer of 1978, 
and never updated. The Navy's expert Sorrie stated that a "long 
detailed managerial study of Cayo Conejo with frequent visits 
over a span of a year" is necessary before any "meaningful mana- 
gerial recommendations" can be made. 
CPR-27 2-114. Again, the draft EIS makes the general observation 
that the birds on Vieques have benefitted by the present tenure 
and land use system. .This is quite an overstatement and is 
contrary to common sense. For example, the Navy's expert Sorrie 
indicated that the brown pelicans would be better off without the 
bombing and that Cayo Conejo, since it is an important brown 
pelican colony, should be protected. [See 2-106 above.] 
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CPR-28 2-116. The draft EIS points out that the Navy's policy of 
controlling human access to restricted areas creates a sanctuary 
effect beneficial to bird populations. The Navy is confusing the 
issue of lfcontrolling of accessIt with the way the land is presently 
being used. The land and surrounding waters are the object of 
target practice. [See 2-106, 2-114 above]. Bombing does not 
help birds. This fact has been acknowledged by the Navy in their 
1972 TAMS study. They admitted that an increase of operations on 
Vieques (which has occurred) would result in a proportional 
increase in the destruction of bird life there. They also 
admitted that llreports from guns, explosions or subsonic aircraft 
noise during the primary nesting periods may cause abandonment of 
nests with resultant depletion in bird populations . II (FM .----A 
. 
Exh. 15, p. 
CPR-29 2-117. 
trends with 
populations 
3-98.) [See 2-106 above]. 
The draft EIS concludes its section on population 
the statement If . . . since the future trend for bird 
does not indicate major changes if land use patterns 
are not modified, it may be assumed that terrestrial herpetiles 
and mammal populations will also remain relatively stable.f* 
Puerto Rico questions the basis for this statement on several 
grounds: 
1. Since "land use" includes bombing and a "major change. 
in a population trend" of an endangered species will include the 
loss of just one animal or bird, the likelihood of,such a loss 
due to a misplaced bomb is sufficiently great as to call this 
flstabilityfr projection into question; 
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2. Scattered throughout this draft EIS are contradictory 
statements about future military land use on Vieques. Many 
assumptions in the draft are based on an assumed continuation of 
present levels of bombardment and military activities. However, 
numerous statements are also present that the levels of bombing 
and military activities on Vieques will increase. Therefore, it 
is meaninglesss to discuss future population trends based on 
non-modified land use patterns; 
3. The draft EIS has provided an inadequate evidentiary 
basis for assuming a stable bird population on Viequesi and 
4. The draft EIS does not demonstrate why terrestial 
herpetile and mammal populations have stability patterns similar 
to those of bird populations. 
Therefore, the draft EIS is inadequate with respect to 
population projections. 
CPR30 2-131. The Navy, in the draft EIS, continues to avoid its 
responsibility under NHPA to provide a lfworst case" analysis of 
Naval impacts on seagrasses and benthic communities around Vieques. 
Instead, a "best case" view is presented: "The disruption of the 
seagrass community as a result of previous Naval activities is 
not extensive enough to effect the structure and productivity of 
the benthos inhabiting the grass beds around Vieques." The 
Navy's expert Iver Brook is cited for this contention. However, 
Iver Brook did an inadequate sampling job on Vieques: 
a. Brook's field work was extremely limited. He 
spent only three days of field work in Vieques. (Brook, Tr. 
6698-6699, 6738-6739.) The reason for this limited field work on 
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Vieques was that he had to "get in and out, quick. Much of the 
same way as the other investigators who have worked there.*' 
(Brook, Tr. 6742.) This field work is clear,ly inadequate in 
comparison with the 104 samples he took over a 13-month period in 
Card Sound. (Brook, Tr. 6738-6739.) 
b. Brook's method did not follow the *'Techniques for 
Sampling and Analyzing the Marine Macrobethosf' put out by the 
Environmental Research Laboratory of the Office of Research and 
Development of the United States Environmental Protection Agency 
(March 1978): (Brook, Tr. 6736.) Nor did he determine distribu- 
tion of the species to determine whether they were random, ffclumpedff 
or even. (Brook, Tr. 6745.) Nor did he develop a species area 
cover. (Brook, Tr. 6742.) ;/-?h 
C. Brook acknowledged the severe limitations of his 
study. He said a complete analysis of the benthic fauna at 
various sites around Vieques is not possible from his single 
sampling effort. (Brook, Exh. 96, p. 5.) "We are talking about 
a single sample, and inferences that you could make from a single 
sanrple are very limited, and there is no way you can really talk 
about them in a statistical sense." (Brook, Tr. 6746.) "I am 
comparing the general areas based on a single sample. I can't 
talk about seasonality. I can't talk about a line transect, or I 
have 15 or 20 different things. And when you start to talk about 
coefficience of variation, and the sampling standardization, all 
I am talking about is individuals counted, no more, no less." 
(Brook, Tr. 6738.) He also acknowledged that IfI have no idea 
what the total environment parameters are. I don't even know 
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what the water temperature was or salinity. This is strictly a 
sumey, and no more than that, a survey of the organisms which 
are found in these communities.ff (Brook, Tr. 
Despite the considerable deficiencies of 
testimony confirms the existence of damage to 
ties on Vieques. 
6746.) 
Brook's work, his 
the benthic communi- 
On the southeast coast of Vieques, his survey showed that 
benthic communities become less as one moves toward the target 
areas. At Station South Bay 4, which is in the center of Bahia 
Salinas de1 Sur, he counted 1,314 organisms. Stations South Bay 
2 and South Bay 3 show a dramatic drop to 455 and 261 organisms, 
respectively. .At Station South Bay 1, which is near tihe northeast 
shore of Bahia Salina de1 Sur near Laguna Anones, the number of 
organisms was 252. (Def. Exh. 96, Table 2.) 
On the northeast:coast of Vieques, Station North 13ay 7, 
which is between the long reef off Punta Gato and the fringing 
reef off Punta Gato, showed 667 organisms. However, somewhat 
closer into shore, Station North Bay 6, showed only 246 organ- 
isms. These numbers are in contrast with 1,507 organisms found 
in Station North Bay 8 (Ensenada Honda) and 2,104 organisms in 
Station North Bay 9 (Puerto Negro). (Def. Exh. 96, p. 7; id., - 
Table 2; id., figs. 1, 2; Brook, Tr. 6700-6703.) 
CPR31 In addition, page 2-131 of the draft EIS which analyzes the 
lower species diversity and abundance of fish populations on 
Vieques as compared with St. Croix (an area comparable to Vieques) 
I 
speculates that the difference in fish populations ffw reflect 
the smaller size and lower habitat diversity of the grassbeds and 
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reefs on eastern Viegues in comparison to that on St. Croix.lf 
(emphasis added). The Navy expert from the injunction hearing, 
Dr. Zieman, is cited as the authority for this contention. 
According to testimony at the injunctive hearing, this 
speculative suggestion cannot be attributed to work done by 
Zieman. Zieman's survey on fish populations consisted of throw- 
ing out a net to catch all fish in that area. He did find that 
total numbers'of fish are ffmuch 1oweP in Vieques when compared* 
to similar data from the Virgin Islands, and that species diversi- 
ties are generally lower for samples collected in Vieques grass-: 
beds than those determined for Virgin Island grass communities. 
Since the seagrass beds on Vieques have suffered damage due 
to military operations, the failure to point out the obvious 
potential connections between bombing, damage to seagrasses, and 
lessening of the diversity and 'abundance of fish populations 
renders this draft EIS inadequate and, therefore, unacceptable as 
an environmental assessment. 
CPR-32 2-133. There are serious omissions of important infor- 
mation in the Navy analysis of seagrass recolonization. The 
draft EIS states unequivocably that *'bomb craters on Vieques have 
been recolonized by seagrasses.ff This is misleading since it 
ignores the fact that such recolonization is often minimal. The 
Navy has an obligation to report the whole truth and to not omit 
relevant information. Therefore, the Navy's next assertion--that 
"the existing damage to the grassbeds is minor and is not consid- 
ered permanent or irrevocable" is even more misleading. 
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The Navy has admitted harm and potential harm.to seagrass 
and other aspects of the marine ecosytem on and around Vieques 
caused by their military operations: 
ffContinuous detonation of explosives above or 
below surface target areas will eventually 
cause pulverization of soil with resultant 
erosion from wind and surface waters . . . This 
would limit the restoration of growth in these 
areas. Aerial and ship-to-shore bombardment 
of impact zones is usually accompanied by some 
ordnance falling long or short of the target 
areas. The potential adverse impact from-this 
threatens damage to thalassia grass beds and? 
mangrove zones. Direct fish kills from the 
impact of stray ordnance may be expected, 
however, a more serious consequence is the 
long-term damage to aquatic life forms result- 
ing from the explosive destruction of habitaz 
turbidity that reduces the photo synthesis 
in turtle grass zones and the sedimentation 
of live coral systems.t* 
(FAAH Exh. 15, p. 3-94.) 
(Emphasis added.) 
The Navy's expert Joseph Zieman stated that there is "no 
questionl' that the naval activiti.es on Vieques have had an impact 
on the seagrass communities. The craters in the seagrass beds 
are the evidence of this fact. (Def. Exh. 95 [Zieman Report], 
pp. 42-43.) The explosion of a bomb in and above seagrass beds 
physically removes the grass. (Zieman, Tr. 6643-6644.) In 
addition, when a bomb hits, sediment is thrown out, the rhizome 
system is destroyed or completely removed. (Zieman, Tr. 6630- 
6631.) Zieman noted circular holes in the seagrass beds, best 
illustrated, he said, north of Punta Gato where the sediment was 
ripped up and torn out as if "someone had taken a giant cookie 
cutter and removed the center of the bed and there was the hole." 
(Def. Exh. 95, pp. 42-43; Zieman Tr. 6650.) Zieman also testified 
that there has been considerable bombing damage in the marine 
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bottom in the eastern part of Bahia Salina de1 Sur. (Zieman,' Tr. 
6651.) Zieman acknowledged that the number of craters have 
increased in the Punta Gato area since 1972. (Def. Exh. 95, p. 
44; Zieman, Tr. 6682, 6687.) It is Zieman's opinion that there 
has been an increase in bombing damage right off the mock runway. 
(Zieman, Tr. 6688; see also CRB Exhs. 355-A, 355-B, 355-C; Jimenez, 
Tr. 4054-4056..) 
Other evidence confirms the existence of damage to the 
seagrass beds. Expert witness Vance Vicente confirmed that 
there are numerous circular disrupted zones or craters within the 
thalassia beds on both Bahia Salina de1 Sur and Bahia Icacos. 
(Vicente, Tr. 2063.) From aerial photography it is apparent that 
the number of craters in the seagrass plateau at Punta Gato have 
at least tripled from 1972 to 1978 (an increase from 5 in 1972 to 
15 in 1978). (CRB Exhs. 316, 317; Vicente, Tr. 2065, 2067-2072) 
Additional holes may not be apparent since some holes can serve 
as traps for seagrass, detritus and algae and thus may not show 
up clearly in aerial photographs. (CRB Exh. 316, 317; Vicente, 
r---h 
Tr. 2067-2068, 2072,) 
There is sediment disturbance in Bahia Icacos and Punta 
Gato. This seriously damages seagrass beds because disturbance 
of sediment changes not only the physical, but also the chemical, 
properties affecting seagrasses. (Vicente, Tr. 2118.) This type 
of sediment disturbance can deteriorate into lfblow-outs,ff there- 
fore making these seagrass beds prone to erosion. (Vicente, Tr. 
2063; 2083-2086.) In addition to the present damage that these 
craters represent, the occurrence of a severe storm or an extreme 
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high wave energy period could cause damage to the .plateau by 
erosion. (Vicente, Tr. 2085-2086.) These disrupted cratered 
areas are expected to have a long-lasting effect on seagrass 
communities and the marine environment generally, since thalassia 
rhizomes do not propagate rapidly. (Vicente, Tr. 2063-2064.) 
An additional problem caused by the destruction of sea- 
grasses around Vieques is that highly nutritive seagrass such as 
thalassia are being replaced by calcareous green algae such as 
halimeda, which have almost no nutritive value and which are not 
as good sediment stabilizers as seagrasses. (Vincente, Tr. 2063, 
2103-2104; Zieman, Tr. 6630-6631.) 
The growth of seagrass is impaired by run-off from the land 
c 
1 caused by the Navy's bombing. Inland vegetation stabilizes the 
soil and the sediment in land. When the vegetation is removed, 
the soil becomes destabilized. Periods of rain and wind transport 
sediment into the water column causing an increase in turbidity. 
This increased turbidity diminishes light penetration in the 
water column which, in turn, limits the depth to which seagrasses 
can grow. (Vicente, Tr. 2083.) 
Photographic evidence and accompanying testimony produced at 
the injunction hearing demonstrated the existence of damage to 
seagrass areas. See, e.g., CRB Exh. 319(l), Vicente, Tr. 2099 
(ordnance found in Bahia Salina de1 Sur, causing sediment disrup- 
tion); CRB Exh. 319(3), Vicente, Tr. 2099 (results of ordnance 
firing); CRB Exh. 319(5), Vicente, Tr. 2100-2101 (piece of ord- 
nance at Punta Gato, which has penetrated,into the sediment and 
caused sediment disruption around it on the seagrass plateau); 
I-51 
., 
CPR 
s Exh. 319(7), Vicente, Tr. 2101 (crater in Bahia Icacos showing 
?diment disruption); CRB Exh. 319(g), Vicente, Tr. 2102 (metal 
:agment found at crater in seagrass bed in Punta Gato, causing 
urge sediment disruption); CRB Exh. 319(12), Vicente, Tr. 2103 
:rater at Punta Gato; rolled up leaves of seagrasses, principally 
lalassia inside crater; vegetation surrounding this crater is a 
Llcareous green algae); CRB Exh. 319(13), Vicente, Tr. 2104 
?dge of crater showing exposed rhizomes); CBB Exhs. 319(14), 
.9(15), Vicente, Tr. 2106 (bombs at Punta Gato, causing disrup- 
.on of substrate; principal vegetation is calcareous algae); CRB 
:h. 319(16), Vice&e Tr. 2106-2107 (crater in Punta Gato with a 
)mb lying over thalassia bed; calcareous green algae evident); 
LB Exh. 310(46), Vicente, Tr. 2108-2110 (craters on north coast 
f Vieques; existence of rolled up leaves tends to make crater 
?ss visible from aerial photography); CRB Exh. 325, Vicente, Tr. 
-09-2110 (craters and substantial sediment disruption); CRB Exh. 
.0(20), Vicente, Tr. 2110 (bomb lying on marginal zone that 
.vides crater from seagrass bed plateau); CRB Exh. 320(7), 
.menez, Tr. 2113 (metal fragment found under leaves on the 
:agrass bed plateau at Punta Gato); CRB Exh. 320(4); Vicente, 
1. 2118 (shell fragment); CRB Exh. 323(l); Vicente, Tr. 2119- 
.20 (three to four coral patches on the western side of Bahia 
:acos, covered by algae detritus [brown algae and calcareous 
:een algae] instead of coral); CRB Exh. 323(2) Vicente, Tr. 
-20-2121 (coral patch in the eastern point of Punta Gato; dead 
lalassia rhizomes): CRB Exh. 323(3), Vicente, Tr. 2121 (mortar 
lell in Bahia Salina de1 Sur); CRB Exh. 323(4), Vicente, Tr. 
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2122-2123 (dead coral rubble in Bahia Salina de1 Sur); CRB Exh. 
323(5), Vicente, Tr. 2124 (ordnance found commonly in Bahia 
Salina de1 Sur); CRB Exh. 323(6A), Vicente, Tr. 2124-2125 (mortar 
shell in Bahia Salina de1 Sur); CRB Exh..323(6B), Vicente, Tr. 
2125 (luminous flare covered with fine sediment); CRB Exhs. 
318(1A); 318(B), 318(C); Vicente, Tr. 2126-2127 (common ordnance, 
including 500 lb. bomb, found at Punta Gato); CRB Exh. 318(2), 
Vicente, Tr. 2129 (ordnance at Punta Gato and Bahia Icacos); CRB 
Exhs. 329(l), 329(2), 329(3), Vicente, Tr. 2130 (craters, dead 
thalassia leaves trapped in craters, and large amount cf calcar- 
eous green algae surrounding craters). 
Finally, the EIS characterization of damage as lfrrot per- 
manent" and "not irrevocable l* is misleading since the concept of 
"permanency If tends to deflect attention from the long period of 
time actually required for recolonization to occur. 
. If disturbed or destroyed, seagrass will take a long time to 
recover. (Zieman, Tr. 6669.) While Dr. Zieman indicated that 
seagrass beds can recover, "the process sometimes takes consider- 
able time . . . [T]he damaged areas must first sediment in. Sedimenl 
must return to the area and then certain chemical processes must , 
take place to enable the rhizomes to grow back into the region." 
(Zieman, Tr. 6644.) Thalassia has not recolonized many of its 
former areas in southern Florida and in the Caribbean even 50 
years after it has been removed. (Vicente, Tr. 2065; Zieman, Tr. 
6662.) Many areas of thalassia have not recovered after many 
years following dredging operations. (Zieman, Tr. 6668.) In one 
experiement, thalassia beds denuded of leaves and rhizomes were 
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not subsequently recolonized. (Vice&e, Tr. 2064.) Tracks 
resulting from propellers have persisted for 2-5 years. (Vicente, 
Tr. 2064-2065.) Shot holes in seagrass beds in British Honduras, 
caused by oil explosions, could still be seen in aerial photographs 
after lo-15 years; they were colonized by calcareous green algae. 
(Vicente, Tr. 2064.) According to Zieman, the best estimates at 
present time indicate that, at minimum, two years are normally 
required for recolonization even to commence. According to 
Zieman, in some instances, recolonization has not occurred for 17 
years after discrete, identifiable disturbances. Zieman said 
that the eastern part of Bahja Salina de1 Sur could take 10 years 
or longer to recolonize and Punta Gato.would normally need 4-6 
years assuming no further disturbance. (Zieman, Tr. 6680-6681) 
According to Zieman, at the slow recovery rate of seagrass, 
cessation of the bombing at Vieques would be the best and quick- 
est way to ensure recovery of the Viegues seagrass. (Zieman, Tr. 
6681.) A continuation at the present level of bombing would mean 
a continued stress on the community. (Zieman, Tr. 6681.) Any 
system can take only a certain amount of stress before a collapse 
occurs, he said: For systems such as seagrass beds, he said, the 
level required to induce this collapse is not known except for 
very few stresses, such as thermal pollution. He concluded that 
the seagrass meadows on Viegues can be productive and functioning 
areas only if the stress is curtailed by changes with respect to 
military activity there. (Def. Exh. 95, p. 44.) 
r-1 
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It is, therefore, difficult to understand how the Navy can 
in good conscience, fail to mention these facts. A new and 
accurate analysis is required before this draft EIS can attain 
final form. 
CPR-33 2-144.. The draft EIS concludes that it is practically 
impossible to determine whether damage to coral reefs is caused 
.by bomb damage or storm damage. Again, a "worst case" analysis 
must be presented in an environmental impact statement in such 
circumstances of uncertainty. 40 C.F.R § 1502.22. In that 
regard, the evidence indicates substantial ordnance effects wit 
respect to reefs and Vieques. 
Items discovered in the waters of Vieques near the reefs 
include metal fragments of airborne bombs, artillery shells, 
practice ordnance, parachutes, parachute cables, flares, flarinl 
casings, barges 
bazooka rockets 
( See, e-q., G. 
and other military vessels, machine gun rounds, 
and many unidentifiable ordnance fragments. 
Cintron, Tr. 1792-1786, 1805-1808, 1813, 1817,' 
1819-1820, 1830, 1954; CRB Exhs. 312, 313 (large caliber machint 
gun rounds), 314 (metal).) 
Expert testimony described some of the kinds of damage to 
reefs caused by such military activities on Vieques: 
a. Shells that detonate in the vicinity of the reef 
cause shearing and cleavage of coral structures, 
the internal structure of the coral to predatory 
Cintron, Tr. 1786-1787, 1794, 1795, 1807, 1941.) 
corals, for examtile, opens the way to the growth 
thereby exposil 
organisms, (G 
Damage to 
o.f blue-green 
algae, which has concerned many scientists because of a possibll 
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link to ciguatera, a type of fish poisoning. (G. Cintron, Tr. 
1795.) Two species of coral found off of Viegues, acropora 
palmata and the columbus lobate form of montastrea annularis, are 
especially susceptible to damage from blasting, which tends to 
split the coral open. (Acropora palmata plays an important role 
in providing shelter for turtles and fish. (G. Cintron, Tr. 
1787.) Colonies of these two species of coral have sustained 
widespread damage in areas that are very sheltered and not subject. ~ 
to wave motion. (G. Cintron, Tr. 1787, 1822.) The blasting-also 
loosens coral, making them susceptible to toppling from movement 
of the water. (G. Cintron, Tr. 1789.) 
b. Metal fragments that strike a reef cause both 
mechanical breakage and abrasions on the living skin of coral. 
Abrasions, by cutting the surface of the coral, increase its 
vulnerability to infections. Military debris and coral fragments 
broken off the reef can be moved by a swell and cause further 
damage to adjacent colonies, This has occurred on Vieques reefs. 
(G. Cintron, Tr. 1789, 1791, 1793, 1831, 1941-1950.) 
C. Ordnance, military hardware and other heavy debris 
striking the ocean floor or detonating in the vicinity of a reef 
puts sediments into suspension, which are then transported by the 
current and deposited on nearby reefs. Sediment from blasting 
which is deposited on coral colonies,ten,~.s,to,..,stay there, due to 
the slightly concave shape of the colonies. Sedimentation damages 
or kills living coral. A number of reefs off of Vieques bear 
evidence of sedimentation damage. (G. Cintron, Tr. 1794, 1799, 
1809, 1969.) 
..M--.i 
/““a, 
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d. Shell fragments and other military- debris that 
come to rest on the surface of a coral,reef cause the death of 
underlying coral tissues by shading the coral from niecessary 
sunlight'and by impeding feeding mechanisms. Such dead areas are 
sites for infection. (G. Cintron, Tr. 1787-1793. 
e. The waters surrounding Vieques contain parachutes 
and shreds of parachute. (G. Cintron, Tr. 1784-1785, 1954; CRB 
Exh, 351) Parachutes that fall into the water and come,to rest 
draped pver coral colonies cause the death of all underlying 
coral tissue. (G. Cintron, Tr. 1792, 1821.) 
Photographic evidence and accompanying testimony corrob- 
orates the existence of damage in the coral areas of Vieques. 
See, e.q., CRB Exhs. 310(58), 310(56), 310(57), 310(6), G. Cintro 
Tr.'1802-1804 (highly disturbed reef areas in the north shore 
area, with bomb fragments); CRB Exh. 310(51), G. Cintron, Tr. 
1805-1806 (recently-dropped drag fin in barrier reef in Bahia 
Salina de1 Sur; drag fins are "exceedingly commonl' in Bahia 
Salina de1 Sur); CRB Exh. 310(52), G. Cintron, Tr. 1806-1808 
(area near Rota Alcatraz containing large circular holes in 
acropora palmata framework sometimes more than 20 meters in 
diameter; aircraft-delivered object visible near large crater; 
"extensive damage to reef); CRB Exhs. 310(30), 310(25), G. 
Cintron, Tr. 1808-1809 (drag fin in very disturbed barrier reef 
area in Bahia Salina de1 Sur); CRB Exh. 310(27), G. Cintron, Tr. 
1809-1811 (large metal fragment in Bahia Salina de1 Sur; sedimenl 
damage); CRB Exh. 310(53), G. Cintron, Tr. 1812-1813 (ordnance 
[perhaps flare casing] in acropora palmata area); CRB Exhs. _. 
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310(31), 310(33), G. Cintron, Tr. 1813-1814 (flare casings and 
cables formerly attached to parachutes in coral areas); CR.B Exhs. 
310(50), 310(49), G, Cintron, Tr. 1814-1815 (metallic object,' 
larger than a human being, resting on coral southwest of Rota 
Alcatraz); CRB Exhs. 310(19), 310(g), G. Cintron, Tr. 1816 (large 
piece of ordnance in reef in Bahia Salinas in north,coast of 
Viegues, coral d&age visible); CRB Exhs. 310(11), 310(4), G. 
Cintron Tr. 1816-1817 (large piece of ordnance in acropora palmata 
coral in Bahia Salinas in north coast of Vieques); CRB Exh. 
310(44), G. Cintron, Tr. 1817 (round of tfartillerytf ordnance at 
reef near Punta Gato); CRB Exhs. 310(55), 310(54), G. Cintron, 
Tr. 1817-1818 (cratered reef area near Rota Alcatraz, large metal 
objects near craters); CRB Exh. 310(8), G. Cintron, Tr. 1819 
("artillery1 shell lodged in reef crevice); CRB Exh. 310(20), G. 
-, 
Cintron, Tr. 1819-1820 (inert ordnance on reef off Punta Gato); 
CRB Exh. 310(29), G. Cintron, Tr. 1820 (tfartillerytt round in 
highly disturbed site near or at barrier reef on south coast of 
Bahia Salina de1 Sur); CRB Exhs. 310(47), 310(48), G. Cintron, 
Tr. 1820-1821 (parachutes draped around coral colonies thus 
killing the coral); CRB Exh. 310(3), G. Cintron, Tr. 1822 (effects 
of probable direct hit on massive colonies of montastrea annularis; 
coral colony split; pieces have lost their orientation and are 
lying on their side); CRB Exh. 310(45), G. Cintron, Tr. 1822-1823 
(large colony of montastrea annularis cleaved by a blast); CRB 
Exh. 310(2), G. Cintron, Tr. 1823-1824 (crater off patch reef at 
Bahia Salinas in north of Viegues); CRB Exh. 310(42), G. Cintron, 
; f---X 
Tr. 1824-1825 (crack in reef framework); CRB Exh. 310(10), G. 
. 
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Cintron, Tr. 1826-1827 (coral rubble, including sheared coral 
blades); CRB Exh. 310(62), G. Cintron, Tr. 1828 (craters off 
northeast flank of Rota Alcatraz); CRB Exh. 310(61), G. Cintron, 
Tr. 1828 (sedimentation and coral rubble in barrier reef in Bahia 
Salina de1 Sur); CRB Exh. 310(22), G. Cintron, Tr. 18130 (living 
coral cover stripped from patch reef in north coast o:f Bahia 
Salinas; reef framework full of large cracks, rocks loose, metal 
fragment visible); CRB Exh. 310(14), G. Cintron, Tr. l830-1831 
(disturbed colony of montastrea annularis at barrier reef in 
Bahia Salina de1 Sur); CRB Exh. 310(15), G. Cintron, Tr. 1831 
(large pieces of dislodged montastrea annularis, more than 10 
feet across); CRB Exh. 310(32), G. Citron, Tr. 1831-1832 (metal 
fragment on top of colony of montastrea annularis); CRB Exh. 
310(46), G. Cintron, Tr. 1832 (dead coral tissue and rust spots 
on coral tissue cause'd by metal fragment) ; CRB Exh. 3:10(13), G. 
Cintron, Tr. 1832 (large circular piece of metal lodged in large 
colony of montastrea annularis in Bahia Salina de1 Sur; abrasion 
to coral seen near metal object); CRB Exh. 310(12), G. Cintron, 
Tr. 1832-1833 (metal piece on coral in Bahia Salina de1 Sur with 
recently abraded, dead coral nearby); CRB Exh. 310(46), G. Cintron, 
Tr. 1833_(crater being filled with debris near base o:f reef in 
patch reef in Bahia Salinas in north of Vie-es); CRB Exh. 310(42), 
G. Cintron, Tr. 1834 (sedimented coral head at base o:f reef in 
Bahia Salinas in north of Viegues); CRB Exh. 310(43), G. Cintron, 
Tr. 1835 (ordnance that the Navy planned to blow up intentionally 
on coral reef near Isla Yallis on June 7, 1978 as part of their 
trial preparation); CBB Exh. 327(14), G. Cintron, Tr. 1851-1852 
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(holes in fringing reefs off Punta Gato); CR.B Exh. 327(11), G. 
Cintron, Tr, 1853 (cratering in barrier reef in Bahia Salina de1 
Sur); CRB Exh. 327(12), G. Cintron, Tr. 1853 (cratering in Bahia 
Salina de1 Sur); CRB Exh. 327(3), G. Cintron, Tr. 1854 (barge 
sunk at Rota Alcatraz; craters visible on reef slope); CRB Exh. 
327(8), G. Cintron, Tr. 1854, 1855 (disturbed area with holes in 
area where there are large metal fragments); CRB Exh. 327(10), G. 
Cintron, Tr. 1854 (disturbed seagrass bed in proximity to patch 
reef off Punta Gato); see also CRB Exh. 336, G. Cintron, Tr. 
1856-1860 (locations of certain damage found by plaintiffs during 
limited inspection of certain reef areas of Vieques). 
The Navy presented three witnesses during the injunction 
hearing who testified on coral reefs: Arnfried Antonius, Richard 
Dodge, and William Raymond. They could not refute the fact that 
the Navy has damaged reefs on Vieques. Indeed, cross-examination 
and even direct testimomy confirmed the existence of damage. 
Antonius acknowledged that there was military impact on the 
reefs on Viegues. He acknowledged, for example, that there was 
military impact on coral reefs all the way to the reef (reef N-l) 
at the very eastern tip of Viegues. (Def. Exh. 88-A, Antonius, 
Tr. 6208.) He also acknowledged military debris that lay at the 
transect line points he measured: he reported 9 bombs, 12 artil- 
lery shells, 7 flares, 5 pieces of metal, 5 parachutes, 2 illumin- 
ation shells, and 2 gun shells that lay at the transect line 
points he measured. (Antonius, Tr. 6222-6223.) He also acknow- 
ledged direct hitting of coral by military activity. (Antonius, 
Tr. 6208.) He further acknowledged that transects run by Raymond 
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north from Punta Gato and in Bahia Salina de1 Sur indicated bomb 
craters. (Antonius, Tr. 6296-6298.) 
The Navy's witness Dodge tended to confirm other evidence 
concerning reef damage. To begin with, Dodge's field notes 
revealed, inter alia, the following: He saw a possible crater on 
the way to the reef on the thalassia tract when he was visiting 
Bahia Icacos. (Dodge, Tr. 5998.) He noted with respect to four 
montastrea annularis he collected that it was "very turbid, with 
resuspended sediments.tt A small patch reef on the western arm of 
Bahia Salina de1 Sur included 30-35 millimeter long aircraft 
cannon shells. (Dodge, Tr. 6001.) At the fringing reef off 
Punta Icacos there was evidence, especially in the flat reef, of 
physical damage from bombs; also, he observed several large 
cannisters in 6 to 8 meters of water. (Dodge, Tr. 6001.) Dodge 
noted that he obsenred bomb craters on the reef flat at .5 meters 
in depth, which craters were 1-2 meters in diameter. He also 
wrote that he observed nfracturedW montastrea annularis and 
"overturned acropora.*l (Dodge, Tr. 6002.) His notes also 
reflect a bomb crater at reef VN-4. (Dodge, Tr. 6002.)1 His 
notes indicated that a scientist, Brinkman, reported potential 
bomb damage northwest of Fossil Point, since there were lots of 
broken coral and unexploded.ordnance. Brinkman had also felt 
that the reef on the north coast of Cerro Indio l'appears strange." 
(Dodge, Tr. 6003.) Dodge's notes also indicate that he and Antonius 
observed a clump of 'IP. peritus [coral] with apparent bomb craters." 
(Dodge, Tr. 6005.) He also noted that at'the reef east of Cayo 
Conejo he saw *'storm and bomb damage." (Dodge, Tr. 6007.) In 
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the patch reef south of Isla Yailis, Dodge's notes identified 
bomb-impacted peritis coral; he indicated that flare impact was 
likely since there was parachute cannister very close and the 
hole looked like a direct hit. (Dodge, Tr. 6010.) On the east 
back reef of Punta Negro, Dodge observed a parachute and a flare. 
(Dodge, Tr. 6007.) At Station VN-8 or VN-9, Dodge saw possible 
bomb holes in acropora palmata. (Dodge, Tr. 6007.) To the east 
of Rota Alcatraz, he wrote that the area appears to have been 
dredged or rammed with a ship. There is a swath about 3 to 4 
meters wide that looks like a bulldozer trace under water. He . 
wrote: "Everything killed. Some fringes of acropora palmata 
were still living; some of the clumps cluster of Montastrea 
annularis had been widely split." (Dodge, Tr. 6008.) 
The Navy's other coral reef witness Raymond made several 
admissions about the deleterious 'effect Navy activities have with 
respect to the Viegues coral reefs. For example: 
(1) '*Periodic bombing and bulldozing in the 
Atlantic Fleet-~-Weapons Range has removed a 
major portion of the veqetation in the eastern - . 
half of the drainage basin of Bahia Salina 
de1 Sur. unc loubtedly increasinq the erosion 
and deposition of sediments into Laquna Anones 
The result has been that Laguna Anones is now - _ _ _ a dry laqoon with standing water Only in bomb 
craters, causinq increased runoff of ter- 
rigenous sediments into Bahia Salina de1 Sur 
at the northeast corner of the bay. Evidence 
exists of recent channelling of sediment 
through a narrow gap through the beach during 
heaw rainfall." (Emphasis added.) (Def. ---- 
Exh. 83, PP- 33-34: Raymond, Tr. 6132.) 
north ten 
photos (flown August 1978 by the U. S. Navy)." 
iEmDhasis added.) (Def. Exh. 83, p. 35; 
. 
f 
"rra$nond, Tr. 6134.) 
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Raymond acknowledged the existence of sediment on corals in 
Viegues. (Raymond, Tr. 6071; Def. Exhs. 82A (sediment on reef 
S-4 in Bahia Salina de1 Sur), 82B (sediment in reef S-4); Raymond 
Tr. 6082; Def. Exh. 82(1-3) (transects A-B); Def. Exh. 83, p. 
12.) In addition, he admitted that sediment damage to Vieques' 
coral has been a relatively recent occurrence: 
"The sediments have built up relatively 
recently, causinq damaqe to corals that 
were formerly! undamaged" (Emphasis added 
(Def. Exh. 83, p. 32.) 
-1 
In light of all of the above evidence, a "worst case" analy- 
sis should be done. 
CPR-34 2-147, 2-152. The survey techniques used by the Navy for 
measuring the reef fish populations are not reliable indicators. 
The Navy is relying on the work done by Hannan.. However, HaMan's 
survey was haphazard and based on an inferior methodolocgy. His 
technique consisted of swimming randomly around to reefs and 
using a visual observation technique to make descriptive observa- 
tions about abundance of fish. His fish counts were divided into 
three categories and were based on very rough estimates of numbers 
of fish he thought he saw, ranging from groups of less than 5 
fish, 5 - 20 fish, and more than 20 fish. Such a very rough survey 
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technique, which did not even include a margin of error, is 
grossly insufficient to measure actual fish abundance. It is 
significantly more unreliable than Zieman's method of using a net 
to catch and count precise numbers of fish. It should be noted 
that Zieman's technique which counted actual numbers of fish, 
demonstrated that Vieques had a much lower fish population density 
than did assertedly comparable areas in the Virgin Islands. 
CPR-35 2-165, 2-166. The draft EIS makes note of the benefit to 
stocks of conch and lobster on the eastern tip of Vieques due to 
restrictions on fishing when the largest complex is in use. The 
draft fails to comment on the resulting increased fishing pres- 
sures in other waters around Vieques because of the constant 
range restrictions imposed on the eastern end to accomodate 
,/*-? , 
bombing practice there. 
CPR-36 2-167. The draft EIS once again fails to indicate that 
military activities have a responsibility for the hypersalinity 
problems of the mangrove complexes on Vieques. [See 2-79, 2-80 
above]. 
CPR-37 2-173. The draft EIS stresses the aggregation of manatees 
on the northwestern end of Viegues as opposed to the eastern 
bombing range area. The failure by the Navy's expert to observe 
manatees on the eastern end could easily be due to her neglect of 
the eastern end as an area of study. She devoted only a small 
percentage of her 24 hours of research time to the Southeastern 
end of Vieques. She spent 12.8 hours at one portion of the 
western end, while less than 3 hours were spent observing the 
area on the east subjected most heavily to shelling and bombing 
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operations. In spite of this, the Navy's expert did concede that 
the, east end of Viegues was appropriate habitat for manatees and 
that it is quite possible that they may be frightened from the 
area by military operations. The draft EIS is silent on this 
point. 
CPR-38 2-174. Although an earlier chart in the draft EIS (p- 2-96: 
indicates that no endangered sea turtles were sighted around 
Vieques, it is stated later in this draft (p. 2-174) that-a total 
of 15 sea turtles were sighted during surveys conducted during the 
summer of 1978. There is no explanation for this inconsistency, 
nor is there any discussion of what kind of turtles were sighted 
and who sighted them. In addition, it is undisputed that the 
Navy is aware that more than 15 sea turtles were seen around, 
Vieques by experts during the Summer of 1978; yet-the draft EIS 
does not acknowledge this. [See 2-96 above]. 
CPR-39' 2-275. The draft EIS underplays the negative impact of 
noise on the people of Vieques by characterizing the effect of 
Naval noise as Wot considered to . . . [be] . . . significant by a 
majority of those questioned." However, a survey of the general 
population revealed that substantial numbers of people on Vieques 
are seriously affected by the noises: 
CPR-39a a. At least 27.4 percent of the community of Vieques is 
"very" or ttextremelylf annoyed by noise from the Navy training 
facility that disturbs sleep, startles people, shakes houses and 
disrupts communication. (CFU3 Exh. 388, App. A & B) only 0.8 
percent consider noise from all other sources (i.e., non-Navy) as 
highly annoying-- a ration of 34 to one. Thus, over one-quarter 
of the population on Viegues is suffering psychological trauma 
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because of the noise from Navy activities. In terms of public 
health and welfare, this is a highly significant fraction of the 
population to be suffering psychological trauma. (Eldred, Tr. 
4026, 4034-4036; CRB Exh. 392.) The percentage of people most 
adversely affected is the most sensitive reliable indicator of a 
noise problem. Such a social survey elicits the actual percep- 
tions of the whole community to the noise. (Eldred, Tr. 4029- 
4030, 4026, 4234, 4259.) g/ 
CPR-39b b. At least 37.4 percent of the population considers 
the noise from the Navy training facility as‘a significant con- 
tribution to their noise environment. Of all noise sources 
studied on Vieques, Navy sources are by far the most serious 
noise contributors, including bombardment (air and ship) (24.2 
percent), followed by artillery firing'(21.2 percent), airplanes 
(18.0 percent) and helicopters (15.1 percent). These are naval 
activities. The high ranking given to these specific noise 
sources associated with naval activities confirms that the impact 
of noise from the Navy training facility is substantial. Only 
2.9 percent of-the population considers all other sources (i.e., 
non-Navy) as a significant contribution to their noise environment. 
Y. The Vieques social survey, if anything, understated the actual 
extent to which Navy noise disrupts the community. Military public 
relations about national security and the economic. importance to 
a community of a noise source cause the population to be more 
tolerant of an otherwise disruptive noise source. (Eldred, Tr. 
4374. ) Similarly, people of lower economic and educational status 
complain less about the same noise .level than do those of higher 
economic and educational status. (Eldred, Tr. 3830-31; See general- 
ly, testimony of Michael Woodbury). 
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(Eldred, Tr. 4022-4025, 4228, 4233-4234, 4263, 4367-4369; CEB 
Exhs. 391, Ques. 12, CRB Exh. 392, CEB Exh. 388, App., A & B, 
Ques. 12, pp. B 13-17.) 
The noise levels emanating from the Navy training facility 
on Vieques and the adverse effects of these noise levels are 
directly comparable to the noise levels and adverse effects in 
other community noise situations which have been held to be 
unacceptable: 
a. A six month noise experiment was performed in 
Oklahoma City in 1964 by the Air Force in conjunction with other 
agencies of the federal government in order to determine the 
acceptability of the impulsive noise of sonic booms to the United 
States population. (Eldred, Tr. 4031-4036.) 
b. The federal government's experiment was terminated 
prematurely,when there were widespread community comp.laints about 
the impulsive noise. XEldred, Tr. 4522.) Based on an analysis 
of the impulsive noise levels produced and the effect on the 
civilian population of those noise levels , supersonic aircraft 
flight over the United States was eventually banned because the 
level of community disturbance was deemed unacceptable. (Eldred, 
Tr. 4522, 4529-4530.) 
C. Thirty percent of the population on Vie-es are 
very (highly) annoyed with impulsive noises which cause houses to 
rattle and shake in comparison to 17 to 35 percent in Oklahoma 
City; 27 percent of the population on Vieques are very annoyed at 
noise which disturbs sleep, as compared to 5-10 percent in 
Oklahoma City. Twenty percent of the population on Viegues are 
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very annoyed at noises which startle or scare them as compared to 
8-17 percent in Oklahoma City. (Eldred, Tr. 4024, 4026, 4031- 
4036; CBB Exh. 388, App. A and B, Ques. 13, p. B18; CRB Exh. 
393. ) The magnitude of the two noise exposures is similar to the 
yearly average C-weighted day/night sound level (C-Ldn) for 
impulsive sounds (bombs and ship gunfire) on Vieques ranging 
between 56 and -61 dB for all days, and 57 to 65 dB on typical 
days of weapons training activity, compared to the sonic booms 
which ranged between 58 and 65 dB during the six-month period of 
the Oklahoma City experiment. (Eldred, Tr. 4524-4526; CBB Exh. 
393. ) 
The draft EIS indicates that the noise levels generated 
during Naval bombardment and maneuver activities do not cause any . 
kind of physical harm to the civilian population, but does not 
offer any analysis of possible psychological effects on the 
civilian population. 
It is essential to indicate that the civilian areas most 
likely to be affected are Colonia Lujan and Destino Ward. The 
document should provide sufficient information on the psychologi- 
cal effects in these and other areas caused by activities of the 
Navy. 
CPR-40 The draft EIS does not discuss the effect that vibrations 
from ordnance might have upon animal species resident in the 
maneuver area: manatees, brown pelicans, coral reef species, sea 
turtles and reef fish. 
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For example, strong vibrations like those generated by bomb 
and shell explosions can cause breakage or fragmentation of coral 
structures; this can either cause immediate death or slow growth 
of remaining coral. These vibrations as well as the noise of 
maneuvers can frighten the brown pelicans and other species 
present in the area. This in turn can cause nest abandonment 
during incubation of eggs, and may lead to a decrease in the 
animal population. 
CPR-41 The draft EIS shows flight patterns used by airplanes during 
maneuvers, and discusses the sound levels generated in the maneuve: 
area, but does not provide any information on the effect these 
sound levels might have upon the residents of the following 
communities: Lujan, Destino, and the northwest sector of Barria 
Santa Maria. 
In addition, it 'is stated in the document that the aircraft 
do not fly over civilian areas; in fact aircraft, including 
helicopters, are commonly sighted over many such areas. 
The draft EIS presents sound levels generated by maneuvers 
during l%ormallf conditions, but does not include information on 
sound levels under unusual conditions, such as coordinated or 
combined maneuvers with representatives of the armed Iforces of 
other nations. In other words, "worst case" sound level condi- 
tions are not discussed. 
The draft EIS states that the normal timetable or schedule 
for maneuvers, is from 7:00 AM to lo:09 PM. This represents a 
violation of article 4.1 of this Board's Regulation for the 
Control of Noise- In addition, no mention is made of exercises 
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outside of this timetable. We observe that it is fairly common 
for exercises to be carried out after 1O:OO PM or that this has 
been the practice in the past. 
CPR-42 2-344 The archeological survey conducted by the Navy for 
historic sites on Viegues is inadequate. The survey was, at 
best, a forced and initial step down the road of compliance, but 
clearly does not fully meet its obligation to locate and inventory 
all sites that may be eligible for inclusion in the National 
Register. In addition, Section 2(a) of Executive Order 11593 
requires that the Navy locate, inventory and nominate all sites 
that appear to qualify for listing in the National Register and 
that all this be done.in cooperation with the SHPO. No consulta- 
tion with the SHPO took place with regard to location and inventory. 
The scrambling, hastily conceived and hastily executed study 
done by the Navy was admittedly an initial step based on sampling 
rather than true inspection. The work that was done did not 
conform with the original recommendation of the Navy's consultants 
for an intensive field survey. The haphazard study that was done 
covered only l/4 of one percent of the island's surface. The 
Navy's own witnesses on this issue admitted that a great deal of 
additional work still had to be done, and that the number of 
sites that remain to be discovered.is surely very substantial. 
Thus, a comprehensive archaeological and historical survey, in 
cooperation with the SHPO, still has to be done. 
One point of overall significance with respect to archaeo- 
logical and historical surveys of Viegues is that the sites 
uncovered in the past, for obvious reasons, have been almost all 
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on the small part of the island that is not Navy property. 
During the very short period of time in which (because of the 
injunction hearing) Navy land was open for study, a large number 
of sites were identified, even though a miniscule part of the 
island was looked at. Apart from the Navy study itself, for 
instance, Agamemnon Pantel found 14 archaeological sites and 8 
historical sites on the eastern end, on Navy property, in approx 
mately two weeks. It is worth mentioning that prac:tically every 
site he found was in a state of damage. One was destroyed. One 
historic site, for instance, had a hand grenade range next to it 
A Navy road cuts directly through another archaeological site, 
and an NC0 club sits on top of still another site. 
The Navy's expert witnesses on this issue stated that they 
had recorded 77 additional archaeological and 20 additional 
historical sites during their hurried study. A number of these 
would qualify for inclusion in the National Register, according 
to those very experts. 
It is worth mentioning here that, apart from prehistoric 
archaeological sites within the target area, and apart from the 
cotton mill ruins found by Agamemnon Pantel, ancient maps, one 
from 1887 and another dated back to 1718, appear to place at 
least one fort and several settlements within what is now N,avy 
property -- almost all of them within the affected area. The 
presence of these maps alone shows the need for more careful 
surveys, and for continued cooperation with state officials, in 
,whose official custody the maps are to be found. 
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CPR-43 2-329, line 23. "Cana Honda" should read I'Cano Honda." The 
EQB publication referred to on line 25 was published in 1972, not 
1973. 
CPR-44 2-330, second paragraph. A carbon dating is incorrectly 
interpreted. This dating of 1600 B.C. was made from an instrument 
made of shell. This instrument was from the surface layer, and 
its dating contrasts sharply with those made in deeper levels, 
which were more recent. We have been informed by Mr. Alfred0 
Figueredo that the controversial dating was done on a tool of 
shell, whose presence at this site might be due to'its having 
been carried there from another (older) site and later reused by 
the person who carried it to Cano Hondo. Therefore, we consider 
it inappropriate to use this particular piece to determine the 
age of the Cano Hondo site on Viegues. 
CPR-45 2-332. The Navy should provide data, authors or references 
to substantiate the chronology proposed. 
In order to determine the validity of the results of the 
Cultural Resources Survey of Viegues, we would need to know the 
methodology used and if possible its verification based on random 
sampling. 
We also urge the Navy to comply with the request of the 
Department of the Interior dated March 11, 1980: 
"Because of the continuing impacts to poten- 
tially significant resources throughout the 
Navy-controlled portions of the island, we 
urge that the cultural resources management 
program proposed on page V and outlined 
briefly on pages 5-7 and 5-8 of the draft 
statement be implemented as soon as possible 
in order to comply fully with Executive Order 
11593, "Protection and Enhancement of the 
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Cultural Environment.lf We also recommend 
that, in consultation with the Puerto Rico 
State Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO), 
the Navy work with the Advisory Council on 
Historic Preservation to develop a Program- 
matic Memorandum of Agreement for further 
identification, evaulation, and treatment of 
these resources. This would assist the Na\y 
in meeting its responsibilities under Section 
106 of the National Historic Preservation 
Act, as amended, and the implementing regu- 
lations (36 CFR Part 800)." 
CPR-46’ 2-365. The following information is not presented in the 
Draft EIS and is required for analysis of said document: 
(1) Details on volume and type of wastes generated in 
activities of the Navy such as demolitions, oil and grease result- 
ing from vehicle maintenance, wrecks of airplanes, ships, boats, 
trucks, tanks, bombs, detonators, munitions and other material. 
Furthermore the EIS should indicate mode of transport, handling, 
and site of final disposal for these materials. 
(2) No information is offered on the chemical propertie 
of waste that is disposed of, including explosives, radioactive 
substances, corrosive substances, flammable substances, etc. 
(3) Details are lacking on any measures taken to 
reduce the volume and/or weight of different types of wastes. 
(4) For the site to be used for final disposal of all 
wastes, the proponent should submit evidence that said site 
possesses the capacity to accept the volume of wastes. 
CPR-47 2-367. The "Communications" section of the draft EIS 
admits that a microwave setup is used for telephone communica- 
tions. The Navy should have looked into the potential harmful 
effect of microwaves as was required with respect to PAVE PAWS at 
Otis Air Force Base. 
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=f’R-48 2-376. The discussion of safety in the draft EIS is 
inadequate. Evidence abounds that the Navy frequently misses 
target areas causing great risk to safety and environmental 
destruction. (CRB Prop. Findings passim.) However, the Navy has 
no reliable knowledge of the frequency, range or magnitude of its 
misses. In the brief period between March 1978 and March 1979 
evidence of the, following extraordinary misses was elicited: 
a. On October 16, 1978 a Navy destroyer overshot the 
AIA sending a live projectile approximately six miles to the 
northeast of Vieques. That projectile landed in the vicinity 
a private vessel. (Court's ,Exh. 6.) 
of 
b. In June, 1976 a 2,500 pound missile misfired and 
landed near the town of Isabel Segunda. (CRB Exh. 154.) This 
missile possesses the speed range of 350 to 550 knots. (CRB Exh. 
37; CRB Exh. 417, Interrogatory Answer 185; CRB Exh. 154; Barr, 
Tr. 2909-10.) The Navy defines this drone missile as being 
llinertl' by virtue of the criteria utilized to conclude that 
machine gun bullets and certain other rockets, bombs and missiles 
\ fired at Viyques are jnert, i.e., it allegedly does not contain 
/ an explossive warhead, although some lfinertll ordnance do contain 
an explosive charge and other chemical composition (CBB Exh. 417, 
Answer to Interrogatory No. 23 a.) 
C. Admiral Kinnear testified that the miss potential 
for air-to-ground bombing is in terms of miles. (Kinnear, Tr. 
3274-75. ) 
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d. Former Range Commander Barr testified-that NGFS 
shells and air-to-ground bombs are fired at Viegues that are 
"lost I1 i.e., I no one knows where they landed. 
He testified that he is personally aware of a four-mile NGFS 
overshot. (Barr, Tr. 2957.) 
(Barr, Tr. 2956.) 
e. Range Officer Lee also testified that during 
air-to-ground bombing, bombs are '1lost,11 (Lee, Tr. 6392.) Lee 
also testified that during air-to-ground bombing, if, for example 
one aircraft drops five or six bombs during one approach, if any 
one bomb hits the target area, the Navy scores the run as a'llhitu 
even if the other bombs miss the target. During the October 18, 
1978 site visit by the Court, one such incident was observed in 
which a bomb'was dropped into the coastal waters but was; not 
scored as "off-target *I because other bombs dropped in that run on , 
the target hit the target area, (Lee, Tr. 6392.) 
CPR-49 2-390’. Again, this draft EIS misconstrues the findings of 
the community noise survey administered‘by Mr. Eldred on Vieques. 
[See 2-275 above for proper interpretation of noise data.] 
CPR-50 2-392,2-393, There is a covert admission in the "sound 
focusing" section: that for explosive weights up to 100 kilo- 
grams and in the presence of strong focusing, the peak flat sound 
pressure level would "barely exceed 140 dB at Isabel Segunda on 
Vieques." Cast in this bland tone, this fact appears to have no 
great significance - which is a perfect example of hoti this draft 
EIS gives a misimpression of relevant data. Ironically, the 140 
dB level is characterized in a chart on page 2-392 as the llThreshold 
for Permanent Damage to Unprotected Ears. - Hiqh Risk of Physiological -- 
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and Straighten Damage." (Emphasis added.) However, the connection 
! 
between these very related points is never made in the draft EIS. 
The Navy is simultaneously trying to advance the idea that with 
strong sound focusing, the noise is no problem at all, while at 
the same time, they admit that the noise level poses a high risk 
of damage. This not a responsible treatment of the noise issue. 
In addition, Mr. Eldred recommended that peak flat sound 
levels not exceed 100 dB, that a radar control system to prevent 
airplanes from straying over to civilian areas be installed, that 
a weather balloon be launched and that a computerized sound 
monitoring network for firing be established on Vieques. These 
recommendations are never mentioned, as they should be, in this 
draft EIS. 
CPR-51 2-395. Table 2-92 (Number of Passes Over Targets by 
Aircraft Type) contains a typographical error under the "grand 
total** column and is therefore unclear. 
CPR-52 3-1. The draft section *lProbable Impact of the Proposed 
Project on the Environmenttl presents a totally muddled and contra- 
dictory picture of the relationship between *llevel of activities*! 
and "expected impact." Unbelievably, it states that the entire 
draft EIS analysis of environmental impact is based on a continua- 
tion of the same level of activities that existed during the 
1977-1978 year. However, this assumption of a continuation of - 
past levels is incorrect and renders any analysis based on this 
assumption useless. It is understood that military activities on 
Vieques are expected to increase, and not to continue on past 
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levels. Therefore,. any projections of minimal future environ- 
mental impacts are underestimates since the activity level will 
increase. 
CPR-53 3-3. The draft EIS states that observations did not reveal 
detectable amounts of sediment reaching the off-shore bays (Bahia 
Salina de1 Sur, Bahia Salinas, and Bahia Icacos). This contra- 
dicts evidence known to the Navy which indicates that there had 
been sediment damage to coral reefs in these areas, In addition, 
the Navy's expert Dodge reported that at least one area on the 
North coast at Penasco Fosil had a significantly lower coral reef 
growth rate than all other north stations during 1970-1977, 
thereby indicating .the existence of a sediment problem. (CRB 
Exhs. 310(27), 310(19), 310(g), 310(61), 310(42); Def. Exh 79, 
p. 11; G. Cintron, Tr. 1809-1811, 1816, 1828, 1834). 
CPR-54 - 3-6. In opposition to the assertion in the draft EIS about 
the existence of acceptable ambient air quality standards on 
Vieques are the actual air quality measurements taken in 1978 at 
Esperanza which clearly show.violations of the national standards 
(Cruz Perez, Tr. 4096). Based on adequate monitoring data, the 
Vieques annual geometric mean is now 99 micrograms per cubic 
meter. (Cruz Perez, Tr. 4096.) MeAsurements taken in 1972, at 
Esperanza and at Isabel Segunda did not indicate violations of 
the national standards at that time. (CNZ Perez, Tr. 4102.) 
A mathematical model done by Mr. Cruz Perez indicates a 
violation of particulate matter standards on Vieques as a result 
of a single battery of 105 howitzers firing for 24 hours. (CNZ 
Perez, Tr. 2564-2565.) A model dispersion pattern also designed 
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by Mr. Cruz Perez (Finding 155) shows a scale from 1,407 micro- 
grams per cubic meter near point of impact down to 33 micrograms 
per cubic meter at Isabel Segunda. (Cruz Perez, Tr. 257402590.) 
Based on the expert model analysis and on his knowledge of 
the Navy target practice and range clearance activity, Mr. Cruz 
Perez concluded that the additional and cumulative impact of air 
pollution created by Navy operations, added to the normal ambient 
level or background of particulate matter on Vieques, is causing 
a violation of the national ambient air quality standards. (CNZ 
Perez, Tr. 4092-4105, Tr. 2586-2590.) 
CP R-55 p. 3-7. (Figure 3-l) Neither,the figure cited nor the text 
offer day-to-day details of TSP concentrations at the three 
stations studied. These data are needed for EQB to determine 
whether the National Primary or Secondary Standards for'24 hours 
were violated. Sampling.was carried out during July, .August and 
September, normally wet months, and therefore might not fairly 
represent annual TSP averages. 
We have doubts about the higher *lbackgroundll TSP concentra- 
'tions measured when bombing was not occurring. What other activi- 
ties were going on during this time? Map 8 (Air Monitoring 
Station Locations) does not pinpoint station locations relative 
to targets or other possible dust sources. 
CPR-56 3-13. Although "AFWTF projections" for 1985 are referred 
to, they are never directly related to environmental impacts. 
The reader therefore cannot assess realistically the effect of 
proposed military operations over the next five years. But the 
"annual surface water loading" numbers supplied here are based on 
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the assumption that the Naval activity level will remain con- 
stant. This is not true -- an increase in.AFWTF operations is 
forecast. Therefore, these numbers are relatively useless since 
they are not correlated to the projected increased expenditure of 
ordnance. 
CPR-57 3-17. The statement here that "heavy metal concentration 
in the surf&e waters approximated natural sea water conditions 
. . . *I is inconsistent.with an earlier statement in this draft EIS 
that excepted zinc and lead levels from this claim. [See page 
2-40 above]. 
CPR-58 3-20. The statement about mangrove decline again fails 
to acknowledge the causes of mangrove problems. The Navy's own 
expert offered specific concrete suggestions for the care of 
Viegues mangrove areas, (i.e. detailed topographical survey, 
restoration plan, planrfor the prevention of over-grazing, and 
wildlife management program). Also, the recommendation in the 
draft EIS that "Further study is needed to determine the specific 
cause for each site and to develop a management plan to mitigate 
future losses" is a vast understatement of what the Navy's own 
expert recommended as critical to the survival of mangrove systems 
on Vieques. [See page 2-79 above]. 
CPR-59 ,- 3-24. Again, this mangrove analysis is totally insuf- 
ficient and ignores the recommendation of the Navy's oum expert. 
[See pages 2-79, 3-20 above]. 
CPR-60 3-31. The projection of an average rate of increase of 
15 hectares (36 acres) per year of barren'land due to air-to-ground 
impacts is useless since it is based on a continuation of past 
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levels of bombing. The levels of air-to-ground bombing are going 
to increase. The draft EIS is required to reflect this projected 
increase, yet it does not. 
CPR-61 3 -34. The inadequacy of the draft EIS discussion of 
lfEffects on Unique Resourcestl is blatant. The draft admits that 
the Navy has not yet instituted a biological survey directed 
toward species location and counting of actual members. 
CPR-62 3-37 l The "present land use factors*' which cause the 
decline and mortality of mangroves are not uncertain and are 
attributable to military operations. The Navy's own expert Lewis 
admitted that military activities appear to be responsible for 
major portions of stressed and dead mangrove areas. [See 2-79, 
3-20, 3-24 above]. -1, 
. 
CPR-63 3 -38. The reference :to *lexclusion of human disturbances" 
which is necessary to preserve endangered species and their 
habitat should include the exclusion of bombing and other military 
operations imposed by military personnel. [See 2-106 above]. 
CP R-64 3-39. The paragraph on brown pelicans nesting on Cayo' 
Conejo is both misleading and inaccurate. The draft EIS stated 
that this brown pelican colony *lbecame established around 1970" 
after military operations had been going on for some years. The 
truth is that the existence of brown pelicans on Viegues has been 
reported in the literature at least since 1916 (See CRB Exh. 176; 
CRB Exh. 177; CRB Exh. 191, p. 541). In 1971, Dr. Cameron Kepler 
identified Cayo Conejo as a brown pelican rookery when he flew 
7-X 
over it in a Navy helicopter and spotted over 50 nests there. 
Those 50 nests were not suddenly "created" on Cayo Conejo in 1971 
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just at the time when Kepler flew by. It is obviousFthat Kepler's 
report is merely a more recent observation of their existence. 
The speculation that *lCayo Conejo has not received direct 
impacts for many years, probably not since the pelicans started 
nesting,** does not comply with the *lworst case" analysis require- 
ment. In any event, the evidence shows the opposite to be true. 
The 'Navy is aware of both bomb impacts on Cayo Conejo and as well 
as reports of a recent direct hit by ordnance (Def. Exh. 73, p. 
15; CRB,Exh. 189, pp. 2-3). Yet there is no dicussion in this 
draft EIS of the potential adverse effect on brown pelicans and 
their habitat of such bombing hits. Grass in craters does not 
adequately cover up this problem. 
CPR-65 3-40. It is ironic that the draft EIS acknowledges here 
that the loss of one member of an endangered species is signifi- 
cant; yet immediately preceeding this statement is the contradic- 
tory assertion that *'occasionally, individual wildlife may be hit 
by small arms fire, but this impact is not significant.*1 If a 
member of an endangered species is.hit by a bomb (as opposed to 
small arms fire), the likelihood and overhanging threat of a loss 
is great and very significant. 
CPR-66 3-42, 3-43. The draft EIS analysis' of the effect of 
military operations on brown pelicans presents an almost *'happy'* 
and optimistic view of Navy protection of both the pe:Lican and 
its habitat. Observations of little or no disturbance to this 
endangered species due to bombing and low aircraft overflights 
puts forth the very best case of sanctuary and protection afforded 
this bird by the Navy. Never is a !worst case*' view presented as 
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is required in an EIS. Although we set forth a full and detailed 
: 
list of the adverse effects on pelicans caused by military opera- 
tions at 2-84, 2-106, and 2-111 supra, a few of the more important 
comments to this section of the draft EIS will be reiterated 
here: 
CPR-66a a. The observations by the Navy's expert Schreiber of 
brown pelican. activities on Cayo Conejo were very limited and 
are, therefore, inadequate to support any positive conclusions 
about the stability of the brown pelican rookery on Cayo Conejo 
at t~time---An~~one+s&ns--based-on Schreiber's 45. 
minute observation period and one helicopter overflight about the 
"adequacy*' of a 500 foot overflight limit or the complacency of 
. 
brown pelicans during military operations are speculative at 
best, [See 2-111 above]. : 
CPR-66b b. The recommendations for further consultation with 
Fish and Wildlife Service and a 1500 foot vertical and 1000 foot 
,F-+% 
horizontal buffer zone around Cayo Conejo are merely minimal 
requirements recommended by experts in 1978. Much more extensive 
further study is mandatory, as well as more stringent restric- 
tions on military operations. A research study should take place 
to determine the 
species prior to 
1219.) 
potential long-term impact of bombing on the 
any further military activity. (Livingston, Tr. 
Schreiber stated that Cayo Conejo should be set aside as "a 
no-entry zone for all military operations and personnel" unless a 
qualified biologist is making an authorized visit to census the 
status of the pelican nesting attempts. (Emphasis added.) ,(Def. 
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Exh. 16, p. 15.) He stated that it is important that the colony 
be protected throughout the year so that all pelicans that attempt 
to, will have every opportunity to nest successfully. (Def. Exh. 
16, pp. 15, 17.) He recommended that "all aircraft" go no lower 
than 1,000 to 1,500 feet above Cayo Conejo. The Navy 1ha.s apparent11 
ignored this recommendation. (Schreiber, Tr. 4963-4964.) 
-The Navy's ornithologist, Sorrie, stated that all other 
things being equal, the pelicans would be better off without 
the Navy's bombing. (CRB Exh. 401A, p. 124; Def. Exh.. 73, p. 
19,) Sorrie believes that Cayo Conejo, since it is an important 
brotjn pelican colony, should be protected. (CFtB Exh. 401A, p. 
64; Sorrie, Tr. 5356.) He proposed numerous recommendations that 
. low passes by helicopters and other fixed wing aircraft-over Cayo 
Conejo should be prohibited (CRH Exh. 401A, p. 65; Sorrie, Tr. 
5356); that tighter controls of the 'firing range should be imposed 
if possible so as not to permit stray bombs and shell cases to 
fall on Cayo Conejo (CRH Exh. 401A, pp. 65, 81; Sorrie, Tr. 
5357-5358); that all people except for the occasional researcher 
or person who would monitor the colony should be excluded from 
Cayo Conejo (Sorrie, Tr. 5356); and that "all the people from 
those at Cerro Matias[,] to the captain of the ship[,] to the 
people who actually fire the shells should be more precise" 
and "try to be more accurate." (Emphasis added.) (CFZ5 Exh. 
401A, p. 82; Sorrie, Tr, 5357.) Sorrie also believes that a 
long, detailed managerial study of Cayo Conejo with "frequent 
visits over a span of a year" is necessary before any Nmeaningful 
managerial recommendationsI' can be made, (Sorrie, Tr. 5357-5358.) 
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He agreed that the FAA recommended minimum level for aircraft 
overflights over wildlife areas should be imposed with respect to 
Cay0 Conejo. .(Sorrie, Tr. 5360.) The FAA's recommended minimum 
level is 2,000 feet. (FAA Advisory Circular No. 91-36A, July 9, 
1974.) [See also 2-111 above]. 
CPR-66c C. The fact that Cayo Conejo is considered critically 
important habitat for the brown pelican is never adequately sug- 
gested by this draft EIS in any meaningful way. Appropriate 
brown pelican breeding habitat is extremely scarce. Schreiber 
has written expressing great concern, generally, about the 
limited supply of appropriate habitats for the brown pelican. 
(Schreiber, Tr. 4931.) Cayo Conejo is critical and is the only 
place where brown pelicans nest on Vieques. Indeed, only one 
other known nesting area for brown pelicans exists in Puerto 
Rico -- near La Parguera. (CRB Exh. 189, pp- 2-3; Belitsky, Tr. 
819-820, 835, 1002, 1041; Schreiber, Tr. 4837.) The Navy's 
ornithologist Sorrie agreed that "Cay0 Conejo is an important 
brown pelican colony.11 (CRB Exh. 401A, p. 64; Sorrie, Tr. 5356.) 
Indeed, Sorrie specifically stated that he considered Cayo Conejo 
to be "of course" critical habitat for the brown pelican -- 
by which he meant that it was, in his words, llessential for 
the continuancell of that species. (CRB Exh. 401B, pp. V2-57 -- 
v2-59. ) Cayo Conejo thus deserves stringent protection in order 
to assure the survival of the brown pelican. The protection 
H---Y. 
would be specifically aimed at preventing the alteration of 
habitat form disturbances -- including disturbances caused by 
military operations. (CRB Exh. 189, ppe 2-3; CRB Exh. 401B, pp. 
V2-57 V2-59; Belitsky, Tr. 836; see also Sorrie, Tr, 5356-5358.) 
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CP R-66d d. The draft states that the birds are not disturbed 
by .the operations. This is contrary to their own expert's admis- 
sion, both with 
well as bombs. 
their nests and 
respect to helicopter and plane over-flights, as 
Brown pelicans have been observed "flushing?? fron 
restricting their mating activities because of 
bombing and over-flights near Cayo Conejo. It is a known fact 
that when pelicans are feeding in the water, the shock waves fron 
bombs could kill them. In addition, when pelicans flush from 
their nests, the eggs may overheat in the sun (thereby killing 
the chicks) or be cracked when the pelicans fly off. [See page 
2-111 above]. 
CP R-66e e. Current evidence indicates a decline in the brown 
pelican population on Cayo Conejo since 1971. This contradicts 
the assertion in the EIS that the I?possibility of adverse impacts 
on endangered species, such as the brown pelican, directly due tc 
ordnance, is very low and has not occurred since the colony was 
established." Again, the draft EIS should not present the *'best'! 
possible environmental assessment of this brown pelican colony, 
but instead should approach possible dangers to this endangered 
species from the standpoint of a *'worst case" analysis. 
In 1972, the Navy admitted that an increase of opera- 
tions on Viegues would result in a proportional increase in the 
destruction of birdlife there. (FAAH Exh. 15, p. 3-98.) An 
increase in operations on Viegues indeed taken place- 
(Findings 8-15.) An eyewitness specifically stated that there 
are currently fewer pelicans on Vieques than in 1971. (Santos 
Velazguez, Tr. 1082.) Belitsky testified that when Dr. Kepler 
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made the count of pelicans in 1971, he flew over Cayo Conejo at a 
low altitude of about 300 feet, hovered over the island for as 
long as it took him to dount, and counted the backs of birds that 
were perched in a nesting posture. From that, Kepler derived the c 
number of more than 50 nests that were active at that one time, - . 
(Belitsky, Tr'. 990, 1034.) In 1978,'there were fewer than 50 
nests couxed at any one time on Cayo Conejo. (CBB Exh. .189, p. 
2; Belitsky, Tr. -838, 1041-1042.) Schreiber made an estimate 
that about 50 nests had existed over a four-month period. -(Def. 
Exh. 16, -pa 8.) This indicates apparently less nesting activity 
on Cay0 Conejo in'comparisbn with 1971. Any decline in nesting 
activity would cause a corresponding-decrease in the pelican 
population. (Belitsky, Tr. 989, 1010.) Schreiber was apparently 
careful not to say there was no decrease in nesting activity on 
Vieques since 1971. Schreiber only said that the Kepler 1971 
data were insufficiently strong for Schreiber to rely on Kepler's 
count. (Schreiber, Tr. 4849-4851.) Yet Sorrie, the Navy's other 
ornithologist, who had worked with -Kepler, rely on Kepler's 
Cayo Conejo count in's published article (Exh. 177, p- 91) ("Flying 
by helicopter, Kepler located a colony [of brown pelicans] with 
over fifty nests on Cay0 Conejo, south of Bahia Salina de1 Sur, 
on July 20, 19?11'), and Sorrie also 'gave Kepler credit for a 
llgood bird count" on Culebra. (CR3 Exh. 401A-94.) 
CPR-66f f. It should be noted that Cayo Conejo is located 
within an area which is l'saturatedlf with ordnance. (CRB Exh. 212, 
B 12; CRB Exh. 232; CRB Exh. 233, Encl. 1, p. 5). 
,,- + 
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CPR-67 3-45, 3-46, 3-47. The draft EIS characterizes the impacts 
on marine communities, associations, and fish populations inhabitir 
the reefs and grassbeds from air-to-ground or Naval gunfire as 
negligible. As demonstrated above, this is an inaccurate and 
overly optimistic view of the adverse effects of military opera- 
tions on marine life, reefs and seagrasses. However, even assum- 
ing',that the marine communities are not totally destroyed as of 
the date expert surveys for the draft were performed (i-et 1978), 
that does not mean that serious and potentially fatal risks are 
not present. The seagrass system can take only a certain.amount 
of stress before a collapse occurs. The same is true with respect 
to coral reefs. Without healthy reef and seagrass systems, the 
' fish population will suffer an even greater decline --- an effect I 
which is not insignificant. [See 2-131, 2-133, 2-144, 2-152, 
2-165, 2-166 above.] 
CPR-68 S-48. The methodology used by the Navy's expert Hannan 
to determine size of fish populations was inadequate. Reference 
should be to Zieman's work, which was more accurate and indicated 
a lower fish population density than would be expected around the 
eastern end of Vieques. [See 2-131, 2-1521. 
CP R-69 3-51. The survey of reefs by the Navy's expert Antonius 
was not sufficient to support any comparison in the draft EIS 
between the health of Vieques reefs versus Virgin Islands reefs- 
Although the draft constantly refers to "the reefs", giving the 
impression that an in-depth study of numerous reef areas was 
performed, .such is not the case. In any event, a worst case 
analysis is certainly not offered. 
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When Antonius testified, he was offered as an expert 
presenting highly scientific, systematic, ploddingly-thorough, 
and conclusive evidence on the Vieques reefs. This illusion was 
quickly shattered. To begin with, Antonius was unfamiliar with 
his own report. He failed, for example, to distinguish between 
two of his own important categories -- "military impact" and 
"military debris" -- which are defined clearly on the face of his 
own report. (Def. Exh. 89, pp. l-3; Antonius Tr. 6221-6225, 
6229.) During the hearing, it was quickly revealed that there 
were numerous important reefs that he did not do transects on. 
In addition, a great deal of data were taken in areas, such as 
the very tip of Vieques, where there might be expected to be 
- 
somewhat less military impact -- thereby diluting the data with 
respect to damage. Thus, at reef:N-1, at the very eastern tip of 
Viegues, he took four transects with 900 data points. Yet he 
gathered no data at reefs N-2, N-3, N-4, and N-5 along the north 
coast, which includes llsupersaturatedll Area llJ1l in the April 10 
Exh. 1 (Appendix D hereto.) He gathered no data at reef N-7 in 
Bahia Salinas near supersaturated area ltE'f from the April 10 Exh. 
1. He gathered no data at reef N-9, the long reef to the north 
of Bahia Icacos. He gathered no data at Puerto Diablo, which is 
in supersaturated Area lfB." He gathered no data at reef S-l. At 
reef S-3 he took 950 data points, but at S-5 which is closer to 
the target areas, he took only 430. He gathered no data at reefs 
S-4 or S-6. S-4 is in supersaturated Area lrA1* and S-6 is between -~---+ 
supersaturated.Areas "A" and l'D.qr (Antonius, Tr. 6270-6278.) 
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There are additional reasons for discounting '&ttonius' test- 
imony. He stated with respect to one inaccuracy in his written 
testimony that, "this is only a report, not a scientific paper." 
(Antonius, Tr. 6310.) He could not identify for the record where 
any of his transects in Vieques were done. (Tr. 6282-6283.) He 
had similar difficulties with respect to transects he did in the 
Virgin Islands used for comparison with Viegues. (Antonius, Tr, 
6287-6294.) He could not even locate Dorothea Bay, St. Thomas on 
the.map (he had done transects there): IfI cannot indicate Dorothe 
Bay. I have no idea which one of those bays would be Dorothea." 
(Antonius, Tr. 6292.) 
Antonius' report is deficient in that it fails to list para- 
chute damage as one of the areas of YiClitary impact" despite the 
fact that parachutes,are presented as part of the numerical 
portions of his report. Antonius testified: ffWell, I may have 
overlooked this, yes, it seems so. When I wrote this report, I 
thought in terms of broken corals, and I may have just overlooked 
parachutes." (Antonius, Tr. 6314-6315.) 
In addition, certain data that could have been quite rele- 
vant was thrown out by Antonius. Antonius and another diver ran 
transects ten meters apart. The transects.were only iaccepted 
"when they were close to identical." (Antonius, Tr. 6192.) 
Under this approach should a great deal of damage have shown up 
rn one of the transects whereas in the other it did not, the 
information would apparently not be accepted for purposes of 
Antonius' report. 
I-89 
CPR 
Antonius indicated that he could not distinguish whether 
broken coral and coral rubble in Vieques is caused by military 
impact or natural causes except in certain clear instances. 
(See, Antonius, Tr. 6208, 6212.) (The extent of Antonius' diffi- 
culty in distinguishing storm damage from bomb.damage is shown by 
the fact that Antonius had wanted as part of trial preparation to 
deliberately blow up a reef at Vieques with a bomb to see what 
bomb damage looks like. (Antonius, Tr. 6212.)) Thus, in those 
cases where damage could have been caused by either ordnance 
damage or by storms, he concluded that it was caused by storm 
damage. (Antonius, Tr. 6315-6316.) Based on the evidence in the 
record, the presumption should have been exactly the opposite: 
Given the fact that these areas are saturated with ordnance and ,K----X. 
some are even supersaturated, there is every reason to believe 
that at least a substantial portion of the damage that was con- 
sistent with having been caused by either military activities or 
storms was indeed caused by military activities. 
Aritonius tried to bolster his testimony by indicating that 
he had gone to reefs in the Virgin Islands and compared percent- 
ages of broken corals with those on Vieques. This jaunt to the 
Virgin Islands does not serve to refute the overwhelming evidence 
on the issue of military damage to .Vieques corals. As stated 
previously, Antonius had great trouble describing his transects; 
he could not even locate Dorothea Bay on St. Thomas where he did 
work. (Antonius, Tr. 6292.) Antonius' data were "lumped into 
one package" and not broken out for possibly useful analysis of 
individual sites. (Antonius, Tr. 6304.) Thus, Antonius did not 
r--b. 
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make any attempt to compare any wave action at sites in the 
Virgin Islands and wave action at reef sites areas of Viegues, 01 
to compare the more protected areas of the Virgin Islands with 
the more protected areas of Vieques. (Antonius, Tr. 6304.) He 
conceded that the number of reefs in "high wave action" areas 
versus ffprotected" areas would be of importance. (Antonius, Tr.. 
6305.) Nor did he attempt, in picking his sites in the Virgin 
Islands, to pick a reef and a certain number of data points that 
are comparable to each of the reefs selected by the sites in 
Vieques. (Antonius, Tr. 6304.) 
The evidence tends to support the conclusion that the reefs 
A.ntonius visited on the Virgin Islands had higher wave energy 
(and were thus more susceptible to wave damage) than those on 
'Vieques. . 
For example, one of the re,efs in the Virgin Islands chosen 
by Antonius was the treacherous Johnson's Reef at St. John where, 
he said, "we were carried by considerable waves, over the reef 
crest, and we had to return to the port where we started and do 
it all over again. It was very rough.ff He agreed with the 
statement in a yachting guide that Johnson's Reef "is a very 
dangerous reef, and in spite of the fact it is well :marked, 
continues to garner its toll of boats each year." (Antonius, Tr. 
6217-6218, 6283-A 6284.) In other words, Antonius used for 
comparison with Viegues a reef subject to very heavy wave action 
and also subject to the impact of crashing boats. 
:_ 
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Furthermore, Antonius' own data show that the Virgin Island 
reefs he visited had higher wave energy than those on Vieques. 
This is made very clear from a comparison of sponges found in 
Vieques and the Virgin Islands reefs Antonius visited. In 
Vieques, 35 percent of the sponges he noted were ircinia strobilina, 
which is a non-encrusting form of sponge that would be found in a 
low wave energy area. In contrast, on the Virgin Islands, only 
15 percent were ircinia strobilina (the non-encrusting low-wave 
energy sponge) and 77 percent were anthosigmella varians (incrust- 
ing high wave energy sponge.) This suggests a very high wave 
energy on the Virgin Islands reefs he visited in comparison with 
Vieques. (Antonius, Tr. 6310-6313). 
CP R-70 3-53. Again, a deceptively-sweeping statement about the 
overall health of "the reefs" based on Antonius' work is presented 
with great certainty. Inadequdte and limited work by Antonius 
/--a" 
coupled with evidence to the contrary refutes this assertion. 
The notion that reefs which are in adequate condition at present 
means that such reefs will continue to remain in adequate condition 
forever, is erroneous and misleading. A lfworst case" analysis 
must be offered with respect to future reef damage. [See 3-51, 
2-144 above.] 
CPR-71 3-54. The draft EIS states that the magnitude of the 
impact of restriction of access to fishing waters around eastern 
Viegues and the resulting reduction in the potential fisheries 
catch 'Iis not known since the sustainable yields from these 
waters has not been established.lf Again, a worst case analysis 
should be presented here instead of an admission that such issues 
have not been researched since the Summer of 1978. 
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CPR-72 3-55. Although prevention of overfishing on the eastern 
end.due to ordnance restrictions is cited as an alleged effectiv 
management practice initiated by the Navy, the fact that it is 
causing increased fishing pressures on other water areas around 
Viegues is not mentioned. 
CPR-73 3-56. With respect to the specific.causes for the signi 
ficant loss of mangroves around both Puerto Mosquito and Bahia 
Tapon, responsibility should be allocated to naval operations. 
This fact is never once acknowledged in this draft :EIS. [See 
2-34, 2-79, 3-20, 3-24, 3-37 above). 
CPR-74 3-57. The draft EIS states that the potential impact of 
military operations on sea turtles is lfindeterminatefr and that 
the primary areas of concern are the disruption of breeding be- 
havior and nesting sites. This assertion does not recognize 
expert opinion which warned that the chance for the survival of 
turtles on Vieques is "very slimIf if there is no change in the 
current conditions on Vieques. The draft EIS has again failed tc 
present the required Ifworst case!' analysis. [See 2-106 above]. 
CPR-75 3-67, 3-68. Again, the draft EIS has misinterpreted the 
data collected in the noise survey on Veiques, In addition, it 
is erroneous to characterize noise as merely a 1fsociologica18r 
problem not based on reality. Nothing could be more real than 
140 dB level sound that is actually dangerous on a physical 
level. Also, it would be stretching the imagination to believe 
that the Navy would settle damage claims for cracks in houses 
that the Navy believes were not caused by military operations. 
[See 2-275, 2-276, 2-393 above]. 
i 
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Cf'R-76. 3-84. There is much more than a "limited probability" 
that archeological and historical sites would be found in the 
i 
target area. In fact, one such site has already been nominated 
by the Navy since the termination of the injunction hearing. 
Numerous other important sites on the eastern end (14 archeolog- 
ical and 8 historical sites) were designated by other experts 
during the very brief two week inspection permitted in 1978. 
[See 2-344 above]. 
CPR-77 3-93. For detailed discussion about the reasons for 
mangrove decline, see 2-34, 2-79, 3-20, 3-24, 3-37, 3-56 above. 
CPR-78 3-95. The analysis of lfImpacts on Water ResourcesIf in 
the draft EIS is insufficient and contradicts earlier discussions 
of this issue in the Vieques portion of the TAMS study. [See 
.f---% 
2-133 above--reference to FAAE Exh. 15, p. 3-941. 
CPR-79 3-105. The Navy underestimates the amount of inaccurate 
Naval gunfire that occurs as a matter of course. In the Navy's 
effort to minimize the fear for the safety of the inhabitants of 
Vieques, it has left out vital information, such as the six-mile 
miss in October, 19.78 of a live projectile to the northeast of 
Viegues. Such misfiring has the serious potential to fatally 
injure citizens of Vieques and others, as well as causing other 
damage such as to endangered species in and around the island 
[See 2-376 above.] 
CPR-80 3-106. The draft contains a bizarre prediction: That 
with the low level of FMFLANT activity, "it is unlikely that 
accidents will occur at regular intervals in the future." 
‘f-7 
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(Emphasis added). Puerto Rico questions whether having1 accidents 
at irregular intervals would be any improvement, when the issue 
of safety is at stake. 
cpjq-81 3-115. Noise impacts of current operations are significant. 
[See 2-393, 3-68 above], 
CPR-82 4. Alternatives Section. 
Although the Alternatives Analysis contained in Section 
4 of the draft EIS predictably ranks Vieques as the only practical 
choice available to the Navy for Atlantic Fleet Training, since 
Culebra is no longer available, common sense alone should tell us 
that there's something wrong with a conclusion that ap:proves the 
continuing use, not to mention the increased use, of a small 
island with an estimated population of 9,000, as the preferred 
target for intensive shelling, strafing and amphibious assaults. 
At least two Secretaries of Defense within the very 
recent past have concluded that Viegues would not be a good 
choice for so-called fftrainingfl operations. On Decembler 27, 1971 
Melvin Laird, then Secretary of Defense, reported to the Congress 
that the Navy could transfer Culebra operations to Viegues 
because to do so If. . -would transfer the training activity from 
an island with 700 inhabitants [Culebra] to one with 7,000 inhabi- 
tants [Viegues]. I do not think this would be a prudent course 
of action." (Emphasis added.) (CRB Exh. 118 at p. 2.) 
On May 24, 1973, Secretary of Defense Elliot Richardson 
reported to the Congress on the pressing problem of where to 
transfer Culebra military operations. Secretary Richardson 
stated that, taking into account both "the long-range interest of 
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the Department of Defense" and the need Ifto reduce as much as ! 
possible the,impact of Navy training activities on local inhabi- 
tants. . .I', Navy training activities on Culebra had to be trans- 
ferred to uninhabited alternative islands. (Emphasis added.) 
(CRB Exh. 126, pp. 2-4.) 
The improper transfer of Culebra operations to Vieques 
has intensified the Navy's use of Vieques to such a point that 
the environmental and social controversy generated by that transfer 
has tragically reached sometimes violent proportions', and there 
is no reason to suppose that this will necessarily abate over the 
years. As Secretary Laird foresaw, turning Culebra fire on 
Vieques was certainly not "prudent." 
The irreparable harm that is being done every month of 
the year to the eastern part of Vieques has a corresponding 
impact on the many people who live on that small island. The 
unexploded ordnance lying amidst the destructive signs of exploded 
ordnance has sown corresponding seeds of resentment among the 
populations of both Viegues and Puerto Rico, to the prejudice of 
all concerned. As Secretary Richardson knew, Culebra training 
had to be located somewhere other than on Vieques. 
If there were no other examples available, what has 
happened in Vieques would remain as the living proof, the vital 
reason for the existence of environmental legislation as applied 
directly to a community. The land, the beaches, the flora and 
fauna, the air, lagoons and waters of Viegues, are important not 
just in themselves, not in a vacuum, but because they form part 
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of a total environment within which thousands of people live. 
Both that environment and the cultural heritage contained in the 
variety of historical and archaeological objects and sites depos- 
ited in the thousands of years in which human presence has made 
its mark on Vieques, are extremely important to the larger com- 
munity of Puerto Rico as a whole. Neither of these communities -- 
that'of Vieques nor that of Puerto Rico -- will accept the Navy's 
argument, as expressed in this draft EIS again and again, that 
danger or harm to the environment due to naval bombing and shelling 
operations in this area would be ffnegligiblelf. No sensible 
person will believe that for very long, if at all. 
For these reasons, the lfcomparative evaluaticon'f of the 
various alternatives proposed by the Navy is doomed to failure, 
since the most basic problem of all -- environmental and social 
controversy created by the impact of intensive military activity 
on a small inhabited island -- is simply ignored in this part of 
the .draft EIS. Secretary Laird and Secretary Richardson knew 
what they were doing when they refused to ignore that issue in 
1971 and 1973. The Navy cannot simply pretend that the problem 
does not exist. 
As Admiral Holloway, now Chief'of Naval Operations, 
stated in 1975: 
"No matter how we attempt to justify it, 
turning our guns in their direction will not 
be palatable to the Viegueans [sic].'! (CRB 
Exh. 69.) 
T-a7 
An alternatives analysis that does not even discuss 
this issue can only be considered inadequate. 
There is no weapons training activity on Vieques that 
could not be accomplished elsewhere. For instance, ffSolid Shield" I 
the massive 40,000-man combined fleet integrated operation origin- 
ally scheduled for Viegues in March of 1978, was moved to deserted 
areas of North Carolina upon the filing by the Puerto Rican 
government of a request for injunctive relief. In addition, the 
Pacific Fleet for years has conducted its main training exercises' 
in such a way that ship-to-shore and air-to-ground shelling and 
bombing are carried out in two completely separate areas, the 
former far off the coast of California and the latter in uninhabit- 
ed areas' qf the southwestern United States. 
Just as importantly, the training not only does not r 
need to be done where 
in the manner that it 
lery does not have to 
it is, but it also does not need to be done 
is being done. For instance, marine artil- 
be fired long range from battery positions 
on Viegues into an impact zone on Vieques. Fire crews could be 
trained on long range fire with an instrumented offshore impact . 
area, using short range shots to train fire observers. (Leuba, 
Tr. 105.) 
And almost all naval gunfire support exercises could be 
conducted effectively against an instrumented water impact target, 
with more accurate scoring and at less cost than against a land 
based target. (Leuba, Tr. 104.) The reduction of the environ- /--y 
mental impact of Navy training exercises would be very substantial. 
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A report on Navy weapons training prepared by Dr. 
William A. Kemper of the Naval Gunfire Weapons Laboratory at 
Dahlgren, Virginia evaluated the kind of ship-to-shore and air- 
to-ground activity conducted at Vieques and concluded that all 
ship-to-shore training activity could be conducted using a water 
target. (CRB Exh. 109, pp. 2, 4-5.) Even if there 'were some 
that had to be on land, with the use of inert ordnance these 
could be conducted on any suitable piece of-land. (.Leuba, Tr. 
104.) 
Landing beaches for marine amphibious training'are 
certainly available elsewhere, (Kinnear, Tr. 3260-3261, 3285,) 
A& air-to-ground training conducted on Viegues could 
be conducted using cameras and electronic instrumentation over 
water targets (Leuba, Tr. 104; Kemper Report, CRB Exh. 109.) 
The kind of combined total team training maneuvers 
exemplified by "Solid Shield '78" can also be conducted else- 
where, as shown by its transfer to North Carolina. (Kinnear, Tr. 
3301.) This sort of activity, in any case, while it was once the 
principal activity for Navy use of Viegues, now represents but a 
fraction of the Navy's total Vieques range usage, after the 
transfer of air-to-ground and ship-to-shore activity from Culebra 
to Viegues. (Kinnear, Tr. 3233.) 
Finally, the use of inert ordnance would be of immense 
benefit in terms of reducing environmental impact on Viegues, and 
in terms of analyzing alternatives. Admiral Sagerholm, then 
Commander of the Caribbean Sea Frontier, stated in 1978 that,the 
functioning of the weapons system in ship-to-shore training 
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activity and the delivery of the projectiles on target can be 
determined completely through the use of inert ordnance, and that 
the highest possible level in training could be adequately tested 
through the use of inert ordnance. 
Admiral Kinnear generally concurred in Admiral Sagerholm's 
conclusion. (Kinnear, Tr. 3239-3240.) 
It is clear that the Navy could significantly reduce at 
once, and eliminate almost completely in the future, the use of 
live ordnance on Vieques. Ironically, the Secretary of Defense 
ordered the Navy to use only puff rounds in ship-to-shore training 
activity when the Navy was conducting such activity on Culebra. 
(Leuba, Tr. 149-150.) Live ordnance is now being used in the 
case of Viegues. 
In the case of the Rawa@an island of Kahoolawe, the 
Navy has recently agreed to reduce the use-of live ordnance 
significantly, and to eliminate its use almost entirely within 
the next few years. In that case the Navy has also agreed to 
remove unexploded ordnance from approximately 10,000 acres on 
Kahoolawe, according to a specific clearance plan. This has been 
agreed to by the Navy in the case of an uninhabited island. The 
fact that this arrangement has been worked out for Kahoolawe must 
mean that the Navy surely has the capacity to reach similar 
arrangements and solutions in the case of Viegues -- it simply 
has chosen not to do so in Viegues, as it chose not to do so in 
Culebra until forced to vacate the premises by Presidential 
order. To refuse to discuss in an envir,onmental impact statement 
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what the Navy does not want to do but is clearly capable of doin 
is not an honest, adequate response to the applicable law and 
regulations governing environmental impact statements. 
The absence in the Alternatives Analysis of any discus- 
sion of less harmful ways of conducting the separate and the 
total military training activities carried out by the Navy 
renders the analysis inadequate. The use of instrumented off- 
shore impact areas, and cameras and electronic instrumentation 
together with water targets, combined with inert ordnance, are 
alternatives that the Navy cannot responsibly ignore in'reviewinc 
its environmental responsibilities and their review might very 
well lead to different conclusions with respect to where Navy 
training can and should be carried out. 
CPR-83 5 . Probable Adverse Effects Which Cannot Be Avoided 
[See all earlier Comments which refute this entire 
concept. These adverse effects can be avoided.] 
CPR-84 7. Irreversible or Irretrievable Commitments of 
Resources: 
The Navy is incorrect in its belief that '"the land 
committed to live air-to-ground and naval gunfire support activi. 
ties is essentially lost for all time to any other active use due 
to the extreme danger and difficulty of removing unexploded 
ordnance and returning the land to its former condition." The 
Navy's activities on the Hawaiian island of Kahoolawe refute thiz 
assertion. The Navy agreed to remove unexploded ordnance from 
approximately 10,000 acres on Kahoolawe according to a specific 
clearance plan. This could be done on Vieques as well. 
r-101 
Volume II, MAP 14 
This map contains the location of water quality sampling 
stations and classification of the inshore waters. The Navy 
CPR 
should also be required to sample waters in lagoons with offshore 
stations. 
Volume II, MAP 39 
CP R-86 This map is supposed to indicate the density of impacts 
of live air-to-ground ordnance. This description is misleading, 
however, because it is contradicted by the maps of llsaturated" 
and "supersaturated" areas presented by the Navy to the District 
Court and as confirmed on site visits by experts. [See Appendices 
C and D to these comments.] 
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Servicios Legales de Puerto Rico 
UNIDAD DE CALIDAD AMBIENTAL 
Avenida Muiioz Rivera 1058 
Piso 6 - Aparrado CM 
Rio Piedras, P. R. 00927 
Tel. 7634007 
May 14, 1980 
Commander Atlantic Division 
Naval Facilities Engineering Command 
Attention: Code 2d 
Norfolk, Virginia 23511 
Dear Sir: 
The following are comments on the Draft EnvironmGrLcas sJL1i ,b.nCTl '-7act Statement on the'continued Use of the Atlantic Fleet Weapons 
Training Facilities Inner Range (Vieques&,from here on,, the Draft 
EIS. 
SLPR-1 
Generally speaking, we find that the Draft EIS does not 
comply with the requirements of'the National Environmental Policy 
Act nor the applicable EIS guidelines. The Draft EIS does not 
reasonably examine all the environment and human consequences of 
the military activities and presence in Vieques in scientic terms 
but, instead, the document appears to be concerned with justif- 
ying the present military uses of Vieques. 
We believe the main problems or deficiencies of the Draft 
EIS are as follows: 
SLPR-2 1 
. 
life 
The evaluation and consideration of the danger to human 
from military activities on Vieques is a mayor failure of 
the Draft EIS. 
tain theoretical 
The Draft EIS limits itself to enumerating cer- 
safety measures allegedly employed by the U.S. 
Navy (section 2.4.3) and.discussing certain safety records from 
August 1967 to July 1978 (sec. 3.4.3). But this is inadequate 
when the following examples are considered: 
SLPR-2a a- Throughout the years, several civilians have been 
kil' - -led or injured in Vieques as a result of explosions of 
grenades and other ordnance. These civilians are not referred 
to at all in the Draft EIS but instead only two instances of 
injury to civilians are addressed in page 3-106, 
much more serious. 
The problem is 
SLPR 
SLPR-2b b-’ No reference is made to one naval gunfire miss in 
Oct. 18, 1979 which landed approximately 5 miles off of the 
Northeast coast of Vieques, outside the Danger Zone, and very 
.near a passing small fishing craft. The ship involved was the 
USS Texas. In the light of incidents as this one the discussion 
of misses in the Draft EIS at page 3-104 has to be considered 
superficial because the true safety risks have not been taken 
into account. 
SLPR-2c c- No mention is made of a target drone which fell in 
a populated sector of Vieques in June 1, 1976 (see page 2-245). ', 
The name of the sector is Destino Ward. The U.S. Navy paid cer- 
tain money damages because of the destruction of property. 
Deaths nearly occurred at that time since the drone, weiglting 
approximately 300 pounds., landed very near the houses of that 
ward. 
SLPR-2d d- No mention or consideration is given to the risks to 
human life frm other military accidents, such as aircraft 
collisions. one such collision occurred in i&e Vieques area 
between two jet bombers in De,cc. 5, 1979, One plane was lost 
and a pilot died. The other plane, with its tail damaged, was 
able to get back to the Roosevelt Road Naval,Station. Grumman 
F-14 Tomcat fighters were involved. Vieques residents could 
observe the rescue operations ,from their homes. The incident 
was reported in the San Juan Star of Dec. -7, 1979. 
, d--w, 
On an earlier date a jet fighter lost control and crashed 
in the mangrove areas of that Naval Station- 
These incidents derive from U.S. Navy activities in Vieques 
and represent a serious threat to the safety of civilians in that 
island because of the geographical closeness of the activities 
and their residences among other factors. 
SLPR-2e e- The Draft EIS neither contains any evaluation of the 
risks to fishermen because of ordnance lying in the bottom of the 
sea and ordnance which will continue to accumulate in ocean waters 
thereby increasing the risks to their lives. 
SLPR-2f f- Finally, no consideration is given to the risks to 
the occurrence of war be it local 
.F--X 
the people of Vieques because 
. 
or total. Since the western portion of Vieques is used by the 
U.S. Navy for the storage of ordnance and the rest of the island 
as an important training and practice locale, continuation of this 
SLPR 
entails risks to all the civilians of Vieques at time of war; 
and- not only to the civilians, but to the total environment, 
both aquatic and terrestial, 
SLPR-3 2, The discussion of the damage to corals near Clay0 Alca- 
traz (pages 2-444 to 2-245) downplays the very severe damage 
brought about by extensive 500-lbs bombs explosions against 
the nearby shi. target. In fact, Cayo Alcatraz island and the 
nearby reefswf8&ost totally destroyed because of the heavy 
bombardment. 
SLPR-4 3 
. The part entitled "Historical Civilian-Military Rela- 
tionships" (2.3.2.2) avoids mentioning the death of an 80-year 
old man due to beatings from U.S. Marines in 1953, At page 
2-245 it also avoids mentioning the fact that, though the Navy 
has always claimed that its operations do not cause walls to 
crack, it payed compensation due to damage to property bacause 
of that reason, 
SLPR-5 4 . Part 2.3.2.8, "Current Civilian-Military Relationships", 
should be updated to indicate that the former Navy liason officer, 
Lt. La Zerda, has been charged with using and conspiring to use 
Navy plastic explosives against several groups and persons that 
advocate an end to the military operations in Vieques. See the 
attached indictments. 
SLPR-6 
5. In relation to' important environmental concerns, 
Draft EIS relies heavily on the short-term work of the va 
experts contracted by the U.S. Navy for the very specific 
of testifying in the Brown case. An example is the use 0 
Hannan for evaluating fish populations in Vieques, 
the 
rious 
purpo 
f 
se 
6. The following comments relate to various portions of 
section 3 (pages 3-l to 3-119): 
SLPR-7. 
-3.1.1 Topography 
The very short-terms observation during 1978 are not enough 
to judge adequately the problem of sediment transportation and 
contamination of nearby ocean waters: and, *such less, cannot 
support the conclusion of the Draf EIS that such sediments pose 
no long term threats to those waters. 
SLPR-6 -3.1.2.1 Air Emissions from Firing of Ordnance- 
The air-emission problem due to explosions has not been 
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adequately considered since yearly total explosive quantities 
for 1977-78 are used and not peak monthly values which would 
indicate a much more serious contamination problem. 
SLPR-9 -3 -1.3 Hydrology 
The alteration by the Navy of the lagoons' natural drainage 
patterns due.to road building and other activities have caused 
serious damage to wetland areas in Vieques. Those activities are 
not adequately considered and discussed in the Draft EIS contrary 
to other available evidence in Court testimony in the Brown case 
and Lewis' own conclusions. 
SLPR-10 -3.1.4.1 Water Quality 
The cumulative effect of explosive by-products up to 1985 
and beyond is superficially set aside in one sentence in page. 
3-18 since the observations and water quality testing performed 
to this point are not enough to make adequate proyections, that 
-is, to conclude that explosive by-products will be washed away. 
SLPR-7 1 -3.2.1.3 Vegetation ': 
f-k 
The document does not adequately evaluate the various craters 
and military debris lying east of the Eastern Front Friendly Line 
and which represent a threat to valuable plant species and the 
general unique vegetation east of that line. 
SLPR-12 In discussing small arms (page 3-26) no mention is made of 
the fires caused by bullet and rock frictions and the subsequent 
damage to vegetation. 
SLPR-13 -3 -2.1.5 Effects on Unicue~lants~Resources 
As indicated by the Draft EIS the survey of rare and endan- 
gered species on Vieques has not been completed which means that 
current military activities might be endangering said species. 
Temporary protective measures should be taken. 
SLPR-14 The list in Table 2-20 does not take into consideration the 
recent findings (1978) by Prof. Roy Woodbury in U.S. Navy land 
relating to newly discovered endemic guava species in the Monte 
Matlas area. 
.--., 
SLPR 
SLPR-15 
-3.2 -3.4 Unique Features and Rare and Endangered 
&uatiySpecies) 
The Draft EIS states that the potential impact on sea turtles 
is *'indeterminate" because lack of knowledge on sea-turtle stocks. 
But several sea-turtles which use Vieques are in the endangered 
or rare species list irrespective offully 'adequate knowledge of. 
stock numbers. The Draft EIS has chosen to ignore the fact that 
Vieques beaches and ocean waters are used by said sea-turtles 
for nesting and feeding and that the evidence gathered to this 
point (including that one by Navy contracted experts) establishes 
detrimental effect of several Navy activities on the nesting and 
Possibly feeding habits of sea-.turtles. Such activities include 
vehicle traffic, trench-digging, 
beaches. 
and explosions in likely nesting. 
See Court testimonies and reports by Weiwandt, Carr and 
Rainey. 
The vast implications derived from the impact on sea-turtles 
in Vieques because of the military operations are superficially 
put aside by the Draft EIS in one paragraph (page 3-57). 
SLPR-16 
-3.3.3 Economic Sys terns 
The Draft EIS asserts that, perhaps, the Navy's land controls 
in Vieques has negatively affected only the tourism and fishing 
industry. But only a limited and superficial analysis supports 
this conclusion which excludes other potential social and economic 
development alternatives. 
SLPR-17 7. The alternatives (Section 4) considered are three: 
continued use,,of Vieques, cessation of the activities 
in the 'carribbean and the transfer of those activities 
to one of four sites (see page 4-5). But the alternatives and 
subsequent environmental, operational and costs considerations 
of those alternatives operate within self-imposed operational 
constraints which make the analysis of alternatives an incomplete 
and faulty one. More specifically: 
a- The same operational methods are given, hence, alter- 
native of an artificial target island is not considered and 
discussed. 
b- Similarly, no evaluations is given to other than 
live-bombing practices as, for instance, electronic scoring 
devices. 
SLPR 
c- No consideration is given to transfering the Roosevelt 
Road and Viegues complex to other sites, more specifically, to 
one of the many islands in the Florida keys; that is, the Navy 
Caribbean military operations are considered a fact irrespective 
of the risk to human life and the environment; The matrix approach 
employed cannot account properly for the risk of loss of human 
life. 
Please send me 
present Draft EIS. 
a copy of all the documents received on the 
Thank you. 
nmental Quality Unit 
Puerto Rico Legal Services, Inc. 
BOX C M 
RIO Piedras, Puerto Rico 00928 
developmenl co. 
P-0. BOX 2923 . SAN JUAN, PUERTO IUCO. BOB03 
April 25, 1980 
Director, Puerto Rico Branch 
Atlantic Division 
Naval Facilities Engineering Command. 
l3. S. Naval Station 
Box 3037 
Ceiba, Puerto Rico 00635 
Dear Sir; 
We thank you for the copy of the draft environmental impact 
statement of continued Naval activities on Vieques. 
We have received with great interest the contents of the 
two (2) volumes comprising the "DEE". 
It is our considered opinion that the continuation of Naval 
activities will not have an adverse effect on the development of 
our proposed recreational project for the Island of Vieques. 
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Publlic Library, Ponce 
ZSTADO LIBP? ASOCIADO DE PUERTO RICO 
DEX?.TAMENTO DE INSTXJCCIOX PUBLICA 
CEXTRC DE SERVICL3S EDUCATIVOS 
BIBLIOTRC;?, PUBLICA 
PONCE, PUZRTO RICO 
The following iB based on information gathered from various sources 
including the Draft Enviromental Statement consisting of two volumes published 
hy the Navy Department in december 1979. Various newspapers and magazines accounts 
published in both the island arid in some mainland publications, on conversations 
with various interested parties and on some personal research and is intended to be 
an impartial version of the Vieques Vs. Navy controversy. 
The present controversy is not the first one that Vieques ha,s be&involved 
The first historical mention of the island was made by Columbus in his 
second voyage.in 1493. In 1514 Don Cristdbal Martinez led an expedition against 
the Caribe Tribe in retaliation for an attack on a Spanish Settlement there. 
During the 17 th. Century it was practically unhabited. But late in that same- 
century an English Colony was established in the southern part of the island. 
And early 17 map shows and English Colony and fort at that site. During this 
time both the English and the Spanish claimed the island. 
Early in the 19 th. Century the first Spanish settlement was established 
but this led on a confrontation between the English and the Spanish, and later 
with the Danes of nearby Virgin Islands But by mid 19 th. Century ,the Spanish 
were in complete control of the Isiand. 
Public Library, Ponce 
The area of-Vieques is approx. 33,000 acres; and 20,000 of them 
>elong to the Navy: plus 2600 acres that are owned by the Federal Government. 
Naval activities consists of both marine and land operations which 
include air to ground bombings with bombs of various types and sizes. Some are 
from 500 to 2000 in Size. This type of training last about 155 days per year. 
These activities coupled with naval gunfire training takes up to 200 days of 
the year. 
During and after the Culebra situation was being settled alternate 
Locations were being investigated by both the Navy Department and the Conmonwealth 
of Puerto Rico but none of those investigate of were satisfactory. These locations 
were in and around the Puerto Rican area and on the mainland. P--Y. 
The Atlantic Fleet provides defense capabilities in the Atlantic Ocean 
and assures the United states of the free use of the Gulf of Mexico, the 
Atlantic Ocean and the Caribbean Sea; and provides naval forces North to Alaska, 
South to Antartica, East to Suez and West to Mexico. 
Petroleum is the single most important commodity that is shipped by 
sea. The largest suppliers of petroleum are the Middle $ast Nations, with 
some coming from Venezuela and other Central and South Americans countries. 
All of them use the Atlantic ocean for shipping petroleum. 
In view of the above conditions it is necessary for the United States 
to maintain a certain degree of naval superiority in the varioues areas and 
to have a high level of readiness at al.1 times. To be able to do this is highly 
essentail that continuous training activities be maintained at all time. 
/ L 
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To me these responsabilities requires faciPities and areas ti conduct 
these.training activities. 
The United States possesses scme of the most sophisticated and advanced 
equipment plus newer and more technical advances that are being made. These have 
to be tested and proven satisfactory and upon acceptance have to be inmediately 
used in the process of training personell to become proficient in their operation. 
These include underwater detection, aerial detection and missile det ction. 
Vieques Island ,possess these requirements as to location, that is deep sea 
requirements, topography of the island and easy access to Roosevelt Roads. 
Vieques has a surface area of approx. 52 sq. miles and is located 
7 miles east of Puerto Rico. The topography consists of 2 series of low hill's !_' ; , 
and small v2Ikys. The highest point on the island is Monte Pirata which is 301 
meters high and is situated on the western part of the island. The second highest 
point is Cerro Matias on the eastern end. The island is composed of various types 
of soil from rather shallow top soil to volcanic rock, limestone, alluvial deposits 
of sand and tripping of quartz. 
At one time Vieques enjoyed a limited prosperity in agricultural enterprises, 
when sugar was at its peak. Sugar cane was a mayor, crop with pineapples and coconuts 
includee; but when sugar lost its profit potential the mills closed or went into bankr 
and agriculture gradually lost its appeal. At present cattle grazing nad the cultivat 
of some vegetables are'about the only activities in agriculture. 
Much of the island is covered with mangrove forests, coca palms and scrub 
trees with pasture lands. Crops lands and barren areas make up the rest of the island 
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The target and training areas are mostly in the rocky and out 
zapping areas. 
Wildlife is'limited mostly to birds of such types as the cattle egret and 
severa specks of marine birds and small birds. Naval activities are no threat to 
my of the bird life, Any historical sites of which there are few has been preserved 
)y the Navy. 
Fishing is an important industry on Vieques and is divided into three areas 
,f habitat, namely in the grass beds and sand flats, reef fishes and deep sea or open 
se2 where mackarel, tuna, tarpon sailfish, marlin and.swordfish are found, this area 
is not affected by Naval operations. 
The inshore fisheries comprise the sector which is of most concern to Vieques. 
rhese areas can be fished without large boats or expensive equipment, lobster pots, 
xollingbottom and other equipment are used. The lowest catch are on the North coast 
>f Puerto Rico between Isabel Segunda and !Luquillo. Naval operations do not affect 
:his area. 
The next .lowest catch is between Lajas and Patillas. Naval operations 
IO no affect this area. 
The area on the-east coast between Fajardo and Maunabo, which includes 
rieques and Culebra island have many small reefs and islets favored by the lobsters 
md are used by trolling and haul seines. Part of these areas are affected by Naval 
operations with restricted access during operations to fishing and transit to other 
Lre2s. This use of the target complex lasts about 206 days per year. Some damage to 
fishing gear, like nets, traps, etc. or other losses are to the fishermen. 
Surveys d&e for damages,or affects on marine life or fish due to.Naval 
operations have'shown that there is no variance in either the operations area or 
the opposite side of the island. 
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Presetit population of the island varies in estimates from 8,000 tp 9,000. 
me to the very little industrial activity of manufacturing, unemployment is high, 
Approximately 45 2 of the inhabitants are on food stamps and Civilian employees 
cn Navy 88 payroll is one of the sources of income, and practically all are residents 
of the island. 
Restrictions by the Navy to restricted areas has led to many confrontations 
between the Navy activities on both land and beach areas, 
Access to restricted waters along 4 miles of 'the south coast has met 
with opposit?on from the fishermen. One view is that the Navy has permitted access 
to those areas except during operations even tho there is restriction on fishing by 
Federal regulartions in title 33 of the Federal code in this area. 
The Fihezmans Association has 'filed a $700 millon class action suit against 
the Navy Right or wrong this people are protected by the U.S. Constitution to voice 
their feelings and grienvances, until they.step over the line and break the law; 
Them it becamesza legal problem. 
Some times coverage by the news media and T.V, of this protest demostrations 
canbecame a bit biased unintentionally, depending on whose side they are on, depen- 
ding by how they interpret T.V. scenes and new account of these demostrations. 
. As to protests on the restricttons of certain areas during operations, there 
are times when these restrictions are lifted and fihsermen have access to these areas 
Fishermen are notified of the lifting of restrictions. Now most fishermen do not 
“go out” every day. If they are" of" when the restrictions are lifted them they 
have n:)t lost any opportunity but if the restrictions are in effect and he happen$ 
to be on a day that he would normal&y be '* out " then he loses the opportunity to fisl 
and can't catch anything. The Association feels that during these 200 days of - 
operations there are many lost "days of opportunities 'I that constitute a loss of 
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income to the fishermen. 
During those 200 days that the restrictions are in effect there are 
other areas open to fishing that have no restrictions, tho those areas may not be 
satisfactory to the fishemen. 
There is no doubt that both sides have valid arguments concerning the 
question of whether the Navy continues as they have in the past or leaves the 
island. There is very reason to believe that a satsfactory settlement between 
the involved parties could be reached thru a compromise on thru a better understanding 
of the questions involved; if they were to do so between'themselves if they were 
allowed. 
Damage to walls, loss of cattle that strayed from the land leassed by the 
T--x 
Cattlemen: Association and other damages are paid for by the Navy. Claims are 
delayed due to settlement of damage 2mouuts. 
Some of the residents have mixed feelings about the Navy presence; so me 
feel that the Navy took land that was not need by them and have land that cou;ld 
be released,to the Government of Puerto Rico. Some have had their homes and birth- 
places taken from them by the Navy and t$ay had to move. They still have sentimental 
. feelings about homes they gave up. 
Many complaints arise during training operations complaints of " roudyism 
insiolting remarks drunkness and antagonism. Thesesame complaints are heard fn the 
states during National Guard, Encampments, that are located in rural areas near 
small towns where access to larg t3 cities are not easily available or too far away 
for personell o celebrate. ,;*--- i 
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New as the demostrations by persons opposing the Navy presence these 
types of protests are not confined to Vieques. The Same type of these protests are 
place at construction sites of the Nuclear Power plants, ChemJcal plants and other. 
Hundreds are being arrested, even in Germany and Austria have demostrations at the 
sites of EJuclear Pov7er Plants. There are protests at building sites has freeways. 
All four political parties of Puerto Rico hate taken an interest in 
the protests but only the Socialist party and the Independence Party have taken 
an active interest in the controversy. A great many or the participants have been 
from the "outside" who always want to participate in a "cause", tho they are not 
involved. Jane Fonda and Joan BaBe are two to do so without outside interference. 
Navy personell and equipment are used in many ways in assisting municipa- 
lities in street repairs beachjclean-up, housing assistance and repairs in the 57 
kilometers of roads in the island at no charge. 
One last note; in a very recent survey taken on the island it showed 
that 70% of the residents favored the Navy to stay on the island. 
Regardless of the outcome, whether the Navy stays or leaves the land and 
beach areas in the target coutplek will never be available for recreation, tourist 
facilities, hotels, resorts or agriculture due to the un ploded bombs, shells nad 
other ordnance that are settled over the entire area. So tath land and beaches 
are lost to Vieques forever. 
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Director 
Puerto Rico Branch 
U.S. Navy 
Ceiba, Puerto Rico 00635 
Dear Mr. Director: 
In the newspaper's we have read an ad in which the Navy requests 
public comments on the Environmental Impact Statement covering Naval 
activities in Vieques. Even though this formality is directed to 
comply with requirements established by law, in practice, our public 
participation will be a waste of time. No matter how hard the Navy 
may try to comply with environmental regulations, the political issue, 
which is the force pushing the Navy out of Vieques, will still remain 
unresolved. If in fact the Navy needs to train in Vieques, it must 
analyze the situation on the basis of acknowledging ineludible realities 
and assume a position which would allow the retention of those essential 
facilities. 
The very first thing that must be recognized is that all this situation 
revolves around the political status of Puerto Rico. Besides the genuine 
interests that residents might have t,o oppose the practices, there exists 
the political interests of those separatist groups whose objective is 
not to pull the Navy out of Vieques, but to pull the Americans out of 
Puerto Rico. It can be affirmed that any demonstration against the Navy 
in Vieques has been motivated by the political sentiment. An evident 
example is the participation of Monsignor Antulio Parrilla. His claim 
that he went to Vieques to offer a religious service is a sacrilege. 
The Catholic Church does not allow this gentleman to officiate mass at 
any place and keeps him floating over nothing with the title of "Titular 
Bishop of Ucres", the name of a parish or town in North Africa. 
Another ineludible reality is that the Navy does not necessarily enjoy 
general sympathy in Puerto Rico. The situation sprouts, among other' 
things, from the absence of a genuine program of public relations; 
from the isolation in which Naval personnel have lived and continues to 
live in Puerto Rico, without integrating into the adjacent communities; 
from the restrictions which necessarily accompany the target practices; 
and on the Vieques issue, from the circumstances in which those lands 
were acquired and handled. 
The socio-economic problems which result from'this situation in Vieques, 
without entering into any further considerations, have been aired in 
the press long before the present controversy and have been gradually 
causing devastating effects against the Navy. It has struck deep into 
the conscience of the people the stories on the conditions in which the 
people from Vieques have lived for almost two generations; expropriated; 
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forced to exile, or relocated to Navy parcels, in theory, liable to be 
'thrown out on the street, at Navy's discretion; unable to secure loans 
to construct decent homes, or for improvements; and all of the 
inconveniences which result from having to live on someone else's 
property. 
In light of the above described picture, no politician in Puerto Rico 
who desires to gain power or to remain in power, can assume a favorable 
position to the Navy. In view of the aforementioned, it results obvious 
the position of the Commonwealth Government to sue the Navy in Vieques. 
The environmental motive of the demand is a subtle way of a highly 
capable governor whose objective is to convert Puerto Rico into a 
State of the Union, and who governs a population, whose 95% of which 
desire permanent union with the United States, to confron the Navy in 
order to maintain his political image in an elector4 mass who 
disagrees with Navy's behavior. 
At this point, it would be convenient to clarify that not every reaction 
against the Navy.can be classified as anti-American. 
United States are not synonimous. 
The Navy and the 
generous and democratic. 
The United States is a great country, 
insensible. 
The Navy is considered here as arrogant and 
All previous statements evolve toward the necessity which the Navy has 
to gain the public opinion. In our democratic system of Government, 
nobody can hold on before an adverse public opinion. The Navy can give 
credit to this if it looks back to Culebra and sees how public opinion 
turned against the Navy, to the extent of influencing congressmen and . 
the President of the United States. The fact that the recent surveys 
have favored Navy presence in Vieques does not necessarily mean that. 
In essence, what this really means is that the people of Puerto Rico 
are pro-American. The protests of the separatists will continue to 
gain ground and the government will always have a subtle way to confront 
the Navy. The recent statements of the Governor that the Vieques situatior 
must be looked from another perspective in view of Russian presence in 
the Caribbean is another move in a political game which the Navy does 
not seem to comprehend. 
According to the Navy, no substitute exists for Vieques. The Puerto 
Rican Government insists on the opposite. 
Navy's behavior. 
The people do not agree with 
The Puerto Rican Government cannot take sides with 
the Navy. Separatist groups, well organized and voiceferous, take 
advantage of all this situation to add to their cause, both at local 
and international level. The Navy continues assuming a defens'ive 
position which proved to be a disaster in Culebra. 
Then, what shall be done? 
To all this problematic situation there is only one alternative; these 
ineludible realities must be recognized and a plan forged to recover the 
support of the public opinion. We must gain the people of Vieques 
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so that they would be the' ones who reject these separatists, as was done 
by the employees of the Caribe Hilton few years ago on a similar 
situation. The Hilton employees, sticks on hand, threw out the 
invaders because they threatened their jobs. The Viequenses tolerate 
these demonstrations because little or nothing they have to lose with 
the Navy's departure; on the contrary, they live in the uncertainty 
that they may benefit. 
The Navy has the moral obligation to do more for the people of Vieques. 
The provision of lands to,the cattlemen for a minute amount of money, 
as alleged; the provision of some employment opportunities'and any 
other insignificant gratuities cannot alleviate the economical 
necessities of a population whose 2/3 of their land is being occupied 
by the Navy and whose territorial waters are subject to additional 
restrictions. The situation worsens by the fact of Vieques being an 
isolated island that does not permit its inhabitants to work outside 
and keep residence on the island. While Ceiba, Fajardo, Naguabo, 
Luquillo, Humacao and even the metropolitan area benefit from Navy's 
payroll in Puerto Rico, without being subject to noise in their 
backyards, our counterparts in Vieques live within the greatest 
limitations. Justice tells us that this imbalance must be broken for 
the benefit of the Navy and of the people of Vieques, that even in 
their suffering favor Navy presence-on their land. Such gesture must 
be reciprocated by the largest landowner in the island by injecting 
the economy of the island in directrproportion to the lands and waters 
under its control. 
This writing is not intended to suggest the Navy alternatives to improve 
the economy of Vieques. The Navy will have to do that and should do so 
if it indeed needs these lands and waters. If not, the history of 
Culebra will repeat itself in Vieques. 
Sincerely, 
Jacinto Rulz Mej%a 
I-128 
Mejia Letter 
in Spanish 
San Juan, Puerto Rico 
11 de mayo, 1980 
Director 
Puerto Rico Branch 
IiS Navy 
Ceiba ?R O&35 
Estimado sefior'Director: 
En 10s peri&iicos hems lefdo un aviso en donde la Marina invita 10s 
comentarios de p&lico acerca de la declaraci6n de impact0 ambiental 
que cubre las actividades navales en Vieques. Aunque esta formalidad 
va dirigida a llenar requisitos establecidos por ley, en la pr&ctica, 
cualquier participaci6n de1 pfiblico ser& ma phiida de tiempo. No 
importa cuan cabalmente pueda la Xarina cumplir con 10s requisitos 
ambientales, quedari sin resolver la cuestih politica, que es la 
fuerza que presiona a la Marina a sU de Vieques. Si la Mmina ver- 
daderamente necesita entrenar en Vieques, debe analizar la situacih 
a base de reconocer re+lidades ineludibles y asumir una posicih que 
le pernxita retener esas facilidades esencialeso 
Lo primer0 que hay que reconocer es que toda esta situacibn giia alre- 
dedor de1 status politico de Puerto Rico. Ade& de 10s intereses 
genuinos que pueda tener el pueblo, a oponerse a las pricticas, es& 
10s intereses politicos de aquellos grupos separatistas cuya finalidad 
no es sacar a la Marina de Vieques, sin0 sacar a lo8 norteamericanos 
de Puerto Rico. Se puede aseverar que toda mnifestacibn en contra de 
la Marina en Vieques ha sido motivada por el sentimiento politico. 
E jemplo claro es la participaci6n de1 MonseZSor Antulio Parrilla. Su 
reclamo de que fue a Vieques a ofrecer un sevicio religioso, es un sa- 
crilegio. A este se&r la Iglesia Catdlica no le pemite oficiar miss 
en ninguna parte y lo man%iene flotando eobre la nada con el &ulo de 
"Obispo Titular de Ucresn, el nombre de una parroquia o pueblo en el 
norte de Africa* 
Otra realidad ineludible es que la Marina no pecesariamente goza de la 
simpatia general en Puerto Rico. La situacidn surge, entre otras cosas, 
de la ausencia de uu program genuine de relaciones p6blicas, de1 aisla- 
miento en que ha vivid0 y vive el personal naval en Puerto Rico, sin 
integrarse a las comunidacies adyacentes, de las restricciones qie necesa- 
riamnte conllevan las prhticas de tire, y en el case de Vieques, de 
las circus&an+3 en que ae adquirieron y se manejaron esos Lerrenos. 
Los problems socio-econhicos que resultan de esta situacibn en Vieques, 
sin entrar en consfderaci6n alguna, haa 8ido venteados en.la prensi 
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desde echo antes de la presente controversia, y ban ido gradualmente 
causando efectoa. devastadores en contra de la Marina. Ha calado hondo 
en la consciencia de1 pueblo 10s relatos de las condiciones en que ha 
vivid0 el pueblo viequense por casi dos generaciones: expropiados, 
foreados al exilio, o enviados a parcelas de la Marina, en teoria . 
sujetos a ser arrojados a la calle, a discrecidn de la Marina, sin 
poder hater prQstamos para construk viviendas detentes, o para mejoras, 
y todos aquellos inconvenientes que coulleva el teuer que tixir en 
propiedad ajena. 
Ante el cuadro descrito arriba, tin@& politico en Puerto Rico que inte- 
rese escalar o mahtenerse en el poder, puede irse a favor de la Marina. 
En vista de lo anterior, resulta obligada la posici6n de1 gobierno de 
Puerto Rico de demandar a la Marina en Vieques. El leotivo ambiental de 
la demanda es una mauera sutil de un gobernante sumamente hail, cuya 
meta es convert* a Puerto Rico en un estado de la U&n, y que gobierna 
un pueblo que en un 95% desea la u&n pemanente con 10s Estados Unidos, 
de enfrentarse a la Marina para poder xnantener su arraigo politico ante 
ma mass electoral que discrepa de1 comportamiento de la Marina0 
A estas alturas seria conveniente aclarar que no toda reaccibn en contra 
de la Marina puede tildarse de antianmidana9 La Marina y 10s Estados 
Uuidos de Am6rica no son sin@ixaos. Los Estados Unidos son un pueblo 
grande, generoso y democr&ico. La Marina se considera aqui corm arro- 
gante e insensible. 
Todo lo anterior va evolviendo hacia ti necesidad que tiene la Marina 
de ganarse la opini6n pGbl.ica. En nuestxlo sistenm demcr&tico de gobier- 
no, nada ni uadie puede sostenerse ante una opini6n pirblica adversa. 
b Marina puede dar c&dito de esto si.mira at&s hacia Culebra y ve 
c&so la opini6n piklica se le volcti en contra, hasta influir a cougre- 
sistas y al Presidente de 10s Estados Unidoso El que las recientes 
encuestas hayan favorecido la presencia de la Marina en Vieques no 
necesariamente quiere decir eso. En el fondo,;lo que la encuesta demues- 
tra es que el pueblo puertorriqueiio es proaxaemanoo Las protestas de 
10s separatistas-seguirbn ganando terreno y el gobierno sielnpre tend& 
una manera.sutil .de enfrentarse a la Marina* Las recientes manifesta- 
ciones de1 gobernador indicando que la situaci6n de Vieques hay que 
mirarla desde otra perspectiva en vista de la presencia rusa en el Caribe 
es otra movida m&s en un juego politico que la Marina no acierta a 
comprendero 
Se& la Marina, no existe un substituto para Vieques. El gobierno de 
Puerto Rico insiste en lo contrario. El pueblo no',aprueba el comporta- 
miento de la Wina. El gobierno insular no puede aliarse con la 
Marina. Los grupos separatistas, bien organizados y vociferantes, se 
aprovechan de toda esta situacidn para abonar a su causa, tanto a nivel 
local comD international. La Marina sigue asumiendo una posici6n ' 
defensiva que ya prob6 ser un desastre en Culebrao 
;Qu& hater entonces? 
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A- toda esta proble&tica ~610 hay una alternativa: hay que reconocer 
esas realidades ineludibles y forjar un plan para ganarse el respaldo 
de la opiniijn p6blica. Habria que ganarse el pueblo de Vieques para 
que sean eU.os 10s que repudien a estos separatistas, corn lo hicieron 
10s empleados de1 Cakibe Hilton hate algunos ties ante una situaciiia 
SilllilarO Los empleados de1 Hilton echaron a palos a 10s invasores 
porque amenazaban sus empleoso Los viequeuses toleran estas manifesta- 
ciones porque poco o nada tienen que perder con la partida de la Zkrina; 
al contrario, viven ante la incertidumbre que pod&an beneficiarse, 
Ia'Mariua tiene la obligacibn moral de hater I&S por el pueblo de Vieques. 
El facilitarle tierras a 10s ganaderos por una sum irrisoria de dinero, 
seg&n se-alega, el proveer algunas oportunidades de empleo, y alguna 
otra regalia de poca yenta, uo puede aliviar las necesidades econ&nicas 
de un pueblo cuyas dos teceras partes est.&n ocupadas por la Marinay 
cuyas aguas territoriales es&i sujetas a restkiccicines adicionales., 
La situaci6n empeora por el hecho de ser Vieques una isla aislada que no 
le permite a sus habitatites el trabajar fuera y mantener residsncia en 
la isla. Mientras Ceiba, Fajardo, Naguabo, Luquillo, Humacao, y hasta 
la zona metropolitana se benefician enormemente de la ndmina de la Marina 
en Puerto Rico, sin siquiera sent& ruido en sus corrales, nuestros 
conciudadanos de Vieques liven dentro de las n&s grandes limitaciones. 
La justicia nos dice que hay que romper ese desbalance pgr el bien de 
la Marina y por el pueblo viequeuse, que afn dentro de su sufrimiento, 
favorece la presencia de la Marina en su suelo. Tal gesto debiera ser 
reciprocado par el mayor terrateniente de la isla inyectando la ecouomia 
de la isla en proporcik directa al terreno y las aguas que controla. 
No es el prop&it0 de este escrito el sugerirle a la Marina alternativas 
para mejorar la economia de Vieques. Eso tendria que hacerlo la lhrina, 
y debe hacerlo si verdaderamente tiene necesidad de esas tierras y de 
esas aguas. 
Vieques. 
De lo contrario, la historia de Clebra se repetirg en 
Atentamente, 
/ * $\A, >r i . . ‘. 
6 
.: ; 
Jacinto Ruiz Mejia 
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Mr. Director, 
Here we are letting you know that the majority of the Puerto Ricans 
and those who are not Puerto Ricans are not pleased to know that at any 
given moment the U.S. Navy that we have here in Puerto Rico on Vieques 
Island, will be.destroyed in Puerto Rico. 
The U.S; Navy that we have here in Puerto Rico is a backing that 
Puerto Rico has from the United States in case of war. 
The majority of the Puerto Ricans at every moment want the 
union of Puerto Rico and the United States. 
Due to the fact that the United States is the only country that 
supports and helps Puerto Rico with the millions of dollars, products 
and materials which Puerto Rico cannot manufacture. 
Here we are letting you know that the problems which have arisen 
at Cerro Maravilla, 
Puerto Rico Bar Association, 
in the Construction of the Filtration Plant in Carolina at Torrecilla Ward, 
The problems that are taking place in the Navy on ViequesIsland, 
The majority of the automobiles which are found destroyed and burned, 
All of these problems and many more are cussed by the majority of the 
young people who belong. to these parties, 
The Puerto Rican Independent, Socialist, Nationalist and Communist 
Parties, are the ones against the United States. 
These parties do not want the union of the United States and 
Puerto Rico. 
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They want Puerto Rico to become independent from the United States, 
something that cannot be. 
So you will understand that what we are letting you know in this 
letter, are clear and real reasons. 
Here we furnish you the names of persons who belong to different 
parties: 
Juan Mari Bras, PSP General Secretary 
Attorney Pedro Baigel Chapel 
Bishop Antulio Parrilla 
Lolita Lebr6n 
Rafael Cancel Miranda 
Baltasar Quiiiones Ellas, well known Criminal Lawyer of Aguadilla 
Carlos Zen&, Fishermen Leader 
Attorney Pedro Saadb, of the same Fishermen Organization 
Armengol Iglesias, Engineer from Mayaguez 
Doctor Carlos Frontera 
Jorge Baucaje, PIP Actual President in Aguadilla 
Teodoro Ruiz Brignoni, Farmer and a San Sebastian Businessman 
Ismael Vargas Musk, Department of Instruction Supervisor 
Moisds Toro Laurant, Health Department employee 
Ismael Guarda Ldpez 
Jo& Aponte Toro, from the PSP 
The majority of these personshaveentered the Navy to try to take out 
weapons but we believe that they have not'had the opportunity. 
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All of these persons who have entered and who continue entering the 
U.S. Navy in Vieques, should be punished with the death penalty, so 
there will be no more problems. 
All of those who have entered the Navy in Vieques, must understand 
that since many years ago it is forbidden to enter Navy land and these 
laws must be complied with. 
In Puerto Rico, as well as in every country, these parties have upset everyone, 
and to bring an end to all these problems they must be eliminated. 
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A& ledejamos sab& ha l&&d, que h nayoria de 10s Puertorriqut&m y ~OS que 
IlO S&l b?rtOmiqUe~OS-, IlO eStkUT.tOS~ cOnfOme que b &k&la de 10s Es&+&s -do6 
que tenemos aq& en Puertorrlco en 1a II&S de Vieques, que en r&& mome&o Sea 
de& de Ptzertorrico, 9 
&li%rina; de iosE&ados Unidos qge tenemos ar& en Pueriarrico, es rm re@b 
qne tiene faertorrico de h~sE&zzdos trnidos, en C%SO de tma Guerrz, 
I&r ldagwrh de no SW&OS 10s PuertorriqpefiOS a todo ntOm&O querC%nOS la U&m de 
1osBtados Ibidas con Ptktorrico, 
tiebid aqye 10s Estados anidos es el &nico.Pais que Respalda y A.yuda a P&co 
.cm! l~s EiXlmm de $.ws, con 10s productos y con 10s materialLes.que P,R&co 
no puede faz?zicaz,~ 
&.b hdejmoti sdr ha Uslzd, que 20s problems que ban pasado cm el Cemo de 
BIar-, 
sll. el Ce%ejio de kbogados, 
@la coI&ruCCiOn de’la; Planta de FUixacion en Carolba~ en et Barrio Tomecm 
ElPartido Xndep?ndenti&a, SociaUrta, l'hcion&iStas y(=omUniS% SOZI 10s 
Partitlos q~e @6&k!k encon~ de. 10s E&ados ahidos, 
Estos Pzskhios no qaieren la Unich de 10s E&ados midos con PU~Z%OZT~CO, 
hkr~ Cb@ ~eetorrfco teak Sndependiente de las E&ados IEaidos, cosa que ZXJ 
puede sers 
Unsigned Letter No. 1 
in Spanish 
Lie& PWroSaa& de Isemisma Orgai?m~ion de 10s Pewadores, 
Nos dap&dimos deceandole un buen ezdto en e3 &so que le 
p;re6entanos,~paraque no Wstruiw laMarins 
i?ttt, S.R, San Juan, P,Rico,. Abril 8 de2 1980‘ 
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Unsigned Letter No. 2 
in English 
Mr. Director: 
According to the ad that we have read in the newspaper, you 
must beware that the same persons who are against the U.S. Navy in 
Vieques have>wri.tten letters to destroy it. 
Here in Puerto Rico there are four parties that are against 
the United States. and do not want the U.S. Navy here in Puerto Rico. 
The Puerto Rican Independent, Socialist, Nationalist and the Communist 
Parties, are the ones that are against the Navy in Vieques. 
They want Puerto Rico to become independent from the United States. 
Due to this is that they have started up the Navy problems in 
Vieques. 
We do not want to let them destroy the U.S. Navy here in Puerto 
Rico. 
At all times the U.S. Navy in Puerto Rico is a defense which 
Puerto Rico has in the .event a revolution starts. 
We hope you do everything you can to prevent its destruction. 
Thank you very much and may Cod bless you. 
! 
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Unsigned Letter No. 2 
in Spanish -. .-. . . . 
Llnsianed Letter No. 3 
in English 
Calle Z&SO. 81689 
Las Lomas, P.R. 00921 
11 de abri:L de 1980 
Director, Puerto Rico Branch 
Atlantic Division 
Naval Facilities Engineering Command 
U.S. Naval Station 
Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico 00635 
Dear Sirs: 
RE: Public Comments on Preliminary Report on the 
Environmental Impact Statement that the 
U.S. Navy has prepared for the Environmental 
Protection Agency of Puerto Rico 
Mrs. Juana Bgez Sends 
I have visited Vieques Island on two occasions during the carnival 
season. We have not returned because the last time we were not able 
to board the 7:00 P.M. boat to return because the trip was cancelled 
out, 'and at 9:00 P.M. because it had an early arrival, loaded up and 
had an early departure. We were able to board at 12:00 midnight. 
To arrive in San Juan at 3:30 A.M., exhausted, is not very pleasant 
and my husband who did the driving mentioned that he would never go 
back by boat. 
The friends who invited us took their 
at the beach for several days. I have very 
Translator's Note: 
csmping tents and stayed 
pleasant memories... 
This letter continues in "prose" and is not related to the 
Navy except for isolated sentences or paragraphs. The writer is 
proposed to fill out 12 pages, one page for each of the 12 tribes 
of Israel. A sample of her "prose" follows to give the reader an 
idea of the contents of this correspondence. Other comments follow: 
"In the boat, when the wind hit my face, in my arms and in my 
whole body, the sea sprays and even wets us, the brilliant ,sky, all of 
us happy, the beaches not as crowded as in Puerto Rico, as the 
Viequenses say. I walked over the tips of the waves hitting the shoreline 
to protect my feet from the hurting stones (and I have phlebitis, and 
that night, it was almost daylight; Row bad did I sleep!) My 
enthusiasm was in each one of these described instances like for 
someone being Puerto.Rican and American at the same time, does not have 
grief and feels... "free as a seagull", or as it is said "happy as an 
earth worm." This last phrase I do not like because it reminds me of 
the Devil and with the Devil I do not want to have any remembrances 
nor dealings." 
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Unsiqwd letter No. 3 
in English 
During mytwo visits to Vieques I also saw the Navy lands which 
bound the road to the beach, etc. "In Vieques we spent two very happy 
days and we didn't even see a single sailor. A "Viequense" told me that 
the lot of the house which he was selling bebrrg-sto the Navy. I asked 
him what worried him the most. He told me that he could sell his house 
a lot faster and easier if he would own the lot also. There are also 
lots of people in that same situation down here, and they all sell." 
The fishermen from Vieques like to fish on Navy restricted waters. 
They fish there a great number of fish and lobster. Then, it is not 
true that the Navy destroys the marine fauna. Then, they are lying. The 
fish they catch do not cost them any money, just the effort, devices and 
a boat to do so. Why do the majority of Viequenses want to leave the 
Puerto Ricans without adequate Naval protection? If my neighbor 
becomes intolerant, the alternative will be to move out. There are many 
advantages in Puerto Rico, boats won't cancel oh, will not leave 
‘passengers waiting; as such happened to us. None of those who want the 
Navy to depart are more patriots than Jesus Christ... 
These are my comments to you. Like the 12 tribes of Israel, 
12 pages. Cod bless you and that peace and prosperity be wherever 
you are. 
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Unsigned Letter No. 3 
in Spanish 
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Unsigned Letter No. 3 
in Spanish 
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Unsigned Letter No. 3 
in Spanish 
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PO 
ndence,.. a;ld”.&&i;leAis 
Regarding Conservation and 
Development of Wildlife Resources 
This appendix contains copies of the following documents: 
0 
0 
0 
0 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Biological Opinion 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and U.S. Navy 
Cooperative Plan Agreement 
U.S. Navy Response to Biological Opinion 
U.S. Navy Request for Consultation to the 
National Oceanographic and Atmoshpheric 
Administration 
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United States Department of the Interior 
FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE 
75 SPRING STREET. S.W. 
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 
Mr. C. D. Moore, Jr., P.E. 
Director, Install ation Planning Division 
Department o.f the Navy 
Naval Facilities Engineering Command 
Norfolk, Virginia 23511 
Dear Mr. Moore: 
This presents the Biological Opinion of the Fish and Wildlife Service 
(FWS) pursuant to Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act regarding 
potential effects of naval operations on Vieques Is1 and - Roosevelt 
Roads Naval Station (RRNS), Puerto Rico (Log No. 4-l-79-F-459) on the 
green turtle (Chel 
Trichechus manatus) , brown pelican 
ill turtle -mchelys imbricata) an 
coriacea) as well as the threatened 
nd 1 oggerhead turtle (Caretta caretta). 
Id 
Consultation was originally formally initiated for the brown pelican by 
your request of June 29, 1979 (received July 2) and for the manatee on 
August 1, 1979 (received August 6). Marine turtles were added in a 
1 ater request. 
An on-site vi sit by Fish and Wi 1 dl ife Service personnel was schedul ed 
for the week. of September 4, 1979; however, unfavorable weather conditions 
caused by Hurricane David caused cancellation of the meeting. A subsequent 
visit was scheduled for October 15 but was cancelled due to the delay in 
Congressional appropriation for Fi seal Year 1980 funds. Another visit 
was schedul ed for the week of December 11, 1979, but a terrorist attack 
on military personnel resulted in another delay of the consultation. 
Our joint attempts finally met with success on March 10-14, 1980, when a 
consultation team met with the Navy at Vieques and Roosevelt Roads. The 
Team consisted of: James L. ljaker (Team Leader) and David W. Peterson, 
Jacksonvil le Area Office; Robert Cooke, Atlanta Regional Office; James 
Powell, National Fi sh and Wildlife Laboratory Sirenia Project; and 
Sean Furniss, Culebra National Wildlife Refuge. 
Monday, March 10, the Team met with Navy personnel and discussed naval 
operations in relation to endangered species. The Team also viewed the 
site cleared by the Army in yellow-shouldered blackbird Critical Habitat. 
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On March 11, the group traveled by boat around the coastline of Roosevelt 
Roads and spent most of the day along the north coast of Vieques. 
Emphasis was placed on underwater examinations of seagrass beds between 
Punta Arenas and Mosquito Pier. Potential turtle nesting beaches on the 
north coast were viewed both by boat and from shore. On March 12, the 
Team was taken by helicopter to the observation post on Cerro Matias to 
view both day and night air-to-ground bombing as we'll as daylight strafing 
and mine-laying practice. 
turtle nesting beaches 
During the helicopter flight, a17 potential 
from Punta Arenas south and east to Punta Este 
and then west to Bahia Icacos were examined. A debriefing and discussion 
of initial reactions of the Team was held with Navy personnel on March 13. 
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Based on the Team's on-site inspection, information- in the December 1979 
Draft Environmental Impact Statement, reports of contractors ~vnployed by 
the Navy for environmental studies, and other pertinent reports, it is 
our Biological Opinion that naval activities associated with training at 
Vieques Island are not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of 
the manatee, brown pelican, loggerhead turtle, green turtle, leatherback 
turtle or hawksbill turtle, or adversely modify habitat essential to 
these species existence. Cumulative effects were considered in reaching 
this opinion but we felt they did not apply in this case. 
Project Description 
Vieques Is1 and is a long narrow island about seven miles east of 
the Roosevelt Roads Naval Station which is on the southeast coast of 
Puerto Rico. The island contains about 52 square miles of surface area 
or approximately 33,000 ;acres. Although naval training has taken place 
on Vieques for over twenty years, the intensity has increased since 1973 
when the Navy terminated use of-Culebra Island and its cays. 
The project consists of the continuation of naval activities on Vieques. 
These activities include air-to-ground and naval gunfire support training 
in the 3,500-acre Inner Range of the Atlantic Fleet lJeapons Training 
Facility (AFWTF) on the eastern tip of Vieques; Marine landings, maneuvers 
and artillery training in the adjacent 11,000-acre Eastern Maneuver 
Area (EMA) on east-central Vieques; and storage of ammunition at the 
Naval Ammunition Facility (NAF) which occupies about 8,000 acres on the 
western tip of the island. 
Currently,'air-to-ground training takes up about 115 days per year 
during which more than 30,000 pieces of ordnance and 533 tons of explosives 
are expended. 
Approximatkly 96 Atlantic Fleet ships are designated to use the AFtJTF 
for naval gunfire training.and in order for a ship to qualify, it must 
successfully complete five fire missions annually. In addition to U.S. 
ships, the range is also annually used by roughly 30 NATO ships. This 
naval gunfire support training takes up about 108 days per year and 
expends nearly 9,000 rounds , or more than 36 tons of explosives. Typical 
rounds are five-inch shells weighing about 80 pounds of which 8 pounds 
are explosive. 
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In the Eastern Maneuver Area the Fleet Marine Force, the Puerto Rico 
National Guard, and foreign marine forces train for amphibious landings, 
maneuvers, sma.11 arms and artillery practice, and combat engineering. 
Four beaches are used for amphibious landing training. Presently Fleet 
Marine Force units train for about 16 days per year of which nine days 
are amphibious landings. February, May and June have been the peak 
months of training. 
The Naval Ammunition Facility operates a 625-foot ammunition handling 
pier (Mosquito Pier) on the northwest coast of Vieques. The facility 
handles all ammunition and explosives for RRNS and some ammunition for 
units training on the inner range. During a recent 12-month period, the 
facility received over 4,100 tons of explosives and ammunition. 
A summary of the biological considerations and recommendations for 
enhancing conservation of the listed species are as follows: 
Brown Pelican 
The only pelican colony in the immediate vicinity of Vieques is on Cayo 
Conejo, a small two-acre island less than a mile offshore of the impact 
area. The colony was first reported in 1971 with an estimated 50 nests 
and is one of only two active colonies in the Commonwealth of Puerto 
Rico, the other being near La Parguera on the southwest coast of Puerto 
Rico. The Cayo Conejo colony appears to be stable or increasing. Ralph 
Schreiber, a pelican specialist hired by the Navy to investigate the 
status of the pelican on Vieques, reported that about 50 nests wre 
present during April-July, 1978. He speculated that, based on the 
number of young birds in the vicinity, perhaps as many as 100 nests were 
present during the previous year. 
A Cooperative Agreement now exists between the Navy and FWS for conservation 
on Cay0 Conejo. Under this agreement, the FWS will provide technical 
advice and assistance for protection and management of the area and a 
minimum of one visit annually will be made to the area by an FWS wildlife 
biologist. Monitoring of pelican nesting will, of course, be a high 
priority. Unauthorized visitations to the island by civil and military 
personnel are prohibited and the Navy and FWS has agreed to cooperate in 
controlling access. .The Navy has also agreed to make concerted efforts 
to ensure that no ordnance is dropped accidentally on the cay. 
All naval aircraft are prohibited from flying below 500 feet altitude 
over Cayo Conejo and helicopters are prohibited by a 1500-foot vertical 
and 1000-foot horizontal buffer zone. These restrictions appear to be 
adequate in preventing undue disturbance to the nesting pelicans. The 
consultation team observed repeated bombing and strafing runs which 
passed directly over the cay and the pelicans appeared to be oblivious 
to the air traffic. Even night bombings did not seem to disturb the 
pelicans. 
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West Indian Manatee 
For purposes of this consultation, manatees on RRNS are also considered 
since interchange between Vieques and RRNS by manatees probably occurs. 
To determine the current distribution and abundance of manat'ees in 
Puerto Rico, the FWS and Puerto Rican Department of Natural Resources 
(DNR) conducted 10 aerial surveys of the island in 1976, 1978, and 7979. 
A total of 226 manatees were sighted. Sixty-five manatees or approximately 
30 percent of the total were seen within the RRNS area (including Vieques 
Island). 
Luxuriant seagrass beds plus sheltered bays and sources of fresh water 
from sewage treatment plants may explain the high proportion of animals 
found there. In addition, human activity in' and adjacent to the water 
is restricted to only a small area of RRNS. 
Manatee surveys conducted during the Navy's data gathering studies for 
their EIS on Vieques revealed that most manatees were observed in the 
sheltered waters on the northwest end of the island from Mosquito.Pier 
to Punta Arenas. During these surveys an estimated 15-25 manatees were 
observed in the,coastal waters of Vieques. 
There is .a low probability of manatees being harmed by training exercises 
since manatees apparently tend to avoid the east end of the island in 
the impact area. Much of the north and east end of Vieques is subject 
to strong wave action and is a higher energy coastline than the northwest 
end. The Ensenada Honda area on the south coast appeared to offer both 
sheltered waters and extensive grassbeds but few manatees have been 
sighted in this area. This is perhaps due to Ensenada Honda's isolation 
from adjacent manatee habitat and considerable stretches of exposed 
rocky shorelines which separate this area from the sheltered west coast 
to Mosquito Pier. 
To further protect the manatee, we recommend the following: 
1. More information should be gathered on the manatee numbers and 
distribution on RRNS and Vieques and movements between these two 
areas should be documented to better understand the interaction 
that presumably exists. Sightings by Navy pi7 ots coul d perhaps be 
used in this documentation. 
2. Roosevelt Roads Naval Station must play a key role in conserving 
the manatee population. There are relatively low-level water 
activities west and south of the port and docks around the coast to 
the western boundary. If boat traffic is significantly increased, 
then the effects on manatees should be carefully evaluated and 
implementation of management activity to reduce their impacts should 
be considered, such as posting of "no wake areas." 
3. Sewage outfalls at RRNS may be a source of fresh water for 
manatees and before changes are made to discharges from ,these 
outfalls, consultation with the FWS should be initiated. 
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4. Seagrass beds are foraging sites for manatees and special 
efforts should be made to prevent damage to seagrasses from boats 
or motor propellors scouring and digging through these beds. 
5. Care should be taken by boats in the, Mosquito Pier area to 
avoid injuring manatees. Deep-draft vessels operating in shallower 
waters of this area should exercise particular caution. 
Sea Turtles 
Our comments on sea turtles mainly concern nesting turtles. The Fish 
and Wildlife Service has jurisdiction over sea turtles while they are on 
land but when they are in their marine environment, the National Marine 
Fisheries Service has jurisdiction and this agency should be consulted 
if the Navy feels that their operations might affect turtles or their 
marine habitat. 
Most of the beaches on Vieques appear suitable for sea turtle nesting. 
In 1977, Tom Carr made a brief aerial and ground truth reconnaissance 
for the Puerto Rico DNR of the entire island and also conducted interviews 
with local people on Vieques- William Rainey conducted, short surveys 
during 1978 to gather information for the Navy on the status of sea 
turtles at Vieques. Other than these two* reports, virtually nothing has 
been documented about sea turtle nesting on Vieques. 
Both Carr and Rainey found leatherback and hawksbill turtles nesting on. 
the northeast end of Vieques at Playa Barco and Playa Brava and on the 
south coast at Playa Matias (Yellow Beach). A few nests were also found 
on several other beaches along the south coast and at the west end 
between Punta Arenas and Punta Boca Quebrada. 
Leatherbacks may be expected to nest between March and September while 
most hawksbills nest from June to December. According to Rainey, green 
turtles nest mainly between June and October but isolated nesting may 
occur during other months. 
Our recommendations for conserving turtles are: ,, 
7. More intensive surveys to determine numbers and distribution of 
nesting turtles are extremely important. Since it is difficult to 
intensively protect and manage all beaches for turtles, emphasis 
should be placed on the more important beaches. At this point, 
these beaches have been only tentatively identified. 
2. Poaching of both adult nesting turtles and eggs onshore and 
catching various sized turtles in nets offshore are prime reasons 
for these species' decline throughout the Caribbean, and Vieques is 
no exception. For example, of the 12 nests that Tom Carr located, 
ten were shortly raided by poachers and in the other two, no eggs 
had been deposited. 
While restrictions in the impact areas deter poaching to some 
degree by limiting access, these regulations apply only when the 
range is operational. Furthenore, trespass by boats and overland 
is canmon in violation of the regulations. 
II-6 
Enforcement of existing laws prohibiting ‘taking of turtles should 
be stepped up. There are probably 1 imited numbers of people responsible 
for most of the poaching and apprehension and prosecution of some 
of these individuals could have far-reaching effects. 
3. Heavy use by cattle and horses was noted al ong many of the 
beaches but 1 ivestock density appeared to decrease toward the east 
side of the island,where most turtle nesting’is occurring. Trampling 
on beaches by livestock is considered a serious problem since 
cattl e and horses can collapse turtle nests and crush eggs. This 
problem should be studied and methods to exclude livestock from 
preferred nesting beaches should be considered. 
” 4. The impact of heavy ordnance striking the beaches should be 
avoided. 
5. All personnel should be instructed to avoid driving vehicles on 
beaches above high tide line. Vehicles such as jeeps can collapse 
nests, destroy vegetation, and leave deep tracks which can hinder 
hatch1 ing turtles from reaching the water. 
6. Lights near beaches can adversely affect turtles. Hatchlings 
are attracted to lights and can become disoriented while Inesting 
adults can be deterred from coming ashore to nest. F7 are.s are 
commonly used in night training and the effects of these flares on 
turtles using the east end of Vieques should be investigated. 
Lights from recreational bbaters on the west end off Green Beach 
cou’ld cause problems for nesting adults and hatchlings. Most of 
the nesting on thi s end appears to be from hawksbill turtl es and 
public use of these beaches could be regulated during the hawksbill 
nesting season. For instance, al 1 boats coul d be required to 
anchor within a control 1 ed area. Tighter reins on night activity 
would also help stop some of the poaching. 
7. Amphibious marine landings can have a potentially disastrous 
effect on nesting beaches by destruction of nests from vehicles and 
troops during the landing and grading the beaches after the landing 
operations are compl eted. Yellow Beach (Playa Matias) is an important 
turtle nesting beach and particular attention should be given to 
turtle nest protection there. 
Prior to landings, nests should be marked and placed off 1 imits. 
I;f this is not possible, eggs should be removed to a protected area 
by trained personnel. We emphasize that only qualified personnel 
should handle eggs since time of removal is critical and care must 
be taken in removing and reburying eggs, If the eggs are removed 
then daily searches for nests must be made since eggs should not 
be moved 24 hqurs after being laid. Incubation takes about two 
months, therefore, daily searches of the landing beach for at least 
two months should be conducted. If the nests are to be left in 
pl ace, searches could be 1 imi ted to several-day interval s if 
turtl e tracks are not obl iterated by wind and rain. 
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We hope that these recommendations will assist the Navy in carrying out 
its responsi bil i ties toward endangered and threatened species. The Fish 
and Wi 1 dl ife Service wi 11 offer assistance in management and enforcement 
of wildlife regulations to the extent that funding and manpower allow. 
Much of Vieques contains excellent wildlife habitat and proper management 
is a must. 
We appreciate the courtesies extended during the consultation and we 
hope to continue the cooperative approach that has existed between the 
Navy and the’Fish and Wildlife Service in Puerto Rico. 
If modifications are made in the continued use of Vieques by the Navy 
and endangered or threatened species may be affected then consultation 
should be reinitiated. 
Si ncerely yours, 
g>;y&L-A : # 
Regional Di rector 
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COOPERATIVE PLAN AGREEMEKT 
FOR 
CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPaNT OF WILDLIFE RESOURCES 
NATURAL HABITAT 
ON 
CAY0 CONEJO, PUERTO RICO 
In accordance‘with the authority contained in Public Law 86-797 
of 15 September 1960 and Public Law 93-452 of October 1974 and 
Public Law 93-205 of 28 Deceznber 1973 2s aznended in Public L2w 95-632 
of ??ovember 10, 1978, the Department of the Navy, and the DeparFent 
of the Interior, through their duly designated representatives whose 
signatures appear below, approve the following cooperative agreement 
for the prctection, development, and management of wildlife, especially 
Endangered and Threatened species, and natural habitat on Cay0 Conejo, 
Puerto Rico. 
Approved Apbroved 
Area Manager 
U.S. Fish and -Wildlife Service 
Jacksonville, Florida 
Commanding Officer 
Naval Station 
Roosevelt.Roads, Puerto Rico 
Commanding Officer 
Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training 
Facility 
COOPERATIVE PLAN AGREEMENT 
for 
CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF WILDLIFE RESOI;RCES 
and 
NATURAL HABITAT 
on 
CAY0 CONEJO, PUERTO RICO 
I. Introduction 
A. Purpose 
The purpose of this plan agreement is to provide for cooperative 
effort between the Area Xanager, Fish and Wildlife Service, U.S. 
Department of the Interior, the Commanding Officer, Naval Station, 
Roosevelt Roads, and the Commanding Officer, Atlantic Fleet Weapons 
Training Facility for the 0nservation and development of wildlife 
resources, especially endangered species, and natural habitat on 
Cay0 Conejo, that lies off Vieques Island, Puerto Rico at latitude 
18"07'16"N, longitude 65"18'3O'W. 
B. Policy 
The primary mission of Vieques Island, acquired by the Navy-, is 
for defense purposes which include exercises requiring the use of 
armament and explosives. 
Cayo Conejo is within the danger zone described in 33 CFR 204.234, 
Caribbean Sea and Vieques Sound of Eastern Vieques, bombing and gunnery 
target area. 
The Cay has been identified as a nesting area for a variety 
of birds, including the.brown pelican, .a Federally Endangered species. 
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1. This agreement will be in effect for a period of five years 
at which point it may be renewed for a similar time period. It may be 
modified or amended by natural agreement by the authorized representatives 
of the two ,agenw; provided, that the Navy, upon written notice to 
the Area Manager, shall have the right to terminate this agreement, in 
whole or in part at any time when, in the opinion of the Navy, the 
pr$mary mission of the Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training Facility or other 
requirements of national defense makes it necessary to do so, in which 
event the Area Manager shall have the right to terminate those 
remaining 'parts of the agreement, the feasibility of which, in his, 
opinion, are materially affected. In addition either the Navy or the 
Area Manager may terminate this agreement for other reasons, ,provided 
written notice is given 30 days prior to termination. 
II. ACCESS 
The Commanding Officer of the Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training 
Facility, as scheduling and operations authority for the Vieques Island 
Target Area, will. be advised of desired visits and inspections of the Cay 
at least ten days in advance and clearances granted to ensure non-interferenc 
with training exercises. 
Explosive Ordnance.Disposal experts will accompany Fish <and Wildlife 
Service personnel during vist;+ts and inspections. Transportation to and 
from Cayo Conejo will be provided by the Navy on a space available 
basis on scheduled transportation: 
A. Helicopter flights from Roosevelt Roads to Cerro Marlas, 
Vieques Island can be arranged for FWS employees and light cargo. 
II-11 
B. Ferry from Roosevelt Roads to Mosquito Pier, Vieques Island 
is available fo? U.S. Government vehicles and FWS personnel. 
C. Navy boats and land v'hicles on Vieques are limited in number, 
but may be made available to FWS personnel, operations 
permitting. 
In the event FWS personnel choose to arrange their own transportation 
to Cay0 Conejo, the same ten-day advance notification and clearance 
requirement will still exist. In this case, Atlantic Fleet Weapons 
Training Facility will arrange for the inspection party to be met and 
accompanied by an Explosive Ordnance Disposal expert for the duration of m 
the visit. Under no circumstances will members of the general public be' 
permitted to visit or otherwise accompany FWS personnel to Cayo Conejo 
or the Vieques Island.impact Area. 
III. RESTRICTIONS I 
A. 
B. 
C. 
D. 
E. 
Naval aircraft will not be permitted to fly at an altitude 
below 500 feet over Cayo Conejo. 
Ordnance will not be dropped deliberately on the Cay. 
Concerted efforts will be made to ensure that no ordnance is 
dropped accidentally on the Cay. 
Navy boats or land vehicles will be prohibited at or on the 
Cay, unless especially requested by the FWS; 
Navy and Navy contractor personnel will be.prohibited from 
visiting the Cay, unless the visit has to do with operational 
safety, or prior permission has been granted by the FWS. 
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IV. INTRA-AGENCY COOPERATION 
A. Law Enforcement 
The Navy will attempt to warn any unauthorized individual 
(civil or military) who attempts to approach or visit Cayo Conejo. 
Unauthorized visitation will be reported to the FWS. 
B. Wildlife Management 
The Area Xanager will provide technical advice and assistance 
to the installation on wildlife management programs for Cayo Conejo to 
enhance and protect endangered species and other wildlife. A minimum of 
one visit to the area will be made annually by a FWS wildlife bfologist. 
Other visits will be made as requested or as necessary to maintain a 
sound wildlife management program, provid'ing personnel and funds are 
available. 
-C* Habitat Management 
The Area Manager and Commanding Officers agree to mutually 
advise, assist and support each other in preparing and carrying out a well- 
balanced natural habitat management program. The Area Manager will, subjec 
to the limitations of available funds and r?sources, provide technical 
assistan.ce and advise the Navy in formulating management plans for the 
maintenance and development of the natural habitat. 
D. 
Roosevelt 
Coordination 
The office of 
Roads and the 
the environmental coordinator at Naval Station 
Inner Range Officer of the Atlantic Fleet Weapons 
Training Facility will be the offices of contact for cooperating persoqnel 
who desire to visit the Cay in relation to matters involving the managemen 
of tildlife. 
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E. Annual Meeting 
An annual meeting will be held between the signatory agencies in 
/ order to review progress and to prepare a plan of work for the coming 
year. The Navy agrees to coordinate a specific date for the meeting 
and to provide a meeting place on the Station. The Commanding Officer 
and Area Manager agree to make every reasonable effort to personally 
attend; but if they are unable to do so they will assign representatives 
who are qualified to act in their behalf. The attendees will bring 
written drafts covering the operations and progress of the preceding year 
and plans for the coming year. The Commanding Officer, Naval Station 
agrees to produce *and publish a report of this meeting and distribute it 
to the Area Manager for his review and signature. Copies of these 
reports, signed by the Commanding Officers and Area Manager shall be 
retained in the Naval Station and Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training Facility 
files. 
V. INVENTORY AND MANAGEMENT PUNS 
A. Inventory 
A general inventory of wildlife and/or vegetation has not been 
conducted on the Cay. This task should be undertaken at the first 
opportunity. 
B. Plan 
A plan for the conservation/preservaticn of the resources has not 
been proposed. This task should be undertaken at the first opportunity. 
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VI. REVISION 
This agreement is subjeci to amendment or revision as agreed upon 
by all participating parties. Action to amend or revise may be initiated 
by any party. 
VII. ADDRRSS INTER-AGENCY COOP=TORS 
A. Department of the Interior 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
Donald J. Hankla 
900 San Marco Boulevard 
Jacksonville, Florida 32207 
B, Department of Defense 
Commanding Officer 
U.S. Naval Station 
Roosevelt Roads 
Box 3621 
Ceiba, Puerto Rico 00635 
i 
C. Department of Defense 
'. Commanding Officer 
Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training Facility 
Box 3023 
FPOMiami ;4051 
i 
t 
446-7131 
r-h 
tie' 
,/T-k 
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6. It is agreed that a survey of turtle nesting &aches 0~2~ 
an e:;tendcd period of the would be a valmble xanacernent tool 
Cl'* ALaS ::a-q will initiate such a survey in a tizely fakon consi&- 
tent with availability of fund- 
cary out such a survey. 
3 a+ld e-ert personnel needed to 
A proposal is currently being written 
for a study to begin this year. 
?- The Navy recognizes 
.prohibiting the 
the difficulties in enforcing laws 
and Fusrto ~Ricaz 
taking of turtles and is workirrg wi-irlr, tkle'vs 2x9s 
DXR to develop a progr&T to deal wiCt--h t& probleI;: 
of poaching 0~1 'irieqt;as, 
8. The grazing pfar, devefoped for 
the U - S - 
Navy LiLT?ds on 'Vieqaes by 
Soil Coxservation Service is being enforced, Thi 3 will he12 alleviate the nuiiar of cattle and horses which ;ootentially 
disturb nestir,g beaches. 
be p^-rf orxzed 
1x3 addition the turtle study WhiC3 will 
tcction 
should tell us which beaches r,elC ad,ditisnal pro- 
ar,d the tize of year that nestirg is greatest. 
measures to excitide livestock fron these Additional prefzrrsd r.e::sting beaches 
will be considered as results fron the study becox avaiLable, 
9. Current information indicates that heavy ordnmce strikes 
on trirtle ncstixq beaches are highly unlikely due to the locationa 
of such beaches. 
10. 
drive 
Tersozmel will be instructed that they are not allo-tied to 
jeeps on be aches above the high tide aark. Daring azqki.b- 
ious operations beaches are being surveyed periodically durir,g the 
60-day 2sriod prior to ol>erations, and 'nests T:ill be urotected, :. 
II- The potential for negative impacts on nesting turtles and 
hatchlings fron flares will be assessed duricg t;-re turtle study, 
-2owever t 
3leiti-,er 
this will not be a major parameter since the flares are 
freqxcnt nor in the vicinity of -the majority of the clown 
nestins beaches. 
12. 
landkgs 
If nests are located 021 beaches to be used for amphibious 
and cannot be protected in place, the Xavy agrees to 
rerrove es$s in cooperation 
Service- 
with experts from the Fish and ~~ildfife 
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VT= appreciate the helpful cements of the Fish and Fildlife 
Service and l.ook forward to continued cooperation Setween,our 
organizations in th-. - management and pxotectio-n or' endangered 
species found on Vieques, 
SincerEgy, 
.-.. 
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DEPARTMENT OF: THE NAVY 
ATLANTIC DIVlS?ON 
NAVAL FAClLITliES ENGINCERING CO.vMAND 
NORFOLK, ‘VIRSINIA 23511 
TELEPHONE HO. 
444-7131 
1N REPLY REFER TO: 
20 3El:JHB P...#.A 
Mr. William H. Stevenson 
Director Southeast Regioh 
National Marine Fisheries Service 
National Oceanographic and Atm0spheri.c Admin$stration 
9450 Koger Boulevard 
St, Petersburg, Florida. 33702 
Dear Mr. Stevenson: 
Pursuant to Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act, and a& 
required by 50 CFR Part 402, this'letter constitutes a request for 
formal con&ltation concerning the potential effects off U. s, 
Naval. operations in the waters surrounding Vieques 1sland;Puerto 
Rico, on several species of endangered and threatened turtles. 
The species of concern are the endangered hawksbill turtle 
(Eretmochelys tiricata) and leatherback turtle (Derrnochelys 
coriacea) and the threatened tireen turtle (Cheloniadas) and 
loggerhead turtle '(Caretta caretta), 
-- 
Appropriate coasu,ltation with the U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
concerning the above-mentioned species has been effected, and a 
copy of that Biologicaf Opinion is attached for your information. 
In additir -1, a co&y of the Draft Environmental Impact Statement 
(DEIS) for continued use of the Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training 
Facility Inner Range (Vieques) is attached for your use in assess- 
ir?g the potential impacts of Naval operations on the above-mentiom 
species . A copy of a report by William Rainey concerning turtles 
on Vieques will be forwarded separatkly. 
Please contact Mr. J, H. Brandon (FTS 954-7131/Come.rcial 804 
444-7131) if you desire further information and for scheduling of 
a site visit to Vieques as appropriate. 
We look forward to working with your office on this matter. 
Sincerely, 
Enclosure 
II-I.9 
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1979 HURRICANE DAMAGE TO CORAL REEFS OF VIEQUES 
A report to 
Commander, AtJantic Division 
Naval Facilities Engineering Command 
Norfolk, Virginia 23511 
BY 
Will iam F. Raymond Richard E. Dodge, Ph.D. 
Ocean Research & Survey, Inc. 
1442 S.E. 13th Street 
Nova University Ocean Sci. Ctr 
Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316 
8000 North Ocean Drive 
Dania, Florida 33004 
July, 1980 
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1979 HURRICANE DAMAGE TO CORAL REEFS OF VIEQUES 
I. Introduction 
Background 
In early 1978 a suit was brought against the U.S. Secretary of Defense 
by the Governor of Puerto Rico and other individuals which included allegation! 
that military activities on the island of Vieques were endangering the marine 
environment, specifically causing permanent and irreparable damage to the 
coral reefs and nearby marine systems. In response to these charges, the U.S. 
Navy, through the services of various marine scientists conducted a damage 
assessment of Vieques' reefs in mid-1978. Results of these studies,indicated 
relatively small environmental impact from Naval activities and that the 
amounts of damage present were within the reef's capacity to regenerate. 
.In Fall, 1979 Hurricanes-David (Aug. 29-31) and Frederic (Sept. 4) passed 
relatively close to the i,sland of Vieques (Figure 1). It is well known from 
the scientific literature that damage can occur in coral reefs from high wave 
activity generated by tropical storms. In addition damage to Sit. Croix reefs 
from high waves generated by the storms had been reported (Dr. C. Rogers, pers 
comm.) and observed by one of us during a reconnaissance dive in early 1980. 
Scientific concern was expressed for a survey of storm damage to the 
Vieques' marine habitat for various reasons. 1) Identification of storm re- 
lated damage would absolve the Navy against possible future claims by others 
that such damage was caused by or related to Naval activities. 2)'Knowledge 
of the altered conditions of the reefs would establish a new baseline with 
which to compare any succeeding damage which might be caused by Naval range 
usage or by natural causes. 3) The health conditions of the reefs may have 
been so altered by the storms that any further insults by man's activities 
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=.--’ 
f . I - - 
- - . 
- . 
. . 
. 
. 
- 4 
- . 
. 
. , 
3 
could cause a disproportionate or excessive amount of ecologScal damage, pre- 
venting or prolonging reef recovery. 
Literature Review 
The catastrophic effects of hurricanes on coral reef environments are 
only beginning to be understood, primarily due to the lack of a comprehensive 
data base on reef conditions prior to the actual hurricane event. Nevertheless 
there are various reports in the scientific literature dealing with past 
hurricane studies and also on recovery aspects. The following iis a brief lit- 
erature review and discussion. 
The major cause of natural catastrophic coral mortality on reefs is the 
destruction caused by storms (Stoddart, 1969) of which hurricanes are by far 
the most important in the Atlantic and Caribbean. Mortality can be due to 
colony breakage, overturning , current force stripping tissue from the colonies, 
lowered salinity effects from rain and runoff fresh water, and sediment abrasio 
of the living corals, as well as by attendant resuspension of sediments re- 
ducing necessary light levels and settling on coral tissue. Literature reviews 
are provided by Stoddart (1969), Stoddart (1971), and Endean (1976). Some 
specific examples follow. 
Hedley (1925) reported on the destruction of a portion of the Great Barrie 
Reef from cyclones. The force of waves broke large numbers of living colonies 
and other mortality was caused by an influx of fresh water from heavy rains. 
Goreau (1964) reported extensive bleaching of corals due to expulsion of their 
associated algae due to lowered salinity effects from Hurricane Flora in 1963. 
Glynn et al. (1964) reported on the effects of Hurricane Edith of 1963. Ex- 
tensive coral destruction was observed especially to the branchiing forms such 
as Acropora sp. and Porites porites. The massive coral forms were less affectc 
Stoddart (1971) reported large scale destruction to corals from Hurricane 
4 
Hattie i,n 1961 on reefs of Belize. At the storm's center reefs were,. 
essentially swept completely clear of all living corals. Only at distances 
greater than 25 miles from the storm's center did scattered coral survival 
begin. Greater survival in the marginally affected areas'occurred in the 
head type corals (e.g., Montastrea annularis). Perkin and Enos (1968), 
Ball et al. (1967), and Shinn (1976) documented damage to Florida coral reefs 
from Hurricane Donna and Betsy in 1960 and 1965. Randall and Eldredge (1977) 
reported on coral damage to coral reefs of Guam following Typhoon Pamela in 
1976 $here growing tips of corals were fragmented and corals were overturned 
~. 
on the reef front by storm waves. Ditlev (1978) reported storm damage to 
reefs in Thailand from resuspended sediment. 
Recovery of reefs after storm effects is less well known and depends on 
T”-s i 
a number of factors. Endean (1976) provides a good review. In general, the .--%.. 
. 
total amount of damage to living corals, the number and age of surviving 
corals, the amount of scattering of broken branches with living bits of 
coral tissue, and the coral growth rate are all factors. The availability 
of substrate is an additional consideration. If rapidly growing benthic 
organisms other than corals populate a devastated area, coral recolonization 
will be difficult and slow. The nature of the substrate is also a problem. 
If large amounts of sediment have either been produced or are available from 
another source, recolonization can be slowed. 
Stoddart (1974) in a restudy of Belize reefs 10 years after hurricane 
damage found little or no recovery of reefs in the areas of highest damage, 
whereas, nearly complete recovery had occurred in the marginal areas. Stoddart 
(1974) stated: "This suggests that there is a threshold of damage beyond which 
storm effects are likely to be prolonged". He estimated recovery times in 
H---x 
severely affected areas of growth to be greater than 20-25 years. Shinn (1976) 
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reported a recovery time of greater than 10 years for Florida reefs which were 
previously damaged by hurricanes Donna and Betsy. Precise know1 edge of recovery 
times is impossible. Resonable estimates can be given after knowledge of the 
extent of damage, other storm effects, and the conditions of the 1 iving corals 
which may have survived are known. 
In.late May, 1980 two members of the original coral reef assessment group 
(Richard E. Dodge, William F. Raymond) conducted a prel imi nary reconnaissance 
assessment of hurricane related damage to Vieques' reefs. The purposes of 
the overview were to gain an indication of: 
1) amounts and locations of storm damage, if any, 
2) coral species and types primarily affected, 
3) potential for reef recovery, and 
4) necessity for detailed restudy. 
II. Materi al s and Methods 
Because of logistic and funding limitations, our study was conducted over 
a three day period (flay 28, 29, 30). We visually inspected reefs on both the 
North and South coasts of the range area (Fig. 2) by snorkle 'diving. Underwater pho 
graphy was accomplished with a Nikonos I II underwater camera and a. Rebi kof? 
underwater photogrammetric camera. Three specimens of the coral Elontastrea 
annularis which survived the storms were collected to check ior any growth 
disturbances in the internal annual banding (see Dodge, 1978 for exact method- 
ology and a discussion of the 1978 growth characteristics of Vieques’ corals). 
A photomosaic transect conducted in 1978 on reef S-S by W. Raymond was re- 
/ 
occuppied as closely as possible and rephotographed for comparison purposes. 
Photogrammetric methods were as follows. A’100 meter l/8 inch steel 
cable was laid in a straight line along the edge of the western margin of 
III-7 
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reef S-5 (see Figure 2 1, at an approximate depth of 5 feet. The depth of the 
sand at the edge of the reef varied from 9 feet at the beginning to about 15 
feet at the southern end of the transect. The cable was labled at meter 
intervals with numbered tags. A Rebikoff photograrrsnetric camera was hand 
held at a height of 42 inches directly over the cable. Constant camera height 
was maintained by a small lead weight at the end of a monofilament line 
attached to the camera. Camera attitude was maintained vertically by an 
universal 1 eve1 mounted on the camera back. The shutter was manually operated. 1 
An overlapping series of photographs were taken every half-meter for a 
distance of 60 meters; from 60 to 100 meters photographs were taken at 10 
meter intervals. The film was bulk load Kodak #5025 100 ASA color negative 
35 ITTII and was exposed at f/l1 with fill-in strobe flash. Appropriate photo- 
graphs were composed into a photomosaic of the transect. Measurements-of 
coral tissue coverage in plan view were made by tracing the outlines of living 
coral tissue and calculating surface area with a planimeter. 
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III. Results 
/” 
The reefs of Vieques have been shown to be similar in biologic composition 
to those of the Virgin Islands (Antonius and Weiner, 1973). For 1973 these 
authors reported that reef-building corals composed an average of 50% of the 
available substrate on reefs. The most abundant species, the elkhorn coral 
--Y 
Acropora palmata, comprised about 50% of the coral covered substrate. 
Fig. 2 shows a sketch map of the east end of the island of Vieques. The 
approximate positions of reefs are denoted. An "x" indicates the reefs we 
visually inspected during the field study. The reef numbering system is the 
same as that used by Antonius and Weiner (1973). 
We begin with a brief discussion of results for each coast. What follows 
next is a more detailed account of our field observations for each reef we 
visited. f----x 
r 
, 
A. North Reefs 
The path of the major storm (David) passed approximately 120 miles south 
of Vieques with winds of 165 mph. 'The minor storm (Frederic) had degenerated 
to tropical storm status when it pass.ed over the island. Although Vieques 
did not experience hurricane force winds from either storm, the south coast, 
in particular, received large waves from Hurricane David. It was therefore 
expected that reefs on the north side would have suffered a lesser amount of 
damage due to the greater protection from high wave activity. In general we 
found this,to be the case. On north reefs visited we did detqct evidence of 
coral damage which was mostly confined to breakage, uprooting, and overturning 
of corals. This type of occurrence is common in relatively mild storms and 
was evident to a lesser degree in 1978. 
We saw no evidence that broken coral colonies had; been transported over 
TTT-1 FI 
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the reef to be deposited as rubble mounds on the lee sides. Damage observed 
was primarily restricted to 5. palmata in the fore-reef area. Reef-crest 
conrnunities of Millepora sp. appeared to have suffered little damage. Massiv 
head type corals such as 5 annularis and Diploria sp. appeared to be little 
affected aside from minor abrasion effects. Some damage was noted to under- 
lying corals when impacted by a fallen or uprooted &. palmata. For example, 
.beds of c. porites were occassionally crushed by broken L pa'lmata branches. 
Long Reef on the north coast tias ‘observed to have experienced the most 
damage, apparently due to its greater exposure td incoming waves. Me were 
not able to dive on north reefs near the east end of the island, however, the 
lack of breaking waves in this area along former reef crests suggested that 
extensive damage had occurred. 
B. South Reefs , 
In great contrast to northern reefs, south reefs were severely affected 
by the storms. In all places visited the former lush stands of Acropora 
palmata with many colonies reaching upwards of 6 feet high and broad were 
essentially destroyed and reduced to rubble. A- palmata was the main reef 
forming coral of Vieques reefs, however, it is now a very minor component 
in the south. In some places, especially in more protected and deeper sites 
(greater than 20 feet depth), a few colonies survived with evident broken 
arms and fronds. The A. palmata rubble in some areas was seen to frequently 
contain living patches of tissue still adhering to the pieces of the former 
colony. These tissue patches.were often infected with "white line” disease. 
The other branching species Porites porites suffered similar mortality 
Very few living colonies were observed whereas rubble fields of effects. 
former E. porites colonies were common. 11. cervicornis, not i3 common coral 
10 
c 
species initially, was rarely observed living and rubble occurrences of this 
species were observed. . 
The massive “head” type corals (e.g., 5. annularis, Diploria ‘sp.) appeared 
to have experienced greater survival. Judgements were difficult because the 
absence of the formerly abundant &. palmata emphasized other corals which may 
have survived. Damage to head corals was noted, however, in the form of over- 
turning, burial , and colony breakage. Many intact colony cl usters of E. annulari s 
had constituent colonies infected by black line disease or were dead. On 
Rota Alcatraz there was evidence that entire colonies of Montastrea annularis 
had been buried or were nearly buried by 4. palmata rubble. 
We were unable to assess damage to sea-grass communities because of lack 
of available field time and helicopter malfunction on the appointed day for 
an aerial survey. Given the observed disruption to the coral communities, 
it seems ,safe to conclude that sea grass beds were certainly affected by the 
storms . 
Qualitatively we noted that water clarity was poorer than in 1978. This 
may have been only a temporary condition on the days that we were able to 
visit or a more permanent feature of the reef ecology generated by the storms ’ 
passage. 
11 
C. Site Descriptions 
The following is a detailed description of each reef visited with qualita- 
tive estimates of the amount of storm damage where possible. 
Reef number designations are according to the numbering system of Antonius 
and Weiner (1978) and are indicated on Fig. 2. Nine reef sites were visited 
in this May, 1980 inspection. Underwater photographs were taken at eight of 
the reefs. 
North Reefs 
N-6 Penasco Fosil Reef 
This reef appeared to have few significant changes since 1978. Some 
broken Acropora palmata werefound but this was not directly attributable to 
hurricane damage (Fig. 4). In 1978 Antonius and Weiner (1978) found approx- 
* 
imately 15% coral rubble as a substrate type and 50% living coral substrate 
of which 18 % were broken; We estimate the same for 1980. Figs. 5 and 6 show 
A. palmata with occassional breakage. 
N-9 Long Reef 
The east end of Long Reef was inspected in the vicinity.of a photo transec 
conducted across the reef in 1978 by W. Raymond. Little damage was observed 
on the extreme reef crest where clumps of 
lanata and M. squarrosa proliferate (Fig. 
palmata were found toppled in the shallow 
were found to have broken branches (Figs. 
fragile fire coral (Millepora comp- 
7). Occassional colonies of A. 
fore-reef area (Fig. 8) and others 
9 and 10). An estimated 10-l 5% of 
the _A. palmata were found broken or overturned. Most remained alive and had 
not been transported far from their original growth site. White band disease 
was observed on some of the 1 iving rubble pieces (Fig. 8) and on some of the 
III-13 
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in place colonies (Fig. 11). No obviously new coral rubble accumulations 
,were found on the reef crest or back reef areas. No significant damage to 
“head” type corals was found, except where abraided by 6. palmata rubble. 
Black band disease was as comnon as in 1978 (Fig. 12). 
N-10 Isla Yallis Reef 
This reef was '.one of the most scenic areas examined during 1978 and this 
inspection. Large brain (D'iploria sp.) corals (Fig. 13), star (5. annularis) : 
corals (Fig. 14), and elkhorn (A. palmata) corals (Fig. 15) are common to- 
gether with large sea fans. The reef lies partly in the lee of Long Reef and 
it is in this protected east end portion where the largest coral colonies are 
observed. 
Most of the & palmata appeared to have survived undamaged. Large ' 
branching stands of L. palmata (Fig'. 16), 5. cervicornis, and A. prolifera 
(Fig. 17) in shallow areas near the fringing reef crest were undamaged. Total 
,.---X, 
L. palmata damage was estimated to be less than 10%. Antonius and Weiner 
(1978) reported 12% broken coral at this reef in 1978. 
A 500 lb. bomb found on the reef in 1978 (Fig. 18) was located in the 
same area (Fig. 19) but in a slightly different position indicating wave 
transport. * 
South Reefs 
s-2, south fringing reef, east margin 
In 1978 this reef contained abundant medium sized (4-6 foot) colonies of 
b. palmata. The percentage of storm rubble and coral breakage was relatively 
f-7 
low. Antonius and Weiner (1978) found 2% rubble and 60% coral substrate of 
which 20% was broken. In this inspection we found the fore-reef area to 
13 
consist entirely of broken coral rubble, predominately 4. palmata. 'The 
rubble contained very little live surface area (Fig. 20). Occassional Diploria 
and Montastrea corals have survived; however, most have sustained damage 
from tumbling and rolling coral debris (Fig. 21). 
Some of the & palmata colonies were deposited along the margin of the 
west end of the reef into 15-20 foot depths. Occassionally whole colonies 
landed upright and were relatively undamaged (Fig. 22). Survivorship in 
terms of percentage live coral surface area is higher for these colonies which 
were transported intact off the reef as opposed to those which remained on 
the fore-reef and reef crest. Great quantities of coral rubble have accumulated 
at the reef margin along.the cut between reefs S-2 and S-3. The result is 
that the edge of the reef has encroached an estimated lo-15 feet into the 
t channel. It is estimated that there is less than 10%. living coral coverage 
at this site. 
S-3, south fringing reef, west margin 
Damage here was observed to be similar in degree as in S-2. Former lush 
fields of 11. palmata were reduced to mostly dead rubble. Less encroachment 
of rubble into the channel was observed. Occassional coinnunities of Montastrea 
annularis and Porites pori tes along the reef margin and in the vicinity of 
the reef crest escaped heavy damage (Fig. a). Living coral coverage is 
estimated for this reef at less than 10%. In 1978 Antonius and Weiner (1978) 
found approximately 60% living coral substrate. 
s-5, Patch Reef in eastern Bahia Salina de1 Sur 
In 1978 this reef consisted of large, widely dispersed colonies of 4. 
palmata sheltering small colonies of Diploria sp.; E. annularis, and A. cervicornis. 
III-15 
14 
r---N. 
The density of live & palmata was highest at the western reef margin and 
along the reef crest. Antonius and Weiner (1978) estimated rubble at 2X, 
coral substrate at 70%, and broken corals at 3%. 
We found that the fore-reef area is now essentially devoid of A. palmata; 
only a few pieces of well anchored trunks have survived with all branches 
broken away. One upright trunk displayed new growing tips. The percent. 
live coral coverage in the fore-reef area Ss estimated at less than 10%. No 
traces of live 5. cervicornis were found. Some of the head corals have sur- 
vived in depths over 15 feet. 
Many large A. palmata colonies have toppled off the edge of the western 
margin of the reef. Some are basically intact and alive, but most are in 
fragments of which some living tissue often remains on the largest pieces. 
We measured the live bottom coverage of coral in a photograph of this area 
(Fig. 24) and found it to be 12% comp$red to 39% measured from a mosaic photo- 
.,? 
transect of this area in 1978. 
The deep edge of the reef margin (20 foot depths) also contained toppled 
4. palmata colonies; however, these were mainly dead. A large metal fragment 
and a concrete block (apparently a sediment sampling jar base) where were 
photographed in 1978 were found 
western edge of the reef. 
Dead A. palmata rubble was 
coral Briarium asbestinum along 
reef zone. 
in approximately the same position along the 
often densely covered with the soft encrusting 
the reef margin nearest the shallow fore- 
Surviving A. palmata colonies were more abundant at the shoaling reef 
crest, although many were broken by the rubble being moved from seaward to 
leeward over the reef. 
The back reef areas, formerly containing E. annularis and Siderastrea sp. 
15 
colonies, is now a clutter of A. palmata rubble. A large pillar coral 
(Dendrogyra sp.) colony along the reef margin was found overturned but still 
alive. 
S-6 Fringing reef, northern Bahia Salina de1 Sur 
In 1978 this shallow fringing reef surrounding a small island at the 
north of B. Salina de1 Sur was relatively barren on the east imargin where 
several promina'nt bomb craters were evident in aerial photos. The western 
margin contained a lush community of Porites porites over an area bf several 
thousand square feet (Fig. 25). 
We observed in this inspection nearly 100% of the L mites to be dead 
with-many broken and sheared colony tops. A. palmata rubble on and around 
the area appears to have been the cause of the damage. 
In 1978 it was possible to swim around the north of-the island at high 
tide; today a coral rubble tombolo connects the island to the mainland with 
a berm elevation of approximately +3 feet MSL. 
S-7 Fringing reef, west Bahia Salina de1 Sur 
Antonius and Wein$E. (1978) found this reef to have approximately 50% 
live coral substrate of which 2% was broken. Coral rubble comprised approx- 
imately 1% of the substrate. &. palmata was the most abundant coral species 
(Fig. 26). We estimate a total live coral coverate of less than 15% for thi 
reef today. 
We found the seaward (south and southeast) portion of this fringing ree 
to have receiyed heavy damage. Most of the 6. palmata colonies have been 
stripped away and deposited as a new storm berm of coral rubble on the reef 
flat area and on the northeast fore-reef area (Fig. 27). Some have been 
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pushed into a crowded jam of coral, remaining upright, in the northeast 
portion of the reef with a high percentage of survival of the polyps (Fig. 
28). Many of these have long fragile branches remaining unbroken, apparently 
protected by having become alligned parallel to each other. Many head 
corals were left undamaged in the fore-reef area (Fig 29). 
A large pI. dnnularis colony that was found broken into several live 
pieces in 1978, possibly by ordinance impact, was found to be unchanged; 
the broken fragments were still present and alive. This was apparently due 
'to the fact that this specimen was located in the lee of the reef on the ', 
north side (Fig. 30). Although some other ?I-. annularis appeared to have 
survived, there was no trace of many large colonies on which numerous conch 
shells had been heaped after havesting by fishermen in 1978. 
s-9 Rota Alcatraz Reef I 
The southeast and south sides of the reef surrounding the island of 
Rota Alcatraz were the most severely affected sites we observed. Here destruc- 
tion of this formerly lush A. palmata cotnnunity (Fig. 31) was total. Colonies 
were deposited as rubble on both the-northeast and east sides (Fig. 32). Very 
little coral tissue was observed alive on the rubble fragments which resembled 
a bulldozed pavement (Fig. 33). Some of the surviving E. annularis corals 
suffered abrasive damage and partial buria+. A. palmata colonies were also 
occassionally observed partially buried.. A. palmata'on the west side of the 
island, although still in place, were observed to be mostly dead (Fig. 35). 
A. palmata surrounding a piece of military debris in 1978 (Fig. 34) was found 
dead in 1980 (Fig. 35). 
The only area of significant coral survival was the north-side in the lee 
of the island where former bomb craters were filled with live A. palmata and - 
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and dead rubble. 
Damage to the reef is estimated to be mqre than 90% loss of A. palmata 
and dssociated corals on the south side and 50% loss in the lee side on the 
north. 
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D. Photogranm%%try Results 
The majority of this report is qualitative in scope; 
some quantitative estimates have been made of coral breakage 
and destruction. A small amount of phototransect data was 
collected in order to calculate percent bottom coverage of 
live coral and compare it to similar data collected in 1978. 
The photomosaic was photographed at the same location 
as phototransect #2 in 1978, which began at the 'shoreline 
where Laguna Anones breaks through the beach (in line with 
the ('runway" tarbet) and continued for 1200 meters across 
the western edge_cf Reef S-5 to Rota Alcatraz. The portion 
of that transect with the highest probability for precise 
relocation was where it skirted the margin of Reef S-5. A 
loo-meter cable was laid along the 1978 transect and photo- 
graphed for a distance of 60 meters. Weather conditions at 
the time of the 1980 field work did not permit underwater 
photogrammetry in the forereef area of reef S-5 or Alcatraz. 
In Figure 36 is depicted a 13-meter portion of the 
60-meter transect photographed in 1980, beginning at the one- 
meter tag (northern edge of transect), approximately 400 meters 
from the shoreline origin of the 1978 transect. 
The mid-sections of overlapping photographs were used 
to form a photomosaic strip. Scale was provided by a tag line 
in the center of the phototransect. The surface area of live 
stony coral coverage of the sea floor, projected onto a 
horizontal plane, was determined by graphically measuring the 
live, pigmented areas visible in the photomosaic, The original 
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photomosaic iS 39 inches long and 5 inches wide. Diver 
inspection of the transect while the cable (tag line) 
was in place enabled identification of coral species. This 
technique was used in Vieques in 1978 to photograph more than 
a linear mile of sea floor over coral reefs.and...sea grass 
beds. 
Since horizontal scale changes from the center of each 
photo to the edges, the measurement of live benthic,coverage 
is not valid as an absolute value. It is significant only 
in terms of percentage of bottom coverage since it is divided 
by the total area, and the probability of coral occurring in 
the center of the mosaic is no different than along the edges 
The results shown in Figure 36 indicate a total coral 
per cent bottom coverage of 6.7% with Montastrea annularis 
the major contributor (4.5%). A comparison of the 1978 
transect to the 1980 transect has not yet been made, due to 
the lack of availability of the 1978 phototransect, It is 
not expected that there will be a significant difference in 
percent live coral coverage in this area, since it is on 
the lee side of Reef S-5. Phototransects in the forereef 
area of reef S-5 are expected to show a pronounced reduction 
since 1978; live*coral coverage reached over 60% in the A. 
palmata zone of Reef S-5 in 1978. 
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E. X-radiography Results 
Three specimens of 5. annularis were collected from reef S-3. These. 
were transported to Nova Ocean Sciences Center where they were sectioned 
to -5 cm thick slabs and X-radiographed. The X-ray negatives were printed 
onto photographic paper and growth bands were inspected. Fig. 3 shows the 
X-radiograph positive of one of the corals. 
The annual band of coral skeletons consists of's high and low density 
portion which appears as areas of darker and lighter skeleton on the X-radio- 
graph positive. The dense portion of the annual cycle forms normally in the 
fall months of the year. 
By visual techniques only no readily observable growth disturbance,or 
other anomaly was detected in the fall, 1979 growth bands of the three corals. 
This suggests that lowered salinity effects from increased rainfall was not 
an important factor in coral damage and death. It also suggests.that in the 
f----. 
three corals examined that current forces were not sufficiently high or of 
long enough duration to create a permanent growth disturbance in skeleton 
formation. Corals from other sites should be checked to insure that results 
from these three corals are typical. 
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F. Evaluation of Recovery Potential 
Recovery of coral reefs after major natural or artificially induced 
disasters depends on a number of factors. These are: 1) amount and type 
of damage; 2) availability of 1 iving corals (either as whole specimens or 
coral fragments with tissue still alive) to repopulate; 3) presence of 
fast-growing animals or plants which may outcompete recolonizing corals 
for space; and 4) any new or continuing disturbance which may hinder re- 
growth. 
Recovery of the Vieques' reefs from the 1979 storm damage will be slow. ', 
Individual coral colonies which sustained broken branches.but remained anchored I 
will recover more rapidly and more successfully than uprooted and overturned 
colonies. Many of the latter will suffer additional damage during subsequent 
f--h 
lesser storms. Those fragments with living tissue which find secure resting 
places have a good chance of survival, except where exposed to sedimentation 
in their new locations or where attacked by disease. Because corals are 
colonial animals, surviving coral fragments have the potential to regenerate 
like freshly seeded juveniles. 
In the 9 months since Hurricanes David and Fr.ederic, recovery has been 
mostly in the form of annealment of new polyps over freshly broken surfaces, 
a process requiring asexual reporduction by budding. Thick branches (2" dia- 
meter and greater) have not yet completely annealed (Fig. 9). Once this pro- 
cess is complete, recovery of broken colonies wi 11 depend largely on linear 
growth rates. 
Acropora palmata growth rates are generally 10 cm/year in tropical 
waters for healthy growing tips. Colonies one to two meters in height (or J---X 
length) will therefore take an additional 10 to 20 years to grow back to their 
pre-storm condition. 
._ 
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On Vieques north reefs there are better prospects for recovery. Damage 
here was relatively slight and mostly limited to breakage of A. palmata. It 
is expected that regeneration will proceed and the reefs examined will be at 
pre-hurricane status in 5-10 years. 
The exposed south coast reefs of Vieques will require an even greater 
time to regenerate because so little live substrate remains. Extensive 
damage, to corals such as complete breakage and reduction to rubble, burigl, 
and abrasion indicate that in many places the reefs will have to beginas if 
on a new surface. These reefs will require repopulating by new coral planulae 
* (larvae) to return to their pre-storm condition. In the meantime, surviving 
fragments and broken colonies will regenerate first forming a thin forest of 
a few isolated larger individuals. 
Several factors will aid recovery. There are abundant seed corals in 
some places (adhering tissue to A- palmata rubble) which can grow into mature 
colonies. This will only take place, however, if the rubble becomes well- 
cemented to offer a firm substrate to prevent toppling of the developing 
colonies. In addition there are ample corals in the Vieques vicinity to 
offer a supply of coral larvae which will settle and grow. 'Areas such as the 
protected coast of Alcatraz and certain reef margins will remain heavily con- 
gested, densely populated, labyrinthine mazes of A. palmata, both living 
and dead. 
Other factors may pose problems. We noticed abundant soft coral encrust- 
ations on rubble mounds and these occurrences, coupled with other fast growing 
flora and fauna,ootentially may prevent coral larvae from settling and/or 
growing. The rubble mounds and deposits themselves will create difficulties 
if they are mobilized by high wave energy because'of their abrasion potential 
on newly developing colonies. A concern is increased sediment productit 
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from either natural or artificial causes which could produce un- 
favorable conditions for regrowth and lengthen recovery times. 
Barring any natural or artificial disturbance of relatively ' 
great magnitude, it is expected that the south Vieques reef will 
recover. It is.difficult to place an exact figure of time on 
the duration of recovery. A minimum estimate of 25,-30 years is . . 
expected for the heavily damaged area. Recovery times may be 
even longer. 
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G. Summary and Conclusions 
A reconnaissance survey conducted May 27-30, 1980 of coral reefs within 
the U.S. Naval weapons training range area of Vieques, Puerto Riico has indicate 
significant damage, particularly to the southern reefs from the relatively clos 
passage of Hurricanes David and Frederic in fall, 1979. 
Primary damage observed was in the form of overturned and broken coral 
and coral rubble accumulations to the lee of former rich coral areas and on 
the slope edges of reefs. Branching coral was the 
particul,a.r]y Acropora palmata which was completely 
locations. Non-branching forms such as Montastrea 
most severely affected, 
denuded from several reef 
annularis and Diploria sp. 
suffered less mortality. Many specimens of these species wer"e killed or in- 
jured, however, by overturning, breakage, abrasion, and/or burial. 
The observations made and conclusions drawn are entirely consistent with 
scientific literature reports of hurricane generated reef damage elsewhere 
and at other times. There is no evidence of 1) increasing range usage over 
the past two years; 2) numerous and newly formed bomb craters; and 3) in- 
creased amounts of ordinance fragments on the reefs. Any of the preceeding 
might have suggested that Naval activities have been the cause 0.f the reef 
damage. 
In the absence of any succeeding natural or artificial disturbance of 
unusual magnitude we project recovery timescfor the northern ree,fs to be 
approximately 5-10 years. Southern reefs will take longer, probably on the 
order of 20-30 years. Certain portions which were heavily damaged may take 
even longer for recovery. 
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IV. Recormnendations 
The reconnaissance nature, time restrictions, and qualitative data of 
this study renders’ a longer and more detailed reef investigation appropriate. 
The baseline conditions established in 1978 no longer apply due to the severe 
1 alterations of the hurricane damaged reefs. A new study should begin as 
soon as possible with the following goals: accurate mapping of reef dimensions 
and locations using low level aerial photography and ground-truthing; detailed 
assessment of reef health conditions using transect, quadrat, and photography 
techniques; establishment of semi-permanent reef study sites; assessment of 
sites at regular intervals to monitor the reef regrowth and recovery as well 
as any damage which may be induced by range activities. Stations should be 
established outside of the ra.nge area as well for comparison purposes. It 
should be recognized that Vieques reefs are now in a state of rebuilding and 
recovery. Consequently they comprise a more fragile ecosystem. These reef 
systems should be monitored closely for’detrimental effects. 
The advantages of such a study to U .S. Naval interests are as follows. 
1) Establishment of a new reef baseline condition will prevent allegations 
that reef alterations or damage was caused. by range activities. 
2) Monitoring of reefs to identify developing ecological problems, if 
any, will avoid future litigation over contended new destruction caused by 
naval activities. 
3) Generation of scientific data on reef recovery rates and techniques 
of reef surveying will be useful fcr other reef areas under naval influence 
(e.g., Hawaii, Pacific trust territories, Dieqo Garcia, etc.) which ultimately 
will require assessment. 
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NORTH REEFS 
VIEQUES, PUERTO RICO 
FIGURE 4. Reef N - 6. Penasco Fosil. Acropora palmata 
branch on Porites porites. Growth of finger 
coral stalks through elkhorn branch indicates 
storm damage probably predating hurricanes 
of 1979. 
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FIGURE 5. Broken tip on A. palmata at P. Fosil Reef. 
FIGURE 6. Healthy A. palmata at P. Fosil Reef. 
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FIGURE 7. Reef N - 9. Undamaged Millepora complanata on the crest of Long Reef. 
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FIGURE 8. Overturned A- . palmata at Reef N - 9. White line disease visible on 
living areas. Brain coral’Dioioria strkosa damaged. 
FIGURE 9. A. palmata with broken branches, partly annealed with new growth of 
live coral. Long Reef. 
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FIGURE 10. Minor breakage in A. palmata zone in 
forereef of Long Reef. 
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FIGURE 11. White band disease. Long Reef. 
FIGURE 12. Black band disease on Diploria strigosa. Long Reef. (Reef N - 9). 
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FIGURE 13. Four-ft. diameter, Diploria striqosa. lsla Yallis. 
FIGURE 14. M. annularis, approx. 8 ft. high. lsla Yallis. 
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FIGURE 15. Large partly dead A. palmata. lsla Yallis. 
FIGURE 16. Unbroken, A. palmata,north side lsla Yallis. 
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FIGURE 17. Unbroken, fragile A. prolifera (foreground) and Milleoora comolanata. 
lsia Yallis Reef. 
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FIGURE 18. Unexploded 500-pound 
Yallis Reef. 1978. 
bomb on lsla 
FIGURE 19. Same bomb as above. May 1980. Moved slightly to the left (shoreward) 
presumably by storm waves. A. palmata breakage near diver’s flipper. 
SOUTH REEFS 
VIEQUES, PUERTO RICO 
FIGURE 20 Coral rubble from extensive destruction of exposed reefs on south 
coast. Reef S - 2. 
FIGURE 21. Brain coral damaged by abrasion from coral rubble. Dead patches 
coated by algae and sediment. S - 2. 
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FIGURE 22. Large colony of A. palmata broken off shallow reef S - 2 and deposited 
in 184%. deep channel. 
FIGURE 23. P. porites with A. cervicornis rubble. Sample of M. annutaris being 
collected for X-radiography. 
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FIGURE 24. -rubble on western edge of reef S - 5. Live yellow patches 
occupy 12% surface area. Subject area is a 450 slope. 
FIGURE 25. Healthy P. porites at reef S - 6 in 1978. This area is nearly all dead today. 
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FIGURE 26. Healthy A. palmata at reef S - 7.1978. 
FIGURE 27. Dead A. palmata rubble at reef S - 7. 7980. 
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FIGURE 28. Surviving A. palmata colonies broken loose from anchorages and crowded 
in coral jam at the northeast side of reef S - 7. 
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FIGURE 29. Undamaged braih Corals formerly under the shelter of A palmata fronds. 
Reefs-7. 
FIGURE 30. Large colony of M. annularis found shattered in 1978, unchanged in 1980. 
Live ends are still alive. North side of reef S - 7. 
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FIGURE 31. A. palmata forest at east end of Rota Alcatraz. 1978. (Before). 
FIGURE 32. Dead A. palmata rubble at east end of Rota Alcatraz. 1983. (After). 
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FIGURE 33. Former forest of A. palmata completely swept away, leaving a lone 
survivor. East end of Rota Alcatraz. 
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FIGURE 34. Ordnance fragment in A. palmata beds at west end of Rota Alcatraz. 
1978. 
FIGURE 35. Same ordnance as in Figure 34. A. palmata is nearly all #dead. 1980. 
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APPENDIX IV 
Court's Opinion in Barcelo v. Bmwn 
This appendix contains a copy of the judge's opinion in 
Barcelo v. Brown (13 ERC 2105 - 2156). 
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Barcelo v. Brown 13ERC 2105 
BARCELO v. BROWN 
U.S. District Court 
District of Puerto Rico 
CARLOS ROMERO BARCELO. Gov- 
ernor of Puerto Rico, ef of., Plaintiffs, CAR- 
LOS ZENON. et al.. Plaintiffs-Inrervenors. 
v. HAROLD BROWN: ef oz.. LUIS MEDI: 
NA, et aL, Plaintiffs, FUNDACION 
ARQUEOLOGICA, AhTROPOLOGICA 
E HISTORICA DE PUERTO RICO, 
Plaintiff-Intervenor, 
BROWN, et aL, Defenda:&. NC!?%%% 
and 78-377, September 17.1979 
WATER 
1. Federal, state, and IocaI regulation - 
In general ($28.01) 
Federal, state, and local regulation - 
Navigable waters ($28.35) 
U.S. Navy in carrying out naval training 
operations in navigable waters of U.S. 
must obtain national poilutant discharge 
elimination system peimit under Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act in order to 
cover accidenta or intentiona release or 
firing of military ordnance into waters. 
2. FederaI, state, and local regulation - 
In general ($28.01) 
Court jurisdiction and procedure - 
Parties -Standing ($40.212) 
Private parties, alleging that U.S. Navy 
dischar 
navigab e waters constitutes dumping of H 
es of military ordnance in U-S. 
refuse materia1 without permit from Ann 
Corps of En ‘neers, violating Section 1 s 
of Rivers an lT Harbors Act, lack standing 
because there is no private right of action 
under Act to enforce its pronsions. 
LAND 
3. Federal, state, and local regulation - 
Statutory construction ($8.05) 
Federal, state, and local regulation - 
Public lands - In general ($8.201) 
Federal, state, and local regulation - 
Special land uses - Construction 
($8.413) 
AIR 
Federal, state, and local regulation - 
In generaI (948.01) 
Court jurisdiction and procedure - 
Parties - Standing (958.212) 
private parties. who alleged that U.S. 
Navy’s use of ordnance and bulldozing 
and maintenance of unpaved roads prod- 
uces fugitive dust and th@‘+&ure violates 
local air pollution regulations and federal 
Clean Ax Act, lack standing to sue since 
citizen suit for enforcement of local regu- 
lations under Clean Air Act must be based 
on violations of specific emission standard 
or limitation. 
IAND 
4. Federal, state, and local regulation - 
In general ($8.01) 
WATER 
Federal, state, and local reguIation - 
Coastal waters ($28.30) 
Lands owned by U.S. Navy on U.S. trust 
island used for naval training operations 
are excluded from provisions of Coastai 
Zone Management Act under defense 
establishment exclusion. 
LAND 
5. Federal, state, and local regulation - 
In general ($8.01) 
Federal, state, and local regulation - 
Statutory construction ($8.05) 
U-S. Navy violated National Environ- 
mental Policy Act by failing to 
F 
repare en- 
vironmental impact statement or ongoing 
project which was commenced prior to 
enactment of NEPA but which has envi- 
ronrn$aI effects after NEPA enactment. 
WATER 
6. Federal, state, and local regulation - 
In general ($28.01) 
Court jurisdiction and procedure -. 
Injunctions ($40.7 1) 
Private parties who waited eight years 
after National Environmental Policy Act 
was enacted, more than six years after Fed- 
eral Water Poliution Control Act was en- 
acted are barred by luck from seeking in- 
-1, 
‘unctive relief barring activities conducted 
y Navy since World War II. 
STATUTE!5 
gederal - National E.nvironn!kntaI 
Policy Act - Impact statement 
preparation (§95.0112) 
FederaI - Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act - National Pollutant 
Discharge JZIimination System 
(g95.0213) 
Federal - Rivers and Harbors Act of 
1899 (Refuse Act) ($95.025) 
Federal - Clean Air Act - In general 
(395.0311) 
IV-2 
13ERC 2106 Barcelo v. Brown 
Federal - Noise Control Act 
(895.061) 
Federal - Marine Protection, Re- 
search, and Sanctuaries Act 
(895.071) 
Federal - Coastal Zone Management 
Act (895.075) 
Federal - Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act (§95.081) 
Construed. 
Plaintiffs seek to prohibit defendant 
portion of itslands in 
e waters which surround 
sland, for the purpose of carrying out 
naval training operations. 
Injunction denied. 
Miguel Gimenez Munoz, Secretary of 
Justice. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 
Gerard0 A. Carlo, special lega counse1 to 
the governor. La Fortaleza, San 
R., and Jorge L. Cordova and J 
uan, P. 
ohn A. 
Hodges, ofWashington, D.C., for plaintlff 
Carlos Barcelo. 
Pedro J. Saade, of Rio Piedns. P. R., for 
plaintiff-mtervenbr Carlos Zenon. 
Judith Be&an, of San Juan, P. R., and 
Pedro Varela, of Hato Rey. P. R.. for piain- 
tiff Luis Medina. 
Wilfred0 Geigel, of Santurce, P. R., for 
plaintiff-iniervenor Fundacion 
Arqueologka. 
Jose A. Q$les, court appointed U.S. at- 
torney, San Juan, P. R.. Dorothy Bukarexs, 
an% 
De artment ofJustice. Washington, D.C., 
Rtchard Cornelius. De artment of the 
Navy. Washington. DC., or defendants. F 
Full Ted ofOpinion 
DECISION bAND ORDER 
TORRUELIA. . 
In substance, ii t ese suits concern the 
military use by the United States Navy of 
land which it owns in the IsIand of 
Vieques. a civilian municipality of the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. They 
bring into focus the delicate and complex 
constitutional interpIay that exists be- 
tween our three branches of Government, 
as well as between the Federal and local 
establishments and its citizens. 
I. Procedural Prejace 
The parties LO these actions are as varied 
and as multifarious as the issues which they 
raise. 
In Civil Number 78-323 the Plainriffsl 
are Caries Romero Barcelo. who is the 
1 These Plaintiffs will hereinafter be collec- 
tively referred to as “Plainriffs Romero-Bard6 
Governor of the Commonwealth of Puerto 
Rico, Radamis Tirado Guevara, the Mayor 
of Vieques, and the Environmental QuaIi- 
z 
t Board, an administrauve agency of the 
ommonwealth charged by law wtth pro- 
tection of the environment in Pueno 
Rico.2 The Defendants in that suit are Har- 
old Brown, Secretary of Defense of the 
United States, W. Graha:m Claytor, r., the 
Secretary of the Navy,James L. I’ Ho 
Chief of Naval 0 
loway, 
Commander in C ii. 
erauons, 1-C. Kidd, Jr., 
ief of the Atlantic Fleet, 
and Louis H. Wilson, Commandant of the 
Marine Corps-s After the commencement 
of this suit on March 1, 1978, additional 
Plaintiffs sou 
to intervene. s-3 
ht and received permission 
ey were CarIos A. Zenon, 
Mario Felix, Mariano Rivera Guishard, Al- 
icio Ayala Soto, Francisco Medina Melin- 
dez. Esmeraldo Melendez and Santos 
Rio;, fishermen who are residents of 
Vieques, and the “Asociacion de 
Pescadores de Vieques, Inc.“, a coopera- 
tive of Vieques fishermen.4 
The Plaintiffs in Civil Number 78-377, 
which was filed on March 8. 1978. are Luis 
Medina, Jesus Medina, Mario AntoIino 
FGlix, Cristobal Medina, Severino Ventura 
Cintron, Hector Medina, CristobaI Medi- 
na, Jr., Enrique Garcia, Antonio Ayala 
Gonzilez, Angel Ventura, and DanieI Me- 
dina, al1 fishermen and/or residents of 
Vieques, and Mision Industrial de Puerto 
Rico. Inc., an entity which is allegedly in- 
terested in advocatmg environmental cau- 
ses.3 Intervention wa; also sought and ai- 
lowed in this case on behalf of “Fundacion 
Arqeuologica. Antropol6gica e,Hist&ica 
de Puerto Rico”, a non-Iprofit corporation 
involved in research and preservation of 
historical and prehisto~rical cultural Je- 
sources.6 The Defendants in this suit are 
the same as those in Civil Number 78-323. 
exceot for the addition of William R. Flan- 
nagan, Caribbean Commander of the AL- 
lantic Fleet, Swain Wilson, Commandant 
of the United States Coast Guard, and un- 
named John Doe Defendants. 
* See 12 L.P.R.A. 1 I3 1; ~Commonweakh ofk- 
to Rico V. S.S. Zoc Cotocotroni, 456 F.Supp. 1327. 
1337 [I1 ERC 21071 (D.P.R.. 1978). 
s These Defendants, toe:ether with other De- 
fendants mentioned in Cwil Number 78-377. 
will hereinafter, be collectively referred to as 
“Defendant Navy.” 
4 These Plaintiffs-Intertenors will hcrcinaf- 
ter be coIlcctivelv referred LO as “Plaintiffs 
’ Zen6n. et al.” 
s These Plaintiifs will hereinafter be CO~~CC- 
tivelv referred to as “Plaintiffs Mcdina, et al.” 
6 this Plaintiff-Intcmcnor will hereinafter be 
referred to as “Plaintiff Fundackk.” 
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After various preliminary procedural in- 
terchanges, including a hearing in which a 
request for a temporary restramin order 
was denied in CivirNumber 78-37 5 , Civil 
Numbers 78-323 and 78-377 were consoli- 
dated. It is appropriate to briefly set forth 
the alieaations in the various comdaints. 
Plain& seek to enjoin Defendait Navy 
from using any portion of its lands in 
Vie ues, or in the waters which surround 
this 4 sland, for the purpose of carrying out 
naval training operations. Broadly speak- 
in 
3 
, the complamts allege harm to all re- 
sr ents of Vieques, to its fishing and agri- 
cultural industries,. to certain endan ered 
8- 
s ecies of plant and wildlife, to o ft- ~ctally 
esignated and unidentified historical 
sites and to private property, all as a conse- 
quence of Defendant Navy’s activities. 
The main thrust of Plaintiffs Romero- 
Barcelo’s allegations in Civil Number 78- 
323 is related to claims of violation by De- 
fendant Na 
laws. These 
2 -of ~anous envxronmentj31 
alms m&de the alleged fatl- 
ure of Defendant Navy to prepare and file 
an environmental im 
ant to the National E 
act statement pursu- 
nvironmental Policy 
Act of 1969 (42 USC. @4321. et seq.), as 
well as other substantive offenses thereun- 
der, and alleged vioIation of the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 (33 
USC. $131 I), the Water Pollution Con- 
trol Act of Puerto Rico (24 L.P.R.A. 8 $59 1, 
et seq.). Public Policy Environmental Act 
(12L.P.R.A.~$1121 rtseq.),andExecutive 
Order No. 11752 (38 F.R. 34793); the Ma- 
rine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries 
Act of 1972 (33 U.S.C. §$1401, 141 I and 
1412); the Clean Air Act (42 USC. 
$07401 et seq.); the Noise Control Act of 
1972 (42 USC. f94901 et seq.) and the 
eneral 
E 
Nuisance Law of Puerto Rico (33 
.P.R.A. 51365); the Resource Conserva- 
tion and Recovery Act (42 USC. @6901 
et se .); the Endangered Species Act of 
197j (16 U.S.C. $01531 et seq.); the Na- 
tional Historic Preservation Act (16 USC. 
$ $470 et seq.), and Executive Order 11593 
(36 F-R. 892 I); the Coastal Zone Mana e- 
ment Act (16 USC. §§I451 et seq.); &e 
Marine MammaI Protection Act of 1972 
(16 USC. 0 5 136 1, et seq.); the Rivers and 
Harbors Act of 1899 (33 USC. 1407); the 
First and Fifth Amendments to the Consti- 
tution. and Presidential Orders and Con- 
gressional restrictions relating to the 
transfer of military activities from the Is- 
land of Culebra. another off-shore mu- 
nicipality of the Commonwealth.7 The al- 
--- 
7 See Fdickw at United S&ah. 297 FSupp. 
1356(D.P.R.l969).af d422F.2d%S(C.A. 1. 
1970).ccn.dcn.400 G .S.823 (1970). 
legations of Plaintiffs Zenon et al are sub- 
stantially a copy of the complaint of Plain- 
tiffs Romero BarceI6 et al. with the exce 
tion that additional contentions are ma 1 
- 
e 
with regards to violations of the Federal 
Relations Act of 1950 (48 U.S.C. 749) and 
the Water Law of Puerto Rico (12 L.P.R.A. 
§§1501-1523). 
In Civil Number 78-377 Plaintiffs Medi- 
na et al, in addition to also relying on the 
previously enumerated claims, allege vari- 
ous other basis for relief, including a chal- 
lenge to the takin 
fendant Navy oft E 
and acquisition by De- 
e land on which the ac- 
tivities subject of these suits are carried 
out, aIle 
Act of 1 8 
attons of violation of the Organic 
00 (“Fotaker Act”) (31 Stat. 77), 
the Or 
Stat. 9 f? 
nit Act of 19 17 (‘yones Act”) (39 
1). the Federal Relations Act (64 
Stat. 319,48 U.S.C. 73 1 et se 
tain treaties (15 U.S.T. 163 2 
-). and of cer- 
), by virtue of 
Defendant Navy’s use of the na\l ble wa- 
ters surrounding Vieques, and c alms for F 
damages arising by reason of Defendant 
Navy’s allegedly intentional and/or ne li- 
gent actions, which claims are ostensl Q iy 
grounded on the Federal Tort Claims Act 
(28 USC. 2671 etseq.). The contentions of 
Plaintiff Fundacion are similar to paraBe 
ones by Plaintiff Romero Barcelo et al, 
based on the National Historic Preserva- 
tion Act of 1966, supra, and Executive 
Order 11593. supra. 
For the present moment, suffice it to say 
that Defendant Navy’s answers put at issue 
Plaintiffs’ allegations and resulted in a trial 
lasting three months in duration. Sixty 
three witnesses, many of them leading 
authori ties in various fields of expertise, as 
we11 as hundreds of exhibits were pre- 
sented durimr the course of this leaal mar- 
athon. Addityonally, at the re ues’t 
3 
of the 
parties, the Court conducte two field 
trips to various sites in and around 
Vieques. The Court consolidated the pre- 
liminary and permanent injunction hear- 
ings. 
Because these cases present such an all- 
inclusive challenge to Defendant pavy’s 
presence and activities in Viequm we 
must commence our homeric voyage 
through this evidence with some relevant 
background discussion about the Island in 
question. 
ZZ. Bukground 
A. Physical Biography 
Vieaues is a lona narrow island located 
appro&mately 6 &les off the Southeast- 
em coast of the main Island of Puerto Rico 
and about 9 miles due South of its sister 
municipality of Culebra. It is nearly 20 
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miles long and 4.5 miles wide at its widest 
uoint. and is oriented on an East-West 
axis. The Island has an area of about 
33.000 acres or 51 sauare miles of land. 
of Vieques is dominat- 
of rollmg hills several 
height leading up CO 
Monte Pirata in its western extremity, 
which at nine hundred and eighty one feet 
is the highest point on the Island. The 
shores are principally composed of calcar- 
eous sandy beaches, mterrupted by several 
rocky promontories. particularly in the east- 
em &remities. and in the points of the 
various half-moon bavs located throuah- 
out the southern coast. There are fri; e 
and off-shore coral reefs mostly in tlte 
northern, eastern and southern sectors. 
The mean average temperature is 80’ 
and the average annual rainfall is 46.23 
inches, mostly concentrated in the central 
and western areas. There are no per- 
manently flowing fresh water streams or 
rivers. Generally speaking the prevailing 
winds are from the East; however, they 
tend to bend towards the Northeast along 
the north coast and the South East along 
the southern shores. 
The ocean and wave action follow a pat- 
tern similar to that of the wind. The ocean 
currents are also genetally wind-oriented 
from East to West. but tidal flow can affect 
this pattern substa&Uy, particular1 in 
the eastern: and western extremities o r the 
Island where the tide moves north when 
ebbing and south when floodin 
The biota of Vie 
ibbean Island with 
the various humidity zones as well as the 
present land use, a matter we shall res- 
entlv deal with in greater detail. Su f? Ice it 
to iay for the mgment thk it ,genera.Ily 
tends to run from thomv brush in the East 
to lusher vegetation in ihe West, the cen- 
ual strip bemg subjected to some cultiva- 
tion of minor crops. Scrub grass covers 
much of the bare ground throughout 
Vieques. There are several large stands of 
mangrove along the coast. the most im- 
portant ofwhich are in the vicinity ofPunta 
Arenas in the West. and surrounding 
Puerto Mos uito, Puerto Fetro and En- 
senada Hon 3 a on the South. Inland from 
these are generally found dryland forests 
of ucar (Budu buccras). Many areas of the 
ocean floor in the immediate vicinity of the 
coast are covered with stands of sea 
8” 
sses, mostly of the ihuLz5G.a variety, the 
argat of these concentrations startin 
West from Puma CabaUo on the No rzf 
coast and fanning around Punta Arenas to 
the South West. There are also 
seagrass areas in the South in 
lar e 
Ensena 
Honda and in Bahia Salinas de1 Sur. 
%i 
Vieques’ animal lift: includes seved 
species ofparticular interest to the present 
action. In addition to the usual comole- 
ment of fish and bird populations therg&e 
present in Vieques six species which are 
designated as either “endangered” or 
“threatened” pursuant to statute or regu- 
1ations.s These are the brown pelican 
(Pelecnnuc OCcidentaZir),io the manatee 
(Trichechus manatv.s),*~ the leatherback tur- 
tle (Dermochciys catiocrlz).t* the hawksbill 
turtle (EretmochElys imbricata),*s the logger- 
head turtle (Curefta carel!la),i4 and thegreen 
turtle (Cheioniu mydas).t5 
Three coves in the Southern coast of 
Vie ues (Puerto Mosquito, Puerto Ferro 
and 9B ahia Tao&i) contain an unusual uhe- 
nomena founh o&asionaIly~s~n prote&& 
shorelines of tropical waters, w-&in very 
particular physical and biological patame’- 
ters. This ohenomena is known as biolu- 
minescens;, a process which has not been 
fully ex lored scientificall but which is 
believe B to be related to li e presence of 
microsco 
specific p R 
ic dinoflageilatetr activated by 
ysical circumstances. 
B. Rc-Hitto~g andHistory 
A brief look at Vieques’ pre-history and 
history will give us some insight into the 
problems we are faced with in the present 
case. 
The first semi-permanent inhabitants of 
Vieques were Carib Indians. They arrived 
in the period immediate1 preceding the 
discovery of Vieques by e hristopher Co- 
lumbus (1493). and for various decades 
thereafter.** These sea-going tribes came 
8 There arc no wild land mammals in 
Viequcs orhcr than rodcnu. mongooses. and 
bats. They. as well as the: various rcsidcnt SAC- 
ties of iand reptiles and crustacians. play no slg- 
nifieant role in this conuovmy. 
9 16 USC. 031361 cl sq.; 16 U.S.C. 0015Sl 
et seq. 
10 35 Fcd.Reg. 16047 and 18S19.50 GF.R 
$17.11 p.12. F%wxtoRicanrcsidm~ofLhll~p+ 
tics arc a subsDecks denominated txti a- 
cSdmt&a~. 
1’ 16U.S.C. $1362(5); 50C.F.R X7.11 p.59. 
1) 50 C.F.R. 17.11 p- 130. 
1’ Id. 
1’ Id. 
‘5 Id. 
16 Only four ocbcr similar bays arc known to 
exist in the World. 
Dinoflagellau). 
I8 Some sources date the Cariis ankl to 
Vicqucs at about 1480. See ltig Rouse. “Sci- 
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up from chenorchem coast ofSouth Amer- 
ica via the Lesser Antilles and used 
Vieques as a base from which to carry out 
their fierce raids into Puerto Rico. Prior 
thereto, commencing as far back as per- 
haos 8.50 A-D.. various mieratorv waves of 
A&wak Indians19 which &iginaied in the 
Orinoco Basin, passed through the Island 
on their way to inore permarienc abode in 
Puerto Rico and Hisoanola. In historic 
times, Indians from Puerto Rico and St. 
Croix, Virgin Islands moved to Vieques co 
esca 
ish P 
e the Spanish conquest.20The Span- 
orces sent to conquer Vieques had lit- 
tle influence on the native populacion liv- 
ing there and no attempt was made by 
Spain CO colonize the Island at this point. 
Durin the 17th and 18th Centuries the 
French, H nglish, Dutch and Danes all ac- 
tempted to establish footholds on 
Vieques. In 1673 the Spanish attacked and 
destro ed 
there 9 
the colonial population and 
ter continued to send military ex- 
peditions from time to time. In 18 16. colo- 
nists from Saint Thomas and SC. Croix 
asked and received permission to establish 
a Iivestock industry in Vieques, and thus 
began what is today the Island’s dominant 
agricultural activity. One year later the 
Governor of Puerto Rico delegated 
authority to one of these colonists and 
thereafter a fort was built at Isabel Segun- 
da, the capital of Vieques. B 1828 the 
population of Vieques was I 2 engaged d 
mostly in timber harvesting for export to 
the Virgin Islands, in the growin of cro s 
and livestock and in fishmg. der 186%. 
economic ac;ivit 
T 
increased and sugar 
cane became the eading crop. 
In 1898, and as a result of the Spanish- 
American -War Vie ues 
rest of the Dresent- % 
together &h the 
av Commonwealth of 
Puerto Ri& became a ;erritory of the Unit- 
ed Siates.21 Through the early 1940’s, the 
principal activities in yieques were the 
r- 
owing of sugar cane and livestock, and 
shmg. The total population throughout 
encific Survey of Port0 Rico and the Vir ‘n Is- 
lands”, Vohnne XVIII, Part 4. page 56 B . New 
York Academy of Sciences. New York, 1952. 
19 Id. Both thr: lgueri (Saladoid) and Taino 
eulxurcs of the Atawaks were ceramic and a *- 
cultural, which are normally indicative of hlg -fT a 
social organization. It is probable that 
prccaamic (Coroso) Indians preceded the 
Anwaks to Vicy~es. and erhaps also Ciboney 
Indians from H~s~anola. d. DD. 570. P 
x0 Ironically, i;l recent tit& many present 
da;ighabionts of Vieques have mignted to SL 
*I &c Treaty of Paris of 1898. Art. II. 1 
L.P.R.A. Historical Documents, p. 17; see also. 
BaLznc ZL Port0 Rico, 258 US. 298. 305 (1922). 
this eriod fluctuated between 6,000 and 
12.090. The population of Vie ues ac- 
cordin 
sons o B 
CO the 1970 census was 7, 67 per- s 
which 2,378 lived in Isabel Segun- 
da and 620 in Es 
towns, and 4.76 B 
eranza. the Island’s two 
were classified as rural 
inhabitants. Sugar is no longer of any rele- 
vance, and the principal agricultural en- 
deavours are related to the plancin of 
some minors crops, and co Iivestock. # Ish- 
ing is still of importance co the local inhab- 
itants. 
As previously stated, Vieques is a civil- 
ian municipality of the Commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico. It is divided into seven wards 
(“barrios”): Puerto DiabIo. Puerto Ferro. 
Puerto Real, Florida, Mosquito. Llave and 
Punta Arenas. Durin 
1939 to 1944, Defen 3 
the period from 
ant Navy acquired 
title by purchase co 26,000 of the 33,000 
total acres of Vieques. This property is 
Fi 
hysically divided into two sections and is 
lsecced by the civilian area of Vieques. 
(See Appendix A). 
The&tern pan of the naval reservation 
includes Banrio Puerto Diablo and most of 
Barrio Puerto Fen-o. The western art be- 
gins at a north-south Iine whr -$ com- 
mences west of Punta Cabal10 and con- 
tinues south to the eastern end of Laguna 
Playa Grande. It includes the barrios of 
Punta Arenas, part of Mos uito, Uave and 
Florida. There is also an a 3 ditional area in 
the middle of civilian sector known as Bar- 
riada donte Sanco. to which Defendant 
Navy holds title but in which there has 
been considerable civilian squatting with 
Defendant Navy’s knowIedge and acquies- 
cence.= 
III. Defdnt Nay’s Acfivitiu in and around 
viequcs. 
Generally speaking, in the eastern sec- 
tor are located a Marine Co s facility 
known as Camp Garcia. a 000 foot T 
airstrip not presently in active use, a heli- 
port, a field ammunition de OC, the bulk of 
the beaches used for amphr -E IOUS landings, 
an observation post compIex on top of 
Cerro Matias. and the various ordnance 
impact zones, with related targets. The 
western sector is mainly us-r the stor- 
age of ammunition in the bunkers spread 
rx ?his parcel. together with various other 
arcels in the other two sectors of Defendant 
R avy’s Viequa properties. have been de&red 
surplus pro 
services A 3 
CRY and turned over to the General 
mimsuation. who has for some time 
Lxen conducting interminable negotiations 
with ihe Commonweahh Government for their 
transfer. 
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throughout this area. as well as for quan-y- 
ing, some amphibious operations, and 
some of the non-firing small unit training. 
Also in this sector is located a break-water- 
pier at Desembarcadero Mosquito, an ad- 
ministrative center, and an electronic war- 
fare facility on the summit ofMonte Pimta. 
Defendant Navy’s properties in Vieques 
are part of a mu& larger and inclusive 
military complex known as the Atlantic 
Fleet Weapons Training Range, which 
consists of four ranges: the inner range in 
the east end ofvieques, previously alluded 
to; the outer range, which is an ocean 
range extending both north and south of 
Puerto Rico and CO the east; the un- 
derwater trackin 
gin Islands; 
range at St. Croix, Vir- 
an % an electronic warfare 
range. All of the operations of these vari- 
ous ranges are directed from a center lo- 
cated at the Roosevelt Roads Naval Station 
in Ceiba, Puerto Rico, approximately 7 
miles northeast of Vieques across Vieques 
Sound. 
The outer range is at least 35 miles 
north ofvieques and 20 miles to the south. 
On this range are conducted various sur- 
face and ant)-aircraft gunnery exercises as 
well as missile exercises, including sur- 
face-to-air, surface-to-surface, air-to-sur- 
face and air-to-air training. 
shore of St. Croix (and south east of 
Vieques), and encompasses 21 square 
nautical miles. This range is used for train- 
ing for accurate three-dimensional 
tracking of surface and underwater ob- 
jects. 
The electronic warfare’ range is a com- 
plex of so-called threat platform simula- 
tors located at various sites in Puerto Rico 
and adjacent islands, including Monte 
Pirata as previously stated, as well from 
one sea-going location. These facilities 
P 
rovide a reahstic electronic environment 
or the training of shipboard electronic 
warfare teams and tactical electronic 
order-of-battle, in support of ‘exercises 
and operations conducted on the various 
other ranges. 
The inner range (see Appendix B). 
which consists of air-to-ground, ship-to- 
shore, and artillery targets, is locally con- 
trolled from the observation post previ- 
ously. mentioned atop Cerro Matfas. The 
post IS surrounded by a 1200 yard safety 
tone into which no ordnance may be dis- 
charged. 
The 
be use B 
ublic is notified that the range will 
through notices to airmen, notices 
LO mariners and fishermen’s notices. 
Fishermen’s notices indicate the schedule 
of activities for the followin 
8. 
week and m- 
elude a ma 
to the rea B 
ofthe island of reques foraid 
er m determining the activated 
areas. These notices are widely distributed 
and posted, including ac the fishermen’s 
cooperative. In the event of a change in ac- 
tiviues, a wrirren schedule is printed and 
distributed at least 24 hours in advance to 
fishermen. Defendant Navy does not re- 
strict access to the waters in the danger 
zone at*f Vieques except shonly prior to, 
during, and tmmediately after training 
operations utilizing these waters. 
This range normally opens at 7~30 A.M., 
with firing commencing at 8:00 A.M., and 
usually closes at IO:00 P.M.*’ When the 
range is active, a red eight-foot square flag 
is flown from a I5 foot i ole above the ob- 
servation post during t 'R e daylight hours, 
and a red rotating beacon is operated at all 
times. Prior to commencing range use, a 
patroI aircraft covers the wafer areas 
around the Island to assure that the area is 
clear. When required, a patrol boat is also 
204.234. The hut)\ consists of 3 
each about 4 feet in dime tcr. we1 
chow balls, 
d ed together. 
on which there is a triangular warning SI 
There arc LWO rcstrictcd areas (see 33 r- .F.R. 
207.815(2),(3)), in the coastal waters off 
Vicqucs. activated at all times: one on the south 
coast around the Camp Garcia arca. cxtcndii 
1,500 yards offshore; and :a second one aroun 8 
the Naval Ammunition Facility at the west end 
of the Isiand, including Mosquito Pier, extend- 
in 
% 
1,500 yards offshore. 
cfendant Navy has both CB radios and a 
VHF unit for communication with the fisher- 
man. In fact. Defendant Navy instalkd a VHF 
unit in the fishcnncn’s coopcrativc for their w 
in contacting the obscrvatton ~OSL atop Ccrro 
Ma&s. This has proven ICI be a useless QturC 
‘i as the fishermen either refuse or ncgcct u) 
make use of this facility. 
On shore. there arc warnin 
and Engiish posted at intc: ml5 
signs in Sp;mirh 
along cbe cntirt 
len h of the cattle fence which acts as the wc~t- 
5t cm oundary of the inncr range. Signs arc ab+o 
posted along the beachcs. 
sonncl into theeastern 
properties. The cattle 
24 Operations are 
P.M. as a saicty cushion. Eiccptions have .bccn 
made for naval gunfire acrcisa. and for a~-t~- 
ground operations with incrt OrdIWKc. In mc 
mstances. chc range has opcnd at 6:OO A-M. 
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used for this purpose. The range control of- 
ficer on location can visually observe the 
entire land mass area and the surrounding 
sea and air space for considerable dis- 
tances.*s Additionally, tbereare two radars 
observing the surface water area and to 
maintaim the 
on the range. E 
osition of ships while firing 
There have been occasions when ships 
or aircraft have disregarded safety precau- 
tions into 
manual or 
orated m the range user’s 
Xe t-anr officer’s instructions. 
The range offLcer as authority, which has 
in fact been exercised at times, to order an 
offender off the range. 
In addition to fire control and related 
.safety measures. one of the m-in&al firm- 
tionsof the observation posi is the scoring 
of the firing. This is accomplished visually, 
in the case of shio-to-shore firirur. and bv 
television in th; case of air-t&round 
bombing. 
The eastern boundarv of the inner 
range is a north-south fire break, ap roxi- 
mately 20 meters in width, running K om a 
point just west of Bahia Playa Bianca and 
continuing directl south to the shore west 
of Cerro Indio. dis boundary is referred 
to by Defendant Navy as the “Eastern 
Friendly Front Line.” No ordnance is used 
east of this demarcation. Immediately to 
the west of this line commences the Air Im- 
pact Area and Close Air Support Zone 
(AIAKAS) which extends west to another 
north-south fire break known as the 
“Western Friendly Front Line.” This ‘line 
commences on the shore of Bahia Icacos 
and nms directly south past the eastern 
ed 
at i3 
e of an unnamed lagoon, to the beach 
ahia SaIinas de1 Sur. The area between 
the two “Friendly Lines” is also known as 
the Naval Gunfire Su 
West of the Western F- 
port Range (NGFS). 
nendly Front Line is 
the Surface Impact Area (SIA) which runs 
LO another north-south boundary com- 
mencing from a point west of Bahia Fandu- 
s For visual observation the range officer is 
u+ly assisted by binoculars. The range of un- 
a:dcd, accurate. bnc of sight observation from 
the observation past is approximately 5 miles 
onadcarday. 
m Airemft are tnckcd by radar located at the 
Roosevelt Road center. 
ca in the south. to the north shore three 
fourths a mile east of Puerto Diablo. A cat- 
tle fence, which is a 
yards west and paralle P 
proximately 1,000 
to this SIA bounda- 
marks the western most extension of 
Z inner range. 
Since most of the controversies m-this 
case arise out of Defendant Navy’s activi- 
ties within inner ramre. we shall describe 
these and the facilities herein located with 
greater detail. 
(1) The&gets 
The inner xanze contains two bullseve 
targets, referred-to as Targets 1 and ‘2. 
These are used for inert ordnance practice 
with Mark 76 Practice bombs27 and 2.75 
mm. inert rockets. Live ordnance is never 
used on these tar ets. Target I is located 
a 
9 
proximately h ZwayufontheWestem f 
nendly Front Line. It is 00 feet in diame- 
ter and consists of 4 concentric rings of 
tires, 50 feet apart- Target 2, which is made 
up of three similar rings 300 feet in diame- 
ter. is located approximately two statute 
mtles west of Target 1. 
‘. At the southern extremity of the West- 
em Friendly Front Line is located a suaf- 
ing target. A 
used against 
zF&s- inert ordnance is 
The AIAKAS zones are the air-to- 
ground live ordnance iarget areas.28 The 
targets consist of realistic mockuns of an 
ai&ip, a fuel far-m, a motor pooI: an am- 
munition dump, SAM rocket sites, and nu- 
merous: targets of op 
tanks, a convoy and airp Ln 
ortunity such as 
dix B). 
es. (SeeAppen- 
There is also one stationary water target 
currently active= located about a mile off 
rhe eastern tip of Punta Este and con- 
sisting of a floating buoy. It was installed 
for inert, air-to-ground activity and has 
been used very infrequently. 
A Mark 33’SEPTAR. which is an 18 foot 
drone target boat operated remotely from 
Cerro Matfas, is sometimes operated in 
Bahia SaIinas de1 Sur for air-to-ground ex- 
ercises using inert ordnance. 
In August of I977 a target barge was an- 
chored off the southeastern tip of Vieques 
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n 250 pound bombs. 
=-I-h 
which o 
2 +so contain some targets against 
y mcrz ordnance IS allow& 
IV-8 
for about a month. A guided 500 pound 
inert glide bomb called SMART ROC was 
fired at ir. 
All of the targets described above in the 
inner range. with the exception of the 
water tar >o, were installed and opem- 
tional bv c a e end of 197 1. Some of the tar- 
gets in-the SIA and AIA were in use for 
some years prior to that. 
(2) Air-lo-ground activities 
The type of aircraft usually involved in 
ordnance delivers on the ALWFAS targets 
and on the two bullseye targets are A-4: A- 
h and A-7 fixed wing jet aircr;lft flying either 
from carriers 1 
Roosevelt Roa J 
ing offshore or from the 
s Station. 
It is standard procedure to conduct safe- 
ty .and range use briefings for all range 
users, including air crews. These proce- 
dures are outlined in the range user’s man- 
ual and will be discussed hereinafter. 
Coming out of Roosevelt Roads aircraft 
cake off on a headin 
% 
of either 060 M and 
turn on a radial of 1 WM headed out co an 
area 3 miles off the central Vieaues coast. 
In a warning area north of Vieques known 
as Whiskey 428, the radial 100” M inter- 
sects Defendant Navy’s o erational area. 
Aircraft in this area must lie a flight plan F 
and are controlled by the Federal Aviation 
Administration (F.A:A..). At this point air- 
craft will be at about 6-7000 feet in al- 
titude. climbing and proceeding- easteri) 
until they reach an area directly off Puma 
Este where they will begin a cum to the 
south. The aircraft must maintain altitude 
until they are inside a restricted area south 
of Vieques known as Romeo 7104, and 
then must descend immediately to an al- 
titudc of ;~hout X000 Isic] feel and proceed over 
the target low enough to identify the same. 
If the point of origin of aircxaft coming 
into the inner range is an aircraft carrier 
Vieques. The aircraft come in on a south- 
erly heading through Point November at 
an altitude of between I2-15,000 feet. 
This altitude reservation is pre-estab- 
fished by agreement with the F.A.A. 
If the aircraft carrier is operatin 
& 
co the 
south of Vie 
0.2 
ues, airciaft come in rough 
Romeo 71 as it lines up with Whiskey 
428. in a two mile wide corridor on a 
northerly heading. 
NormaIIy aircraft come over the ran e 
area in group of 3 or 4.5 aircraft being t.Ee 
maximum that Targets I and 2 can handle 
in a pattern. 
Aircraft loaded with either inert or live 
ordnance are not permitted by range regu- 
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lations KO overff y any civilian area, and no 
credible proof was presented during the 
trial of any practice to the contrary. 
After the target identifying run, the air- 
craft must assume a course pointed at the 
designated target and W:IC~ wings level. 
whereupoon he is declared “cleared hot” 
after vi&al observation of the range con- 
trol officer stationed at rthe observation 
post atop Cerro Matias.s’J Thereafter the 
pilot is permitted to arm the aircraft’s mas- 
ter switch and to tire when he gets wit.& 
the correct range. As the :aircrafc pulls off 
the target, it is required co advise the range 
officer that the master switch is on a “safe” 
position so that no ordnance may leave the 
- lane. The minimum se 
t 
aratidn interval 
etween different aircra P t firing is 30 se- 
onds. The second aircmft is not permitted 
to fire until the first aircraft overihe target 
calls in that its master switch is “safe.” 
For bombing runs aircmft typically ass 
over target at about 1500 feet. In stra P mg, 
aircraft cum at about 3000 feet, fire ar 
about 500 feet and pull out over the target 
at about 200 feet. 
The course headings for the various tar- 
B 
ecs are predetermined. The ap roach for 
is 
argets 1 and 2 and for the stra F mg target 
from the south, on OIO’M headin s. 
Over Target 1 the pilot must make a ng 2 t- 
hand cum off the tar et, except in in- 
stances where Target !! is not activated 
when he may request a left-hand turn. The 
normal pattern for Target 2 is counter- 
clockwi&. In a left-hand ‘iurn off Target-2 
the closest distance to the civilian sec’ior is 
about 5.8 miles (to Ban-h Santa Marfa).st 
The approach to the AIAJCAS targets is 
also from the south on courses of between 
33OW and 030’M. Over the AIAKAS tar- 
gets the normal pattern is a right hand 
turn, although a left-hand cum can also be 
requested. 
‘(3) Ship-fo-she a&ifics 
As previously intimated ship-to-shore 
firing is also conducted in the inner ran e. 
This takes nlace into the same A.LW c!is 
zone. on s& point targets located around 
YJ In the case of operations conducted dur- 
ing the night time hours. Lhc target idmtifving 
run is preceded by the dropping of parachute 
illumination flares. An cxq~tion to this made 
for night radar bombing wth light inert ord- 
nance. which is conduaed AMIV bv snccial ver- 
runs on the same targeL 
SJ The width of a turn off Target 1 or 2 is 
about 1500-2000 yards offscr from the Target 
rhumb line. except thaw sonwtin~a in a right 
turn off Tarrret 1 the ~iloc extends the turn and 
comes out t; the end-of the Mand. 
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the shore-line of Bahia Salina dcl Sur and 
on two area targets. As in the case ofair-to- 
ground range useii, ships crews must re- 
ceive a briefing prior to arrival on the 
range. 
Ships fire only from the waters to the 
south of Vieques. Upon arrival at the 
range, each ship must work its way through 
the range, visually identifying each one of 
the point targets and plotting them on a 
chart. The naval gunfire range can accom- 
modate two ships maneuvering on the 
range at one time, but on1 one ship can 
fire at a time. During gun ire. except on I 
rare occasions, the shops are between three 
to eleven miles from the shoreline. As 
previously stated, while Bring the ship’s 
position is monitored by the observation 
post’s radar. Only live ordnance is used by 
shi s as it has been found that inert naval 
or nance creates a safety and B scorin 
problem by its propensity to ricochet an 2 
its difficulty of observation. 
When ship-to-shore firing is scheduled, 
air-to-ground activity is restricted to Tar- 
get 2. 
(4) FieZd artillery 
To the west of cerro Matias is located 
the SIA reviousl described, which is the 
Marine i! -P orps aru lery range.ss This is the 
live ordnance target area which is closest 
to the civilian 
uroximatelv 6. H 
opulated areas. It is ap- 
miles from Barrio Santa 
‘Maria. Thii type of practice involves the 
firing of howitzers, sm 
from positions along 
ly or in batteries, 
3l e vicinit of the 
SIA’s western bounda 7 towar 2 targets 
near the Western Friend y Front Line, that 
is, from west to the east. Howitzer activity 
normally occurs only twice a year durin 
the Marine amphibious exercises whrc -lt 
will be subsequently discussed. 
B 2% Ground Maneuvering Area (GMA ) ’ 
The GMA is the princi 
training area in Vieques. his area is locat- 
al Marine Corps 
ed withm the tone comprised from the cat- 
tle fence previously described, which is the 
eastern boundary, aIl the way to the west- 
em pro R, P;11O1IStothecivilian erty line conti 
sector. e property me IS marked by a 
chain link fence, topped by barbed wire. 
(1) Gnnp Garth 
On the south western extremity of the 
GMA is the Marine cam previously re- 
ferred to, Camp Garcia. T&s camp has suf- 
ficient facilities to accommodate several 
thousand troops, although its present 
~2 This area has occasionally also been used 
for air-to-ground machine gun fire by Marine 
helicopter 
i!iY 4 
n ships firin from west tc east on 
targets on c side of a ht I. 
complement is about 150 men. Camp 
Garcia has been operational since the early 
1940’s althoueh tmorovements and addi- 
tions have b&n cairied out until recent 
times. The intensity of its use has fluctu- 
ated with the variated state ofworld affairs. 
The airstri 
is operationa P 
which is adjunct to the base 
but has only been used once 
in recent years and this was to allow an 
emergency landing by a civilian aircraft. 
Air transport to the base is conducted 
thrwch ;I-h&port located on a grassy field. 
The freauencv of use of the hebort de- 
pends in’ lar 
sures of the E 
e part on the training pres- 
MA. Normal helicopter traf- 
fit in and out of Camp Garcia, or the pads 
atop Monte Pitata and Cerro Matias. does 
not overfly the civilian sector of Vieques. 
(2) Amphibious landings 
The GMA contains the beaches wherein 
the Marines conduct the bulk of their am- 
phibious landings in Viequesss 
The principal landing beaches are called 
Red Beach and Blue Beach and are located 
on the south coast in an area desi 
ydas “Amnhibious OP Area South”. w rch runs 
from*Punta Conejo on the east to Punta 
Negra on the west. Both beaches are im- 
mediately to the north of two cays approxi- 
mately 2% miles anart but which are con- 
fusingly -enough’ both called “Cayo 
Chiva.” Yellow Beach, which is south of 
Cerro Matias in the immediate vicinit of 
Puma Matias. is rarely used because o ? the 
other activities that are conducted in the 
SIA zone. On the north coast, in the “Am- 
nhibious Of Area North”. is located Pur- 
ple Beach between Punta Goleta and 
Puma Campanilla. Purple Beach is also 
used infrequently. 
A typical landing exercise on OP Area 
South mvolves various support ships in the 
viciniry of the south coast off the restricted 
area south ‘of Red and Blue Beaches. 
Those are large amphibious attack trans- 
ports from which are launched the landing 
;raft and amphibious tracked vehiciec 
These vessels proceed to the beaches 
where they land the troo 
porting ‘tank. field artd esy and vehtc e -P 
s as well as su 
3 
- 
units. 
In recent years these exercises have in- 
cluded vertical envelopment landings by 
s Green Beach (Puma Arenas) on the north 
western extremity of Vieques is also a designa- 
ted landing beach but has onlv rarelv been used 
as such. Iris in racrice a rkreacional beach 
used in krge pan g y both civilians from Vieques 
:md wzkend-visiting ~achls from Puerto Rico 
norwichstanding its Iymg within the restricted 
area previously described in Note 23. 
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helicopter-borne troo s. These arc some- 
times conducted in t! ependently of con- 
ventional amphibious o erations. -l-hose 
.maneuvers include he icopter carriers P- 
withingthe supfortinp fleet. The troop 
landm s take p ace In and of the conven- 
tional anding beaches. 
Landings are usuaily accompanied by 
realistic low-level su 
rine air units of fixe B 
port flights by Ma- 
wing, jet aircraft or 
helicopter gunships. If ordnance is used, 
this is expended within ALWCAS zone. 
Naval units ma be involved in activities re- 
lated to the N E FS area. 
Upon landing the troops enga e in vari- 
ous tactical maneuvers throug out the !I 
GMA related with the securing of 
predetermined objectives in the area- At 
times, the Iandin s are opposed by 
“enemy” troops, w Ii- tch have periodically 
included units of the Puerto RICO National 
Guard. As part of these activities the how- 
itzer exercises previously described are 
carried out. 
After the exercises are completed, the 
troops and their equipment are nor-mall 
embarked in the same manner as lande d . 
The amphibious exercises revioudy 
described usually take place cl! roughout 
the year and in various degrees of com- 
plexrty, involvin 
d 
from-a score of men to 
various thousan s of troons. and from one 
vessel to large su 
also be indepen % 
porting’ fl&ets. They can 
ent of other Naval activi- 
ties or be art of “sequential” operations 
in which t.l!e different segments of a naval 
force (aircraft, ships and landings) are co- 
ordinated in a hopefitlly well-timed se- 
quence. 
C. The Naual Ammunihqn FaciZity (NAF) 
As previously indicated. the NAF covers 
the entire portion of Vieques to the west of 
the civilian sector. 
Before we discuss the principal activity 
in this area we should state that it contains 
a designated landing zone in the south 
western coast. -l-his landing area is some- 
times used for infiltration type exercises by 
small units. 
-l-he NA.F is not nrooerlv a Dart of the 
Inner Range, althdu 
support its activities. 
fi it ‘may’ indirectly 
v t IS a division of the 
weanons denartmenr of Roosevelt Roads 
and Its main’ function is as a magazine for 
the storage of ammunition for both ship- 
to-shore and air-to-ground tit-ing.~ -l-be 
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rincipal “client” of the NAF is of course 
efendant Navy, but it also stores ammu- 
nition for the Puerto Rico .4ir and Army 
National Guard. 
A link wire fence, again topped by 
barbed wire, se arates the NAF from the 
civilian sector. P t has two guarded gates 
and its perimeter is secured by roving 
patrols. 
Ordnance is stored in 102 bunkers 
s 
7p 
read throughout the NAF, of which only 
6 are presently in use. -l-hey are an aver- 
age of 450 feet away from each other and 
are designed and built in such a manner 
chat if one were to explode, no damage 
wouid occur ta another magazine or any 
off-station location (from which the near- 
est is 2000 feet :tway.)” 
The bunkers are periodically inspected 
by several levels of su ervision, as often as 
on a monthly basis. -I-i e last major ins ec- 
tion of the magazines was conducte 1 by 
the Naval Sea Systems Command on May 
35, 1978. No deficiencies were found. 
-I-he ammunition is landed in Vieques 
from civilian cargo ships docking at 
Mosquito Pier in the north coast There is 
also an ammunition anchorage area off 
this sector for ships that may have to await 
approaching the dock. 
Ammunition may be moved from the 
NAF to the GhL4 through tbe civilian sec- 
tor- -I--his consists of anything from 5.56 
caliber small arms rounds up CO 175 mil- 
limeter howitzer ammunitionw Eighty- 
one millimeter white phosphorous smoke 
rounds are also occasionally moved to 
Cerro Matias. -I-he ordnance is trans- 
ported by pick-up trucks when it is small 
amounts, or in a larger truck when large 
amounts are involved, with an escort m 
front and in back. -I-he ammunition-cany- 
contingency use only. A small percentage is ac- 
tually used on Viequa itself. 
Only conventional ordnance is stored in 
Vicques. although some dynamite is aSso kept 
Lhere for blasting in quarries. No poxsonous gu 
or nuclear weapons are stored in Viequa. 
u If a magazine with 30.000 pounds of a- 
plosiva (a representative figure) were to cI- 
!a- 
lode. only minimal damage would bc done CO a 
mldmg 1,250 feet away. 
n This stonge is referred to as “deep stor- 
age” because the ordnance is placed there nor 
for tram-shipment, but to remain on location 
until withdrawn for use. ?his ammunition is for 
~6 In the last twelve months, [here have been 
eight issues of ammunition to the Marines at 
Cam Garcia and six issua to Cerro Mat&. 
The Ya st movcmcnt of 155 or 175 millimeter 
ammunition to Camp Garcia was on March 12. 
1976. 
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ordnance on Vieques. 
Two overland routes are used to trans- 
port munitions from the NAF to the GMA. 
One is through the front gate on the north 
side of the Island and through Isabel 
Segunda. The second is through the back 
gate on the south ‘side of Vieques, which 
route is used most frequently because it 
passes through areas with fewer people 
and less uafiic. 
There has not been any known accident 
from handling ammunition on Vieques. 
We thus arrive to the legal issues raised 
by Plaintiffs’ complaints. ’ 
IV. THE LEGAL ISSUES 
A. Preliminu~ Qw&ons Raised by Defendant 
Navy 5 Motion to Dismiss 
Shortly before the commencement of 
trial Defendant Navy filed a Motion to Dis- 
miss. Because of the tardiness of this filing 
the Court decided to take it under advise- 
ment and allow opposing counsel to file 
opposition thereto. No op osition was in 
fact filed, although some o P the issues were 
covered by Plaintiffs Romero-Barcel6 ef al. 
in their brief.% 
(1) The Party Dejbuiants 
All complaints except that of Plaintiff 
Fundac%n, attempt to state claims against 
Defendants in their individual as well as of- 
ficial capacities. These complaints how- 
ever, ari silent as to the per&a1 involve- 
ment of anv of these Defendants. nor do 
they specify’ what claims are stated against 
sf Mass detonating high ex losives are those 
which detonate instantaneous v d knited. They P-
arc known as Class A explosivks a;d carried ii 
accordance with De arunent OfTnnsponation 
regulations. 49 C.F.%.173.1 ef seq. We note that 
uansportacion of hazardous material a pi on1 
to carriers in commerce, see: 49 IJ.S.C! q%ll30! 
dscq.:49C.F.R X71.1. 
sa Plaintiffs Medina et al and Zen& et al have 
in fia refused to file any post trial brief or pro- 
posed findings. all in violation of specific orders 
of this Court. These PlaintiEs, who were al- 
lowed co litigate infknu 
with daily copy of the tna -P 
aupcru and supplied 
record at considera- 
ble pubhc expense. sou 
without or&dice a&r t 
ht voluntary dismissal 
ii e trial had ended. This 
action which we consider to have been taken in 
baoxkh by said Plaintiffs. was denied by the 
which Defendanr in their individual capac- 
ities. The rule that constitutional and 
other claims against government offLzials 
in their individual ca acities must be 
P 
leaded with specificity 1 as thus been vio- 
ated. Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 
F.2d 920,922 (C.A. 3, 1976). 
Furthermore, it is well established that 
Federal officials are not vicariously liable 
for the acts of their subordinates, Black v. 
United States, 534 F.2d 524, 528 (C-A-2. 
1976). and Plaintiffs must show a direct in- 
volv&ment or responsibility on the part of 
each of the named Defendants in the ac- 
tion of which they complain. Rizzo v. Goode, 
423 U.S. 362,371, 375-376 (1976). 
On all these counts Plaintiffs have failed 
and thus the actions against Defendants as 
individuals must be drsmissed. 
The allegations in Plaintiffs Medina et 
d’s complaint against “John Doe” and 
“Unknown Federal Agents” must also be 
dismissed as there is no provision in the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for suit 
against persons under fictitious names. See: 
Rules 4(d)(l); 10(a). 17(a) Red.R.Civ.P.; 
McDonald v. General Mills, Inc., 387 FSupp. 
24.33 (E.D.Cal., 1974). 
(2) The actions thai seek damages fur alieg- 
edly w-tiou.s conduct 
-Although the United States is not named 
as a party Defendant, the various nuisance 
and tort claims are in reality claims against 
the sovereign. In determining this, we are 
not bound by the namin 
*ff* 
of individual De- 
fendants nor by Plaint1 s characterization 
of the suit. Spr~iyue Farhionr Inc. E 
S&ran. 421 F.Supp. 302, 305 (N.D.Cd. 
Pursuant to Dugan I’. Rank. 372 U.S. 609. 
620 (1963). a suit is deemed to be a 
the sovereign if the 
P 
end itself on the pu 
ere with public administration. See also 
Smith v. Grimes, 534 F.2d 1346,135 1. (CA. 
9.1976). cert. den. 429 U.S. 980(1976). 
These claims have precisely that effect, 
particularly where there is no alle tion or 
proof that any of Defendants &” too any ac- 
tion beyond the scope of their authority. 
They thus qualify for absolute immunity as 
to common law torts and statutory claims 
under Ban 3. Ma&o, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); 
Howard v. Lyons. 360 U.S. 593 (1959); Spas- 
lique Farhiom. supra. at 305-306: as the im- 
port of these claims would only fall upon 
the United States. Larson u. Dumcstic U Fur- 
wealth of. Mass- v. U.S. Vetian’s Administra- 
tion, 511 F.2d 119 (CA. 1. 1976). 
It is elementary that the Federal Tort 
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2671 et sty., consti- 
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tutes an express. but limited waiver of sov- 
ereign immunity. Although negligent .ac- 
tions of government agents constituting a 
common law tort mav be sued u on. inten- 
tional torts are spe&ally exe uded from P 
this waiver. 28 USC. 2680(a)(h). See 
Da&hi&v. L’nited States, 346 U.S. 15( 1953). 
Claims against the Government based 
uponthe concept ofnuisancehowever, are 
included. In Re: Silver Blidge Ditasier Litiga- 
tion, 381 F.Supp. 931, 967 (S.D.W.Va, 
1974). But the statute specifically requires 
an initial presentation of the claim to the 
appropriate federal agency and a fina 
denial by that a 
suit. 28 U.S.C. B 
envy as a prerequisite to 
675. This requirement is 
jurisdictional and cannot be waived. Bi- 
al0wa.s v. United States, 443 F.2d 1047,1049 
(CA. 3. 197 1); Colluzn v. Unitid St&s, 372 
F.Supp. 61 (D.P.R. 1973). Plaintiffs have 
made no allegation nor presented any evi- 
dence to show compliance with this pre- 
requisite. 
The consequence of this situation is that 
the nuisance claims of Plaintiffs Romero 
Barcel6, et al, Zen& et al and Medina et al, 
to the extent they may be interpreted as 
. seeking damages, and the intentional 
and/or negligent conduct counts of Plain- 
tiffs Medina et al’s complaint, must be dis- 
missed for lack of jurisdiction. 
(3) Pluintifi Medinu et al “&king” 
claims 
Plaintiffs Me&a et al claim that they 
have been deprived of their property with- 
out just compensation when agents of the 
United States purchased a large number of 
private tracts an Vieques in “about 194 1”. 
which tracts are now part of the lands used 
by Defendant Navy. Here again we see that 
the real party is the United States and not 
the named individual Defendants. 
With the exception of one Plaintiff. 
Angel Ventura, none of rthe other PIaintiffs 
have any standing to sue as they do not 
even allege to have been “deprived” 
erty owners.Sg In any event, these c aams 
p”P- 
are subject to the rovisions of the Tucker 
Act 28 U.S.C. $§%%46(a)(2) 1491, under 
r*hi>h the Plaintiffs would haie to sue. Dow 
v. United Sides. 357 U.S. 17,21 (1958). 
The statute of limitations under this 
legisiation is six years measured from the 
time when the cause of action first accrues 
against the Government. 28 U.S.C. $2501. 
Cumacho v. United Stairs. 4941 F.2d 1363 (Ct. 
Cl., 1974); Cart70 v. &ted States, 500 F.2d 
436 (CL. Cl. 1974). The time of taking is 
the date when the United States first enters 
inro possession or files a declaration of 
taking, whichever is earlier. Dow v. L’ni&d 
States, supra. Thus the time for fiIing a suit 
against United States would have ex ired 
in “about 1947”, and a suit filed in 19 P 8,as 
in the present case, is absolutely time 
barred. See Camucho v. United States. supta. 
B. The Federal Water Pokkm Control Act 
Plaintiffs’ claims under the Federal 
Water Pollution Control ,4Ct (33 U.S.C. 
1251-1376, as amended). referred to in 
this Section as the “Act”, fall into ttio cate- 
gories: (I) that Defendant Navy is re uired 
to obtain a National Pollution DISC -1 arge 
Elimination System (NPDICS) permit for 
its discharge of sewage at Camp Garcia 
and for the alleged dischar:ge of ordnance 
from ships and planes which fal1 into the 
The uncontroverted evidence pre- 
sented, including the testimony of the 
President of Plaintiff :Environmental 
Quality Board, clearly establishes that De- 
fendant Navy no longer-discharges treated 
sewage effluent from Its plant at Camp 
Garaa into the waters surrounding 
Vieques.40 This o eration has been con- 
verted to a land cf Ischarge, for which no 
permit is required under the Act. 
As to the dischar 
5 
e of sewage by De- 
fendant Navy’s vesse s into the surround- 
ing sea, altliough there is no direct evi- 
dence bresented of this takinn Lace. the r 
nature of Defendant Navy’s’dperaGons 
make this a distinct possibility. The evi- 
dence is however, that with the exception 
of landing barges, these vessels operate 
bevond the three-mile limit, which is the 
maximum geogra 
f! 
hical co’verage of the 
Act. 33 USC. 13 2(7), (8) and (12). Fur- 
thermore. the Secreta 
x 
of Defense has a- 
empted these vessels om marine sax&- 
* In conuast we should ncae that the MU- 
nicipaliit)t of Vieques is one of’ 25 co+l mQ- 
nicipaliua in Puerto Rico that stiIl d~dryy 
municipal wastes direcdy into the toad zor~. 
and is considered by Plaintiff Enviro~~~~~ti 
Quality Board to “be a ma’07 source of= 
uon.” (See Exhibit CRB 40 d A. page 9%. 
wastes mch coastal WXCTY “*htive WI- 
diluted and wirhout having been CnmPl-dY 
broken down biologically.” 
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tion requircmcnts puisuant to authority 
conferred by the Act. 33 USC. 1322(d).” 
It is our opinion that the majority of the 
ordnance chat falls into the waters sur- 
rounding Vieques does so by chance, al- 
though it a 
P 
pears that this may happen 
with some r,equency in the waters in the 
immediate vicmity of Bahia Icacos and 
Bahia Salinas de1 Sur in the 
AIA/CAS/NGFS zones. Furthermore, as 
previously stated, a water target exists east 
of Punta Este which lies within the “cerri- 
torial seas.” 33 U.S.C. 3 1362(8). 
We must decide .whether these acciden- 
tal bombings of the navigable waters, and 
the occasiona intentional bombing of the 
water target, require that Defendant Navy 
obtain a NPDES permit. 
The conduct that requires an NPDES 
permit is “the discharge [or runoffs] of any 
pollutants” (emphasts added), 33 U.S.C. 
13 I 1 (a), 0 1323(a). The term “discharge of 
any poIluncant” means: 
4. . . . (A) any addition of any pollutant 
to navigable waters from any point source. 
(B) an 
waters 0 P 
addition of anypollutcmt to the 
the contiguous zone or the 
“Pollutant” is defined as: 
. . . . . dred 
cinerator rest -% 
ed spoil, solid waste, in- 
ue, sewage, garbage, sew- 
a esludgv.munitions, chemical wastes, bi- 
o o~cal materials, radioactive materi- f - 
als. heat, wrecked or discarded equip 
ment, rock, sand. cellar dirt and indus- 
trial, mumcrpal and agricultural waste 
discharged into water . _ . .** 
‘*Point source” in turn is defined as: 
“uny discernible, confined and dis- 
crete conv~anc~, including but not Iimit- 
ed to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel. 
conduit, well, discrete fissure. container 
roiling stock. concentrated animal feed- 
[l] II would be a strained construction 
of unambi uous Ian 
interpret a 7 
uage for the Court to 
t at the re ease or firing of ord- 
nance from aircraft into the navi able wa- 
ters of Vieques is not “. . . any a druon of d . . 
Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966); United States v. 
RgubZic Steel Corp.. 362 US. 482 (1960); 
Mxnnehaha Creek Watershed Dishict v. Hof - 
man, 597 F.2d 617, 625 [13 ERC 100 d ] 
(C.A. 8. 1979); United States v. Hamel, 551 
F.2d 107. 112 [9 ERC 19321 (CA. 6, 
1977); Unitcd States v. AshZand Oil and Trans- 
portation Co., 504 F.2d. 13 17.1328- 1329 [7 
ERC 11141 (C.A. 6. 1974). We are forced 
to so conclude notwithstanding the fact 
that the agency charged with aaministra- 
tion of this Act. the Environmental Protec- 
tion Agency, d.oes not appear to have any 
regulation which provides for the issuance 
of a NPDES permit under circumstances 
such as herein presented, and further not- 
wichstandine that we find that no credible 
evidence wa: presented to the Court to the 
effect that anyofthe materials deposited in 
the waters surrounding Vieques as a result 
of the aforementioned activities has had 
any mr:tsurxhie deleterious effects has had 
environment, or on the quality of the sur- 
rounding waters, from a scientific vis-a-vis 
a legal srandpoint. Nevertheless, we hold 
that as the Act now reads. Defendant Naw 
is required co have an kPDES permit to 
cover the accidental or intentional release 
or firing of ordnance into the areas herein 
discussed. Train v. Colorado Public Interest 
Croup, 426 U.S. 1, 7 [8 ERC 20571 (1976); 
ERA. v. State Water Rezotrrces Control Board, 
426 U.S. 200,205 (1976). 
The second aspect of this issue is called 
into play by the provisions of 33 U.S.C. 
1323(a).‘which states: 
“Each department. agency, or instru- 
mentality of the executive, legislative. 
and judicial branches of the Federal 
Government (1) havin jurisdiction 
over any property or fa cif rty, or (2) en- 
gaged in any activity resulting, or which 
ma 
pol utants Y 
result in the discharge or rJrnoff of 
and each officer, agent. or 
emplo ee thereof in the perfo&ance of 
his o 2. ~aal duties. shall be subiect co. 
and comply with ail Federal, Stat& inter: 
state. and local requirements, adminis- 
trative authority. and process and sanc- 
tions respecting the control and abate- 
ment of water ollution in the same 
manner. and to tL same extent a.5 any non- 
govnnmzntaf entity. including the pay- 
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ment of reasonable service charges 
* . . . ” (Emphasis added). 
It is the contention of Plaintiffs that acci- 
dental and intentional ordnance droppin 
into the water areas previously indrcate % 
vioIates various Puerto Rican legislation, 
namely the Water Pollution Control Act 
(24 -L.P.R& 591 et se -) the PubIic Policy 
Environmental Act (I 9 L.P.R.A. 112 I, et 
seq.) and the Water Pollution Control 
Regulation, promulgated thereunder. 
The Public Policy Environmental Act, 
supra, is a statute which, as the title im- 
plxes, generally sets out the Common- 
wealth’s environmental posture and estab- 
lishes the Environmental Quality Board to 
administer it. There is little ofa specific na- 
ture in this statute on which we can hang 
our legal hat for purposes of the present 
issue. 
It is in the Water Pollution Control Act. 
supta, that we find a s ecific relevant pro- 
hibition (24 L.P.R.A. ,P 95): 
“It shall be unlawful for any person di- 
rectly or indirectly. to throw, discharge, 
pour, or dump, or 
ii!-) 
ermit to be thrown, 
discharged, poure or dumped into the 
waters, an or 
p. J f 
anic or inorganic matter 
ca able o pol uting or of leading to the 
po lut~on of said waters in such manner as 
to place them out of the minimum stun- 
a&is of purity that the [Environmental 
Quality Board]42 mav establish under 
section 599 ofthis title.” (Emphasis sup- 
ptied). 
That statute defines “pollution” as fol- 
lows: (24 L.P.R.A. 591 (i): 
” ‘To pollute’, with reference to wa- 
ters, means making them in any way zuxious 
to human health, or to that of animals 
vegetables or fish, or rendering them ill- 
smehing or impure. all according to &per- 
missibk stundurds ofpurity or im 
tofore or hereinafter establis k 
rity here- 
ed as pro- 
vided herein. “Pollution’ has this same 
meaning.” (Emphasis supplied). 
“Discharge” is defined as (24 L.P.R.A. 
591(j)): 
.I . . . [TJhe terminal of a sewer sys- 
tem, large or smaI1. collective or indivld- 
ual. or of a dischar 
f 
e of industrial refuse 
or any other kin of refuse, where it 
emerges to be dumped into the waters.” 
This language, together with that stat- 
ute’s definition of “sewage”,4f “industrial 
4: 12 L.P.R.A. 1 lS2(b). 
43 “Sewage. sewer wati. mean human and ani- 
mal wastes. intestinal and other. dragged by 
water flowing from houses, residences. build- 
waste’*44 and “other[s]4s kinds of refuse 
leads us to conclude that the prohibited 
acts under the Puerto Rican legslation are 
narrower in scope than those under the 
“Act.” 
To begin with, upon reading this statute 
we are left with the clear im,pression that it 
is only meant to cover notmal endeavors 
of human activity producing sewage and 
industrial water through pipes and similar 
devices, and not military operations of the 
type here in question.46 Apart from that 
however, the activity has to either make the 
water noxious to humans, ianimals. etc. or 
violate specific standards of water purity. 
We have already stated that no credible 
evidence was adduced establishing that 
the activities of Defenda.nt Navy have 
made the water noxious. Thus assuming it 
was the intention of the Puerto Rican 
Vieques, we must look to ,the regulations 
to determine whether a standard of purity 
established thereunder haz, been vioIated. 
Plaintiffs rely on the a plicability of the 
“Water Quality Standar& Re~lations” of 
Plamtlff Envtronmental Qua icy Board.47 
ings, industriat establishments and other places, 
whether alone or mingled with surface or land 
waters. The mingling of industrial or other 
wastes with sewage or sewer waters shaIl be con- 
sidered included under this term.” (Emphasis in 
the original). 
u ~‘Imf~~tMl wosfe is anv liquid, 
solid refuse, or a combination of a i? 
aseous. or 
. resultin 
from any industrial, manufacturing. commcrcl -3 
or business process. or from the processing of 
any new material or natural wcahh.” (Emphasis 
in the original). 
4s “Orhm in connection with wastes, indude 
garbage. residues, rotten wood, saw dust. fil- 
m 
H 
s. hmc. ashes, offals. oil. dyes. acids. chcmi- 
ca substances and any other substance that may 
polhue or cause the pollution of waters.” (Em- 
phasis in the original). ~ 
46 This is rcmforccd by the definition of 
“harmful substance” and “spiliagc” contained 
in the Public Poli 
8 
Environmental Act (12 
L.P.R.A. 1141 (c) an (b): 
‘* ‘Harmful substance’ - Those subsmnccs 
which by their nature may. in the event of spil- 
lage. cause damage to the environment in- 
cluding without being limited to. substances 
such as petroleum and its derivatives.” 
“Spilia e” - 
a 
Discharge. emission or cxpcl- 
ling. w ether aceidentaI or inrendonal. of 
harmful substances from anv hind of ship 
through pipelines or by any other means. into 
high seas or other bodies asf water in Puerto 
Rico.” 
47 According to this document. the regula- 
cion was filed in the Department of State of the 
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This regulation is intended to promulgate 
water quaIity standards for the coastal and 
surface waters of Puerto Rico, (Art. 3). and 
prohibits the pollution48 of these waters 
(Art. 4.1.1) or the discharge of any water 
pollutant (Art. 4.1.2). 
The water quality standards are the fol- 
lowing: 
“2.1 Gmeral water quaIity standards. All 
waters shall meet generally acce ted 
aesthetic quahficauons and sha K be 
capable of supporting diversified 
aquatic life. These waters shall, ex- 
ce 
fo P 
t as specifically noted, meet the 
lowing quality standards: 
2.1.1 Solids and other matter. The 
waters of Puerto Rico shall not con- 
tain materials attributabte to dis- 
charges that will settle to form objec- 
tionable deposits. Nor will they 
contain floating debris, scum, oil 
and other floating materials attrib- 
utable to tiircherges in amounts suffi- 
cient to be unsightly or deleterious. 
2.1.2 Color, odor, taste or turbidity. 
The waters of Puerto Rico shaIl be 
free from color, odor, taste or tur- 
bidates attributable to discharges in 
such a degree as to create a nui- 
,sance. 
2.1.3 Substances in toxic concentra- 
tions thereof The waters of Puerto 
Rico shall not contain substances in 
concentrations or combinations 
which are toxic or which produce 
undesirable physiological respon- 
Commonweakh of Puerto Rico on 
1974. and later amended in May, 
anuaty 4, 
19 ! 4 and Oc- 
tober, 1976. The Political Code of Puerto Rico 
F 
rovidcs (3 LP.R.A. 31046) that regulations 
rled with the Department be published in two 
newspapers of eneral circulation and in the 
“Commonweal CR of Puerto Rico Re ‘ster” 
(“Boletin de1 Estado tibrc Asociado de Fu crto 
Rico”). It does not appear that this fegulation or 
p?~J”;;ls.ng;y~;~ gyp&e&$ 
& 
ublishing the Register since 1972 for alleged 
ck of funds.The prior re lation is found at 24 
R & R 598-l et seq., an r IS substantially dif- 
fercnt in pans from the regulation assumed to 
be in effect bv all parties. 
4s The de&tion of “pollution” in the rcgu- 
lation is sIightly different from that in the stat- 
ute: “Pollute (to). Pollution. Altering the natu- 
ral characteristics of a body of water so as to 
make it in any way harmful or noxious to human 
health. or to that of animals, or plants, or 
rendering it ill-smelling or impure or alterin 
adversely its physical. chemical. microbioiogr 27 
or radioactive condition. in such a way as to in- 
terfere with the standards of purity established 
by this Regulation.” Art. 1. 
ses in human, fish or other animal 
life, and plants. 
A. Specijic sfandards for some sub- 
stances: . 
i)* Coastal waters The maximum al- 
lowable concentrations of certain 
substances in the receiving coastal 
waters shall be the following: 
Substance Limit (mg/l) 
Arsenic (As) 
Barium (Ba) 
0.15 
Boron (B) 
1.0 
Cadmium (Cd) i-i05 
Carbon (Chloroform extract) 2810 
Chromium (hexavalent (Cr.) 8.85 
Chromium (trivalent (Cr.) 
Copper (Cu) 
0.30 
Cyamde (CN) 
0.05 
Detergents (Methylene Blue 
0.01 
(Active Substances) 0.5 
Fluorides (F) 
Iron (Fe) i-i00 
Lead (Pb) 0:015 
Manganese (Mn) 0.100 
M-q 0%) 0.001 
;;f-r;~~ ~O,NWW 5.0 
.OlO 
Selenium (Se) 0.01 
Silver (Ag) 0.001 
Sulfate (SO,) 2800. 
Uianil (UO,) 0.500 
Zinc (Zn) 0’050.” 
j (Emphasis supplied). 
Defendant Navy makes much ado about 
the unconstitutional vagueness of these 
provisions. See Corrnull v. Gerurat Constmc- 
turn Co., 269 U.S. 385, 4 91 (1926); Lanzetla 
v. New Jmq306 U.S. 451 (1939); Cram v. 
Board of Fkblir Instnutim, 368 U.S. it 78 
(1961); but see: Cmame &as V. Secretary of 
Herr& 99 P.R.R. 44 (1976). However, this 
is an issue we need not decide as this regu- 
lation is clearly inapplicable to Defendant 
Navy’s operations presently at issue. 
The key word in the uabty standards, 
reproduced above is “$schar~.*’ The 
regulation defines this term as 0110~s: 
” ‘Discharge (to), Discharge’-The out- 
flow of wastewati from any domestic, 
commercial, industrial, agrir$tunl or 
any other source into recerving waters.” 
(Emphasis supplied). Art. 1. 
When we seek the definition of *‘waste- 
water” in the regulation we are referred co 
the definirion of 
which states: 
“municipal wastes”. 
“Water carrying human and animal 
wastes from homes, buildings, industri- 
al establishments and other places alone 
or in combination with industrial 
wastes.” (Art. 1. 
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rhe accldenta or mtentronal born rn or 
We see no plausible way of inte’p’tng 
shelling of the coastal waters as fal ing 
within the 
regulation. #h* 
roscribing language of the 
IS of course. IS in keeping 
with our 
guage of x 
rior interpretation of the lan- 
e Statute which authorizes this 
regulation. 
Furthermore, the record is barren of any 
credible evidence which would supporr a 
finding chat Defendane Navy has conducr- 
ed any activity violative of the specific stan- 
dards ofArticle 2.1.3 Ai) of this Regulation 
or that the wafers in question do not “meet 
generally accepted aesthetic qualifica- 
uons” or are not “ca able of supporting 
diversified aquatic II e.” In fact, if any- -F 
thing. these waters are as aeschencally ac- 
ceptable as any LO be found anywhere, and 
Plaintiffs’ witnesses unanimously testified 
as to their being the best fishing grounds 
in Vieques. 
C. The Marine Protection, Research and 
Santuaries Act 
Plaintiffs’ claim to the effect that De- 
fendant Navy’s activities violate the Ma- 
rine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries 
Act. also known as the “Ocean Dumping 
Act”. and referred to in this section as the 
“Act”, 33 U.S.C. 1401 et se -8: are clearly without m&it. It is Plaintx s contention 
that Defendant Navy’s discharge of ord- 
nance in the waters off Vieques as well as 
related activitces during the course of mili- 
tary operatiotls, constitute “dumping” 
which requires a permit from the Environ- 
mental Protection Agency, a permit which 
Defendant Navy lacks. 
IL cannot be disputed but that the com- 
plained of activities are incidental LO mili- 
tary training exercises and that the pur- 
pose of Defendant Navy’s activities are 
said exercises rather than the disposal of 
waste. 
The definition of “dumping” contained 
in the Act excludes ‘.(I . . the intenrional 
placement of any device in ocean wafers or 
on the submerged land beneath such wa- 
ters. for a purpose other than disposal, 
when. . . such 
9, 
lacement . . .occurspur- 
want LO an au orized Federal . . . pro- 
pm.” 33 U.S.C. 5 14020. This langua e, 
together with the Ie 6e 
Act, leave no doubt % 
‘slative history of 
ut that Congress in- 
tended to prohibit purp~stf; disposal of 
waste. See 1972 U.S. Code Gong. Adm. 
News, pp. 4234 et seq. The re OR of EPA 
Admimstrator William D. ii uckelshaus 
specifically states: 
“Special note should also’be made 
of the fact that ‘dumping’as defined in 
subsection 3(g) would not include an 
D. 
activity which has as its primary pur- 
pose a result other than ‘a disposnion 
of material’ but which involves the in- 
cidenta1 depositin 
other material in t ?I 
of some debris or 
e relevant waters. 
For aample. m&d from missles and de- 
bris from gun pCojecfxiu urui bombs u&i- 
mutely come to rest in th! protected waks. 
Such acctiuitirr are ~1 cowred by this Act. *’ 
Supta. p. 4255-6. (Emphasis sup- 
plied). 
Allegations under the Resource Conservation 
and Rccovny Act. .- 
The allegations of Plaintiffs pursuant to 
the Resource Conservation and Recove 
Act of 1976.42 U.S.C. 690’1 et seq. herem -2 
ter referred to in this Secdon as the “Act” 
are equally without substance. A reading 
of this statute as well as its legislative histo- 
2 
establishes beyond arry question that 
ongress’ intended targets were the evils 
brought about by “solid wastes” and “haz- 
ardous wastes” as therein defined.49 
49 The Congressional findings contained in 
42 USC. 6901 are particularly illusua~ive of 
this point: 
“(a) Solid waste. The Congress finds with 
respect to solid waste 
(1) that the continuing technological prog- 
ress and improvement in methods of manu- 
facture, packagin 
sumer products 
fgy,“~~~~p,nOfC:OC:: 
mounting increase. and in a than e in 
3. 
the 
characteristics, of the mass matcna dxard- 
cd by the purchaser of such products. 
(2) that the economic and population growth 
of our Natiqn,. and the i lrovements in the 
standard of hvmg enjoyed 1 my our population. 
have required Increased industrial produc- 
tion to meet our needs, and have made neccs- 
sary the demolition of old buiidin 
8’ 
the con- 
stmction of new buii$ngs. and e have re- 
quired increased industrial production to 
meet our needs, and have made necessary the 
demolition of old building:,. the construction 
of new buildings. and the provisions of high- 
ways and other avenues of ttansponation. 
which together with related industrial. com- 
mercial, and agrjcultural operations, have re- 
sulted in a rising tide of scrap. discarded, and 
waste mat& 
(3) that the continuin 
population in expan 65 
concentration of our 
mg metropolitan and 
other urban areas has presented these com- 
munities wiih serious finan~cial, management. 
intergovernmental. and technical problems 
in the disposal of solid wastes resulting from 
the industrial. commercial, domestic. and 
olha activities carried on iin such arms: 
(4) that while the collection and disposal of 
solid wastes should continue to be primarily 
the function of Sutc. regional. and 104 
agencies. the problems of waste dispowi as 
set forrh above have become a matter. na- 
tional in scope and in concern and necessuatc 
k&r;11 :xtlon through fkmcial and tcchni- 
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“Solid Waste” is defined as: 
cal assistance and-leadership in the deveiop- 
mcnt, demonstration. and a plication of new 
and improved methods an t processes to re- 
duce the amoum of waste and unsalvegcable 
materials and 10 provide for proper and eco- 
nomical solid-waste disposal practices. 
(b) Environment and hcalfh. - The Con- 
gress finds with respect to the environment 
and health, that 
(I) although land is loo valuable a national 
resource to be needlesslv oIluted by dis- 
carded materials. most so Id waste is dis- -P 
& 
osed of on land in ppen dumps and sanitary 
ndfills; 
(2) disposal of solid waste and hazardous 
waste in or on the land wirhout careful plan- 
ning and mana 
to human healr a 
ement can presem a danger 
and the environment 
(3) as a rcsulr of rhe Clean Air Act, the Water 
Pollution ComroI Act. and other Federal and 
State laws respecting public health and the 
environmenr, greater amounts of soIid u-axe 
(in (he form of sludge and orher pollurion 
treatment residues) have been creared. Simi- 
larly, inadequate and cnvironmenraily un- 
sound pracnces for the disposal or use of 
solid waste have created greater amounts of, 
air and water pollution and other problems 
for Ihe environment and for health; 
(4) open dumping is anicularly harmful fo 
health, contaminates cf. . nnlcmg water from un- 
derground and surface supphes, and pollules 
the air and the land; 
(5) hazardous waste presents. in addition to 
the problems associated wirh non-hazardous 
solid waste. special dangers to health and re- 
c~ uires a aearer degree of regulation than 
oes non- azardous sohd waste; and 
(6) aItematives to existing methods of land 
d+posal must be developed +nce many of the 
cmes in Ihe United States ~111 be runnine out 
of suitable solid waste disposa1 sites w&in 
five years unless immediate action is taken; 
(c) Mo&ria&. - The Congress finds with 
respect to materials. thax 
(1) miliions of tons of recoverable mate.rial 
which could be used arc needIessly burned 
$thLe?h?ds are available to separate usable 
ma~rials from solid waste; and 
(3) the recovery and conservation of such 
materials can reduce the dependence of the 
United States on forei 
$ 
resources and re- 
duce the deficit in its ba ante of payments. _ 
(4 ET. -The Congress finds with re- 
spect 10 energy, that 
(1) Solid waste rcpresencs a potential source 
of solid fuel, oil. or gas that can be covened 
into energy: 
(2) the need exists to develop alternative en- 
ergy sources for public and priva~ consump- 
tion in order to reduce our de 
such sources as petroleum pro r 
ndence on 
UCIS. natural 
gas. nuclear and hydroelectric generation; 
and 
(3) technolo 
P 
exists 10 produce usable en- 
ergy from so Id waste.” 
. [A]ny garbage, refuse, sIudge 
frol;l g wasre treatment plant, water sup- 
ply treatment planr. orair pollurion con- 
rrol facility and orher discarded material, 
incIuding solid. liquid. semisolid, or 
contained gaseous material resulfingfrom 
induhal, commercial, mining and agricul- 
tural operations, and from communilJ achi- 
e&-. 6903(2$. 
” (Em hasls supplied). See 42 
With one exception which will be 
entIy discussed, I[ is dbvious that De P 
res- 
end- 
ant Navy’s military activities, although 
causing the incidental de 
are not the discarding o P 
ositing of debris 
matenal nor are 
they the result of an industrial, commer- 
cia1. mining or agriculwral operation. 
“Hazardous waste” is in turn defined as: 
“[A] solid waste or combination of solid 
masfes, which because of iu quantity, 
concentration or physical, chemical, or 
infectious charactensdcs may- 
(A) cause, or significantly contribute 
I0 an increase in mortality or an increase 
in serious irreversible, or incapacitating 
reversible illness; or 
(B) pose a subsrantia1 present or 
potential hazard to human heaIth or the 
environment when improperly treated, 
stored, transported, or disposed of, or 
otherwise mana ed.” (Em hasis sup- 
plied). See 42 v8.C. 6903(l). 
Even assumin 
otherwise met fl 
that Plaintiffs have 
t e substantial burden 
placed’ upo? them .by sub;paraF$s(A) 
and (B) of thu definmon. a act w IC 1s far 
from certain, the scope of this definition in 
referring to “solid waste’:,: a term of art 
under this Act, excludes malata~ hazardous 
wastes from its coverage. 
Plaintiffs next rely on the “Regulation 
for the Control of SoIid Waste” promul- 
ated 
5 
by Plaintiff Environmental Quality 
oard.” PIaintiffs allege thar this repla- 
tion is appIicabIe to Defendant Navy s ac- 
tivities by virtue of 42 U.S.C. 6961, which 
states: 
“Each department, agency, and instru- 
men&icy of the executive, IegisIative, 
and judldal branches of the Federal 
Government (1) having jurisdict+on 
over an 
disposa r- 
solid Waite managementfacility or 
site, or (2) engaged in any activ- 
ity resultin 
H 
or which ma resuh. in the 
dlsposa1 o solid waste or La - rdous waste 
shall be subject to, and comply with, aI1 
Federal, State, interstate. and local 
requirements, both substantive and pro- 
See also 1976 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, 
pp. 6238 et seq. 
y, See footnote 47. 
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cedural (including any requirement for 
F 
crmtts or reportmg or any provisions 
or permits reporting or any provisions 
for mjunctive relief and such sanctions 
as may be imposed by a court to enforce 
such relief) respecting control and 
abatement of solid wcu& or hezardow wasle 
disposal in the same manner, and to the 
‘same extent, as any person is subject to 
such requirements, . . .‘* (emphasis 
supplied). 
The militate activities of Defendant 
Navy, with one exce 
the scope of this P 
tion, fall outside of 
de egation. Within the 
Act’s definition of the term “solid waste 
management facility” we find that it in- 
cludes “any facility for the treatment of 
solid wastes, including hazardous wastes, 
whether such facilitv is associated with 
dicated, includes “discarde 
resulting from community ucriviti*r . . ” 
(emphasis supplied, 42 U.S.C. 6903(27),‘it 
becomes ap arent that the Common- 
wealth’s re rration is applicable to a single 
trench Ian fill operated by the Marines in 
Camp Garcia for the disposal offood waste 
and packaging material. As to this, the evi- 
dence presented durin the trial shows 
that on October 16.197 d , Defendant Navy 
appbed to the Environmental Quality 
Boar+ for a sohd waste faahty operatmg 
permtt. 
E. The Rivers and Harbors Act 
Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief aIle 
that Defendant Navv has violated the %* 
‘ng 
IV- 
ers and Harbors Act of 1899. 33 USC. 
$5401 et scg., hereinafter called the “Act” 
in this Section. More specifically. Plaintiffs 
claim that Defendant PJavv has without a 
permit from the Corps’ of Engineers 
thrown. discharged or deoosited refuse 
material in theYnavigable ‘waters of the 
United States in violation of Section 13 of 
the Act (33 U.S.C. $407). and also without 
a permit, has sunk vessels and other craft 
in the vi&it of Vie ues in violation of 
Section 15 o J s the Act 33 U.S.C. 9409). 
[Z] The short answer to these conten- 
tions is that Plaintiffs lack standintr to sue 
for these alleged violations. y 
In differentiation to other statutes in- 
volved in this case.51 the “Act” not only 
5’ See e.g.: Section 505 of the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act. 33 U.S.C. 0 1365: Section 
11 of the Endangered S 
§154O(g) (I); Section 7 !%%‘z lIEi:; 
Conservation and Recovery Acr. 42 U.S.C. 
13ERC 2122 Ramlo v. Brown 
fails to provide for a private right of action 
to enforce its 
empts the Iiel s- 
rovtslons, but in fact pre- 
m favor of public enforce- 
ment. Thus 33 U.S.C. $4 13 clearly and ex- 
pressly mandates that: 
“The Department of-justice shall con- 
duct the legal proceedings necessary 
to enforce the provisions of Sections 
401,403,404,406.407.408.409 
4 11.549,686 and 687 of this itle; . _ . 
(Emphasis supplied). 
Plaintiffs rely on W andotk Tram 
Co. u. United Staks, 38 8 8 
ortatimt 
the pro osition 
U.S. 191 (1 67). for 
that in addition to the 
crimina f sanctions of this enal statute, 
they as private Fries are Jowed to seek 
injunctive rebe for its alleged violation. 
But this case far from supportin 
‘t 
this 
proposition concludes that It is the nitid 
S&&s that has the right to injunctive relief 
in aid of protectinK a pubhc interest ex- 
pressed in a stature containing criminal 
nenalties for its violation. ‘The Court there 
iaid (389 US. 201-202, citations omitted): 
“Article I. 48. of the Constitution 
fr nts to Congress the power to re te commerce. For the exercise oft IS 
!i 
ower. the navi ble water of the United 
tates are to e deemed the nuzc fa l .- 
property of the nation, and subjeci to all 
the reouisite letislation bv Concrress.’ 
The F;deraI G&emmeni is charged 
with ensuring that navi 
like any other routes o i 
able waterways, 
commerce over 
which it has assumed control. remain 
free of obstruction. The Rivers and Har- 
bors Act of 1899, an assertion of the sov- 
ereign power of the United States, was 
obviously intended LO prmcnt obsfmctium in 
the Nation’s waterways. Despite some dif- 
ficulties with the wording of the Act, we 
have consistently found its coverage to 
be broad. And we kuveftn~nd that a princi- 
t 
al bem$&a~ of ihe Act, if not the jmuipal 
encficiaTy, ii the Govemmmt i&If. 
“Our decisions have established, too, 
the general rule that the United States 
may sue to protect its interests-This rule 
is not necessarily inapplicable when the 
particular government interest sought 
36972: and Section 304 of the Clean Air Act. 42 
U.S.C. 4 7604. Reccntlv chc SuDrcmc Court has 
St.XC& “When Congkss irknds p&ate liti- 
gants to have a cause of action to support their 
statutory rights, the far better course u for it to 
s ccify as such when it cTeatcs Lhosc rights.” 
En- u. uni* of cllicop. us. 
(Sli Opinion. May 14. 19791 p.38. Exceptions 
$5 arc both “limited” an~“typical.” Id 
ngress’ failure to specify a rivalc cwse of 
Here the language ofSection 4 I3 is indiative oi 
legislative inrcnc for public m.hcr fitan private 
enforcement. 
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to be protected is expressed in a statute 
carrying criminal penalties for its vioIa- 
tion. Our decisions in cases involving 
civil actions of rivace at-ties based on 
the violation o P P a Dena statute so indi- 
cate. In chose r&s we concluded that 
criminal liability was inade uate to in- 
sure the fulI effectiveness o P the statute 
which Con es; had intended. Because 
Ihe interest o the plaintiffs in ihose cases fell 7 
within the c&s Uuzr Ihe statute was intended to 
procecf, and because the harm that occurred 
was of the t,pe that the statute was intended to 
forestall, we held that civil aciions were pro- 
per.. That concius’ion was in accordaiace 
with a eeneral rule of the law of torts. We 
see no;eason to distinrish the Govem- 
menc, and co depnve t e L’nzted Stales of 
the benefit of chat rule. 
The inadequacy of the criminal penal- 
ties cxpliciciy provided by § i6 of the 
Rivers and Harbors Act is be ond 
puce. That section contains on K 
dis- 
y meager 
monetary penalties. In many cases, as 
here, the combination of those fines and 
the Government’s in rem rights would 
not serve to reimburse the &ted States 
for removal cxnenses. It is true that Ei I6 
also provides for prison terms, but ihis 
punishment is hardly a satisfactory rem- 
edy for the pecuniary injury which the 
negligent shop owner may reflect upon 
the sov@n.” (Emphasis supplied). 
It is clear that this ease does not support 
Plaintiffs’ standing under the Act to seek 
if? 
‘vati injunctive relief. See Curt v. Ash, 422 
S. 66, fn. 11 (1974); Cannon v. Univcnit 
d 
o Chicago, supra at fn. 13 and @ Powel , f 
issenting) fn. 3. 
We dedine the invitation to foIIow Xatu- 
ral Resources Deferrse Council Inc. v. Grant. 355 
FSupp. 280 - 
(E.D.N.C.1973) and[$e Zc~~~ Sta~~~~~ 
linoir Ex Rel. Scott v. Hof man, 425 F.Supp. 
f 71 [ 11 ERC 10491 (S-D. 11.. 1977). as in our 
opinion they run contrary to the concrol- 
Iing language of 33 U.S.C. 413 and to the 
%i 
barer weight of authority. The Second. 
xrd, Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits 
have al1 expressed themselves as finding 
no private causes of action under different 
se&ions of the Rivers and Harbots Act. 
see: Connecticut A&m h&o, Inc. V. Roberts 
Platin 
Slas -f; 
Cf., 457 F.2d 81 (CA. 2. 1972); Red 
owmg U Transportation Co. v. Dcpcrt- 
ment of Transportation, 423 F.2d 104. 105 
(CA. 3.1970); H hes v. Ra 
467 F.2d 6.8 n. 1 ( F 7 
CT Fuel Coq, 
.A.4, 197 );52 Guthricv. 
s* The Fourth Circuit may have implictly 
recognized such a right by afikming three Iowcr 
court decisions without dmxssion on this point. 
Alabama By Products, 456 F.2d 1294 (CA. 5. 
1972) cert.dcn. 410 US. 946 (1973);ss 
Jacklovich v. lnierfake, Inc.. 458 F.2d 923 
(CA. 7. 1972). Besides Grant, supra, and 
Hoffman, supra, only the Ninth Circuit in 
Rigglr v. Slaie of California, 577 F.2d 579 6.8 
(CA. 9, 1978),” and in two lower court 
decisions. Sierra Club v. hforton, 400 
~k%!&L 197k)- S&a Club v Z-e& Salt Co 
610 622-623 [4 ERC 1561] 
354 F.Supp. 10~9.1104-05 i4 ERC 1669j 
(N.D.Cal., 1972). have recognized f rivate causes ofaction under this “Act.” A I other 
lower court case Iaw is 
rc~o~ni~ing such rl rirhc. 
Beach v. City of New For& 
111 ERC 14171 (D.N.I. 
fro erty Owners &ir v:Raab 430 F.Su 
276 281 [ 10 ERC 12423 (b.N.J., 19&j 
aff’d unreoorced decision. 547 F.2d 1162 
(CA. 3 1476) cert. den. 432 U.S.‘906 [ 10 
ERC 12491 (1977); Panell v. Shell Oil Co., 
42 1 F.Supp. 1275 [9 ERC 21 066) (D.Conn.. 
1976); Bur es u. M/YTamano 373 F.Su 
839. 845 75 ERC 19141 @‘-Me., 19??): f5 &p ;
Gerbing v . Z.T.T. Rayonier Incorporated, 332 
F.SUDD. 3”~ IL~I.U. ~-1. 1~11 L ~WUCT V. 09 (M.D. FL 97 ): HO&M v. 
Llni&d States. ‘33 1 F.Su 
(D.Conn.1971); Bass Ang rers 
p. ib56, ‘ 1058 
Sportman’s So- 
&J v. Scholze Tanneq Inc., 329 FSupp. 339 
.[2 ERC 17713 (E-D. Tenn. 1971); United 
Sfalesexrel. M4ttron. 327 FSupp. 87 [2 ERC 
15661 (D.Minn.. 1971); Enquist v. 4t(Qker 
Oats compcny. 327 FSupp. 347 12 ERC 
16011 (D.Neb. 1971); Bare Anglers 
Sportiman Sociefy v. Plywood Cham ion Pa m. 
5; 8 Inc., 324 F.Supp. 302 [2 E C 1 981 
(S.D.Tex. 197 1): Bass An&s SPortman Soci- 
it>’ v. united St&s S!eel Corp. $24 F.Su 
412 (N-D.. M.D.. and SD. Ala- 19711 a ff 
p. 
d. 
447 k.2d i304 (&A. 5. 1971); see also: H. 
Chrictiansm c3 Sons, Inc. v. City of Duluth, 154 
F.2d 205 (C.A. 8. 1946). Contra see: Poto- 
mac River Association. Inc. v. Luna’eb~~ .lIarv- 
land Seamanshi School, Inc. 402 
344 17 ERC 1 8 451 (D.Md.1975). 
p.Supp. 
While we hold that sounder law dictates 
a findin 
created % 
that no private cause of action is 
y the Rivers and Harbors Act, as 
see: Ruckeru. 1Vilii.t. 358 FSupp. 4% (E.D.N.C. 
1973) affd 484 F.2d 158 (1973): Rivq XI. Rich- 
nwnd Mctropoiitun Authmity. 359 FSupp. 61 I 
(E.D. Va. 1972) affd. 451 F.2d 1280 (1973): 
I.mwim*n I: C %c~~.vam~ul r Bur Bridrr and Tunnel 
IJi\/h.t. liY F.Supp: 632 (E.D.Va. i;)clh) 4lTd Jo1 
F.2d 1001 (1968). 
5J Buf I$ Secchu Canals Co. v. Miller Ej Vi 
Lumber Co. 24 F. 2 763 (CA. 5, 1928) with Inter- 
coastal Tranrporiatti. Inc. v. Decatur Counf~. &or- 
aia. 482 F.2d 36 fn. 14 PZAA. 5. 1973). 
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is cIear from the above citations, we are not 
unmindful of the division of authority on 
this point. As mentioned Plaintiffs specifi- 
caIly alIe 
f 
e violations under Sections 13 
and 15 o this Act, 33 U.S.C. $8407,409. 
Sectiop 13 of this Act, also commonly 
known as the “Refuse Act” generally pro- 
hibits the “discharge, or deposit. [o . . ., 
any refuse matter of any kind or J 
tion 
escrip- 
- . ., into any navigable water of the 
United States” without a permit from the 
Secretary of the @ny. It ma{ be true that 
Defendant Navy s re ease o ordnance m 
the navigable waters surrounding Vieques 
could constitute “refuse matter” under 
Section 407. United States v. Standard oil, 
384 U.S. 224 [ 1 ERC 10331 (1966); United 
Stafes v. Remblic Sfeel Cm.. 362 U.S. 482 I1 
ERC 10221 (1960). But’eken so assum& 
any rel.ipf that we could enter for this viola- 
tion would he only suprrfiuous and cumula- 
tive. We have hereinbefore found that 
under the Federal Water Pollution Con- 
trol Act the Defendant Navy must secure a 
permit for the release or firing of ordnance 
into the surroundimz waters. An NPDES 
permit under the poilution act is the same 
ermit required under Section 407 of the 
Kivers and Harbors Act see- 33 U S C 
5 1342(a)(4), (5). Relief e;tereh unde; ;he 
pollution act and any relief that might be 
entered under Section 407 would neces- 
sariIy be identical. 
Plaintiffs tiso argue that Defendant 
Navy is in vidlacion of Section 409 of this 
Act. Said Section makes it unlawful 
. . . . . to tie up or anchor vessels or 
other craft in navigable channels in such 
a manner as to prevent or obstruct the 
passage of other vessels or aft; or co 
voluntarily, or carelessly sink, or permit 
or cause to be sunk, vessels or other craft 
in navigable channels; _ . .‘* 
Plaint* contention in this re 
on the sinking of the U.S.S. Kr lan. a land- $ 
rd centers 
ing barge, in the waters of Vieques. See n. 
29, supra. The short answer to these al- 
legations is that the record contains no evi- 
dence establishing any obstruction to 
navigation or that any other vessels plying 
these waters are endan 
F 
ered by this. In 
fict the state of this vesse IS such as ma be 
classified as “broken up”, cf. 33 dc. 
3414, and constitutes no safety hazard. 
Moreover, the environmental effects of 
this sinking, if any, are essentially minimal. 
F. Claims under the Fe&al Clean Air Act 
Plaintiffs Romero Barcel6, et al. Medi- 
M. et aI. and Zen&, et 4, claim that De- 
fendant Navy’s activities nolate the Feder- 
al Clean Air Act, 42 USC. 7401 et seq. 
(hereinafter called the “Act” in this Sec- 
tion) and Executive Ordler 11752. It is al- 
leged that this statute requires that the de- 
Dartments of the executive branch of the 
bedera Rovemmenc comDlv with local 
requirements regulating? the’control and 
abatement of air Dolluclon. but that De- ~~. -- 
fendanc Navy’s aciivities, 
use of ordnance and the E 
articularly the 
ulldozing and 
maintenance of unpaved roads, violate the 
“Regulation for the Control of At- 
mo&pheric Pollution” promulgated b 
the PIainciff Environmental 
P 
uality Boar B , 
especially as related to so-ca led “fugitive 
dust.” 
It cannot be seriously questioned but 
chat, under appropriate circumstances, the 
Act requires* ihe PedeaI Government to 
comDIv with State substantive and proce- 
prialc circumstance. 
The reguXation in ue.stion% states that 
[n]o person shal cause or permit air I 
m &iution as defined in Article 1.” An. 
Y. -1.1. “Air poIlution” is defined as: 
‘The presence in the outdoor atmos- 
phere of one or more air pollutants in 
such quan&.es and duration as is or could 
ss This Drovision states: 
administrative authority. iand (C) to any ro- 
cess and sanction, whetbtrr enforced in F cd- 
~6 W-e are faced with a problem nqckng 
this re lation similar to t.bai dkwKd m FOC+ 
note 4 Y and 49. 
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fare.&nal or 
or which inte 
be iniurious to human health or wel- 
l-F 
lant life, or property, 
ment of life or 
eres with the enjoy- 
supplied). Art. P 
roperty.” (Emphasis 
_ 
“‘Air pollutant” includes: 
“Dust, fumes, mist, smoke, other par- 
ticulate matter. vapor, gas odorous 
substances, or an 
r 
combination there- 
of, but not inc uding uncombined 
water vapor.” Art. 1. 
As to “fugitive dust” the regulation states 
that it is: 
“Solid airbone(sic) particulate matter 
from any source other than through a 
stack.” 
Article 5.2.1, which specifically deals with 
fugitive dust, states: 
“No person shall cause or permit any 
materials to be handled, transported 
or stored; or a building, its appur- 
tenances, or a road to be used, con- 
structed, altered, repaired or 
demolished without taking reasona- 
ble precautions to prevent particulate 
matter from becoming airborne. ., . . . 
Another section of this regulation requires 
that: 
“No person shall cause or permit the 
discharge of visible emissions of fu . 
tive dust beyond the lot line of tE 
property on which the emissions orig- 
mate.*’ (Art. 5.2.2). 
&tdoubtedG produce “dust, ‘fumes _ . . 
[and] smoke. . -” in what we consider to 
be relativelv limited amount+ and of 
short duratibn, Plaintiffs fall considerably 
short of their burden in having failed to 
show in any convincing fashion any delete- 
rious effect to humans, or otherwise, of the 
“fugitive dust” caused by the ob’ected ac- 
tivitres of Defendant Naw. muc h less that 
there are **visible emissibns . . .-beyond 
the lot line of the property on which the 
emissions originate.” 
In fact the “hard” evidence is to the con- 
trary. Although the Environmental Protec- 
tion Agency ins 
cility on Novem % 
ected the Camp Garcia fa- 
er 1977. and March 1978 
57 Based on observation by the Court of 
bombin 
troduce %. 
runs. as well as photographs in- 
m evidence. 
for air oollution matters. no “fugitive 
13ERC 2125 
dust” wa> noted as a problem in eith& re- 
port. Existin studies b Plaintiff Environ- 
mental Qua Icy Boar (EQB) show no f d’ 
violation of the federal standards for 24- 
hours maximum allowable concentration 
of particulate matter in either Isabel 
Segunda or Esperanza. A nineteen-day 
study in 1972 conducted by the EOB in 
Isabel Segunda, found the background 
level for particulate matter at 80 micro- 
8” 
ms per cubic meter, far less than the al- 
owable concentration, which is 150 
microgrnms per cubic meter. or thnn the na- 
tional secondarv standard for 24-hour 
maximum allowable concentration. which 
is 150 micrograms per cubic meter. Fur- 
thermore,- the measurements* of sulfur 
dioxide, nrtrogen oxide, ozone, hydrocar- 
bons and particulates did not show any 
violation of national ambient air quality 
standards in either Isabel Segunda or 
Esperanza. Another sampling conducted 
by the EQB at Esperanza throughout May 
X-June 6. 1978. showed an average of 99 
micrograms 
as comoare B 
er cubic meter at Esperanza 
to onlv 25.9 microe-ram per 
cubic meter at the ‘impact area,“again’ in 
neither case exceeding the 24-hour maxi- 
mum allowable concentration. 
[3] Of course, we have throughout this 
discussion been assuming that Plaintiffs 
are on sound footing procedurally, a situa- 
tion which unfortunately for Plamtiffs. is 
not the case. Although for many sources of 
air polluting emissions the states are al- 
lowed to continue enforcing their own 
laws and regulations (42 U.S.C. 374 16),is 
a citizen’s suit such as the oresent one 
under the provisions of * 42 USC. 
37604(a), must be based on the violations 
of a stk33ic emission stx3rdur~ or k&&m. 
1973). As - 
- . 
This section provides that: 
“(a) . . . [A]ny person may commence 
a civil action on his own behalf - (1) 
a 
8 
inst any person (including (i) the 
mted States, and (ii) any O&W govem- 
‘mental instrumentality or agen 
8 
to the 
extent permitted by the eventh 
Amendment to the Constitution) who is 
58 In ifs pertinent parts this section reads as 
(1) any standard or’limirarion respecting 
emissions of air polhnants or 
(2) any re 
Pa 
uiremcnt respecting control or 
abatement o ir pollution. . . . ’ 
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alleged to be in violation of (A) an emis- 
sion standard or limitation under this 
chaoter or IB) an order issued bv the Ad- 
“Each department, agency or instru- 
mentality of the executive legislative, 
and judtcial branches of the Federal 
Government - (1) having jurisdiction 
over any property or facility, or (2) en- 
gaged in any activity resulting, or which 
may resuh. in the emission of noise. 
ministrator or a state with respect to such 
a sfandard 07 limitation . . -” (Emphasis 
supplied). . . . 
Under 42 U.S.C. 7606(f) “emission 
standard or limitation” is defined as: 
“1p - 
(1) a schedule or timetable of 
corn liance, emission limitation, stan- 
dar of performance or emission stan- 
dard, 
(2) a control or prohibition respect- 
ing a motor vehicle fuel or fuel additive. 
or 
(3) any condition or requirement of a 
permit _ . . any condition or re 
9 
uire- 
ment . . . (relating to certain en orce- 
ment order) . . any condition or 
requirement under an applicable imple- 
mentation 
tion contra P 
Ian relating to transporta- 
measures, air quality main- 
tenance plan, vehicle inspection and 
maintenance programs or vapor recov- 
ery requirements, . . . (relatmg to fuel 
and fuel additives) . . . [and] (relating 
to visibility protection, any condition or 
requirement _ . . (relating to ozone pro- 
tection) or any re uirement . _ . (with- 
out regard to whet er such requirement w 
is expressed as an emission standard or 
otherwise).” 
This definition does not incorporate a 
local regulaiion such as the on; here in 
question dealing with “fugitive dust” and 
which in fact contains no auantitative limi- 
tation. Therefore, no &ens suit lies 
under the Act for enforcement of the regu- 
lation in question. CitizmfurCk-anAir1n.c. v. 
Carps. of Engineers U.S. Army, supta. 
G. The Noise Control Act ciuimr 
It is the contention of Plaintiffs that De- 
fendant Navy’s military activities (shellin 
bombing, artillery practice and airc Ia% 
and he%co ter ovhrfli hts) 
noise land s ock waves1 t B a 
“generate 
at unreasonablv 
interfere[s] with the welfare of the re- 
sidents on the island” in violation of the 
Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. 
54901 et seq., referred to as the “Act” in 
this section. 
This Statute directs Federal agencies, 
“to the fullest extent consistent wtth their 
authority” to carry out the programs with- 
in their control in such a manner as to fur- 
ther the Act’s noise abatement policies, 
namely. “. . . to promote an environment 
for all America& free from noise that 
ieooardizes their health or welfare.” See 
242 ‘USC §f4901,4903(a). The Act re- 
quires that: 
BarceIo v. Brown 
shall corn ly with Federal, State, inter- 
state and ocal repirenunts respecting ca- P 
trol and abatement of emironmtal noise to 
the same extent that any person is sub- 
ject to such requirements . . .” (See 42 
U.S.C. 4903(b)). (Emphasis supplied). 
Executive Order 11752 (38 
Fed.Reg.34793, Dec. 1’7, 1973) in sub- 
stance requires this same action from Fed- 
eral agencies. 
Plaintiffs’ principal r’eliance for their 
contentions IS placed on Pueno Rico’s 
criminal nuisance statute, 33 LP.R.A. 
9 1365, which states that: 
“Anythin 
oris. . . o fF 
which is injurious to health 
ensive to the senses or is an 
obstruction of the free use of property 
so ;;s to interfere with the comfortable 
- . - is a public nuisance.” 
For reasons that are not clear to us, 
Plaintiffs make no mention of Puerto 
Rico’s civil nuisance law, found at 32 L.P. 
R.A. 12761. which would seem to have 
more relevance than the cited criminallaw~ 
The language of this statute is somewhat 
similar to the penal law: 
“Anything which is injurious to 
health, _ . _ or offensive to the senses, or 
an obstruction to the free use of proper- 
ty, so as to interfere with the comforta- 
ble enjoyment of life or property, is a 
nuisance. and the subiect of an action. 
Such action may be br&tght by any per- 
son whose property is injuriously af- 
fected or whose oersonal eniovment is 
lessened by the ‘nuisance. &d by the 
jud 
r 
ent, the nuisance may be enjoined 
or a aced, as well as damages recovered; 
nothing herein ly to 
activities relate B 
rovided shall ap 
to public wars R; p in 
churches practiced by the diiTerent reli- 
‘ens; 
a 
provided, that the provisions 
erein established shall not be con- 
strued as a limitation of the Environ- 
mental Quality Board to promulgate 
regulations, as it is authorized by la~.~ 
In any event, in our opinion neither the 
penal or the civil nuisance statutes an be 
Act together with the legislauve 
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42 U.S.C. 4903(b) contemplates com- 
E 
liance with specific stanah& existing or LO 
e promulgated by the various jurisdic- 
tions. Thus Senate Re ort 
speaks in terms of “aut fi 
No. 92-I 160 
otity to establish 
and enforce limits on environmental noise” 
and the authority of the ‘*. . States and 
local governments . . . [to] . . . rea& 0T 
muintatn IA& of environmental noise 
which they desire through (a) operational 
limits or regulations or products in use 
. . .; (b) quantitative limits on environ- 
mental notse in a given area which may be 
enforced against any source within the 
area. . . (c) regulations limiting the envi- 
ronmental noise which may exist at the 
boundary of a construction site; (d) nui- 
sance laws; or (e) other devices tailored to 
the needs of different localities and land 
uses . . . .” (Emphasis supplied; see 1972 
U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News p. 
4655.466O)m 
Conversely, in interpreting the civil nui- 
sance statute the Supreme C&t of Puerto 
Rico held in Arceh v. S&z&z 77 P.R.R 782 
J 
(1955)) that there are no fixed nomxs for 
making a determination of whether a nui- 
sance exists but rather that the resolution 
of the problem must be decided on a case 
by case basis, the fundamental question 
being whether or not the use by the de-’ 
fendant of hi 
beating in mind LE 
roperty is reasonable, 
e right of the complain- 
ant to enjoy his own property.ss 
Shortly before the end of the trial, Plain- 
tiff Environmental Quality Board promul- 
gated a “Regulation For The Prevention 
and Control of Noise Pollution”. pursuant 
to authority conferred under the Public 
Policv Environmental Act of Puerto Rico 
(12L:P.R.A.g112l,crsc atgl131(12).Al- 
though it contains specs IC noise standards -f: 
this re lation did not come into effect 
until ar ter the trial ended.60 
Irrespective of the above discussion, 
even under the most liberal interpretation 
of the Puerto Rican nuisance statute or the 
4- 
uoted noise regulation, Plaintiffs have 
ailed LO establish facts attributable to De- 
fendant Navyjustifying a conclusion that it 
is 5l 
enerating noise and shock waves of 
sue magnitude as LO interfere with either 
XJ We need not decide whether these staunes 
nm afoul of Defendant Navy’s cbaUenge on the 
basis of overbroadness and vagueness. Cf.Smith 
v. cogucn, 4 15 U.S. 566 (1974): cmzaau Y. Ccncr- 
al Conrtrrrcria 6. 269 U.S. 385 391 (1926) 
64 The rq-ulat~on was filed v&h the Se&~ 
of State on November 24. 1978. F’ursuanc to its 
own ccrms ic become effective 30 days a ur said 
fiiing. i.e. after the trial ended. See Art. 4 -4. See 
also footnote 47. 
the health or property of the civilian re- 
sidents ofvieques. On this issue the Court 
not only received extensive expert and lay 
testimony, but conducted a site inspection 
during actual bombin 
the specific purpose o B 
of the range, for 
perceiving subjec- 
tive sound impressions. In this respectthe 
Court was nresent on four different loca- 
tions: the’ observation post at Cerro 
Matias, located approximately 2-3000 
yards from the impact points). and three 
civilian sites. Colonia Luian. (about 9 miles 
away) the L&I square :L Isabel Segunda, 
(about 10 miles distant) and Barrio Santa 
Maria (approximateIy 8 miles distant). 
During these listening periods the Court 
was accompanied by ex 
ties, who had P 
erts of all the par- 
surtab e measuring and 
recording instruments. 
Suffice it to say that even during the 
bombing runs while at the observation 
post at Cerro Matias, the aircraft-con- 
nected sound were “negligible”. while this 
same activity was at best “barely audible” 
at the Barrio Santa Maria location. 
The sounds of the bombs landin 
course be clearly heard from the o % 
can of 
serva- 
tion post. These varied from an instnt- 
ment recorded 128 decibels IdB) sound. 
involving the dropping of one hi-82 (Sod 
pounds) bomb, to a high of 137 dB from 
twenty MK-82 (500 pounds) bombs, which 
did cause shockwave-induced rattling in 
the observation post’s windows. 
The sounds of explosions were not dis- 
cernible LO the human ear from any of the 
three civilian locations. Althou ‘h they 
could be recorded with the aid o f - mstnt- 
ments at Lujan and Santa Maria, they were 
completely inaudible, even by instt-u- 
ments. from the central Plaza at Isabel 
Segun’da.6’ At Lujin. using the eak flat 
sound pressure level (peak R at SPL) 
scale.62 with an ambient IweIss of between 
s* This was so even during the times when 
the nearby church is not blasting its message 
throu h 
clud 2 
its loud speakers. a “nuisance” cx- 
from coverage of the law by virtue of the 
proviso in 32 L..P.RA. 2761. Cf. Sucn. dt Vic~orio 
Y. $&J Prn&cos&l, 102 D.P.R. 20 (19X4 
r;’ 
_ 
It has been customary to describe t e mag- 
nitude of the sound of an explosion bv the pcah 
soundprcssur~&veZas received ma wide t&quency 
band. The four elements are (1) peak, signifying 
the greatest instantaneous sound pressure that 
exists during a time cried under ionsideration 
(2) sound pr-* !- w xh is the variation of at- 
mospheri? pressure about the stcadv at- 
mospheric pressure; an important unit of sound 
ressure is the Pascal (Pa). (3) hrcL which is a 
&uithm of a sound-grcssurc ratio; the usual 
uruc oflwel is the dea cl (dB), and (4)&t. pcr- 
taining to a frequency range wide enough to in- 
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83 to 93 dB. the events recorded between 
91 and 99.6 dB. On this same location. 
using rhc Slow A sound pressure level 
(Slow A SPL) scale, with an ambient level 
of between 42 and 53 dB. the events re- 
corded between 45.8 and 53 dB. At Santa 
Maria. usin 
f 
the peak flat SPL scale, with 
an ambient eve1 of between 70 and 92 dB, 
the recorded events varied between 94.8 
and 102.2 dB. but several of the events 
could not be picked up even with the in- 
struments. On the Slow A SPL scale, with 
ambient levels of between 48 to 57 dB, 
none of the events could be heard. The 
events in question involved up to 8 - 500 
pound bombs simultaneously dropped. 
sound, over which the res 
Although the above-contained definition of 
“peak” is simple. it leads to large numbers of 
measuremenu to describe the noise in Ihe com- 
munity. If only the peak sound pressure level in 
an hour were reported. informalion would be 
lost completely about the many different time 
pauerns that could occur. which all have the 
same peak vaiue. Therefore, it is customary to 
measure a certain average over one of several 
standardized time intervals. The averaging time 
fre 
9 
uencv used in a sound level meter is calIed 
FA T: it’causes the sound 1eveI meter to re- 
spond primarily to recent sounds (mostly within 
l/8 second) almost as quickiey as does the earin 
judging the loudness of a sound. This measure- 
ment is called OJZ sound hteL 
A d standar lzed slower res onse is addi- 
tionally available in the sound eve1 meter, il is P 
called SLOW. It likewise causes the sound level 
meter to respond primarily to recent sound 
(mostly within one second). This level is called 
slow sound level. 
Noise in the community may \ary widefy with- 
in any given time span. To get a srngle number 
to represent all the noise in a longer time peri- 
od, an average is taken (in a way peculiar to 
sound ievel meters) over a minute. hour, day or 
year. For oueragc south tuck equal emphasrs is 
given to all sound within the stated averaging 
P 
eriod; whereas for peak, fast. or slow sound 
evcl. the emphasis is graduated 10 put much 
more emphasis on recently occuning sounds. A 
time-pmod average sound level is also @led an 
equnalent continuous sound level. 
Because people are annoyed more by sounds 
measure o 
given time 
It is panicu P 
eriod or event. It is not an average. 
arly appropriate for a discrete evenr 
like the cxpioslon of a bomb. the passage of an 
It is an established scientific fact that 
damage begins to occur to both people 
(eardrums) and houses I:r\indow break- 
age), at a peak flat SPL of ,140 dB. Ground 
motion dama 
-F 
e to Structures can begin to 
occur at 3 mt hmeters vibrations er sec- 
ond. The above recordings, toget R er with 
ocher matters to be discussed, do not es- 
tablish sound pressures or ground motion 
level@ in the civilian area.5 anywhere near 
these levels. 
aircrafr or a clap of thunder. IO contrast to aver- 
age sound level which for a steady sound re- 
mains constant. rhe sound exposure level of a 
steady sound increases continuously with the 
passing of time. 
The ear does-nor respond equaIly to sound; 
of any frequency; it is most sensitive 10 sounds 
whose frequency arc in the vicinity of 3.000 
hertz (cycles per second) near the top of the 
pial<ng range of a iano Tom simulate this ear 
response, the soun x - level mclcr is given the A- 
frcqv wcightiy. A standard sound level Teter 
may contain su I other frequent): welghtmgs. 
such as the C-fiequny tightrrrg which yrelds es- 
sentially the same constant response to sounds 
of any frequency between S!! and 8000 hertz. 
Sound &uel is the quantity measured by a 
sound level meter. The unit of sound level and 
other levels is the decibel (dB). The quantity is 
actually a sound pressure level, but since sound 
pressure is the most commonly measured char- 
acteristic of a sound. it is feasable 10 omit the 
word “pressure” from the name of the quantity. 
The A-frequency -weighting and the FAST time 
averaging a proxxmately match the ear, they are 
understoo B when the simple term “sound 
level” is used. 
The source for the above clefmitions and de- 
scriptions are pa 
P 
es 3-4 of Technical Note No. 
544 of the Nava Ocean Syslcms Center. San 
Diego. California, which is entitled "Noise 
Measurements on Isla de Viequcs, 4 .4pril 
through 6 October 1978”. bv Dr. Robert W. 
Young. This is Defendants’ E:xhibit 62. 
6s This is the level of sound produced by the 
eneral area in which the sound measuring of a 
2 zscrete noise source is to take place. 
@ Interestin 
bie by the use o B . 
ly enough, although it is possi- 
selsmogmphs and other similar 
instrum<nts to take readings of shock-induced 
ground movements. Plaintis offered no such 
evidence but relied on so-alIed eye witness ac- 
counts of these phenomena. We do not credit 
said testimony. 
A social survey taken bv PlGntiffs on Vieques 
indicates that nearly 94% of the civilian re- 
sidents feel that ncnsc is not a problem in their 
neighborhood. In this same survey however. 
when the sam’ ie was asked about noise from 
Naval activity. 5 5p to 3090 ofthe people stated 
My annoyed. Twice as many pea- 
that they wouid like ;o have De- 
leave Viequcs as rhose who in- 
rhev were highlv annoyed with 
noise. This would seem 10 indiiate that there is 
an attitudinal problem whic‘h bears little reL- 
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Wcathcr conditions are of great impor- 
tance to sound and ground motion prob- 
lems because they can bring about 
focusinp. Under severe focusing condi- 
tions the peak flat SPL can be increased by 
up to 25 dB, and ground motion can be 
multiplied by a factor of up to 18. Under 
these weather conditions the predicted 
levels for Isabel Segunda are marginal for 
four Mark 83 bombs, which are 1000 
pound bombs, detonated simultane- 
ously.ss Studies indicate that these weath- 
er conditions occur less than 10% of the 
days during the year, and during these 
days, Defendant Navy takes corrective ac- 
tion. 
To prevent excessive noise caused by 
sound focusing phenomena, Defendant 
Navy has set up an elaborate noise abare- 
ment system for the inner range. Meteoro- 
logical information from San Juan and St. 
Martin is coIlected twice a day and fed into 
a computer which is programmed to pro- 
vide ;I sound focusing prediction for a 
given explosion. This data can be used for 
redictin trends of sound focusing on 
6 % ieques, ut not for predicting absolute 
magnitudes of sound pressure levels. 
Thus a supplementary verification system 
has been set up whereby test bombs are 
dro 
ers ocated in St. Thomas, St. Croix, Camp P 
ped and reports received from listen- 
Garcia and at the police station in Isabel 
Seaunda. A meter on Crown Mountain in 
St.?homas also sends a digital readout to 
the observation post in Cerro Matias. If the 
information received establishes high 
noise levels, operations are modified or 
curtailed, or in extreme cases, cancelled. 
A compilation of the measurement of 
one-hour average sound levels made by 
both Plaintiffs and Defendants at 18 sites 
on Vieques over a six month period;& re- 
tion to the poiied individuals perception of 
noise and thus these *‘eve witness” accounts 
cannot be deemed reliable when compared to 
“hard” scientific evidence to the contrary. 
6s De 
the air b Ls 
ending on the prediction technique. 
t could be between 139 and 142 dB. 
and ground motion, 3.1 mm/set. Predictions of 
blast over-pressure from artillery firin from 
the neninsuk near Luian. a distance of a % out 5 
kilometers. indicate that a peak flat SPL in the 
range of 108 dB would be produced by a muuic 
blast equivalent to 10 out&. Under extreme 
focusing conditions, 8 
SPL would be 133 dB. 
e maximum pe* flat 
29 
66 Complete 24-hour data were available for 
days in that six-month period. The day-night 
average sound level was calculated for each of 
these days. This is a 24-hour average sound 
level for which, as previously stated. there is a 10 
dB emphasis on sound levels that occur before 7 
A.M. and after 10 P.M. 
veals that at a11 populated areas on 
Vieoues. extent Luian tn October. the av- 
erage day-night a&rage sound level was 
about 58 dB. An analysis of this informa- 
tion reveals that most of the sound comes 
from natural sources: the biota. rain and 
thunder. Activities of local residents ap- 
pear to be next in order as sound makers. 
Twelve gra hs 
sound levels 11 ustrate that on many loca- -P
of one-hour average 
tions (except Luian in October), there was 
a sudden increa>e in sound just at sunset 
that is clearlv nor caused bv Defendant 
Navy’s activiiies. Furthermore, the one- 
hour average sound level remains high 
into the ea;ly mornin 
the cessation of Defen ant Navv’s militzxv 3 
hours, long af&r 
activities. Such night time sounds are :c.<!f- 
known to be associated with the mating 
calls of the Puerto Rican tree frog 
(ekutherodoctylrrs portoticnsis). also known as 
the coqu: This conclusion is reaffirmed 
when compared to evidence that the sud- 
den increase in noise at sundown was not 
recorded on less humid days, a fact scien- 
tifically supported in that the coqu’ceases 
calling soon after sundown on nights when 
the relative humidity goes below 85!%.sr 
At Destino, the cumulated sound of big 
claps of thunder were measured b auto- 
matically activated e 
ated there for ten % 
uipment whit oper- 4 
avs to measure the 
sound ex 
sure P 
osure levels: The sound expo- 
leve s of two claps of thunder, which 
were specifically identified by a witness, 
were respectively 96.7 and 103.6 DB. 
These levels ma be corn 
r 7 
ared with the 
sound exposure eve1 of 7 .6 dB of a 500- 
pound (Mark 82) bomb at a distance of 3 
miles. The difference of more than 20 
decibels between the exposure levels of 
thunder and a bomb, means that the drop- 
ping of 100 bombs 3 miles from Destino 
would cause the same cumulated sound 
there (and the same average sound level) 
as would one big clap of thunder. 
(Thunder at Vieques is common in the 
summer). 
Aircraft noise was measured at Destino 
while two Naval aircraft CTvne A-6, which 
is a noisier aircraft than & ‘A-bade 25 
northward runs over Target 2 (only inert 
bombs are dropped on thts target); after a 
run they made a left turn and returned 
southward, east of Destine. to makeanoth- 
er run. Fourteen of the runs triepered the 
automatic measuring equipmegty yielding 
a tvkal sound exnosure level at Destino. 
for bne A-6 aircnafi. of 79.3 dB. Inasmuch 
q See also El Copi: Unico en el Mmdo. by 
p;-; Luis Leon. “El Mundo”. p. 15 A. July 29, 
IV-26 
13ERC 2130 BorceZo II. Brown 
as the sound exposure levels of the ocher 
11 NRS were less than the smallest one 
that did activate the auromaric measuring 
system, by the rules for levels. the typical 
sound ex osure level of all 25 of the A-6 
aircraft vme: southward east of Destino f?- 
was 76.7 dB.” 
In 1977-78 the average number of air- 
craft (ail types) making runs on Target 2. 
and the chmbing left turns thereafter, was 
37.8 per day. An analysis of the distribu- 
tion of operations for 20 days in August 
and Semember 1978 indicated that 3 per 
cent of aircraft operations occur after- 10 
p.m. In view of the IO-dB emphasis. on 
sound levels at night, rhe yearly day-rught 
average sound level at IDestino, due to air- 
craft, would be 44 decibels. 
As- noted above, the day-night avera e 
sound level at Destino for the six mon tf s 
recorded due to ail sources of noise, was 
about 58 dB. If the yearly 
tions described above 
tirely, the da 
r 
-night average soun 
Destmo wou d drop to 57.8 dB - an insig- 
nificant reduction of 0.2 dB. 
Naval gunfire at the Vieques target 
range in September 1978 did not ap- 
preciably increase the noise at Destino, 
and presumably at other po ulated areas 
more distant from the guns. h e evidence 
establishes a one-hour average sound level 
for the hour ending at 1:OO P.M. on Sep- 
tember, 1978. This is the highest level at 
any time during the 10 days of monitoring 
at the Topside House, at Destino. This 
high level was due to thunder and rain. 
Durina the five hours 1:OO to 6~00 P.M. on 
SepteGber 29.1978. the one hour average 
sound levels were resoectiveiv 40.3.46.0. 
42.5.4 1%and 4 I.0 db. The& are amon, 
the lowest in the l&day eriod not- 
withstanding that the Weekly Fc ange Utili- 
zation work sheet for September 29,1978 
lists for the same five hours 7,6,4,10 and 0 
rounds respectively fired by 5-inch guns. 
The fact that the one-hour average sound 
level was 41.0 dB at Destino w&n there 
nfire at all, and 4 1.3 dB with the 
ent nose. 
Accordin 
Academy o B 
to a report of the National 
Sciences entitled “Guidelines 
for Preparing Environmental Impact 
Statements on Noise”‘, 19’77, the primary 
measure for describing noise in an envi- 
ronmental impact statement is the day- 
night average sound level.. Various docu- 
ments of the Environme:ntal Protection 
Agency have named the day-ni ht average 
(A-weighted) sound level as i! e pnmary 
measure of noise in the community. A day- 
night average sound level of 55 decibels is 
identified as the outdoor level in residen- 
tial areas compatible with the rotection of 
public health and welfare. &is day-night 
average sound level is based on ai sounds 
at the particular location. Along these 
same lines. it should be further noted that 
the Acoustical Society of America’s pro- 
posed Ameuican National Standard 
S-3.23, recommends a yearly day-night av- 
erage sound level of between 50 to 65 dB 
for residential. single-family building 
where extensive outdoor use IS anticipat- 
ed. 
The “hard” scientific evidence refutes 
Plaintiffs’ a& 
tions create F 
tion that military opera- 
s ock waves and excessive 
noise that interfere with health and welfare 
of residents of Vieques. The yearly day- 
night average sound level at Destino due 
to Navy aircraft is less than 44 dB, and due 
to gunfire, less than 41 dK 
It would be impossible for planning pur- 
P 
oses to adopt a day-nigh!. average sound 
eve1 limit lower than 55 dB., because the 
outdoor living on Vieques is already 
adapted to a day-night avexa e sound level 
at times as high as 58 dB. w ~ch as previ- 7-i 
ously stated is due mostly lo biota, rain, 
thunder and the activities of the residents 
thereof. If an attempt were made to allow 
residential building only at places where 
the yearly day-night average sound level is 
less than 50 dB, no one would be aIlowed 
to build on Vieques. Whatever limit is 
adopted, it must be appIied to the combine- 
tion of all sour& without discrimination as 
to source. 
For the above reasons it is our opinion 
that Plaintiffs’ claims under the Act lack a 
basis in fact as well as law. 
A. Th Gxzstal Zunc Mano cmeni Act and 
rekztcd mutters under the Em fl ngcrcd Spccio 
Act and the Marine Mammal Rot&h Act 
Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Nay’s 
activities are inconsistent with the Coastal 
Zone Management Act of 1972, I6 U-S-C- 
01451 et se+ (hereinafta Qlied tie 
“CZW’ in &is se&m) or With the Puerto 
Rico Coastal Managemenl. Plan fiereinaf- 
ter called the “Plan”) promulgated pursu- 
ant lo CZMA. 
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The ‘“CZMA” is an ail-encompassing 
satem of Federal policy@J vis-a-vis the 
N&n’s coastal zone, which provides for 
various programs and grants to the States 
dated to this policy. 16 USC. 1454, 
1455. 1456,‘1456a, 1456b, 1456~. 1458, 
1461. This statute IS administered bv the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheri; Ad- 
ministration. an agency which is part of the 
U~ked States Department of Commerce. 
Pursuant to 16 U.S.C. 1454-1455 said 
agency, on September 2 1.1978, approved 
the Plan submitted by the Commonwealth 
of Puerto Rico. . 
The “CZMA” provides that: 
“Each Federal. agency conducting or 
supporting activities directly affecting 
@se coattut zone shaI1 conduct or support 
those activities in a manner which is to the 
zzaxim txtent @zctkabl consistent with 
approved &ate management’s pro- 
zsilT U.S.C. 1456(c)( 1). (Empha- 
As can readily be seen, the bone of this 
contention centers around Plaintiffs’ al- 
legations that Defendant Navy’s activities 
are inconsistent with the Commonwealth’s 
Plan, while Defendant Navy claims that 
they have complied “to the maximum ex- 
tent practicable.” Defendant Na also al- 
leges that Plaintiffs’ actions su 2 
certain procedural defects. 
er from 
There are various reasons why Plaintiffs’ 
coatentioRs are inappropriate, not least of 
which is that the “CZMA” and the Corn-,’ 
monwealth’s Plan are inap iicabie to the 
Deferrdant Naw’s lands in 6 leaues. 
141 The “CZh4”. at 16 U.S.%. 1453( 1) 
speciikally excludes the lands in question: 
“The term ‘coastal zone” means the 
caasral waters (including the lands 
therek and thereunder) and the adja- 
cent shorelands (includine the waters 
therein and theriunder). Ystrongly in- 
Auenced by each other and in proximity 
to the shorelines of the several coastal 
states. aRd includes islands, transitional 
and intertidal areas, salt marshes, wet- 
lands, a,nd beaches. The tone extends, 
irp Great lakes waters to the intema- 
M b&kdary between ,the United 
ti and Canada and. in other areas. 
d to lhe oufer ii&t of the United 
Staes territorial sea. The zone extends 
iuland from the shorelines onlv to the 
extent necessary to control shokelands. 
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or which is held in trust by tk Federal Gouem- 
reip offfccrs or agentr.” (Emphasis sup- 
The legislative history of this provision 
leaves i&e doubt as to this interpretation. 
“This section defines th; various 
terms used throughout this bill. Of par- 
ticular imDortance is the definition of 
“Coastal ione.” The coastal zone 
is meant to include the non-Fe&al coast- 
al waters and the non-Federal land be- 
neath the coastal waters. and the adja- 
cent non-Federal shore lands including 
the waters therein and thereunder 
. . . . The zone also includes such 
transitional and intertidal (sic) as salt 
marshes, wetlands, and beaches. The 
outer limit of the zone is the outer limit 
of the territorial sea. beyond which the 
States have no clear &&ority to act. All 
merged Lands Act or the Outer Con- 
tinent Shelf Lands Act or exteno!ed state 
auhity LO land subject solely to the dis- 
cretion of the Federal Government such 
as national parks, forests and wildlife 
refu 
P 
es, Indxan resemations and de ense 
cstab rrhnwnfs . . .” (Emphasis ad d ed). 
See Senate Report No. 32-753. 1972, 
U.S.Code and AD-p. 4783. In the “‘Joint 
Explanatory Statement of the Committee 
of Conference”, the Congress stated: 
. . . The Conferees also adopted the 
Sen‘aie language in this section which 
made it clear that Federal lands are not 
included within a state’s coastal zone . . 
Se‘e%ference Report No. 92-1544.1972 
U.S.Code &Ad. p. 4822. 
Interestingly enough, the evidence on 
record shows that at a time when litigation 
was not contempIated. Plaintiff Environ- 
mental Quality Board agreed with this 
conclusion. A cursory review af the ap- 
nroved Plan reveals that the Environmen- 
$1 
P 
uality Board specifically acludcd Fed- 
eral ands in Vieques from the provisions 
of the Plan.69 
We are confronted, however. with cer- 
tain provisions of the regularions promo- 
ted by the National Oceanic and AI- 
ea See 16U.S.C. $31451.1452. 
69 See in Exhibit CRB 4OOA (footnote at paze 
185(a); see note on Map 9: page A-5; page B-20: 
Map 27: pages C-l&C-19). 
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mos heric Administration pursuant to the 
“CZ~A”, which s(ate: 
“Federal activities outside of the 
coastdl zone (e.g.. on excluded Federal 
lands . . . or landward of the coastal 
zone) are subject to Federal agency re- 
view to determine whether they signifi- 
cantly affect the coastal zone.” 15 CFR 
930.33(c). 
WC XC somcH.hilt a~ a IOSS LO reconcile 
how F&r:11 lands which are specificall> 
cxludcd bv the “CZMA” can neverthe- 
less he sub&ted to revicu. by administra- 
tive fiat. II would seem that the administra- 
tive inclusion of uhal has been legislatively 
excluded constitutes an ullru vire.q act. 
See. CIr~.der Ct~rp. I*. B~CJUW. U.S. (Slip 
Opinion April 19. 1979) p. 20. We need not 
decide this. however. as discussion of the 
merits of this controversy is also relevant to 
other pending issues. 
Before entering into the merits of Plain- 
tiffs’ claims, however, we should consider 
the 
fen B 
rocedural objections raised by De- 
ant Navy to the effect that pursuant to 
the “CZh4A’s” mediation procedure (16 
U-SC.. 1456(h)). thecourt should defer to 
the “primary Jurisdiction”‘0 of the ad- 
ministrative agency char ed with imple- 
mentin 
well P; 
the “CZMA.” -I%- is point is not 
ta en. The mediation procedures 
contained in the “CZMA”’ are only manda- 
tory on the Secretary of Interior” and not 
on either the Federal agency or the coastal 
states, a fact made abundantly clear by the 
regulations enacted pursuant to said stat- 
we.72 
70 See en.: Davis Administrative Law Treatise 
19.01~19&j: Uniicd’ States u. Weam Pacijii 
R.R.G.. 352 U.S. 59. 63-64 (1956); Far East 
Gm mnce u. ilnitrd Stutu. 342 U.S. 570. 574 
4 (19 2). 
‘1 16 U.S.C. 1456(h) reads as follows: “In 
case of serious disagreement between an Fcd- 
era! agency and a coastal state - (1) in de de- 
veIopmcnr or the initial implementation of a 
management progmm under Section 1454 of 
this title; or (2) in the administration ?f a man- 
a~~+.~~mapprovedunderscctlon 1455 
o this tt e; t e Secretary, wtth the cooperatxon 
of the Executive Of&c of the Resident.’ shall 
seek to mediate the diicrenca involved in such 
disa ccmcnt. The process of such mediation 
sha1. with respcq to any disagreement dc- $ 
scribed in pan 
ings which shal 8” 
ph (2). mcludc public hcar- 
be conducted in the local area 
concerned.” 
12 CFR 930. I 16 Judicial review: ‘The avaifa- 
bility of the medianon services in this subpart is 
not mtcndcd cx 
panics’ USC of a P 
rcssly or implicitly to limit the 
tcmatc forums to resolve dis- 
putes. Spccifica~l 
wise avaxiable by aw may be sought b r 
. judicial review where orher- 
an 
to a serious disagreement without u-st 
patty 
t’ having 
The subsranrive charges implicit in 
Piaintiffs’ allegations hereunder are wirh- 
out merit. Althpugh the nature of Defend- 
ant Navy’s actlvmes have a tendency to- 
wards provoking dramatic condusions, a 
dispassionate analysis of the scientific evi- 
dence leads us to the conclusion that the 
negative impact of the Defendant Navy’s 
activities on the coastal zone of Vieques is 
ne 
tro of large area of Vieques probabl 7 
ligible, and if the truth be said, the con- 
r 
con- 
stitutes a positive factor in its over al ecol- 
ogy. The very fact that there are in the 
Navy zones modest numbers of various 
manne species which are practically non- 
existent m the civilian sector ofvie’ques or 
in the main island of Puerto Rico, is an elo- 
quent example of res @a loq;lifur.7s, 
An analysis of the various components 
which make for a healthy coastal ecosys- 
tem reinforces this view point:. 
(1). The cord reef and retild communi- 
ties 
Various studies were conclucted related 
to alleced sedimentation of :ihe reefs. uar- 
ticulary in the hi 
Salina B d el Sur an 
h impact areas of &hia 
Bahia Icacos. These stu- 
dies were conducted with a view to derer- 
mining the extent and location of any de - 
osition of terrigenous sediment” Ii 0 - 
shore, the location of areas of sediment 
damage to coral reefs, and the source and 
causation of any excessive sedimentation 
on corals. This is important in that sedi- 
mentation not only causes turbidity in the 
water and therefore blocks off light essen- 
tial to the various life recesses. but also 
because sedimentation fi- nngs about stress 
to the coal, which diverts energy from its 
reef-building functions. 
These studies show that the nature of 
sediments contained in thewaters at the 
eastern end of Vie 
ands region, an area 
exhausted the mediation process provided for 
in this subpart.” 
7s Several marine turtles and manatees, of 
which WC will later speak. 
74 Runoff. - 
75 Thcv rdlecr a hinh calcium carbonate scdi- 
mcnt pr&uction rat; typical to a small arid is- 
land. They arc primanly biogcnic uagonitc 
with lesser amounts of calcite and a very small 
ccrri cnous fraction. Results ofthe percent in- 
solu i? lc analysis (used to detemxinc cent ter- 
xi 
o B 
p” cnous sediment) indicate a very ow content 
tcnigenous scdimcnt for all marine sediment 
samples. cvcn in ncarshorc portions of shallow 
bays, except for those areas immcdiitcly adja- 
L’UII, I&> n~nr,fT sources: 31 the end of the “run- 
:,w:I~” :tnd adjaccnl IO the inner gunnery tar- 
get. 
IV-29 
Barcelo v. Brown 13ERC 2133 
and world-renowned for the clarity of its 
waters. Although there are some corals 
which have been damaged by sediment, 
mostly in a narrow zone on the protected 
or leeward edges of the reefs, the percent- 
age of tern’ enous sediment on these 
corals is very ow, and runoffdoes not f 
B 
ose 
a threat of any measurable magnitu e to 
any reef-buildmg or nism. The sediment 
damaged coral IS t I? e result of deposits 
caused by natural forces rather rhan De- 
fendant Navy’s activities. 
Comparative studies of the Monfustrea 
annula& an abundant coral76 and a reef 
builder in Vieoues and throuehout the 
Caribbean, she; that the effect Gf Defend- 
ant Na 
negligib e 1 
‘s activities in Vieques has been 
in terms of retarding coral 
growth rate. At present there is no irrepa- 
rable damage to coral reefs in Vieques and 
what damage does exist can be repaired by 
the reefs’ normal growth processes. 
Although undoubtedly there are some 
indications that stray ordnance have 
caused some pocketing in a limited area of 
the reefs of Bahia Salina de1 Sur and Bahia 
Icacos. the bulk of the damage observed in 
the reefs there and elsewhere is caused by 
the natural processes of bioerosion and 
wave action. which processes cause 
cracks, shearing and breakage in Manti- 
treo. This type of coral damage is typical of 
any high energy (i.e., wave)-area; Such as 
eastern Vieoues. and can easily be con- 
fused with dirnaie caused by explosions. 
A comparison of the Vieq<es reefs with 
those of the VirPin Islands is oarticuiariv 
apropos becausg of the aIrno& identic~ 
Vieques reefs inside the area ofnav;af activ- 
itv vls-a-vis the control reefs in the Virein 
Islands outside of any naval activity sho%d 
establish whether any difference exists 
that can be attributed to naval Dresence on 
Vieques. 
. 
In the study conducted in the eastern 
Vieques range area (AIAKAWNGFS) ap- 
oroximatelv 10.000 samole Doints were 
iaken re 
over 10 fi 
r’esen&ng a l&ear ‘distance of 
lometers. In the Virgin Islands 
4,440 sampIe points were taken represent- 
ir.g a linear distance of ovef4.4 kilometers. 
‘6 Whose growth tate is highly sensitive to 
sedimentation and can easily be measured by X- 
Ray techniques. 
n The blophysical similarity of these areas is 
mainly g&em+ br two parameters: (1) they 
nse from a relative ye shal ow. sandy sea floor, 
and (2) they are subJecc 10 considerable wave 
energy. 
The results of these two transact analvsis 
revcal that the reefs in the eastern 
P 
ari of 
Vieques and those in the Virgin Is ands?s 
are almost identical in corn 
is very similar in both areas. This tends to 
demonsrrale that both reef systems are 
subject IO the same kinds and same 
amount of stresses. it is particularly signif- 
icant when we considei that a lafgeper- 
centage of the reefs studied in the Virein 
Islam&m is within the control of the Pzrk 
Service of the Department of Interior and 
subject to stringent regulations as to its 
use. all of which reinforce our conclusion 
thai the vast majoritv of coral’rubble in 
both the Virgin Islands and Vie 
1 
ues is the 
result of natural bioerosion an wave ac- 
tion.80 
The living biomass of both of these reef 
sysrems exhibit a very low abundance of 
plants and sponges. 81 This is again the re- 
sult of the rather shallow and exposed surf 
crest type environment of these reefs. Sea 
grasses, microalgae and sponges do not 
usual1 flourish in a high energy environ- 
ment. 8; 
The quantitative assessment of 4,974 
sample points of reef building corals in 
eastern Vieques reveals 14 points that 
show military impact. This is equivalent to 
0.2% of the total reef and is representative 
of the dama e - _ 
10 reefs in ? 
attributable to the military 
. . . leques. This amount of dam- 
age IS mslgniflcant to the normal function- 
ing of the Vieques reef ecosystem and 
clearly indicates that the impact of these 
activities on this system is negligible. 
78 Nine reefs were used in the Virgin IsIands 
located in Dorothea Bays (St. Thomas), Little 
St. James, Johnson’s Reef and Reef Bay (St. 
is 
ohn’s), and To 
uck Isiand (St. 
e Bay, Turner’s Hole and 
r* roux). Twelve reefs were used 
in Vieques commencing at Puma Esre 10 Punta 
Icacos on the north coast and from Puma Este to 
F’unta Matias on the south coast. 
“d 
ohnson’s 
and 
Reef and Reef Bay in-St. John 
u&Island in St.Croix. 
and the Atihrosigtulla varimu species are adapted 
to high energy environments. 
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The coral reef fish communities in the 
Vieques range have also been compared 
with those in the Virgin Islands to deter- 
mioe differences in species. abundance, 
disease. oarasitism and behavior.83 The 
ten Vie$es reefs studied showed 105 spe- 
cies, as kompared to the seven Virgin-Is- 
lands reefs. which showed 109 soecies. 
The average number of s 
7 
ecies c&nted 
per hour is also very siml ar with 45 for 
Vieques and 43 for the Virgin Islands 
resr>ectivelv. as well as the abundance of 
sphcies, wi& both areas having 19 species 
with abundance scores of over 5Op.m 
The sublethal effects of military ord- 
nance were also studied. In over 50 hours 
of diving in Vieques. only one fish was ob- 
served with an o en wound, and that was 
of undetermine cr origin. Disease was nof 
seen in either Vieques or the Virgin Is- 
lands.85 
No abnorma1 behavior was observed in 
either study area. In fact courtship and 
soawninc of the Blue-Headed Wrasse was 
&en in gll but two reefs in both Vieques 
and the Virgin Islands, a factor which sci- 
entists consider demonstrative ofa healthv 1 
and undisturbed fish population. 
The results of this siudy are of relevance 
LO commercial fishing in Vieques in that 
40% of the sDecies recorded are also 
ca;ght commekiallv. Evidence that the 
numbers of the fish in the range have not 
been reduced by military activity is that the 
catch- 
stant rom 1968 through 1978. in contrast P 
er-unit- ,effort has remained con- 
with the south central area off Vieques, 
which is in the civilian sector. where the 
catch-Der-unit-effort is half i& level 10 
years ago, thus indicating over-fishing by 
the fishermen rather than a negative im- 
pact from Naval activirks.86 
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We thus conclude that the hcairh of the 
coral reef fish in Vieques is equivalent to 
ihosc of lhs Virgin Islx~ds rend reflects a 
substantially intact coral reef ecosystem. 
(2) The sea-grass communities 
The sea grass communities located in 
Vieques al Bahia Icacos, Bahia Salinas, 
Bahia Salinas de1 Sur and hlosouito Bay 
were studied and corn ared to-those df 
Tague Bay.(St. Croix). pr wo grass species 
were studled: Thalussia kstudinum and 
Syingodiumjil~ome. Average sea pss pro- 
ducnvitv at Vleaues is 3.1 mn/mP/dav as 
, CT --. -- 
compared to 2&m/m2/dav at St. Croix, 
thus showing shghtly higher values in 
Vie 
the %- 
ues.87 Furthermore, a comparison of 
lomass weight of these two areas im- 
pIies that the standing amounts of sea 
m both places is approximately equa . K”” 
The sea grass studies t.hus show that 
Vieques hk moderately productive 
seamass beds. that are healthv. and tvoical 
of s”ea grass beds throughout ?he Ca&bbe- 
an. 
A sampIing of grassbeds fish eelded 25 
mecies m Vleaues and 35 sDecles in St. 
Croix. The deniity of fish in St. Croix was 
57.9 fish/sample compa.red to 21.5 
fish/samole on Vieaues. Soecies diversitv 
on St. C&ix was 3.1 b7 as a$nst 2.787 fo; 
all samples. 
There is no doubt but that the impact of 
ordnance on pss beds creates craters and 
wnoves sediment :md rhizomes at the 
point of impact. This damage is limited to 
the immediate area of impact. No traters 
were observed lareer than about six feet in 
diameter and the; are principaIly limited 
to the waters in the imiediaie vicinity of 
Bahia Icacos. Bahia Salinas. and Bahia 
8) The Vieques studv area was the eastern 
Dan of Vieoues, the &lcction of reefs bcine 
ihose closcs~ to the tareel rannc. the thco& 
being that these would s%ow th; &catesI bid- 
logical impact by Naval activities. Ten rcifs 
were studied in Vicqucs and seven in the Virgin 
Islands. 
Salinas heI- &r in the AIAkAS/NGFS 
zone. None appear to be enlarging or 
brcoming blowouts. 
Blowouts, which are migratin holes in 
mssbeds that erode at one e 2 ge while 
;hcovering at amother ed e, oc& on the 
nonhewest end of $.,e~ues. Those 
U+ Because many of the species occur in large 
schools. it is imoossiblc to individuallv count 
their number. It fs thus. standard oroc;durc to 
USC an index of abundance score.‘in which the 
quantitv of a species is placed into one of five 
numcri~al catc orics 
li 
and an estimate of their 
numbers is ma c within a numerical range. 
05 A large external isopod pamsite was 
blowouts were caused mainly durin the 
construction of a fresh water pipe s rom 
Puerto Rico to Vieques by Commonwealth 
employees or agents. 
Grassbeds can recover from hysical 
disturbance, and most of those on e- leques 
show signs of recovery. Nearly all craters 
show growth ofgreen algea such as Pcnicii- 
counted on the Yellow-cd 
d: 
cd chromia. a very 
abundam fish in borh stu v areas. showed al- 
most identical average si 
Vicqucs and 1.5 for the 5. 
htktgs perrccf. 1.6 for 
trgin Islands. 
~6 7h1s i'x!or together vlrth other\ Ihat \\crc 
broughr out during the trial. such as rhe con- 
tinucd poaching by fishermen of turtles and 
their eggs. causes us to conclude that *the 
Vicques fishermen arc not as ~onscnanon- 
minded as they would have us b&eve. 
a7 The average value for C’icqucs scagxws 
productivity of 3.1 gm/m*/day compares favor- 
ablv with world averages of da11 
culiivarcd x-hear (2.5). corn (3.1 8 
productivity of 
) and rice (3.6). 
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ius and Halimeda, which are known early 
colonizers in the Caribbean. At least two 
craters north ofPunta Gato show coloniza- 
tion by Thalassia, the final state in recovery. 
A corn 
P 
arisen 
graphs o 
between aerial photo- 
Bahi Icacos, Bahia Salinas and 
Bahia Sahnas de! Sur taken in 1936-37, 
with others tnken in 1978. show an increase 
rather than decreases in the total seagrass 
areas. In 1937 Bahia Salinas de1 Sur. an 
iIrC:l of approximately 143.17 hectares 
(Ha), contained about 35.7 Ha of seagrass 
of which 15.3 Ha were dense seagrass. In 
1978 this area has 85 Ha of seagrass of 
which 63.5 Ha is.dense seagrass. In Bahia 
Icacos and Salinas, a total area of about 
33.8 Ha, there was an increase in 
seagrasses of from 7.5 to 17.4 Ha during 
this same peiiod. 
In our opinion the damage to seagrass 
from the activities of Defendant Navy is 
neither substantial. permanent nor irre- 
versible. As a matter of fact, even if all the 
seagrass in the eastern end of Vieques 
were damaged or removed, this would 
constitute but a relativeIy small portion of 
the seagrass productivity of the entire ,is- 
land, as the largest seagrass beds are locat- 
ed not in the AIA/CAS/NGFS zones but 
rather in the western portions of Vieques. 
Studies were also conducted of the 
benchic fauna1 communities associated 
with seagrasses around Vieques. The ob- 
i 
-ccc of these studies was to quantify 
enchic (in fauna), e ibenthic (live on sedi- 
ment) and cryptic ( rve on and among the P 
blades) fauna which provide the main link 
between primary production of the area 
and higher trophic level consumers, many 
of which are valuable sport and commer- 
cial species, and co assess the condition of 
these communities.!Js 
The fauna of the samples was dominac- 
ed numerically by smalf olychaecous an- 
nelids. with no samole ominated bv anv B 
one s 
isms. K- 
.ecies or even’ one family of o&m’- 
opaccem was discernible that could 
be associated co Naval activity. For exam- 
ple, a station within a “very disturbed 
area” yielded a hi h abundance of organ- 
isms and had an a most exact analog m a Q 
station which had similar species and 
abundance but was more than 1 kilometer 
to the west, outside the impact area. The 
station with the hi 
offPunca Gate. ha 2 
hesc seapss biomass, 
the fewest animals. We 
thus must conclude that benchic abun- 
stations were within the im- 
Salinas and Bahia Salinas de1 
ur. and five were in non-impact stations at En- 
senada Honda. Puerto Negro and Mosquito 
Bay. 
d;tncr c;~nno~ hc positively correlated to 
seagrass standing crop biomass. 
Furthermore, any implication that mili- 
tary and other debns in a seagmss meadow 
is always detrimental is erroneous.89 A 
change in the vertica1 relief in a seagrass 
bed or sand bottom acts as an attractant to 
important organism such as spiny lobsters. 
N&al phefiomena, such is blowouts. 
also Drovide this vertical relief and in 
Mosq;ito Bay serve as a surrogate reef, at- 
tractmg concentrations of fishes and 
crustaceans usually found on patch reefs 
which are not present in the Bay. 
(3) Mangrove wetlands 
Mangrovesare an important segment of 
the coastal ecosvstem. See: Commonwealth 
of Pm?0 Rico v. ‘SS ZOE COLOCOTRONZ, 
supra. They are vaiuable as habitat for ma- 
rine and escuarial vertebrates and inver- 
tebrates, are an important segment of the 
marine detrical food chain, and act as 
shoreline stabilizers. 
As previously aluded to, there are sever- 
al areas of mangrove in Vieaues.sQ most of 
which are with& Defendan; Navy’s pro 
K 
- 
erties. Commencing from west to east t e 
important mangrove forests are the Punta 
Arenas-La 
Y 
na Kiani (199.49 “cuer- 
das”)st an Iaguna Playa Grande (57.68 
cdas.) forests in the NAF, and the Puerto 
Mosquito (102.12 cdas.), Puerto Ferro 
(48.18 cdas.). Bahia Tap& (20.36 cdas.), 
Bahi Chiva (34.27 cdas). Bahia Yanuel 
(27.48 cdas.) and Ensenada Honda (86.18 
cda’s.) forests along the southern coast of 
the GMA. There are no mangrove stands 
of any significance or im 
e 
ortance in either 
the SIA or AIA/CAS/N PS zones. 
Two of the above mangrove areas. 
Punta Arenas-Laguna Kiani and Puerto 
Mosquito, are under stress although the 
cause of the stress cannot be attributed co 
Defendant Navy’s activities. 
In the Puma Arena-Laguna Kiani man- 
grove complex there is a large area of dead 
mangrove in the Laguna Boca Quebrada 
area. Plaintiffs claim chat the cause of this 
mortality is the closing ofan aheged access 
to the sea with a consequent risa in the sa- 
linity of the entrapped waters,-a factor 
which is highly decnmencal to man ove 
forests. However. a oco- 
graphs and maps o ? 
re-1940 aerial p 
this area show the ex- 
09 Cf. 16 U.S.C. 1220 ef sq. 
90 AI1 four varieties of mangrove common in 
the Caribbean arc found in Vteques: red man- 
grove (Rhirophoru mu&). white mangrove 
G%mytidmam ~~y~d~. black mangrove 
ntflcu). 
fcanocurpuc mcfu). 
button mangrove 
$1 A “cucrda” is the equivalent of .97 acres. 
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ibtencc ol’ ;I continuous rwdw3!. hcluccn 
that mangrove forest and the sea and thus 
clearly establish that the present day road 
existed before Defendant Navy’s amval in 
Vieques. Although there is a dry scream 
bed CO the south of Punta Boca Ouebcada 
which is crossed by a tramway &nstruc- 
Lion, this scream bed, as appears from a 
map of the area.92 is not connected CO the 
mangrove swamp but rather serves the wa- 
tershed co the north of Monte Piraca. More 
recent maps show a channel-like connec- 
tion between Laguna Boca Quebrada and 
the sea, but no evidence was presented as 
co any activity of Defendant-Navy which 
could sunoort a 6ndinP chat Defendant 
Navy ha; kaused its b&kage. If such a 
channel did in fact exist, it would be as rea- 
sonable CO pressume ahat it has filied from 
natural causes. We might add chat it would 
be a simple operation to reopen such a 
channe1 because of the proximity of Iagu- 
na Boca Quebrada co the sea. 
The second mangrove area of immedi- 
ace concern is chat on the western side of 
Puerto Mosquito, behind the public beach 
at Ensenada Sombe. This mans-rove. al- 
though bordering in pan on the Ravalres- 
ervauon (GMA), is actually in the civilian 
sector. The cause of the stress CO this forest 
is again the hvuersahnicv of the soil, this 
cim; brou 
version of 
ht about by the blockage or di- 
the fresh water runoff and 
ground water. This has been caused by the 
re-routing of the civilian road between 
Esperanaa and Isabel Segunda and by the 
excessive 
N.eicher o P 
umping of wells in the area. 
these factors can be attributed 
to Defendant Navy. 
In our opinion the activities of Defend- 
ant Navy have a negligible impact on the 
mangrove ecosystem 0fVieques. 
(4). Bioluminescent bays 
There is no credible evidence on the re- 
cord co support any finding chat any a&i- 
tv of Defendant ‘Naw has in anv wav af- 
fected the bioIumine;cenc bays or the or- 
ganisms chat thrive therein. 
(5) Beaches 
There are numerous beaches chrough- 
out the Defendant’ Navy’s property in 
Vieques. With the exce Lion of those in 
the confines of the AI.%/ e ASMGFS tones 
the public is allowed permission CO use 
them when maneuvers are not in progress. 
Green Beach (Puma Arenas), as pre&usly 
stated. is in fact used almost exclusivelv for 
recreationa purposes by both service’per- 
sonne1 and avilians. 
92 As well as from the helicopter inspecrion 
of the area. 
As indicated, the bulk ofthc amphibious 
operations cake place at B.lue Beach on the 
South coast. These operations are not on a 
continuous basis but rather cake place two 
or three times a year. There is no indica- 
tion chat the use of this beach for these 
purposes causes any significant ne ative 
imuacc on the beach or its relate f sur- 
rokdings. 
The hcxhrs within the AiA/ 
CAS/NCiFS zone. n:~rnelv those in 
Bahia Salina de1 Sur. Bah& Icacos and 
Bahia Salinas fre uencly receive direct 
ordnance impact. T 1. IS may result in debris 
being strewn throughout as well as oeea- 
sional unexploded rounds or bombs. The 
latter are periodically ciea:red or detonated 
in place by demolition crews of Defendant 
Navy. Quite obviously under its preset 
use, these particular beaclhes would be in- 
appropriate for use by the public. But in 
our opinion, the evidence is at best incoa- 
elusive chat these activities have a substm- 
rid negative ecological impact .on thee 
beaches. In an event we ionclude as a 
matter of law x at because of the lit-&ted 
area in question and because of the in&n- 
sic nature of the activity being conducted, 
Defendant Navy has “CO the maximum ex- 
cent practicable” conducted activities in 
compliance with the Act. 
(6) H’ildlife 
Generally speaking, and leaving aside 
fish species already described, &e w&#&e 
in ViecPies’ coastal zone consists ofvaricv 
aqua&, mai-ngrove, and Iea bird spe&s, 
various kinds of turtles and kiaards, 4 &e 
manatee. 
Birds, however, are the ckxninaw ti 
of wiidhfe in Vieoues. and the ceascal zone 
is no excrption. ” Tke existence. re+.a&x 
Ydlow varbk 
Black-whiskered Vireo (Vire~ altiloquis), 
Kingbird (Tmnmu duminicmsir) Green- 
Throated Canb (Snicor~r iroI~xricrus). Zenaida 
Dove (Zmida amifu). White-crowned P&m 
(Cotu~a Lucoecpha&) Mayye Cuckoo (Cpc- 
c;p’us YWUF), Black-crowne Nghr Heron (hu- 
fanassu tihccu). Great 131~~ Heron (.&a 
iurod;ar), Green Heron (Bu6de.s VircJcnrr ). LktL 
Blue Heron f Florida camrlo). Cat&k Egret (EM- 
buh~ ibis). Great E~TCL (Eirtf& alba) Snowy 
)ipra I k+w~ Ihrdu). 
(2) Mangrove lagoons: Common GaUinuk 
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abundance. and variety of bird life in 
Vieques, and in particular within Defend- 
ant Navy’s properties, clearIy negate Plain- 
tiffs’ contentions to the effect that the ac- 
tivities conducted therein are unfavorably 
affecting said wildlife. We do not credit ev- 
idence presented to the contrary. 
a. The Endangered Species Ad 
As previously stated, various species of 
Vieques’ wildlife are listed as threatened 
or endangered pursuant to the Endan- 
gered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. $153 1 et seq.9 
and these should be discussed herein with 
some particuIarity. The endangered spe- 
cies include the Brown Pelican, the Hawks- 
hill Tunic. the Lrarhcrback Turtle and 
the West Indian Manatee. See 50 CFR 
8 17.11. The threatened species include 
the Green Turtle and the Loggerhead 
Turtle. See 43 Fed.Reg. 32800. 
Heron (sups), White checked Pintal (Anus 
bohammcis). Yellow-crouned Night Heron 
(supra), Tricolored Heron fhyd74mzsa hicobr) 
Snowy Egret (su Pied-Billed Grebe (Pod;- 
l>mbus podiceps) 
ra), 
ii rown Pelican (P&anus oc- 
cidmtalis occaaWalis), .Magnificent Frigatebird 
It is a decIared purpose of this statute 
“to provide a means whereby the 
ecosystems upon which endangered spe- 
cies and threatened s ecies depend may 
be conserved. . . [an$that all Federal de- 
partments and agencies . . _ seek to con- 
serve endangered species and threatened 
s ecies.” 
2 
16 U.S.C. 81531 (b) and (c). 
enemIly speaking the “taking” by any 
(3) Mangrove mudflats and saltflats: Black- 
necked Stilt (Himontopur maicanrrs), Thick-billed 
Plover fChorc&it~~ tuikuniu), Semipahnated 
Sandpiper (Chmadtiw smipalmatrrr), Ruddy 
Tumstone (Arm&u iaterpres). Shortbilled 
Dowitcher (Limnodromus griw.s). Black-bclIied 
Plower (PluviuZc~ sputuco&). Greater YeBow 
Legs (Tringa melancohzcca). Semipalmated 
Plover (Charadriur semi@natw), Spotted Sand- 
piper (Actitic monrloti), Lesser Yellowlegs (Trin- 
gaflpvipcs), and the Least Tern (supa). 
(4) Beaches: Thick-billed Plover (su a), 
Royal Tern (Stcmu muxim~~), and l? Ye ow- 
crowned Night Heron (supra). 
(5) Offshore cays and rocky coastline with 
adjacent cIiffsYe~;~bbe;;rb~rtm 
ahininicensis), 
(fiognc 
(Dendmca 
person of any endangered species within 
the United States or its territorial sea is 
prohibited. 16 U.S.C. 1538. This statute 
defines “taking” as including to “harass, 
harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, 
trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt Lo 
en 
15 f 
age in any such conduct.” 16 U.S.C. 
2( 19). The law encom 
ferm “person”, any l ‘o icer, employee, B 
asses within the 
agent, department, or instrumentahty of 
the Federal Government.” 16 USC. 
1532(13). AI1 Federal departments and 
agencies are required to carry out pro- 
grams for the conservation of threatened 
and endangered species, and LO insure that 
actions “authorized, funded, or carried 
out by them do not jeopardize the con- 
tinued.existance of such endangered . . . 
and threatened species or result in the de- 
struction or modification ofhabitat of such 
suecies which is determined bv the Secre- 
t&y. after consultation as appropriate with 
the affected States, LO be cntical.” 16 
USC. § 1536(a). 
IL is an un&puted fact that a11 of the 
mentioned threatened or endangered spe- 
cies can be found in Vieques or its sur- 
rounding seas. 
The substance of Plaintiffs’ allegations 
is that Defendant Navy’s activities consti- 
tute 
lege i 
rohibited “takings.“-It is further al- 
that these actions are contrary to law 
in that they fail to ensure that thuzpecies’ 
(6) Oceans 
(a) Onshore waters and bays: Brown Peli- 
.can (s a). 
Royal T 
Magnificent Frigatebird (s-a), 
em Isupru). Laughing Gull (nrpra). 
Brown Booby (supra), Osprey (supra). and 
Least Tern (supra). 
cant portion of its range . . . . . . “(20) The 
term ‘threatened species’ means any species 
which is likely :o become an endangered species 
within the foreseeable future throughout all or a 
significant portion of its range.” 
(b) Offshore waters: White-tailed Tropic- 
bird (supra). Brown Booby (supra), Roseate 
The Statute provides for a procedure whereby 
Tern (nrpra). Sooty Tern (Stemafucca~~) and 
the Secretary of the Interior. by regulation. es- 
tablishes what species are threatened and/or 
Bridled Tern (supa). endangered. 16 L’.S.C. 1533. 
w 16 U.S.C. 1532: “(6) The term ‘endan- 
% 
ered species’ means any species which is in 
anger of extinction throughout all or a signifi- 
There is no flora from any part of Puerto 
Rico, including the Island of Vieques. which is 
currently Iisted as endangered or threatened. 
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continued existence is not jeopardized or 
that habitat deemed critical is not de- 
Concjo colony is being disturbed by De- 
strayed or adversely modified. 
fendant Navy’s activities. 
It is best to discuss these species 
There is more specific data LO substan- 
tiate these conclusions. Studies conducted 
separa rely. 
i. The Brown Pelican 
of the Cayo Conejo group showed a clutch 
size of 2.58 eggs per nest, precisely the 
Brown Pelicans are coIonia1 nesters, same clutch size found in Florida colonies 
who seem to orefer to construct their nests 
on Derches In small coastal islands. In 
’ during an eight year study. This tends to 
demonstrate that rhe Vieques colony has 
not suffered during the nestinp season. Vie{ues, they have established a nesting 
colony on Cayo Conejo (also referred to at 
times as No-Name Island). a two acre is- 
The birds observedyn Vie ues ha% an age- 
class distribution with a hlg -72 
“birds of rhe 
percentage of 
d 
ear”. and a reasonable num- 
ber of suba ulcs, which also indicates a 
healthy population with a stable ageclass 
distribution. Direct observation of the 
Cayo Conejo group during both eriods of 
military activity and otherwise, s R owed no 
noticeable reaction by pelican, during 
military operations. In fact pelicans were 
observed engaging in low,-intensity courc- 
ship behavior during oDerations. even 
thou 
? 
h adult. birds are-m&t suscep;ibIe to 
any orm of disturbance during courtship 
activity. This is suoDortive of scientific 
opinidn that bird;,‘ including Brown 
Pelicans, habituate themselves to noise 
and to the presence of airplanes. 
land located just off-*h&-e from Bahia 
SaIinas dei Sur on the AIAKAYNGFS 
zones. 
Plaintiffs claim thait the Cayo Conejo 
rookery is one of only fwo in Puerto Rico, 
the other one beinrr in a small island off La 
Parguera. in the S&th coast. They claim 
that Defendant Navy’s activities disturb 
the Brown Pelican’s reproductive activities 
because they prefer quiet, secluded sur- 
roundings to can-y out these functions. 
Although these are plausible argu- 
ments, we are immediately confronted 
with various factors which m%tate against 
our adoDtion of the same. The most obvi- 
ous or&is the very fact that the peIicans 
have chosen Cayo Conejo as a nesting site. 
This rookery has been known to exist since 
at leasr 1971. If pelicans are as susceptible 
to military activxty as is alleged one won- 
ders wh) they established a nesting colo- 
ny in such close proximity to Vieques’ 
most active iniiitary zone. In fact, the 
“Puerto Rico Coasial Management Pro- 
mam and Final Environmental Imoact 
statement” (referred to in Section &’ H 
above, as the “Plan”, prepared by the De- 
partment of Natural Resources of the 
Commonwealth), lists the mudff ats in San 
Juan Bay, a commercial ha&or with con- 
siderable trafic and in whose midst is lo- 
cated an important local airport, “as [Q] 
nesting area[s] bv the Brown Peiican” 
(sup& p..C--ij:95 bore in point however, 
there is no evidence of a decline in the total 
population of the Vieques pelicans, a fac- 
tor which would seem to bear a direct reia- 
tionship to the breeding rate of the resi- 
dent birds, and thus on whether the Cayo 
9s The large number of Brown P&cans that 
can be seen throuahout Puerto Rico would 
seem to put in quest&n their “cndan ered” sta- 
tus in fact ifnot.in law (this can not o f course be 
IegaIly quesrioncd except through the adminis- 
trative rocedures encompassed in 16 U.S.C. 
1533). n San Juan Harbor for example, many P 
could be seen, even within sight of undersigned 
Judge while sitting on the bench presiding in 
this case. 
From personal obse:%ation by the 
Court, there is no evidence of recent miii- 
tary activity taking place on Cayo Conejo. 
The only evidence thar could be observed 
of any military activity on this island were 
the remains of some caters, completely 
covered over by grass, a.nd some rusted 
metal fragments. In fact, the major dis- 
turbance to this nesting coIony is &ought 
about by visits of fishermen who PO onto 
the cay io collect snails. By restri&nrr the 
presence of humans in this area, De&d- 
ant Naw has de facto Drovided a refune for 
the peliians (aid oder wildlife). a 
Although there is no designated critical 
habitat in Vie ues for Brown Peiicans, De- 
fendant Navy 7x as proposed a cooperative 
agreement with the U.S. IFish and Wildlife 
Service establishing Cave Coneio as a 
managed resource-for ‘Brown Pelicans. 
Under this aereement overflights are re- 
stricted to a&udes above 500"feer and-i% 
personnd will be permitted to visit the cay 
except on ornithological or operational 
safety matters. This altitude restriction is 
ii 
resently contained in Defendant Navy’s 
ange User’s Manual. 
ii. The Sea Turtic.s 
Here a 
fact that tr 
in we are confronted with the 
e sizhtinns of the turtles and of 
their nests a& almost exclusively within 
Defendant Na 
ters adjacent IiT 
‘s properties or in the wa- 
ereto. and again in close 
proximately to or within the AIA/ 
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CAS/NGFS zone. Plaintiffs contend 
that this dictates the automatic curtailment 
of Defendant N&y’s activities, without 
considering that it is perhaps this resence 
that accounts for the existence o P the spc- 
ties there. 
In any event, we must take into account 
that Vieques is not considered a major tur- 
tle site in terms of the range of the species 
here in question. This is a fact which has 
been officially recognized by the failure to 
designate as critical habitat any area in 
Vieques for any of these species. 
The evidence shows that the population 
of green turtles on Vieques does not rep- 
resent a si 
r 
ificant 
number o 
proportion of the total 
these species. Again in terms of 
the tota numbers of the species, the num- 
ber of loggerhead turtles m the Caribbean 
is quite small, and those that can be found 
in Viequrs insignificant. Even the pres- 
ence of the leatherhack and hawksbill Iur- 
tles in Vieques is not of importance in 
terms of relative numbers when compared 
to the various other Caribbean sites where 
it is found, notwithstanding that these two 
species are the most abundant of the sea 
turtles to be found in Vieques. 
Furthermore, no credibie evidence was 
nresented to show that any activitv of De- 
pendant Navy is affecting the sea th-tles in 
Vieques in any significant manner.% The 
record shows that the greatest threat to 
these species in Vieques, as throughout 
the Caribbean, has been the unrestricted 
fishing that has taken place.97 There is evi- 
% Although it is undoubtedly true that if a 
heavy tracked vehicle were to pass over a turtle 
nest the nest wodd be destroyed. it t dear 
speculation to say that this is taking place. The 
areas used by the turtles for nesting sxtes are lo- 
cated in the northeastern extremities ofVieques 
in beaches which are mostly isolated and not 
used for landings. 
Copious testtmony was also presented deai- 
ing wnh a theory to the effect that the light from 
parachute flares attracts the hatchiings inland, 
thus causing their destruction. We consider thts 
such an absurd argument when one considers 
the many other sources of fight in Vieques. in- 
cludina the moon. that it bears no further com- 
ment. - 
97 The records of catches of a Vieques fisher- 
man were presented at the trial. These showed a 
steady decIine in the catches, as the adult 
reproducing stock was progressively decimated. 
The removal of adult sea turtles from the po u- 
lation is much more serious than the remo Jar 
destruction of sea turtle e 
hxlchlings th;!t attain adult 5 . 
gs. The numbers of 
ood IS very low. due 
to natural causes such as predation by sea gulls. 
It is thus imperative that there be large number 
of eggs laid to overcome this high natural mor- 
taIity race. The killing of an adult has the obvi- 
dence that this fishing, althou 
illegal under the Endangered 5 
h presently 
pecies Act. 
is still taking place around Vteques, to- 
gether with t&poaching of sea turtle eggs 
and nesting adults. Defendant Naw’s nre- 
sence on %eques, together with ihh re- 
strictive nature of its activities. has had 
some measure of benefit CO the turtle 
po 
l3-J 
ulation by recludin some of the ille- 
fishing an 8 f- egg poac mg. 
b. The Mamatee and the Mahe Mammal 
Prokclion Ad 
The Manatee (T5idechur munatus), a 
lar e herbivorous marine mammal of the 
d or er Siren&z, is protected by the provi- 
sions of both the Endangered Species. Act, 
supra. and the Marine Mammal Protection 
Act, 16 U.S.C. 3 136 1 et se ., see specifically 
16 U.S.C §1362(5).aa this later statute 
also prohibits the “taking” of the manatee 
by any person in waters or on Iands under 
the junsdiction of the United States (16 
U.S.C. 11372(2)(A)). The definitions of 
“taking” and “person” in this law are simi- 
Iar to those contained in the Endangered 
Species Act. 16 U&C. Q1362(10), (13). 
The evidence presented demonstrates 
that the manatee is found in larger num- 
bers and concentration in Vieques than in 
any other area of Puerto Rico except per- 
haps the Naval Reservation at Roosevelt 
Roads, across Vieques Sound. We do not 
deem it coincidental that both of these 
areas tie under the control of Defendant 
Navy. 
The Vieques group, which is concen- 
trated almost exclusively in the sea grass 
beds around Puma Arenas liti the nortb- 
west), consists of between 13 to 25 
manatees and includes a significantly large 
E 
roportion of calves. It remains question;?- 
Ie whether the manatee nonulation of 
Vieques is totally discreet’ f&m that of 
Roosevelt ‘Roads, particularly since there 
are no year round fresh water sources on 
Vietrues, which seems to be a periodic 
reqtiirement for manatees.99 However. the 
northwestern sector of Vieaues. in addi- 
tion to containing large area: of sea 
has sediment of sufficient penetrabr ny as 
.H”““- 
to allow the manatee to easi?y.root for the 
base of the grass. the preferred manner of 
feeding of manatee. 
ous result of reducing to zero the reproduction 
tare of that aduit. 
* “The term ‘marine mammal’ means any 
mammal which (A) is morphologically adapted 
to the marine environment (mcluding . . . 
members of the orders Sire& . . J.” 
99 There are various fresh water streams in 
an around the Roosevelt Roads area. 
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As previously indicated, the area of 
Vieques preferred by the manatee is an 
area almost total1 
h 
devoid of any military 
activity. Again, alr ough no area of Puerto 
Rico has been designated as critical habi- 
tat, we can find no activiry of Defendant 
Navy which can be said to be affecting in 
any adverse way the manatee or its habltat. 
The facts which we have found proven 
establish as a matter of law that there has 
been no “taking” of any of the above-men- 
tioned endan ered or threatened species 
under either t a e Endangered Species Act 
or, as ap licable. the Marine Mammal Pro- 
section R ct.100 Furthermore, as previously 
indicated, no “critical habitat’ designa- 
rion has been effectuated as to any of these 
species puruanr to the procedures estab- 
hshed by the Endan ered Species Act, 16 
53 U.S.C. 1533. Lastly, t e actions filed under 
both the Endangered Species Act and the 
Marine Mammal Protection Act suffer 
from serious procedural defects: as to the 
first statute, Plaintiffs have failed to com- 
ply with the 60-day notice requirement of 
16 U.S.C. 154O(g)(Z),tOt which we deem to 
bar this citizen suit, (Cf. Loveladies R 
Owns Arm. v. Raab.. 
and as to the second, 
to establish “citizen 
ment but rather specifically limits such 
powers to the Secreiary.102 and thus Plain- 
tiffs lack standing herein to enforce this 
Act.10’ 
The sum total of the matter discussed 
under Sectidn IV H above of this decision 
100 50 C.F.R. $17.3 defines “harass” and 
“harm” to mean, respectively: 
“An intentional or negli enr an or omis- 
sion which creates the likeh ood of injury to -a 
wildlife by annoying it to such an extent as to 
significantly disru t normal behavioral 
terns which inciu cz hut ttre not B limite 8% 
breeding. feeding or sheltering.” 
“An act or omission which actuaIIy injures 
or kills wildlife, includin acts which sign%- 
candy disrupt essenaial %ehavioral pattern. 
which inclu e, but are not limited to. breed- 
ing. feeding. or sheltering. significant envi- 
ronmen& modification or degradation 
which has such effects is included within the 
meaning of harm.” 
101 Which reads in its pertinent pan: 
“(A) No action may be commenced under 
subparagraph (I) (A) of this Section [citizen 
suits] (i) pnor to sixty days after written no- 
tice of the violation has been ‘vcn to the Sec- 
rcrar)r. and to any alleged wo ator of any such -P 
prowsion or regulation. . .‘* 
102 16 U.S.C. 1377. The Secretary can dele- 
$ 
te enforcement to any State. 16 U.S.C. 
379(c). No such delegauon has taken place 
here. 
10s See discussion Section IV E above. 
is thus lhat Plaintiffs have failed to state 
claims under either the Coastal Zone Man- 
agement Acr. the Endan 
or the Marine Mammal i 
,ered Species Act 
rotection Act. 
I. 2% h’afional Hirtoric Presmafion Act and 
Executive Order ,! 1593. 
PIaintiffs allege violations b Defendant 
Navy of Executive Order 1 l:, 4 3 (“Protec- 
tion and Enhancement of the Cultural En- 
vironment”, May 13, 1971. 36 F.R. 8921. 
noted at 16 U.S.C. $470) and of Section 
106 of the National Hisroric Preservation 
Act (16 U.S.C. 9470 f), referred to as the 
“Act” in this Section. 
Section 2 of the Executive Order states 
in part, that federal agencies shall: 
“(a) no later than July 1, 1973, with the 
advice of the Secretar of the Interior 
4 and in cooperation wt the liaison of& 
cer for hIstoxic preservation for the 
State or Territory involved, loca&, inven- 
tq, and nominate to the Secretary of the 
Interior all sites, buildings, districts and 
objects under their jurisdiction or con- 
trol that appear to qu.aZgrjl for listing on the 
Nahmal Regirti of H&kc P&es. 
(b) eMcie caution during the interim p&d 
until inventories and evaluations re- 
quired by subsection (:a) are corn 
B 
leted 
to assure that any federally owne prop- 
erty that might q.ualifi :for nominauon IS 
not inadvertently transferred. sold, 
demolished or substantially altered. 
The agency head shall rejer any quzstiona- 
b& actias to the Secretary of the Interior 
for an opinion respecting the property’s 
eligibility for inclusion. on the National 
Register of Historic Places. The Secre- 
tary shall consult with rhe liaison offker 
for historic preservation for the State or 
territory involved in arrivin 
ion. Where, after a reasona 6 
at his opin- 
le period in 
which to review and evaluate the 
ty, the Secretary determines trla 
roper- 
t the 
property is likely to meet the criteria 
rescribed for Iistin 
rz egister of Historic f 
on the National 
laces, the Federal 
agency head shall reconsider the p?e 
posal m light of national ennronmental 
and preservation policy. Where, after 
such reconsideration, Ihe Federal agen- 
cy head pro 
E 
oses to uansfer, sell, de- 
molish or su stantially alter the proper- 
ty he shall not act with respect to 
ty until the Advisory Council on Ristoric 
roper- 
Preservation shall have been provided 
an o portunity to comment on the pro- 
posa?” (Emphasis suppiied). 
Section 106 of the National Historic 
Preservation Act (I6 U.S.C. $470 t) states 
that: 
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dertaking on any districr, site. building, 
structure, or object that is included in or 
eligib&for inclusion!w in the lthtionnl Regis- 
ter. The head of any such Federal agency 
shall afford the Adviso 
?i Counc’l On Historic Preservation esta hshed under 
Sections 470 i to 470 n of this title a rea- 
sonable opportunity to comment with 
regard to such undertaking.” (Emphasis 
added). 
The National Register referred to is a 
listing maintained by the Secretary of the 
Intenor “. . . of districts, sites, buildings, 
structures, and objects significant in 
American history, architecture, archeolo- 
9 
and cuiture ” 16 U.S.C. 
4 O(a(a)(l). The Com;nb;lwealth of Puer- 
to Rico is eligibie to have listings in the Na- 
tional Register (16 U.S.C. 470a(h)(l)). 
There are three locations in Vieques that 
are enumerated therein: the fort and light 
house at Isabel Segunda, and Frenchman’s 
House at Esperanza. See 44 Fed. Reg. 
7416.7561 (Feb. 6. 1979). 
Criteria for inclusion in the National 
Re ‘ster is 
8081 O(a): 
established in 36 C.F.R. 
l ‘ ‘National Register Criteria’ means 
the following criteria estabIished by the 
Secretary of the Interior for use in evalu- 
ating and determining the eligibility of 
ii 
roperties for listing in the National 
egister: The quaiity of significanc& in 
American history, architecture. archeol- 
ogy, and culture is present in districts, 
sites, buildin structures, and objects 
of State and ocal importance that pos- P 
sess integrity of location, design, set- 
tin 
8 
materials. workmanship, feeIing 
an association and: 
(1) ‘That are associated with events that 
have made a significant contribution to 
the broad patterns of our history, or 
(2) That are associated with the lives of 
persons significant in our past: or 
(3) That embody the distinctive charac- 
teristics of a type. period, or method of 
construction. or tharzepresent the work 
*M The phrase ‘*or cIigiblc for inclusion in” 
was added to the Act by Pub. L. 91-422 in 1976. 
of ;I m~stcr. or Ihat pos~css high rirtistic 
values. or that rc 
and P 
resent a significant 
distinguishab e entity whose com- 
ponents may lack individual. distinction; 
or (4) That have yielded, or may be likely 
IO yield, information important in 
prehistory or history.” 
There is Iittle doubt in our mind but that 
Defendant Navy did not at any time prior 
to the commencement of the present ac- 
tions locate, inventory and/or nominate 
any site or otherwise that appear to quaIify 
for listing on the National Register, as re- 
uired by Section 2(a) of ihe Executive 
8 rder. 
After these actions were filed, however, 
Defendant Naby has conducted an exten- 
sive survey to such effecrs.‘Os 
105 The methodology of this survey began 
with a literature search to provide an overVIew 
of the cultural resources on Vieques for historic 
and archeological sires. Material found at the 
Institute ofPuerto Rican Culture and at the Uni- 
versity of Puerto Rico was reviewed, and various 
persons were contacted in Vieques to supple- 
mcnt the docummt~w~ sarch. Thmcafter a prc- 
dictive base was pre ared from which locations 
could be identified F or purposes of evaluation. 
The field work was performed in two phases. 
The first phase was the survey of the targer area 
east of Ccrro Matias. which took thirteen and a 
half days. The second phase involved a sam- 
pling l+ogxtrn for the remainder of the island 
and re ‘ulred one hundred and ei hteen man 
days 0 P effort. The survey meth J s allowed a 
survey of 55% of the NAF and 34 F of Ihe cast- 
cm area. 
Because of the size of the area on Vieques. it 
would take at Ieasl two years and hundreds of 
thousands of dollars to conduct a 100% survey. 
No other area of a corn 
7 
arable size to Vieques 
has been surveyed 100 Q. nor do WC beiieve this 
to be the intention or a re uirement of the law. 
In our opinion the samp mg method devised P- 
b 
r 
Defendant Navy provides an unbiased sam- 
p e of the archeological sites on tbe entire island 
of Vieques. This method divided Vieques into 
665 sectors each of which measured 500 by 500 
meters. A group ofsectors (10%) were picked at 
random from a random numbers chart. Another 
10% o<the total of 665 sectors was chosen by 
picking the first number at ran&m and then 
selecting aII the other sectors at cdhstant inter- 
vals. The third group was picked based on the 
knowledge of experts as to where archeological 
and historic sites should be found. 
On the field, the squares which were to be 
surveyed were walked at intervals of 100 meters 
from East 10 West, making several passes. and 
then from North to South at the same intervals. 
Four hundred twenty one squares. or 63.2% of 
the total squares on the island were reviewed in 
one manner or another. Defendanl Na 
cheological survey teams actually walked 7 
‘s ar- 
.62F 
of the total surface of the island. 
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Prior to this survey twenty nine archep- 
logical sites were known to exist in 
Vieques, of which all but two were in the 
civihan sector. The survey found an addi- 
tional forty-five new sites. forty of which 
are on mihtary property. The survey aIs 
located seventeen historical sites and 
structures, thirteen of which are on Naval 
lands. 
There are at present no significant ar- 
cheological or historical sites in the 
AIA/CAS/NGFS zones. An that may 
have existed there have in al r probability 
been destroyed.lM 
The sites which are located West of 
Cerro Matias, however, are not in any im- 
mediate dan er of harm or destruction by 
virtue of De endant Navy’s activities. H 
Althou h Defendant Navy admits that 
some oft Fl e newly discovered sites may be 
eligible for listing in the National Register 
no action has been taken to nominate them 
to the Secretary of the Interior or to seek 
his opinion respecting said eligibility. 
Thus Defendant Navy is in violation of 
Section 2(a) and (b) of Executive Order 
11593. This order was issued pursuant to 
statutory authoritylo’ and has the force of 
law. Cf. Farkas v. Texns Instrument, Inc., 375 
F.2d 629, 632 (C.A., 5. 1967)‘ cert. den. 
389 U.S. 977 (1967); Association of Womenin 
Science v. Calqano, 566 F.2d 339,344 (C.A. 
D.C. 1977). Violation of this Order may be 
privately enforced. Aluli v. Brown, 437 
F.Supp. ho’. .60X-609 I10 E RC 17651 (D.C. 
H;tw;;ii. 1977) rev. in part, [I3 ERC 13821 
(C.A. 9. July 9. 1979) (slip opinion); 
.\‘alv the C‘ourrhuuse C~~t?lnli[tee v. Lynn. 
4% F.Supp. fX ERC 12091 1323. 1331 
(S.D.N.Y.. l9,5). 
DX In all fairness we’shouId state that this 
could ve 
7 
well have happened prior to 1971. 
See also oornote 97. It IS in any event an aca- 
dcmic prinl. Tho I;xt ir that this are;! is at pres- 
cnt :zrchcJ+!ic:rll~ :rnd hict~lric;lll~ sterile. WC 
might add however. that we have some doubts 
as LO whether this area was ever a likely place for 
such findings. The evidence rends to indicate 
that in historic times there was little activity 
there. and in prehistory. it was mosr probably a 
transit zone rather than one of sertlemcnt. 
Some su port for this theo 
paring S;. 8 
is found in com- 
roix and Viequcs. 0th ofwhich arc T 
archeologicaily akin because of the slmllar na- 
ture of their sot1 ty 
and their geograp K- 
es. their cultural se uences, 
IC proximity. In St. 8 roix, as 
in Vicqucs. no archeological sites have been 
found on its easternmost end. an area which is 
comparable to chat East of Cerro Ma&s. 
107 The National Environmenwl Policy Act of 
1969 (42 U.S.C. 94321 c! seq.), the National His- 
Itwic. Prc~cr~:~I~~m Act 0I’ 1966 (16 U.S.C. ,$4X p, 
se .). the Historic Sites Act of 1935 (16 V.S.C. 
&I ff seq.). and the Antiquities Act of 1906 (16 
U.S.C. $431 Cf req.). 
K. Claim under the Firsf and Fijh 
Amendmantr and R&&d Matters 
A. Alleged violafiom cfagrccments, 
Residcntzal orders and Congressional 
Di7ec1ives. 
Plaimiffs claim that Defendant Navy has 
violated an agreement, and commitments 
with the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 
not to transfer to Vieques operations for- 
merly conducted by Defendant Navy in the 
Island of Culebra. It is also alleged that 
Defendant Navy in transferin these activi- 
ties, violated Presidential an cf Secretary of 
Defense orders not to effectuate a transfer 
from Culebra to an alternatesite in Puerto 
Rico, without prior Commonwealth ap- 
proval. Lastly. Plaintiffs come?+ that Con- 
gress, in enacting various Mlhtary Con- 
struction Aurhonzation Acts*08 intended 
“to exercise direct legislative supervision 
of the decision-making of the De 
P 
artment 
of Defense” with respect to the al eged Cu- 
lebra transfer, by requirin 
ofDefense to study the pro E 
the Secretary 
lem, negotiate 
and obtain an agreement from the Com- 
monwealth Govemmem prior to any 
transfer within Puerto !Rico, and report 
and recommend to Coqgress on the out- 
come of said matters. 
The roots to these allegations are 
traceable to a controversy that com- 
menced in this Court in the case of Feliciano 
v. Lirited Stutes, 297 FSupp. 1356 (D-P-R., 
1969), affd 422 F.2d 943 (CA. I, 1970), 
cert. den. 400 U.S. 823 (1970). At its in- 
ception it involved a challenge to the exec- 
utive order which created the Culebra Is- 
land Naval Defensive Sea Area. The Pu’avy 
won that legal battle but lost the poiitical 
war that ensued, which culminated in the 
cessation in 1975 of all weapons training 
activities in Culebra Island. 
The many complex, iintertwining ha 
F 
- 
penings that took place between the Fe I- 
ciano case and the Culebra cease fire are 
the alleged basis of the present conten- 
tions. 
In October 1970 Congress enacted the 
Military Construction Authorization Act 
of 1971 (PL 91-511, 84 Stat. 1204). Sec- 
tion 611 of this law’” required the Secre- 
108 The Military Construction Authorization 
ACKS of I971 (PL. 91-5111, 1972 (PL. 92-145) 
and 1974 (PL 93-166). 
109 “Sec. 6 1 I .(a) ?he Secretary of Defense is 
directed to undertake a srudy and to prepare a 
repon on the weapons training now being con- 
ducted in the Culebta complex of the Atfqntic 
Fleet Weapons Range. This, study shall consider 
ossible altematrves. gcogra hicai and tech- 
cal. to the trainin now ta Ing piace in the 
cf sbail !&lain specific 
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tary of Defense to study and report to Con- 
6. 
ress on the weapons trainin that was 
emg conducted in Culebra wxt -a a view to 
considering “all possible alternatives, geo- 
graphical and technological, to the train- 
taking place in the Culebra com- 
z%.*‘l%e report should “contain specific 
recommendations for . . . moving all or 
part of such activities to a new site or sites 
. . . ** In preparing this r 
tary was required to consu t with the peo- T 
on the Secre- 
le of Culebra, the Government of Puerto 
K* KO, and with dppropriate Federal agen- 
cies. Furthermore, the Navy was directed 
lo avoid any increase or expansion of its 
activities in the Culebta complex. 
recommendations for together with the es& 
mated costs of. moving all or a part of such activ- 
ities to a new site or sires, and appropriately 
modifying such activities to minimize danger to 
human health and safety. In addition, such 
study shall consider the feasibilit 
r 
of resetding 
the people of Culebra to another ocation in the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the cost of such 
a move. and the attitude of the people of Cu- 
Iebra to a generous resettlement plan that 
would have to be ap 
qualified dectors o P 
roved by a ma’ority of the 
Culcbra in a p ebiscitc. In i 
preparing such study, the Secretary is directed 
to consider the impact of each of the afternatives 
on: 
who live on &ebra: 
(1) the safet and well-being of the people 
(2) the natural and physical environment of 
Culebra and adjoining cays and their recrea- 
tional value; 
(3) the develo ment 
economy in Cu ebra; P 
of a sound. stable 
(4) the unique political relationship of Cu- 
Debra and Puerto Rico to the United States; 
(5) the operational readiness and proficien- 
cy of the Atlantic Fleet. and 
(6) national security. 
(b) In pr 
the section. t 3
aring the report required b 
e SecretaT shall consult WI -x 
the peo le of Culcbra. the Government of 
Puerto &co and all appropriate Federal 
agencies havkgjurisdiction or special cxper- 
he on the subJect matter involved. The re- 
pon required by this subsection shall be 
transmitted to the President of the United 
States and to thechairmen ofthe Committees 
on Armed Services of the Senate and the 
Later that year Con ess enacted the 
Military Construction uthorization Act ‘Y 
of 1972 (P-L. 92-145; 85 Stat. 394), in 
which the Secreta 
a 
of Defense was direct- 
ed to prepare “a c&led feasibility study 
of the most advantageous alternative to 
the weapons training now bein conduct- 
ed in the Culebra Complex oft if e Atlantic 
Fleet Weapons Range.” $207, 85 Stat. 
401. The standards to be used by the Sec- 
retary i,n determining the most advanta- 
geous alternatives were “cost. nationa se- 
curity, the operational readiness and profi- 
ciency of the Atlantic Fleet, the impact on 
the environment, and other relevant f&c- 
tars.” Id. This report was fo be completed 
by December 3 1.1972, and submitted, to- 
gether with the Secretary’s recommenda- 
tlons. to the President and to the chairmen 
of the Committees on Armed Services of 
the Senate and the House of Representa- 
tives. 
This stud was in fact submitted b Sec- 
retary Lair on December 27, 4 19 2. It 7 
showed that the requirements for the 
Inner Range of the Atlantic Fleet Weapons 
Range, whuh then in&&d both C&bra and 
vieQIIL(, would not changti substantially 
through 1985. The study pre’dicted. how- 
ever, a shift in the kind of operations con- 
ducted: naval gunfire su 
P 
port training. 
which was conducted most y in the north- 
west peninsula of Culebra, was projected 
CO decrease, while air-to-ground wea 
training. which was princtpally came *B 
ons 
out 
on Vie 
of Cult $ 
ues and several rocks and cays west 
ra. were forecast to increase. Of 
ties and the solitude of the people of Cu- the five alternate sites studied none was 
iebxa.” 84 Stat. 1225, deemed superior to Culebra, although 
On January 11, 1971, a document enti- 
tled “Agreement” was signed by the Sec- 
retary of the Navy, John H. Chafee, the 
Governor of Puerto Rico, Luis A. Fe&. 
the President of the Puerto Rican Senate, 
Rafael HemLndez Col6n, and the Mayor 
of Culebrq. Ram& Feliciano. This docu- 
Culebra as of January 1, 1972. 
IV-40 
13 EKC 2144 Barcelo u. Brown 
based on the cri:cria given. Viequcs was 
considered the most advantageous of the 
alternate sites. However, transfer@ to 
Vieques would involve the relocation of 
the “Culebra training targets to the east 
end ofVieques with one air-to-ground tar- 
et two miles 
5ieques ” 
off the northwest, tip of 
The Secrerary did not recom- 
mend &is alternative as it was deemed to 
“significantly reduce the capability of the 
Inner Range and [to] transfer Ihe training 
activity from an island with 700 inhabitants 
to one with 7,000 inhabitants”, a situation 
which the Secretary discarded as not being 
a prudent course of action. The Secretary, 
however, indicated that the requirements 
of weapons systems and training changed 
with time, and thus the Navy would remain 
abreast of developments char would modi- 
fy the study’s conclusions, i.e., the Navy 
was keeping its options o en. 
Thereafter, in May, 19 E; 3, the new Sec- 
retary of Defense, Elliot Richardson, in- 
dicated to the Secretary of the Navy that in 
his o 
est o P 
inion ir was in the Ion 
B 
-range inter- 
the Department of De ense to move 
the Navy training activities by July 1, 1975 
from the Culebra complex to t/se tilarrdr of 
Desecheo and 1Monito. uninhabited islands 
Iying in the Mona Passa e. 
coast of Puerto Rico an 3 
off the West 
a part thereof. 
The Secretary stated chat thic move was 
contingent u 
the funds an B 
on Congress appropriating 
on working out “a satisfacto- 
t-y overall arrangement . . . with the Gov- 
ernment of Puerto Rico for carrying out 
the proposed move and for insurin the 
long-term continuation of the B _ At antxc 
Fleet Weapons Range and the Fleet Ma- 
rine Force Training area.” 
Later in 1973 Congress enacted the 
Military Construction Authorization Act 
of 1974 (P-L. 93- 166. 87 Stat. 668) 1 10 ap- 
**O “Sec. 204.(a) In order to facilitate the 
reIocation of the ship-to-shore and other gun 
fire and bombin 
States Navy from t 5 
operations of the Umred 
c island of Culcbra, lhere is 
hcreb 
of $1 d 
authorized to be appropriated the sum 
.OOO,OOO for the construction and cqui- 
page of substitute facilities in support of such 
relocation. 
(b) The relocation of such opcra&ons 
from the northwest 
Culcbra is express y conditioned upon the P 
cninsula of the island of 
conclusion of a sattsfactory agreement to be 
negotiated by the Secretary of the Na 
his dcsigncc. with the Commonwcah TS 
Puerto Rico and reported IO the Commitrce 
on Armed Services of the Senate and the 
House of Representatives prior to execution 
of such agreement. The agreement shall pro- 
vide. amon 
~4th of IJ 
other things, that the Common- 
UCRO Rico shall insure that (I) 
Commonwealth lands suitable for carrying 
propriating S 12.000.000 to facilitate “the 
relocation of the ship-to-shore and olher 
E 
unfire and bombing operations [from 
ulebra, and for the] construction and eq- 
uipage of substitute faciliti,es in support of 
such relocation.” Section 204(b) of this 
statute then provides lhar “[t]he reIoca- 
tion ofsuch operations from the northwest 
peninsula of the Island of Culebra is ex- 
pressly conditioned upon the conclusion 
of a sacisfactoty agreement to be negoti- 
ated by the Secretary of the Navy. . . with 
the Commonwealth of Puerto RICO and re- 
ported to the Committees on Armed Serv- 
ices of the Senate and the House of Repre- 
sentatives prior to execution of such 
agreement.” The law further required that 
this agreement bind the Commons-ealrh 
of Puerto Rico to insuring that Common- 
wealth kzrzdr suitabIe to carrying ow the re- 
located operations ,would be made avail- 
able for long term continued use of the At- 
lantic Fleet Weapons Range and the Fleet 
Marine Forces Training area, “including, 
but not limited to, present areas and facih- 
ties on the Island of Vieques.” The agree- 
ment also had to have a provision corn ro- 
mising the Commonwealth to refrain rom P 
any activity that would interfere with the 
Navy’s trainin 
building of a t 
1 mi$, including. the 
en ro osed deep water 
super-port on the is an of Mona (which is 
in the vicinity of Monito and Desecheo is- 
land), in the event the agreement included 
the use of said island or nearby areas. 
out operations of the type referred to in sub- 
section (a) will be made availabk for the long 
term continued use of the Adandc Fleet 
Weapons Range and Fleet Marine Forces 
trainmg areas by rhc Navy. including. but not 
limited to, present areas and facikcs on the 
[shnd of Vicqucs. ;;nd (2) ;~?y proposed f&l- 
itv or activiry which would mterferc with the 
N’,vy training mission will not be undcrrakcn. 
inciudin the proposed deep water supcr- 
port on i?il c Island of Mona. in the cvenr that 
such agreement includes rhc use by the Nay 
of such island or the area adjacent to such IS- 
land. 
(c) Notwirhsranding any other provision 
oflaw. the prescnr bombardment area on the 
island of Culebra shalt not be utilized for any 
purpose that would require decontamination 
at the expense of the Unircd States. Am land 
sold, transferred, or orhcxwise disposed ofby 
the Unircd States as a result of the relocation 
of the operations referred 10 in subsection ia) 
may be sold. transferred. or othcnvisc du- 
posed ofonly for pubIic park or pubhc rccxa- 
clod purposes. 
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On June 22,1974 Ihe Secretary of Stale, 
Henry Kissinger, in a confidcnrial mcmo- 
randum to [he Secretary of Defense. in- 
formed him that President Nixon had de- 
cided 10 end weapons training activiries in 
Culebra by July 1,1975 and on the Culebra 
Cays by December 31! 1975. The Secre- 
tary of Defense was dlrected to consider 
and select alremarive sites. “The selection 
of the ~FW site! if . . . in Puerto Rico, 
[would] be contmgent on its being accept- 
able 10 the Commonwealth, and the Secre- 
tary of Defense should so inform the Gov- 
eT”oT of Puerto Rico.” (Emphasis sup- 
plied). 
Although we can well imagine that the 
above-described seauence is but the “tiD 
of the iceberg” of th’e many incidents rha’t 
culminated in the Culebra cease fire, they 
are the mainstay of Plaintiffs’ contentions 
and the principal sources of evidence on 
the record. 
Considering these events in the most 
favorable light to Plaintiffs’ contentions, 
we cannot say that they convince us of the 
rxistcncc of any “agreement” on the part 
of Defendant Navy not to transfer opera- 
tions to Vieques, even assumin that such 
an “agreement” would be legal y enforce- P 
able or that the Plaintiffs would have pro- 
per standing 10 allege its “violation.” The 
very exisrance and contents of the January 
11, 197 1 documenr, which deals with mat- 
ters ofrelative unimportance and ambigui- 
ty, milirates against our concluding that 
Defendant Navy would reach a bindin 
agreement to grant the Commonwealt it 
veto powers over its Vieques exercises, 
without some s ecific written document to 
such effect. TV hen we consider the 
unquestionable proof that Defendant 
Navy was at the time carrying out at least 
some of the Culebra operations also in 
Vieques. it makes it even more unlikely 
that they would agree to so seriously com- 
promise the Vieques operations without a 
substantial quidpro qzw that would ensure 
the continutty of the training operations 
somewhere. 
The above-quoted internal directives of 
the various members of the Executive. 
even if we assume them CO have been is- 
sued at the express order of the President, 
are not such orders as give rise to a private 
cause of action. Zabah Clmnenr~ v. United 
fy4%: 567 F.2d 1140 (CA. 1. 1977). at 
.L Not all acts and orders of the 
U&hdStates government are so sover- 
eign that they must be treated as com- 
mands which create legal duties or stan- 
dards. the violation of which involves 
breaking the law. A considerable part of 
the govcmmenr’s conduct is in the con- 
text of an cmplovcr-cmployec relarion- 
ship, a relationship which includes re- 
ciprocal duties bcrween the government 
and iu staff, but not necessarily a legal 
duty to the citizenry.” 
Furthermore, rhese directives, as well as 
the language in the various A 
Acts, cannot bc taken out oft It 
propriation 
e context of 
the circumstances surrounding them. 
The above-described chain of events 
demonstrates that the Commonwealth 
and the Navy were negotiating for a&i- 
bona1 Commonzvealth lands in substitution 
for the Culebra operations, and rhat even- 
tually agreement could not be reached as 
to those lands, which more specifically 
were the islands of Mona,, Monito and 
Desecheo.Il* Congress appropriated 
111 The Le ‘sfative history of the Military 
Construction w uthorization Act of 1974 reveals 
the following: 
Discussion of 0204 commenced in the Senate 
on September IS. 1973.1~ was sparsely debated 
and passed quickly. As passed m the Senate it 
read 
“Sec. 204. In order to permit the execution of 
an order of the SecretaT of Defense, dated 
May 24, 1973, that the Department of the 
Navy transfer all Atlantic Fleet Weapons 
range activities now conducted on or near the 
island of CuIebra 10 the islands of Desecheo 
and Moniro, nor later than July 1. 1975. there 
is hereby authorized to be appropriated the 
wm .cll‘ Si2.OOll.fxH) for conslruclion of 
equiiment for substitute facilities, such sums 
to be available until expended.” 119 Cong. 
Rec. 2965 1-52 (I 973). 
On October 11, 1973 the House of Represenra- 
&es considering the Military Construction Ap- 
propriations Act as a whole completely deleted 
the above section. See House Bill at 119 
Cong.Rec. 34200-207. As a result of a con- 
ference berween committees of the House and 
Senate a new adjusted authorization bilI issued. 
The Report of the Joint Conference stated the 
Culebra problem thus: 
“The Senate included in their bill auchori- 
zation for S 12 million to relocate the ship-to- 
shore and other 
c 
dire 
[ions of the U.S. 
and bombing open- 
lebra. The 
avy from &he Island of Cu- 
mark-up w: 4 
rovision was pdded during a 
out any hear+ or testimony 
being taken in support‘ thereof. The House 
Bill contained no such provision. 
This provision in the Senate biil caused 
much discussion and debate among the con- 
ferees regarding the feasibility of relocating 
this activrry from Culebra to the Isiands of 
Desecheo and Monito. This subject has been 
the subject of considerable concern in both 
the House and Senate for the last several 
years. The House conferees were privileged 
to have a conference with the Governor of 
Puerto Rico, the Resident Commissioner and 
the Mayor of Culebra prior to final con- 
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$12.000,000 for the purchase of those is- their extensive Dretriai discovcrv or bv in- 
lands or similar Commonweahh lands, 
P 
uiry 
and it wanted to be sure that if it spent 
with the’ General Accouking’ Of- 
Ice. 1 *f Cf. LM.ed Sfates v. Richardson, 4 18 
these sums in movine from Culebra. the 
Commonweaith woupd not do anvthi& in 
U.S. 166 (19743. Converstrlv. in the Milita- 
the future to jeopardize these ;elo&ed 
XY Cons&lion Author&& Act of 1976 
faciIities or the “tx-esent areas and facili- 
(P.L. 94-107, 89 Stat. 5511). Congress au- 
ties on the island GfVieques.“To interpret 
thorized the Secretarv of the Naw 10 “es- , -~ 
the Appropriation Acts as granting the 
tablish or develop &i&;~~{ instaIlations 
Commonwealth a veto power over Naval 
and facilities by acquiring, constructing 
operations in Vieques, even assuming its 
converting. rehabilitating, or installing 
constitutional validity,‘*2 would not only 
permanent or temporary public works, in- 
require a strained construction of these 
cluding Iand acquxsition, site preparation, 
statutes but would, because of the unusual 
appurtenances, utilities. and equipment 
for the following ac uisition and construc- 
nature of the same, necessitate a more spe- tion: . . . Atlantic 2l eet WeaDons Ranpe. 
cific mandate to said effect. Roosevelt Roads, :Pue’no R&d: 
It is interesting to note that Plaintiffs 
have presented no allegation or proofthat 
$?,128,000.” That statute did not ocher- 
Defendant Navy has used any of the 
wise restrict the nature of the spending. 
See also, Military Construction Authoriza- 
amounts appronated pursuant to P.L. 93- tion Act, 1979 (P.L. 95-356, 92 Stat. 565, 
166 in the Vieques facilities or othenvise. at 570). 
It wouId seem that Plaintiffs could easily Furthermore, the evidence of a “trans- 
have established any such spendings, if in 
fact they do exist, during the course of 
fer” from Culebra to Vieques is far from 
clear. Although the record shows that 
ference with Senate conferees. 
some improvements were made to the 
The restrictive language in Section 204 is a 
Inner Range facilities in Vieques after 
rest& of discussion with the Governor and 1975, not only are these relative1 
others and the conferees helievc it provida nature, but none were to estabhs 4 
minor in 
new tar- 
suflicienr protection to the Navy upon reloca- ets, all of which were in existence prior to 
tion of ship-to-shore 
CuIebta to the other slands mentioned. 8” 
nfire operarions from H 975.114 Although there is no question in 
our mind but that there was an mcrease in 
The House receded with an amendment.” the intensity of o 
P 
erations at Vie ues after 
119 Cong.Rec.36857. 1975. this in itse f demonstrates 91 ar these 
The result was the Billas enacted at 87 Slat. 668. o e&ions 
The Legislative History of the Military Con- J 
were already taking place in 
sn-uction Appropriations Act of 1970 reveals 
leques prior to the Culebra closing.115 
assed in the H&se rhere was Executive on a Leash?“. 56 N.C.LRev. 424 
(1978); Leni. “Some Aspects of Separation of 
Powers”. 76 Cob L.Rev. 371 (1976); Nore: 
“Congress. the President. and the Power to 
Commit Forces to Combat”, 81 Harv. L.Rev. 
1225.116 Cong.Rec. 36132. 
177 I ( 1968) ; see also Buck&y II. Vato, 424 U.S. 1, 
120 (1976). 
Thus the history of the Apprpriation acts 1” se-2 31 U.S.C. 103. 
clearly shows that Congress was refenin to 
“Commonweahh lands”. such as the islan s of. If 
*I’ Target One (Oclober. 1971); suafe large1 
Monito and Desecheo,. and not Vieques which 
(October. 1971); Target Two (October, 1971); 
NGFS tarfrets (November. 1973): helicooter 
is “Navy lands.” 
Furthermore. it does reveal that 5204 was in- 
pr~zl and rkrv:;~ion post 2; lCrrro’.Matias (Dc- 
tended to orovide for a two oart ameemenc. The 
cember, 1969); microwave communication and 
Navy’s lea%ng of Cuicbxa &riea with i[ a quid 
electronic warfare radar simulator at Cerro 
of rransfer to other lands the Common- 
Matias (July, 1974); helicopler pad and elcc- 
p”o 
tmic u;~rl’wc I;ldJr-simulator 31 Montc*Piram 
we th would help provide. To find that no 
:tgrecmcnl now exists is just as indicative of the’ 
(December. 1975); T.V. Bomb scoring fa?ilitics 
Commonwealth’s failure to comply with its pan 
al Cerro Manias (November, 1976): radar for 
of Khe bar ain behind 3204. 
ship posirionin 
5 
and bomb scoring on Cerro 
1’2 Cf. 4 tillper Y. Phi&mine kl.und.s. 277 U.S. 
Matias (May, 19 7): shcltcrs for patrol boats in 
189 (19273; s& general&. Dixon. ‘%hc Con- 
East Vicques (September. 1976); boat ramps in 
gressional Veto and Separation of Powers: The 
cast Vieques (September. 19’78). 
II, 
Last k Months Firs 6Months 
Artillery 
in 1973 1974 1975 1976 19n 1978 
HOWS 324.1 387.4 272.7 289.0 39.6 132.0 
ROUtXlS 2297 29080 13266 8367 225 Not availnbie 
DW 20 83 72 26 5 6 
Naval Gunfire 
HOW5 252.5 w.4 669.4 715.0 1016.9 559.7 
Rounds 2099 7200 8265 7040 8700 3816 
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All of these statistics may be interesting 
reading, but they really are immaterial lo 
the present issue.‘*6 Whether or not a 
transfer as such took place, the same can- 
not be the basis for a cognizable claim in 
this Court based on either the First or Fifth 
Amendments, as Plaintiffs have not .shown 
that any such transfer has infringed any 
cognizable property interest or constitu- 
tional nght,Il7 particularly in view of our 
findings which negate the existence of an 
enforceable agreement or mandate. 
b. Tht restriction of waters in the vicinity of 
viequu . 
Plaintiffs Medina et a1 and Zenon et al 
contend that the’ restrictions of certain 
areas of the surrounding wafers of 
Vieques! previously. described, interfere 
wrth their personal nghts and are contrary 
to the “Foraker Act’, 48 USC. 746 and 
the Federal Relations Act. 48 U.S.C. 731 et 
seq. 
Article I, s8, Clause 3 of the United 
States Constitution accords to rhe Con- 
gress the power: “To regulate commerce 
with foreign Nations and amon 
Q 
the sever- 
al states and with the Indian Tn es.** Chief 
price Marshall laid down the broad out- 
ines of the commerce power in Gibbons v. 
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1. 195 (1824): 
“We are now arrived ar the inquiry - 
what is this power? It is the power io 
regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by 
which commerce is to be governed. This 
power, like all others vested in Con- 
Fess, is complete in itself, may be exer- 
ased to its utmost extent, and acknowl- 
edges no Iimitations, other than are pre- 
scribed in the Constitution.” 
In 1865, the Su reme Court in Gilman v. 
Philadelphia, 70 8s. (3 Wall.) 713, 724, 
ruled that navigable waters are public 
property of the Nation: 
*‘Commerce includes navigation. The 
f: 
ower to regulate commerce compre- 
ends the control for that purpose and 
to the extent necessary of all the naviga- 
blewarers of the United States which are 
accessible from a Stale other than those 
lie. For this purpose they 
of the Nation 
e requisite legisla- 
Further. the Supreme Court has consis- 
tently maintained that. insobr as the control 
over commerce was concerned. more specifi- 
c;dly the Commerce Clause. plpnarv POH’~~ 
remained in Congress. See. National League 
4$ C’iries 1’. Usery, 426 U.S. 833. 840 
(1976): ifni/ed S~otes I’. Wrightrcvod Dair.8 
Co.. 315 U.S. 110 (1942). 
The military’s operationa restrictions at 
;+I~: were Issued by the authority of the 
x 
of the Army und 
and Har ors Act of 1889, 3 s 
r the Rivers 
USC. $1 et 
seq. * ** Sections 1 and 3 offttle 33 grant the 
authority to restrict access to waters in 
areas like Vieques. Generally, they com- 
mend to the sound judgment of the Secre- 
rary decisions on whether navigable waters 
should be restricted. His jud 
rtistobe founded upon what “the pu hc necesstty 
may require for the protection of life and 
property.” 33 U.S.C. 8 1. The statute also 
provides for the issuance of Secretarial 
“Ei.” 
lations, “in the interest of the national 
de ense and for the better protection of 
life and property on the navigable w-aters 
of the United States” for waters under the 
jurisdiction of the United States likelv to 
‘be ‘,endangered by target practice.’ 33 
U.S.C. 83. 
As previously indicated in this opinion, 
the pertinent regulations respectmg the 
Vieques Island are 
establishing the restricted areas. On their 
face they are pro 
in the purview o P 
erly issued and fall with- 
33 U.S.C. 35 1 and 3. 
Nowhere have Plaintiffs shown that 
these restrictions operate IO unreasonably 
Ships 
Da-+x 
Lan 6 Months 
in 1973 
:; 
1974 
E 
1975 
if 
1976 
73 
88 
1977 
*G 
FI~SI 6 5lonths 
I978 
39 
49 .~ 
Ai;;;wo-round 
137.9 1593 
Rounds 33779 
sonia 861 *%i 
Dys 42 38 
116 They may have a bearing to matters dis- 
cussed later in this Opinion. See Section IV K. 
1x7 That a causeofaction ma lie under either 
the First. Potanv. La Radt. 524 f .2d 862 (C.A. 3, 
1975). or the Fifth Amendments, acobsa Y. 
Tahoe Regional PIanti 566 F.2d 13 l 3 (C.A. 9. 
1977). rev-d in part-su 3 nom. Lnhe County Estutes 
362.6 484.4 1518.1 819.9 
59219 3osol 107.2&5 100.1% 
1638 1141 3438 1924 
92 92 100 63 
lieve a F’Iaintiffof the burden of establishing the 
rc uisim pro crt . right. Roth v. Board o/Rcgmts. 
40% U.S. 568(1872) or other protected con- 
stitutional interests. k&d St&s u. O’BGn, 391 
U.S. 367 (1968). See also: Lvnch Y. Household Fi- 
MNC Corp.. 405 U.S. 538 (1972). 
I’* The secrccary of the Army is not named as 
a defendant herein. 
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restrict the waters from fishing and other 
activiries. The two areas of restriclcd wa- 
lers - the one, off the coast in the area of 
the Naval Ammunition Facility. and the 
other. off the coast in the Cakp Garcia 
area - extend only 1,500 yards offshore. 
As previously stated, the danger. area 
around the eastern end of Vieques IS ac- 
tivated only at times when the range is in 
operation. Fishermen’s notices indicate 
the schedule of range activities for the fol- 
iowin 
close i 
week, designating the areas to. be 
and time periods of ran e actwa- 
tion. Fishing is 
The Plaint1 2 
ermitted at ail ot It er times. 
s herein have presented ab- 
solutely no evidence that Defendant Navy 
has impermissibiy or unilateral1 ex- 
d panded the areas authorized as a anger 
zone (33 C.F.R. $204.234) or a restricted 
area (33 C.F.R. $207.815). The navigable 
waters contiguous to Defendant Navy’s 
weapons traming range at Vieques are 
navigable waters of the United States, and 
they have been restricted in exactly the 
manner intended by law and regulations. 
The Plaintiffs representations that the 
Federal Relations Act, 48 U.S.C. $731 d 
seq., negates Defendant Navy’s right to op- 
crate in this area are based on a mlsreadinn 
of that law and are contrary lo 58734 ana 
,749 of the same. See PFZ Properties,‘I~. v. 
Train. 393 FSupp. 1370. 1382 [7 ERC 19301 
(D.D.C.. 1975). The waters of Vieques are 
Iegitimltely restricted by the sovereign in 
order to protect Plaintiffs’ “life and prop- 
erly.” Cf. L’nired Srures I: Mowut. 582 
F.2d 1194. k2OS (C.A. 9. 1978). cert. 
den. 99 S. CL 4% (1939). 
Since Plaintiffs have failed to demon- 
strate thar the above restrictions are tm- 
reasonable, it is unnecessary for this Court 
to reach Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment tak- 
in 
fal ed 9 
claims. Again, however, Plaintiffs have 
to demonstrate any property inter- 
est of theirs which has been invaded, and 
indeed, the have none (see Felicimo, 
supxa, at 13 fl 3-1364). particularly since no 
one has a propert mterest capable of 
being “taken” un cr er the Fifth Amend-. 
ment, in the fish in the sea. Do lus v. 
Seamart J’rodu.cts. Inc., 431 U.S. 26 Y , ,284 
(1977). 
Finally. the Plaintiffs Romero Barcelci et 
al and Medina et aI, allege that the United 
States military operations on the Island of 
Vieoues constitute a denial of freedom of 
trav& as guaranteed by the First Amend- 
ment of the United States Constitution. 
(C.A. 1, 1976). The cvidcnce presented at 
u-ial demonstrates clearig [that there is no 
si 
H 
nificam restriction on travel or on use 
o the beaches around Vieques, particu- 
IarIy when we compare it with the factual 
situation that existed in the Feliciuno case. 
c. Alkgafiom that raise non+sticiabk 
‘political questions. ” 
Plaintiffs have contended that the train- 
ing conducted at or around Vieques could 
be carried out at some ot’her location or 
that the type of training could be changed 
or reduced, all without harm to the Na- 
tional defense. Further in line with this o- 
sition Plaintiffs have steadfastly conten i ed 
that these are matters that should be con- 
sidered by the Court in this case. In our 
view. auestions dealine: u-ilth the level and 
type’of training required I:O maintain the 
Navy at an adequate level (of efficiency. or 
the determination of the relative merits of 
various training sites or similar issues, are 
” purely p oliticai” questions which are not 
JusticIab e unless we are concerned with 
whether specific ie 
violated (ex., whet F 
1 standards have been 
er the level of training 
violates environmental laws). 
Although the principle ofnonjusticabiii- 
‘7 is not expressly stated in the Constitu- 
uon, ir derives in part from the doctrine of 
separation of powers. Prlovision for the 
National defense is the responsibility of 
the executive and legislative branches: 
“The President shall be Commander-in- 
Chief of the Army and Navy of the Unit- 
edstates. . .** U.S.Const..Art. II 12.d. 
1. 
“The Congress shall have Power . . . To 
Declare War. . . To Raise and support 
Armies . . . To provide and maintain a 
Navy . . .*’ U.S. Const., Art. I. $8, cis. 
12-14. 
Obviously, not every matter affecting 
the armed forces presenrs non’usticiabie 
issues. But there are instances w -i, en sound 
judicial policy dictates restraint. One of 
these instances is when the comroversy 
presents a l * 
tice Marsha 
oiiticai question.” Chief Jus- 
frhaps bat expressed the 
role of the ju lciary m this regard: “Qws- 
tions in their nature political, or which are. 
by the constitution and laws, submitted to 
the executive. can never ‘be made in this 
court.” Marbu 
7 
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137, 1 0 (1803). 
The contours of a diticai question 
have been well define B by the Supreme 
court: 
that several formula- 
slightly according -fo 
ich the questions anse 
may describe a pohrical question, al- 
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though each has one or more cicmcnts 
which identify it as essentially a function 
of the separation of powers. Prominent 
on the surface ofany case held to involve 
a political question is found a textually 
demonstrable constitutional commit- 
ment of the issue to a coordinate oliti- 
cai department; or a lack of Ju tciaily - %* 
discoverable and manageable standards 
for resolvin it; or the impossibility of 
deciding wtt out an initial policy deter- -1 
mination ofa kind clearly for nonjudicial 
discretion: or the impossibility of a 
court’s undertaking independent reso- 
lution without expressing lack of the re- 
spect due coordinate branches of gov- 
ernment; or an unusual need for 
unquestioning adherence to a political 
decision already made; or the potentiaii- 
ty of embarrassment from multifarious 
Pronouncements by various denart- 
ments on one questfon.” Baker v. karr, 
369 U.S. 186,217 (1962). 
Under the aforementioned criteria, 
determinations regarding the level, type, 
and efficacy of naval training present “po- 
litical” questions. Maintenance and direc- 
tions of the Navy is constitutionally com- 
mitted to Con ess and the President. 
There is an o vlous lack of standards I?-- 
which a court could employ to make its 
own determination concerning training. 
Parenthetically, how would a court deter- 
mine what training is needed or whether 
particular training is accomplishing its 
goal? See United States v. American Tekbhane 
&d Telegraph Company, 551 F.2d 884: 396 
(D.C.Cir.. 1976). In fact, how would a 
court decide what was the desired state of 
readiness without an init& policy determi- 
nation from the branches of our govem- 
ment responsible for the conduct of our 
Nation’s foreign affairs? See MitcheU. V. 
Laid, 488 F.2d 611.616 (D-C. Cir., 1973); 
Pati v. McNamara, 331 F.2d 796 798-9 
(D.C%r.. 1964); cert. den. 377 U:S. 933 
(1964). Obviously, the independent reso- 
lution of such matters by the court would 
not express the respect due coordinate 
branches of 
with the reso ution of such matters. There K 
ovemnient that are charged 
would result not only embarrassment in 
the area of foreign relations if judicial 
pronouncements varied with the studied 
opinion of those to whom the Nation’s de- 
fense is entrusted, but also a possibility of 
real harm if our allies question our abdity 
to train our forces and our enemies in- 
te 
T 
ret such contradictions as a sign of 
ml nary weakness. The im ortance of this 
last consideration has E 
recognized: 
een judicially 
“The decision of the Secretary of War 
is not open to 
fortunate, for I It were open. the ensu- -#- 
‘udicial inquiry. That is 
mg dciay would delight our country’s 
enemies.” United States v. 243.2 Acres of 
Land, 129 F.2d 678,683 (2d Cir., 1942). 
See also Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. 
Laird, 451 F.2d 26 (1st Cir., 1971); Cur- 
ran v. L&d, 420 F.2d 122. 129 (D.C. 
Cir., 1969). 
The Supreme Court has acknowledged 
on numerous occasions that, in military 
matters, constitutional provisions haveen- 
gendered a judicial rule of nonrevieweabili- 
ty founded on the concept ofseparation of 
powers: 
“But judges are not given the task of 
running the Army . . . Orderly govem- 
ment requires that the ‘udiciary be as 
scrupulous not to inte r-2 ere with legiti- 
mate Army matters as the Army must be 
scrupulous not to interfere in judicial 
matters.” Orlo v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 
83.93-94 (19 & ). 
“[I] t is difficult to conceive of an area 
of government activity in which the 
courts have Iess competence. The com- 
plex, subtle, and professional decisions 
as to the composrtion, training, equip- 
pmg, and control of a mthtary orce are 
essentially professional military judg- 
ments, subject always to civilian control 
of the Le ‘slative and Executive Branch- 
es. The u umate responsibility for these T- 
decisions is appropriately vested in 
blanches of the novemment which are 
periodically subject to electoral ac- 
countability. It is this power of oversight 
and control of military force by elected 
representatives and officials which un- 
derlizs our entire constitutional sys- 
;‘;gi31GzZZigan v. Morgan, 4 I3 U.S. 1, 10 
“The responsibility for determining 
how best our Armed Forces shall attend 
to [the business of fighting or being 
see &S. C!onst Art. I §8 cls. 12-14: 
read to fi ht wars] rests with Congress 
and with the Pre~ident.“SeeU.S. Const. 
Art. II $2, cl. 1. SchZesingerv~ Ballard, 4 19 
U.S. 498,510 (1975). 
See also United States v. MaclnGsh 283 IJ S 
605, 622 (193 1); Bertekn V. Cd-. 2ii 
F.2d 275, 277 (5th Cir., 1954). cert. den., 
348 U.S. 856, rehearing denied, 348 U.S. 
890 (1954); Simmons v. United Statzs, 406 
F.2d 456,459 (5th Cir., 1969); Feliciana v. 
United States. supra. at 1366. 
comparative judgments on the merits as 
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to evolving methods of training, cquip- 
ping and controlling military forces with 
respect to their duties under the consti- 
tution. It would be inappropriate for a 
district judge to undertake this respon- 
sibility in the unlikely event he pos- 
sessed requisite technical competence 
to do so.” Gilligan v. Morgan, 4 13 U.S. at 
p. 8. 
K. Tk Environmental impact Statement and 
the Saiional Environmental Policy Act 
Plaintiffs claim that Defendant Navy is in 
violation of the National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. 4331 et seq. 
(hereinafter called “NEPA”), because it 
has failed to prepare an environmental im- 
pact statement (“EIS”) as allegedly re- 
quired by Section 102(2)(c) ofsaid statute. 
Defendant Navy’s defense is two-fold: (1) 
that Plaintiffs are barred from bringing 
this action by the doctrine of lathes, and 
(2) that Defendant Navy is not in violation 
of NEPA. 
The Statute establishes as’foliows: (42 
U.S.C. 4332): 
“The Congress authorizes and directs 
that, to fullest extent possible: (1) . . . 
(2) all agencies of the Federal Govem- 
ment shall: . I. . 
(c) includ; in every recommendation 
or report on proposals for legislation 
and other major Federal actions signifi- 
cantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment, a detailed statement by 
the responsible official +on- 
(i) the environmental impact of the 
proposed action, 
(ii) any adverse environmental ef- 
fects which cannot be avoided 
should the proposal be imple- 
mented, 
(iii) alternatives to the proposed 
action; 
(iv) the relationship between local 
short term uses of man’s environ- 
ment and the maintenance and en- 
hancement of longterm productivi- 
ty, and 
(v) any irreversible and irretrieva- 
ble commitments of resources 
which would be involved in the pro- 
posed action should it be impie- 
mented. 
sh:lll cons1~11 kith kid obtain the com- 
mcnts of :~ny Federal agency which has 
jurisdiction by law or special exper- 
tise with respect to any environmental 
impact involved. 
Copies of such statement and the 
comments and views of the appropriate 
Fcder;tl. State. and local ngencies. 
which arc authorized to develop and 
cnforcc environmental standards. 
shall hc made wailohlc to the Presi- 
dent. the Council on Environmental 
Quality and to the Public as provided 
hv Section 552 of Title 5. and shall BC- 
cbnp;m~ the proposal through the ex- 
isting ;~g~‘m:~ review pruccsses: ; . .-* 
A determination of the issues -raised 
herein requires a multi-step ed analysis, 
the threshold of which is a B e&ion as to 
whether there is before us a recommenda- 
tion or report on 
tion, or (2) major ederal action. Only if ei- F 
roposals for (1) legisia- 
ther of these two matters is in uesrion are 
9, we required to determine w ether said 
pro 
F! 
osal or report significantly affects the 
qua lty of the human environment. Andrus 
v. Sierra Club. U.S. (1979). 47 
~i~g~~. 4676 [!3 ERC 1 ISI] uune 11. 
!P 
e v. Swrra Club, 427 U.S. 390 [8 
ERC il6 ] (1976). 
Because we are quite clearly not con- 
cerned with any proposed legislation. an- 
nual appropriation bills having been 
definitevely excluded by Andrus I+ Sims 
Club, sup+ from such a contentlon, we 
can immed;ateIy lay that possibility to rest. 
We thus come to a det’ermination of 
whether Defendant Navy’s activities in 
promulgated. 
First of all, it is obvious ihat Defendant 
the present day activities catacterize them 
as “ma’or.“Jackson Coun 
571 F.dd 1004 (CA. 8.1 2 
, hkousi v.Jo7us. 
78); Sierra Club v. 
Ho&l, 544 F.2d 1036 [9 ERC 14491 (C-A. 
9. 1976); City of Rochester II. United States 
Postal System, 541 F.2d 967 [9 ERC 13621 
(CA. 2, 1976); McDowell v. I;cklcsingm. 404 
F.Supp. 221 (W.D. MO. 1975); prirrrc 
Georgei County, Maryland v. Hollow * 404 
F.Supp. 118 1 [8 ERC 15491 (D. 2 .D.C. 
13ERC 2150 Barcelo v. Brown 
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Bardo v. Brown 13ERC 2151 
F.Su&. 88 14 E.&J 
1975)*Julis v. Cif o Cedar Ra 
I$ 
ids, Iowa, 349 
18621 ( .C.Ia.. 1972) 
(53’ ‘Although the proposals for much of 
this action nredates the nassaze of NEPA 
in 1969, the Vieques opkatiog is in effect 
part of an on-gomg project which admit- 
tedly, has never been the subject of an EIS. 
In our opinion, the on- oing activities 
must be the subject o 1: an EIS not- 
withstanding that the proposals for said 
actions may have originated in part prior 
to 1969, because it is.cIear that Congress 
did not intend to exempt pre-NEPA 
recommendations if they have 
961 (1974); Jones v. Lynn, 477 F.2d 885, 
889 15 ERC 11691 (C.A. 1. 1973). See S. 
Rep& No. 9I-296,‘9lst. Cong., 1st Se&. 
21 (1969); 40 C.F.R. 1500.13; Cf. TV... v. 
Hill, 437 US. 153 [ll ERC 17053 (1978). 
Considering that, Section 102(2)(c) of 
NEPA. requires the fihng of an EIS only if 
the FederaI actions “significantly [affect] 
the quahty of the human environment”, 
and lest our present ruling he miscontrued 
when considered with prior findings in this 
case (which in syntheses hold that Defend- 
ant Navy’s activities do not general1 
contrary to the various environmenta r 
run 
stat- 
utes that have been raised by Plaintiffs), we 
s 
trl 
ecify that our present ruhng is based on 
e regulations enacted to implement 
NEPA. 
The regulations of the Council on Envi- 
ronmental 
Y r 
ualit , in identif ‘ng major 
actions signi icant y affecting t.r e environ- 
ment, state (40 C.F.R. 1500.6(a)): 
to be construed by agencies with a 
view to the overall, cumulative impact 
of the action 
al actions an B 
roposed, related Feder- 
projects in the area. and 
further actions contem lated Such 
actions may be localize fin their im- 
pact, but if there is pote&zl that the en- 
vironment may be significantly af- 
fected, the statement is to be pre- 
pared. Proposed major actions,-the 
environmental imnact ofwhich is iikelv 
to be high1 * controv&al, should be COY’- 
ered in a I cases . . +” (Emphasis sup- 1
plied). 
The regulations promulgated by the De- 
K 
artment of Defense in comphance with 
EPA, in identifying ma-or actions signifi- 
cantly affecting the qua tty of the human -1. 
environment, indicate (32 CFR 214.7(a)). 
. . . In making a judgment in a par- 
ticular case, it ~111 be necessary for the 
proponent of the action to assess the 
expected environmental effects of the 
actions in conjunction with the intent 
of the NationaI Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA) as implemented by the 
Council on Environmental Quality 
(CEQ). It is essential that all the envi- 
ronmental effects of an action be as- 
sessed, whether those effects are ad- 
verse or beneficial. In determining 
whether or not the effects of an action 
are significant, the proponent must 
evaluate the nature and dea-ree of all 
Contra: Hanly v. Kleindieruk 471 F.2d 823, 
830 [4 ERC 17853 (C-A-2,1972) cert. den. 
412 U.S. 908 [5 ERC 14161 (1973); Cross- 
Sound Feny Services, Inc. v. United States, 573 
E&725. 731 [ 11 ERC 18891 (C.A. 2, 
At the ve 
quired to s x
least, Defendant Navy is re- 
ow that it adequately con- 
sulted with other agencies, and must es- 
tabhsh a reviewable environmental record 
to its threshold negative 
derez%%k as to the necessity for 
preparing an EIS. if that be the case. 
Friends of the Earth, v. Butz, 406 FSupp. 742 
(D. Mon.. 1975), rem. for mootness 576 
F.2d 1377 (CA. 9. 1978); Mid-Shiawusee 
Ct . Concerned Citizens v. Tram 408 F Su 
620 [8 ERC 16811 (E-D. Mich’ 1976) 
559 F.2d 1220 [IO ERC 14321 
a Rp d’ 
(CIA. 6, 
1977); Sierra v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856 [7 
ERC 19771 (CA-DC.. 1975). cert. dism. 
424 U.S. 901 (1976). rev. on other grds. 
427 U.S. 390 (1976); Mary&ad-National 
Capital Park and Plunnin Commission v. U.S. 
Postal Service, 487 F.2d f 029 [5 ERC 17191 
(C.A.D.C.. 1973); Arizona P&L S&e Co. 
v. Federal Power Cammission, 483 F.2d 1275 
[S ERC 16191 (C.A.D.C., 1973); Smifh v. 
Ciq o Ceokeuille, 381 FSupp. 
r’ 
100 
(D.C. enn., 1974). 
The issue of lathes is properly a ues- 
tion to be dealt with in connection wit -1 the 
appropriateness of the Qedy. rather 
than substantively. 
V. The Remedy 
The Court has found: 
(1) That Defendant Na 
tion of the Federal Water PO lution 1 
is in vioia- 
Con- 
trol Act, supso. by reason of its lack of a 
NPDES permit to cover the occasional re- 
lease orfiring of ordnance into the waters 
of Vieques, 
IV-48 
(2) ?%a[ Defendant 
Con of Executive Order 
reason of its failure 10 nominate 10 t 
retary of the Interior various sites in 
Vie ues that may be eligible for listing in 
the Ii .ational Register of Historic Places, 
and/or by its failure to seek the o inion of 
the Secretary respecting said e Iglblllly. 
$! . .- 
and 
(3) That Defendant Navy is in viola- 
rion of the National Environmental Policy 
Act, supra. by its failure 10 file an environ- 
menral- imp&t sralement in connection 
with its acrivities in and around Vieques. 
Plaintiffs urge the issuance of an injunc- 
tion against Defendant Navy prohibitin 
! further militarv activities in Vieques unto 
such time as [here is compliance with all 
such violations. 
. 
The issuance of an in-unction in the fed- 
era1 courts is goveme d by general princi- 
pies of e&it . Stringer v. United States, 471 
F.2d 381. 3 H 4 (C.A. 5, 1973). cert. den. 
4 12 U.S. 943 (1973). See generally, 
“Developments in the Law-Injunctions”. 
78 Harv. L-Rev. 994 (1965). 
Perhaps the most significant single com- 
ponent m the judicial decision whether to 
_. exercise equity jurisdiction and grant per- 
manent injunctxve relief, is the court’s dis- 
cretion. Bein an extraordinary remedy, it 
is not grante fi routinely. 
“We are *dealing here with the 
requirements of equit 
ix k;s;trd of several _
practice with a 
un$red years of 
. . . . The histonc tntunctive $rocess 
ties of the particular case. Flexibility 
rather th:m ririditv had distinguished it. 
The qualities-of mercy and l&ticaIity 
have made equity the instrument of nice 
adjustment aiid reconciliation between 
the Dublic interest and Drivate needs as 
weif as between conipeting private 
claims. We do not believe that such a 
major de arture from that long tradi- 
tion as is R ere proposed should be light- 
lg implied.” - - 
Hecht Co. v. Bowies, 32 1 U.S. 321. 329-330 
(1944), cited in Rondeuu u. Mosinee Paper 
c 
oa” 
. . 422 U.S., 49, 61 (1975). emphasis 
ad ed in that case. 
“In.shapins equity decrees. the trial 
court IS veste with broad dlscretronary 
Dower . _ _ Moreover. in constitutional 
Adjudication as elsewhere. equitable 
remedies are a special blend of what is 
necessary, what is fair, and what is 
workable. ‘Traditionally, equity has 
been characterized by a practical flexi- 
bility in shaping its remedies and py a 
facility for adjusting and reconclhng 
public and private needs.‘. . . 
“In equi; 
d1 
as nowhere else, courts 
eschew nzt absolutes and look to the 
practical Fe&ties and necessides in- 
escapably involved in reconciling com- 
peting interests, notwithstanding that 
those interests have constirutionai 
roofs.” 
L.emon v. Ktf7tzman, 4 11 U.S. 192,200-201 
(1973). See Brown v. Board ofEducation, 349 
u.s.294,300 (1955). 
If this balancing of competing interests 
is re uired where constitutional rights are 
3, at sta e, can it be seriousIy a:rgued that this 
Court should have a different standard 
where statutory matters are at issue? Wc! 
think not. See Essex Counk ,Reservation As- 
so&t&v. Campbell, 536 FI2d 956, (962 [8 
ERC 2 1563 (C.A. 1, 1976); Aluli v.. Brown, 
43 1 FSupp. 602.6 11 [I O,EE!C 1765) (D.C. 
Hawaii, 1977). rev. in part, opinion,July 9, 
1979, [ 13 ERC, 1382) (No. 78-1364, CA. 
9); State of &XLJ York v. Xuckar Re lat 
Commission, 550 F.2d 745,753-754 9 ER VT 
18651 (C.A. 2, 1977); Ohio v. Callawa *, 497 
F.2d 1235 [6 ERC 16331 (CA. 6, J974); 
Colrservation Society of Southern Vermont v. Sec- 
rekty of Transportation, 508, F.2d 927 [7 
ERC 12361 (CA. 2, 1974). vacated on 
ounds and remanded 423 U.S. 
%?;1&5)- Environmental De en& Fund, Inc. 
v. F7oehlhe,‘477 F.2d 1033 5 ERC 13131 f 
(C.A. 8. 1973). 
The courts in construing lenvironmental 
statutes such as NEPA have consistently 
suggested thaK the relief :afforded be a 
product of balancing of equ.ities. See Silvo 
v. Ronmy. 473 F.2d 287 1.4 ERC 19481 
(CA. 1. 1973); Environmental De ense Fund 
Inc. v. Amutrong, 352 F.Sup 
17601 (N.D.CaL, 1972). affc 
p. hi [4 ERC 
487 F.2d 814 
(CA. 9. 1973). cert. den. 416 U.S. 974 
(1973). reh. den. 419 U.S. 1041 (1974); 
Minnesota Public Interest Research Gr 
Y 
v. 
Bur; 358 F.Su 
(D.Minn., I97 5 
p. 584.625 [5 ERC 1 511 
), affd 498 F.2d 1314 [6 
ERC 16941 (CA. 8. 1974),, en bane); East 
63rd Streei ~ssociat&n v.. Coknan, 414 
F.Supp. 1318. 1329 [9 ERC 1192) 
(S.D.N.Y.1976). aff’d b order 538 F.2d 
309 (C.A. 2,1976); Cf. F h ‘nt .Ridge Deu.Co. v. 
Scntic Riven Assn., 426 U.S. 7 76.787-788 [8 
ERC 21371 11976) reh.den. 429 U.S. 875 
(1976); Aluli v. Brkn, supra. 
There are various reasons why injunc- 
tive re’lief is not rhe appropriate remedy in 
this case. 
‘n with, it is clear i.n our mind, as 
13ERC 2152 E~urr~lo v. Brown 
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the acGvities of Defendanr Navy are not 
causing any appreciable harm to the 
Vieques ecology. Aluli v. Brown. supra. at 
aae 611. The violations which we have 
F” ound, are in substance technical viola- 
tions, which must be cured, but do not re- 
quire the drastic treatment suggested by 
Plaintiffs. Furthermore, there does not ap- 
pear any reason why their rectification can 
not be accomplished in a reIativeIy short 
period of time. Nor is there an 
r 
logical 
connection between Ihe accomp lshment 
of this pu 
activities o T 
ose and ordering a halt to the 
Defendant Navy, other than as 
punishment, a purpose for which in’unc- 
tive relief is not appropriate. See Z&c x t Co. 
v. Bowles, supra. 
[6] AdditionaIly. the Court should take 
into consideration the delay by Plaintiffs in 
asserting their claims, as Ii&es has been 
recoenized to be a vaIid defense to similar 
suits:See Ecolo 
Coleman, 5 15 F. Y 
Center of Louisiana, Inc. v. 
d 860,867 [8 ERC 11863 
(C-A. 5, 1975); Minnesota Public Intmxt Re- 
search Group v. Butz, supn, p. 6 19; Manfdd 
Area Citizens Group v. United States, 413 
F.Su p. 810 (D.C.Pa., 1976); Common- 
wealt E of Pennsylvania v. Federal Maritime 
Commissum. 392 FSupp. 795, 803 
(D.C.D.C., 1975); Save ollr Wetkzndc Inc. v. 
U.S. Anny C s. o 
%l 
Engineers, 549 F.2d 102 1, 
1026 19 ER 2 261 GA. 5. 1977). reh. 
den. $53 F.2d IOO-(C-A. 5,. 1977j; cert. 
den. 434 U.S. 836 [lo ERC 18003 (1977); 
Sierra Club v. Cavanaugh, 447 FSupp. 427 
[I 1. ERC 15801 (D.S.D., 1978); woidu v. 
y;;g ;~$y-;;$g l&y&y ;E 
424 .%.&pp. 784. 788 .‘[9 ERC 202Oj 
(D.C.N.Y., 1976); Urganizationr United ur 
Ecolo s v. Bell, 446 F.Su p. 535 [I 1 
1177y(M.D.Pa., 1978); St* 
E L C 
548 F.2d 96, 103 (C.A. P 
v. Schlesinger, 
1977); center- 
view/G&n Avalon iiomeownk Association u. 
Brine UT. 
1973 ; f 
367 F.Supp. 633,639 (CD. Gal., 
Em 
National Association of Government 
13 8 
loyees v. Rums e&i, 4 18 F.Su 
4 [9 ERC 148 5 ] (E.D.Pa., 19 
p. 
f; 
1302, 
6); Smith 
v. Schiesi CT, 371 
(C.D.Cal.. T 
F-Sup 
7i 
559, 561 
974); City of Rot stcr II. United 
States Postal Service, 541 F.2d 967 (CA. 2, 
1976); Fri-end~ a Yosemite v. FrizzeU, 420 
F.Su p. 390.39 f 
1974; Iowa Student Public Interest Research 
[IO ERC X159] (N.D.Cal. 
Grou v. Callaway. 379 F.Sup .714.720 [6 
ER E 17271 (S.D.Ia. 1974). n the present P 
case, Plaintiffs have waited more than 
eight years since NEPA was enacted in 
1969. more than six years sir&e the Federal 
Water Pollution Co&o1 Act was enacted 
in 1972. and armroximatelv seven t’-ars 
since Ex&cutive’C)rder 11593 was pr&nul- 
gated. before fiIing the present actions 
notwithstanding that Dcfcndant Navy has 
been conducting training operations in 
Vieques since World War II. and in its re- 
sent intensity, since at leas1 1975. P* P am- 
tiffs’ sudden awakening to ri 
-% 
hts 
have had for such long peno 
that they 
s of time can 
not bring about a halt, and consequent 
disruption, to activities that have been tak- 
ing place for at least an e ual len th of 
time. Although Plaintiffs’ aches s ouId 9 a 
not total1 bar their claim we are of the 
opinion t i; at it strongly militates against 
the granting of injunctive reiief at present. 
Lastly. we have not the slightest doubt 
but that the granting of the injunctive re- 
lief sought would cause grievous, and per- 
haps irreparable harm, not onIy to Defend- 
ant Navy, but to the general welfare of this 
Nation. Ir is abundantly clear from the evi- 
dence in the record, as weI1 as by our tak- 
ing judicial notice of the present state of 
World affairs, that the traming that takes 
place in Vieques is vital to the defense of 
the interests of the United States. 
From an economic and defense srand- 
point, the United States is an island which 
must import 90% of its strate 
over the sea Ianes of the WorI d 
ic materials 
. PetroIeum 
is the single most important commodity 
moved by-sea, the p&nary sources in th& 
A&tntic seaboard bcine the Middle Easl. 
and secondarily. Sout*h America. These 
sea lanes are ali0 of vital importance in al- 
lowinz the United States to meet its inter- 
natio& obli ations with 4 1 of the 43 na- 
tions tith w lch it has mutual defense %- 
treaties. 
Thus, our ability to maintain a we11 
trained and effective naval force. even in 
time of peace. is essential to the’Nariona1 
welfare.*19 
The Atlantic Fleet is responsible for 
providing naval forces throuihout a geo- 
eraohic area that extends from as far north 
zs the Arctic. IO as fw south t(s the Antarctic 
as t%r east as Turke 
r 
and as far west as 
Mexico. These nava forces. include air. 
submarine, surface, and &ine landing 
forces. all of which the Atlantic Fleet must 
combxne and integrate. Because of al- 
locate! resources, and the extensive geo- 
r 
phlcai area they must pro&t, these 
orces are at best marginal, and it is thus 
imperative that they be kept at the highest 
state of training possible. 
119 Considering the experience of the re- 
sidents of PUCHO Rico during the blockade in 
World War II. the ability to maintain free sea 
lanes to and from the Mainland would seem of 
some interest to the residents of this Common- 
WC&h. 
IV-50 
Atlantic Fleet opcracions are centered 
around carrier-based high-performance 
attack aircraft, which according to expert 
testimony, is the only area wherein United 
States’ naval forces outnumber those of 
our prospective adversaries. The training 
of these forces is a three-stage affair: the 
first six months, which takes pIace when a 
carrier returns from a cruise, is taken up 
with shore leave, maintenance, equipment 
installation, and the training of the ship’s 
personnel to 0 
craft. During t it- 
erate as a platform for air- 
IS period most of the air- 
craft are shore-based. During the next six- 
months the air wing is embarked on the 
ship and the training is directed towards 
coordinating the air-wing and the ship as a 
team. It is during this period that the ship 
is put through the fun ran e of simulated 
combat conditions, in&t 5 mg combined 
exercises with other components of the At- 
lantic Fleet, to bring it up to standards for 
actual de loyment dunn the last 6-8 
months o P the training cyc e. K 
The island of Vieques is the only 
P 
lace 
presently available wherein the At antic 
Fleet can conduct the full range of exer- 
cises under conditions similar to simulated 
combat. It is the only place which ossess- 
es the potential or existing capa ii- . 11tty to 
conduct combined exercises invoIving air- 
to-fl ound ordnances delivery, Marine am- 
phi tous assaults, anti-submarine warfare, 
surface-to-airmissiles, close support bom- 
bardment, and electronic warfare; in short 
everything that a battle group wouId un- 
dertake t&secure our sea-iane; from inter- 
diction bv hostile forces. Furthermore. 
being tha; the ultimate mission in combat 
is the delivery of live ordnance to the 
enemy, it is an essential element of train- 
ing that the personnel be fully exposed to 
its use, both psychologically and in terms 
of actual skills. Vieques is the only location 
presently available wherein this training 
can be conducted within permissible peace 
time parameters. 
Considering all of the above, the Court 
is of the opinion that under the present cir- 
cumstances the continued use of Vieques 
by Defendant Navy for naval trainin 
a 
activ- 
ities is essential to the defense oft e Na- 
tion and that the enjoining of said activities 
is not an appropriate relief for the cor- 
rection of the cued statutory violations. 
Other remedy shall be fashioned. Lenten u. 
Kurtrnunt. suma. 
1. FiIe for and seek a NPDES permit for 
the release or firing of ordnance into the 
waters of Vieques; 
2. Nominate to the Secretary of the In- 
terior sites in Vie 
for listing in the 8 
ues that may be eli ‘ble 
ational Register o H‘. HIS- 
toric Places, and/or seek the opinion of the 
Secretary respecting said eligibility. and 
further, take appropriate actxon for the 
protection ?f.any such prospective sites 
pending deaston as to their ehgibility; and 
3. Corn 
USC. 43 B 
ly with the provisxons of 42 
2(c). 
All other claims are dis:missed as well as 
all claims against Defendants in their indi- 
vidual capacities and against John Doe, 
Defendants. . 
A status conference shaI1 be held before 
the United States Magistrate within 20 
days for the establishment ofa written time 
tabIe for compliance with this Order, 
which time table shall be s#ubject to the ap- 
proval of the Court. 
The Clerk shall enter-ludgment in ac- 
cordance with this Opinion. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
lScc hppcndix A & B ] 
Wherefore. it is ORDERED, that De- 
fendant Navy. “with all deliberate speed”. 
(Brown v. Board of Education, supra, at page 
301). proceed to: 
IV-51 
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Appendix Y 
APPENDIX V 
Archaeological and Historic Sites 
This appendix contains an update of informatilon on archaeo- 
logical and historic sites, Information pres'ented in the 
DEIS was derived largely from the‘results of the initial 
reconnaissance survey conducted in 1978. Further field 
survey, conducted during the period from December 1979 
through June of 1980, has increased. the knowledge of the 
island's cultural properties, which is reflected in the 
revised tables and map included herein. 
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Table Z-86* 
PREHISTORIC SITES ON VXEQUES 
Site No. Investigator Site Cultural 
Disturbance 
Size \ . . . 
(hectares/acres) Kind and Date Name Period Degree 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
c 
t!J 
8 
10 
11 
12 
1311 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
Rouse (1938 ) 
Rouse (1938) 
Rouse (1938) 
Rouse (1938) 
Rouse (1938 1 
Rouse (1938) 
Rouse (1938) 
Rouse (1938) 
Rouse (1938) 
Rouse (1938) 
Rouse (1938 1 
tlouss (1930) 
Rouse (193R 1 
Sot. Be Guaynia 
(1973) 
Lopez (1974) 
Lopez (1974) 
Lopez (1974) 
Lopez (1974) 
Lopez (1974) 
Lopez (1974) 
Casa Saleme 
Martineau 1 
Esperanza 
La Mine 
La Ventana 1 
Mirai 
Clementina 
Tapon 1 
Can0 Hondo 1 
Piedras (La Perie 1) 
La Perie 2 
Marquesa (do) 1 
La Viuda (Trianon) 
Some (La tiueca) 
4F 
4 
4E 
4E?, G 
N.D. 
N.D. 
N.D. 
3A-30 
r3.D. 
N.D. 
TEZ-SE3 
N.D. 
4A & ? 
N.D. 
N.D. 
N.D. 
N.D. 
6.5/16.06 
N.D. 
N.D. 
N.D, 
N.D. 
N.D. 
N.D. 
6.3/15.6 
N.D. 
N.D. 
Monte Santa ? N.D. 
Los Chivos N.D. 4.5/11.12 
Bastimento N.D. N.D. 
Cayo da Afuers ? N.D. 
Cayo de Tierra 1 ? N.D. 
YanueI 1 (El Pozo 1) 4C .60/l .48 
Residential Construction ’ 
Residential Construction 
Commercial Construction 
Farming/Erosion 
Road Construction/Bulldozing 
Airport Construction 
N.D. 
N.D. 
Rosd Construction 
N.D. 
N.D. 
Weathering, Erosion 
N.D. 
Pothunting, Farming, Erosion, 
Residential Construction 
Road Construction 
Road Construct ion 
N.D. 
N.D. 
N.D. 
Road Construct ion 
Severe 
Moderate 
Severe 
N.D. 
Moderate 
Severe 
N.D. 
N.D. 
Severe 
N.D. 
N.D. 
Minimal 
N.D. 
Moderate 
N.D. 
N.D. 
N.D. 
N.D. 
N.D. 
Moderate 
N.D. = No data available 
+ Revised July 1980 
# Also sppears in Table 2-87 
Table 2-86 (Cont.) 
Disturbance 
Site No, Investigator Site Cultural Size 
and Date Name Period (hectares/acres) Kind Degree 
39 E b: E (1979) Escuel a Graduada N.D. 
41 E & E (1978) Cano Hondo 3 3? 
42 E & E (1978) Martineau 2 4E-G? 
43 E L E (1978) Punta Icacos 4G 
44 E & E (1978) Punt a Jalova 4C?, D?, E 
45 E & E (1978) Loma Jalova Norte 3A, 0+ 
46 E & E (1978) Los Corrales 1 4G-5A 
47 E & E (197R) Cerro Palomas ? 
48 E & E 0978) Vivian 4c * 
fl9 E & E (1978) Victoria 4G 
50 E & E (1978) Punta de la Plate 4G 
51 E & E (1978) Playa Chiva 1 4E-4F 
52 E & E (1978) Playa Chiva 2 4G, 5A 
53 E & E (1978) Isle Chiva 4C, 4D, 4E, 4G 
54 E & E (1978) Playa Crande 1 48, C, 0, E, F 
Lopez (1974) El fJuey 1 N.0.‘ N.D. 
E & E (1978) Ceno Hondq 2 3A-30 N.D. 
E & E (1978) Verdiales 1 3A-3R * 2.5/i .oi 
E dr E (1978) Verdiales 2 4 1.13/2.79 
E & E (1978) Playa Mat ias 4c 1.56/3.05 
N.D. 
.045/.11 
25m2 
n 
4mL 
3.12/7.72 
.54/l .33 
. 181.34 
.09/.22 
.05/.12 
.04/.10 
1.25/3.09 
1.62/4.0 
.9/2.23 
1.86/4.7 
1 l oa/2.67 
N.D. 
Grazing, Erosion 
Grazing, Crabs 
Bulldozitq, Maneuvers 
Maneuvers, Grabs, Farming, 
Well Construction 
N.D. 
Bulldozing 
Erosion 
Maneuvers 
Erosion, Crabs 
Bulldozing 
Road Construction 
Maneuvers 
Maneuvers, Grazing 
Road Construction, Grazing 
Erosion, Grazing 
Road Construction, Maneuvers 
Road Construction 
None 
Maneuvers 
N.D. 
Minimal 
Minimal 
Moderate 
Severe 
N.D. 
Moderate 
Moderate 
Moderate 
MO&rate 
Severe 
Moderate 
Moderate 
Moderate 
Moderate 
Moderate 
Severe 
Severe 
Minimal 
Moderate 
Table 2-06 (Cont.) 
Disturbance 
Site No. Investigator Site Cultural Size 
and Date Name Period (hectares/acres) Kind Degree 
55 E & E (1978) 
56 E & E (1978) 
57 E b E (1978) 
50 E b: E (1970) 
59 E b E (1978) 
60 E & E (1979) 
61 E It E (1978) 
62 E & E (1978) 
63 E & E (197%) 
64 E b E (1978) 
Cayito Conejo 
Verdiales 3 
Punta lapon 
Laguna Vapon 
Punts Caracas 
Palmar 1 
La Ventana 2 
Arcadia 1 
4E, 4F .12/.29 
4D, F .04/. IO 
40 .39/.96 
4c 1.12/2.77 
4C, 0, G .19/.46 
4C, D, G .043/.11 
4C, E, G 1.012.47 
4G 0.10/.25 
Playa Arenas 4 .~ 4G 
Paramayon 1 4C, 0, G 
25m2 
.24/.60 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
E & E (1978) 
E dr E (1970) 
E h E (1978) 
E & E (1978) 
E dr E (1970) 
E h E (1978) 
Playita ? 
Paramayon 2 
(Punta Vaca) 
Paramayon 3 
4C, D, G 
4C, 0, G 
Palmar 2 4C, 0, G 
Palmar 3 4C, 0, G 
Playa Vieja 4C, 0, E 
90m2/.02 
i .04/2.50 
27 5m2/ .07 
39m2/ .Ol 
.145/.36 
1.25/3.09 
Maneuvers 
Road Construction, Maneuvers 
Maneuvers 
Maneuvers 
Road Construct ion, Maneuvers 
Maneuvers, Grazing 
Bunker Construct ion 
Erosion, Grazing, 
Land Clearing 
Road Construction 
Brush Clearing, Grazing, 
Maneuvers, Erosion 
Brush Clearing, Grazing, 
Maneuvers, Erosion 
Brush Clearing, Grazing, 
Maneuvers, Erosion 
Brush Clearing, Grazing, 
Maneuvers, Erosion 
Brush Clearing, Grazing, 
Maneuvers, Erosion 
Brush Clearing , Grazing, 
Maneuvers, Erosion 
Brush Clearing, Grazing, 
Maneuvers, Erosion 
Moderate 
Severe 
Minimal 
Moderate 
Moderate 
Minimal 
Severe 
Severe 
Severe 
Moderate 
Moderate 
Moderate 
Moderate 
Moderate 
Moderate 
Moderste 
Table 2-86 (Cent .) 
Disturbance 
Site No. Investigator Site Cul turs1 Size 
and Date Name Period (hectsres/acres) Kind Degree 
71 
72 E L E (1978) 
73 E h E (1978) 
74 E & E (1978) 
751 E 81 E (1978) 
76 E & E (197a) 
77 E & E (1978) 
78 E & E (1978) 
79 Pantel (1978) 
a0 Pantel (1978) 
ai E L E (19a0) 
a5 E L E (i9aO) 
86 E & E (1980) 
a7 E & E (19aD) 
aa E L E (19fJa) 
a9 E & E (i9ae) 
90 E & E (1990) 
91 E & E (1979) 
92 E h E (1900) 
E & E (1978) Boca Quebrada 
. . 
4C, 4G 
Punta Carenero 
Lsguna Caracas 
Verdiales 4 
Monte Largo 
Duiani 
Monte Pirate 
Ensenada Honda 1 
Boathouse Point 
Punto Goleta 1 
Loma Jalova Sur 
Laguna Matias 
Punta Matiaa 
El Tsblon 1 
El 8uey 2 
Palmer 4 
Pozo Prieto 
Pilon 
Media Luna 
4C; E, G 1.73/4.27 
4E, E, G? .3/.74 
4G .20/.49 
4F? .25/.62 
N.D. ,20/.49 
N.D. .48/i. ia 
N.D. 3.75/9.26 
4E, F 1.09/2.69 
4F, G .52/1.2a 
3A, Bt .36/.89 
? .94/2.32 
? 1.56/3.85 
? .07/. 17 
? 25m2 
? lm2 
N.D. N.D. 
N.D. N.D. 
N.D. N.D. 
1.19/2.94 Brush Clearing, Grazing, 
Erosion 
Pothunt ing 
Rulldozing, Maneuvers . 
Bulldozing, Maneuvers 
Grazing, Maneuvers 
Road Construction, Grazing 
Erosion 
Grazing 
Road Construction, Maneuvers 
Grazing, Maneuvers 
Bulldozing 
Road Construction, Maneuvers 
Road Construction, Maneuvers 
Erosion 
Erosion 
Road Construction 
N.O. 
N.D. 
N.D. 
Moderate 
Moderate 
Severe 
Severe 
Moderate 
Mockrate 
Moderate 
Minimal 
Moderate 
Moderate 
Severe 
Severe 
Severe 
MO&rate 
Minimal 
Severe 
N.D. 
N.D. 
N.D. 
Table 2-86 (Cent.) 
Disturbance 
site No. Investigator Site Cultural Size 
end Date Name Period (hectares/acres) Kind Degree 
93 E L E (1980) 
94 E & E (19aO) 
95 E & E (1980) 
131 E & E (19aO) 
134 E b E (1980) 
135 E & E (19aO) 
139 E & E (1978) 
140 E & E (1978) 
I41 E h E (1978) 
142 E & E (1978) 
152 E & E (1980) 
153 Cantel (1978) 
155 E & E (1978) 
Barrs(n)con N.D. 
Puerto Ferro 4 ? 
Puerto Ferro 5 ? 
Quebrads Resolution ? 
Verdiales a ? 
La Ventana 3 N.D. 
No Name ? 
Pleya Arenas 2 ? 
Playa Grande 3 
.~ . 
? 
Playa Crande 4 ? 
Laguns Y anuel ? 
Csmp Garcia 2 ? 
‘Playa Arenas 3 ? 
N.D. 
.03/.07 
25m2 
Undetermined 
1m2 
l/2.47 
lm* 
lm2 
lm2 
lm2 
25m2 
9m2 
lm2 
N.D. 
Erosion 
Erosion 
Erosion 
Erosion 
Bulldozing 
Erosion 
Road Construction 
Erosion 
Crabs 
Road Construction, Crabs 
Camp Construct ion 
Erosion, Road Construction 
N.D. 
Moderate 
Minims1 
Severe 
Minimal 
Moderate 
Minimal 
Moderate 
Moderate 
Minimal 
Moderate 
Severe 
Moderate 
Site No. Investigator Site 
and Date Name 
Table Z-87, 
HIST8RIC SITES ON VIEQUfIS 
Cultural Size 
Period (hectares/acres) 
Disturbance 
Kind Degree 
9 
1311 
36 
7511 
ej 
ioi 
102 
7 
103 
4 104 
105 
106 
,107 
108 
109 
110 
111 
113 
114 
Rouse (1938) 
Rouse (1938) 
Rouse (1938) 
E h E (1978) 
E & E (1980) 
E I% E t197R) 
Institute of 
Culture (1977) 
E A E (197R) 
E & E (1978) 
Institute of 
Culture (1977) 
Institute of 
Culture (1977) 
E & E (1978) 
E & E (1978) 
E & E (1978) 
E & E (1978) 
E & E (1978) 
E & E (1978) 
Inetitute of 
Culture 
Tapon 2 N.0, N.D. N.D. 
Marquesa (do) 1 5 6.3/15,6 Weathering Minimal 
Tepon 3 N.D. N.D. N.D. 
Monte Largo 3‘ .25/.61 Crazing, Maneuvers Moderate 
Peta Negra 5 9m2 Fuel Farm Construction Servere 
Pleya Crande 2 (Central) 5 37.5/92.7 Road Construction Moderate 
Casa ckl Frances 5 N.D. None Minimal 
Faro & Puerto Ferro 5 
La Cempena 5 
(Algodonera) 
El Fortin 5 
Faro ds Punte Mules 5 16e.5m2 None 
Senta Elena 1 5 
Marungey i 5 
Marungey 2 5 
Marungey 3 5 
Msrungey 4 5 
Algodones 1 5 
Tumba of Leguillou 5 
(Santa Marie 1) 
.49/l l 21 Neglect Moderate 
.2/.49 Neglect Moderate 
N.D. None Minimal 
1.0/z .47 
9m2 
9m2 
9m2 
9m2 
9m2 
N.D. 
Erosion Moderete 
None Minimal 
None Minimal 
None Minimal 
None Minimal 
None Minimal 
N.D. N.D. 
Minimal 
N,D. = No data available 
* Revised July 1980 
# Also appeers in Table 2-86 
Table 2-87 (Cont.) 
Oisturbance 
Site No. Investigator Site 
and Date Name 
Cultural 
Period 
Site 
(hectares/acres) Kind Degree 
115 
116 
117 
118 
119 
120 
122 
123 
124 
125 
126 
127 
128 
129 
130 
136 
137 
138 
148 
151 E & E (1978) 
E dr E (1978) 
E & E (1978) 
E & E (1978) 
E & E (1978) 
Pantel (1978) 
E & E (1978) 
E L E (1980) 
E L E (1980) 
E & E (1980) 
E & E (1980) 
E & E (1980) 
E & E (1979) 
E & E (1980) 
E & E (1980) 
E & E (1979) 
E & E (1978) 
E & E (1978) 
E & E (1978) 
E & E (1978) 
Camp Garcia 1 
Arcadia 2 
Cerro Amargura Road 
Yenuel 4 (El Pozo 2) 
Cesa Bird 
Punte Goleta 2 
Marquess (do) 2 
Ensenada Honda 2 
Cayo de Tierra 2 
Santa Maria 2 (Central) 
Playa Arenas 4 
Playa Martinez 
El Ruey 3 
Verdiales 7 
Biblioteca Municipal 
No Name 
No Name 
No Name 
Playa Grande 5 
(La Dunita) 
Punta Vaca 2 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 . .. 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
100m2 Camp Construction 
1.0/2.47 Camp Construction 
Undetermined Road Use 
.04./.10 Neglect 
.25/.62 Neglect 
25m2 Weathering, Road Construction 
6.3/15.6 Weathering 
3.75/9.26 None 
N.D. N.D. 
N.D. N.D. 
20.0/49.4 Road Construction 
Undetermined Undetermined 
16m2 Erosion 
15m2 Neglect 
N.D. N.D. 
lm2 Weathering 
lm2 Weathering 
Ill? Erosion 
3/7.4 Weathering 
270m2/.07 Bulldozing Moderate 
Moderate 
Severe 
Moderate 
Minims1 
Moderate 
Minimal 
Minimal 
Minimal 
N.D. 
N.D. 
Minimal 
Undetermined 
Minimal 
Minimal 
N.D. 
Minimal 
Minimal 
Minimal 
Minimal 
NAME TOPICS EDUCATION 
Bingham, Charlotte S. 0 Land Use 
. Sociocultural Systems 
. Project Management 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
= 
. 
. 
. 
Ph.D. Studies in Environmental Psychology, 
City University of New York, 1977 to date. 
Master of City Planning, 
University of California, Berkeley, 1967. 
A.B. (Natural Resources Conservation), 
Barnard College, Columbia University, Phi Beta Kappa, 1965. 
Orickman, Laurence M. 
Brokx, Peter A. 
Cusack, John L. l Noise u 
De Rafols, Wifredo 
Dodge, Eric D. 
Fiteni, Joseph J., Jr. 
Fitzgerald, Thomas E., Jr. l Economics 
LIST OF PRINCIPAL PREPARERS 
l Aquatic Ecology 
e Water Quality 
l Terrestrial Ecology 
l Terrestrial Wildlife 
l Agriculture and 
Forestry 
0 Tourism 
l Topography 
C.-I--.. . uauluyy 
l Soils 
Ph.D., Biology, Lehigh University, 1972. 
MS., Biology, Lehigh University, 1968. 
Marine Biological Research, Bermuda Biological Station, 
St. Georges West, Bermuda, 1967. 
B.S., Biology, Lehigh University, 1966. 
Ph.D., Biology, University of Waterloo, Canada, 1972. 
MS, Wildlife Zoology, University of Guelph, Canada, 1966. 
B.S., Agriculture, McGill University, Canada, 1959. 
M.C.E., Environmental Engineering, Manhattan 
College, 1977. 
B.C.E., Environmental Engineering, Manhattan College, 1973. 
Ph.D., Agronomy and Engineering, University 
of Madrid, 1947. 
B.S., Mathematics and Biology, University of Madrid, 1942. 
B.A., Mathematics, Williams College, 1941. 
M.C.E., Geotechnical Engineering, Cornell University, 1977. 
DPC f-,,...“I1 I I...:..“..ci*.. 1 O7R Y,“,L,, V”,I,s.II “ll,r”,*,r,, ,“I “I 
Ph.D. Studies in Regional Development, Rutgers 
University, 1978 to date. 
Master of City and Regional Planning, Rutgers University, 1977. 
B.S., Economics, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 1975. 
Years of 
Experience 
9 
9 
18 
8 
32 
35 
3 
4 
Heiderstadt, Richard T. . Project Management l Master of City and Regional Planning, Rutgers 
l Alternatives Analysis University, 1974. 
9 M.A., Sociology, University of Hawaii, 1972. 
0 B.S., Government, Iowa State University, 1967. 
Jenkins, Richard T. l Project Management l M.S., Urban and Policy Sciences, State 
l Naval Operations University of New York at Stony Brook, 1972.. 
l B.S.E.E., Pennsylvania State University, 1968. 
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